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Abstract 
 
Family support is the central pillar of old-age income security in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. But demographic ageing, among the fastest internationally, implies fewer 
adult children to provide support, while the public pension systems remain lean even 
by East Asian standards. Future elderly cohorts therefore face growing risks of 
financial hardship. This study examines the current extent of this problem, its 
prospects in the coming decades, and the possibilities of pension reform. It is unique in 
combining historical and prospective approaches towards policy causes and effects 
within a comparative framework. First, it analyses work, incomes, and living 
arrangements among elderly persons in 1995/1996 and 2005/2006 using microdata 
from national surveys. Next, it models possible living arrangements, income sources, 
and pension outcomes for future elderly cohorts using a macrosimulation model and 
illustrative cases. Finally, it examines the historical factors affecting pension policy 
development and assesses the potential for reform.  
 Elderly poverty is more serious than often acknowledged—three quarters of 
elderly persons have incomes below 40% of the median wage, including a quarter of 
those in work in Singapore. Children‘s transfers are prevalent and large, while co-
residence boosts elderly incomes on a household basis. But co-residence is already 
falling. By 2030, half of elderly persons may not live with their children. Almost a 
third may have access to neither market income nor children‘s contributions. Pensions 
are estimated to replace less than a third of men‘s final wage and are equivalent to a 
quarter or less of the median wage for women. Although developmental policy 
paradigms disfavour generous public pension systems in both places, explicit policy 
demands by the public keep up the pressure on policymakers in Hong Kong. In 
Singapore, reform prospects may depend on the growth of ideational competition and 
the availability of policy proposals to focus public concerns and rejuvenate policy 
thinking. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Research problem 
This study is about the prospects for old-age income security in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Recent debates about public old-age pensions in the industrialised countries 
have focused on the balance between fiscal sustainability at the national level and 
social protection for the individual within a climate of demographic ageing and welfare 
austerity. However the elderly populations in Hong Kong and Singapore face a 
different problem. The public pension systems in these societies are very lean despite 
recent reforms to protect retirement savings in Singapore and the introduction of a new 
pension scheme in Hong Kong in 2000. Some projections suggest that public pensions 
are able to replace no more than a third of pre-retirement earnings in the two systems, 
compared to around 60% in the OECD countries (OECD, 2012). Instead elderly 
persons rely primarily on their adult children for financial support, with 60-80% of 
them reporting income receipts from their children. Intergenerational transfers are 
therefore internalised within the household, rather than conducted through risk-pooling 
public pension schemes. Traditionally strong family support has kept this system in 
balance. But whereas population ageing threatens the contribution base of pay-as-you-
go (PAYG) pension systems, longer life expectancies and falling fertility rates in Hong 
Kong and Singapore are straining the availability of family support to elderly persons 
within the family, both in the form of intergenerational co-residence and direct cash 
contributions from children. Unless public pension systems expand, these demographic 
pressures indicate possible risks of financial hardship in old age. 
 The extent and pace of demographic ageing in the two populations are 
remarkable by international standards (United Nations, 2010). Already, persons aged 
65 in 2010 can expect to live for another 19 years in Singapore and 20 years in Hong 
Kong, compared to 18 years in the United Kingdom (UK). In terms of the population 
median age, Hong Kong stands at 42 years compared to Singapore‘s 38 years and the 
UK‘s 40 years. On these indicators, Hong Kong currently is already edging close to 
Japan, which has one of the world‘s oldest populations. The picture suggested by 
projections is even more striking. While the ratio of elderly to non-elderly persons was 
below 0.20 in Hong Kong and Singapore in 2010 compared to 0.28 in the UK, it is 
expected to reach 0.40 in the two places by 2030 compared to 0.38 in the UK, and will 
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be among the highest in the world. The median age of the two populations will then be 
around 47 years compared to just 41 in the UK. This dramatic demographic shift is 
driven by improving life expectancy and declining fertility. The total fertility rates in 
Singapore and Hong Kong have been falling for several decades, from around five in 
the 1960s to sub-replacement levels by the mid-1980s. During that time, life 
expectancy at birth surpassed European levels.  
 In combination, the pace of demographic ageing, the strain on family support, 
and ungenerous public pension systems suggest that Hong Kong and Singapore 
represent distinct and serious cases of old-age income security at risk, making them an 
important target for research. Broad similarities in their policy and informal 
arrangements for old-age income allow meaningful comparisons and the drawing of 
relevant lessons, while variations in their political environments are useful for 
understanding how policy context affects pension development. 
 The exact nature of the risks to income security depends on several factors: the 
relationship between ageing and income; the impact of demographic trends on family 
support arrangements; and the potential benefits from public pension systems. These 
suggest that the three key axes of the problem—demography, policy, and family—
ought to be examined together. But East Asian pensions research tends not to consider 
these issues jointly. The demography, sociology, public policy, and social policy 
literatures have separately examined ageing trends, intergenerational exchange, 
historical policy development, and pension system performance. This makes it difficult 
to come to firm conclusions about where income security is headed. Questions that lie 
along disciplinary boundaries, such as the income effects of living arrangements, the 
implications of demographic pressures on income sources, and how political context 
may affect the prospects for income security, are also not picked up. This study aims to 
fill these gaps by addressing in a coherent way the different major dimensions of old-
age income security. Accordingly the main research question is worded broadly as: 
What are the prospects for old-age income security in Singapore and Hong Kong? 
 
1.2 Research landscape and scope for contributions 
The research question can be approached in three steps. First, what is the extent to 
which old-age income security is currently a problem? Second, how far is family 
support likely to recede in future and are the public pension systems equipped to fill 
the gap? Third, can public pension systems reform and respond to growing needs if 
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current provisions are inadequate? Current debates on these issues are found in three 
main literatures: on poverty and family support arrangements in old age; on public 
pension systems and their outcomes; and on the development and reform of East Asian 
social security systems. These literatures are discussed at relevant junctures throughout 
the chapters to follow and are integrated with the original work in this study. Research 
on old-age income situations is discussed in Chapter 2, while the theoretical debate on 
intergenerational exchange and major empirical findings about family support in the 
existing literature are covered in Chapter 4. As for studies on pension systems, the key 
findings on pension outcomes in Hong Kong and Singapore are reviewed in Chapter 3, 
while Chapter 5 presents a methodological critique focusing on projections. Finally, 
Chapter 8 includes a review of the public policy literature on the factors behind social 
security reforms. To minimise repetition, this section briefly surveys the literature and 
explains how this study proposes to fill the gaps. 
 
Poverty and family support in old age 
As old age is associated with the transition from work to retirement, there has long 
been interest in the economic well-being of the elderly population, focusing 
particularly on their income package and risk of poverty (Casey & Yamada, 2002; 
Disney & Whitehouse, 2001; Falkingham & Johnson, 1992; Hutton, 1996; OECD, 
2001; Whitehouse, 2000), and how these might change during retirement from a 
longitudinal perspective (Bardasi, Jenkins, & Rigg, 2002; Zaidi, 2008).  
 Old-age income situations: In Hong Kong there has been a steady flow of 
studies highlighting significant pockets of poverty especially among older persons (T. 
L. Lui & Wong, 1995; Stewart MacPherson & Chan, 1996; Stewart MacPherson & Lo, 
1997; H. Wong, 2005; H. Wong & Chua, 1996). For example, in studies 
commissioned by the Hong Kong government, MacPherson (1994, 1998) used a 
budget standards approach to derive a minimum acceptable standard of living and 
found that it was higher than the prevailing public assistance rates. La Grange and 
Yung‘s (2002) study analysed elderly persons‘ strategies for coping with low incomes 
and estimated that they needed about 70% of the median population work income to 
meet minimum living standards. More recently, Lau (2005) found that 39-45% of 
elderly persons who lived with other family members had incomes below 60% of the 
median equivalised household income, whereas 75% of elderly persons who lived 
alone fell below this income threshold. The literature on old-age income security is 
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much more limited for Singapore. One study made use of panel data from the late 
1990s to examine income levels and perceived income adequacy among elderly 
persons (A. Chan, Ofstedal, & Hermalin, 2002). It found considerable fluctuation in 
incomes over a span of four years but only a weak correlation between income levels 
and perceptions of economic wellbeing. However the study did not directly assess 
income adequacy. 
 An alternative to academic literature is official reports. For Hong Kong, these 
reports highlight that in recent years, the median work income of elderly persons was 
two thirds that of all workers, while households with elderly persons had lower 
incomes than the rest of the population (Censtatd, 2008). Official studies in Singapore 
also report that elderly workers earn less from work and that elderly persons in general 
have very low gross incomes (Housing and Development Board, 2010; Ministry of 
Community Development, 1995, 2005; Ministry of Manpower, 2009). But these 
reports do not examine income distributions in detail and offer limited analysis of 
elderly subgroups. On the whole, research on old-age poverty in both populations is 
hampered by the lack of accessible and consistently collected datasets which are 
necessary for building an understanding of how income situations develop across time. 
Current knowledge of elderly persons‘ economic situations is particularly patchy in 
Singapore, where poverty among any demographic group is seldom explicitly studied 
and remains largely an invisible problem. 
 Family support: Income security in old age, especially in East Asian contexts, 
is related to family support in the form of co-residence with adult children and their 
cash contributions. Research about the motivations of intergenerational exchange has 
highlighted individual factors such as altruism and exchange (Becker, 1974; Cox, 
1987); cultural factors or tastes (Hashimoto, 1991; Jones, 1993); and policy factors 
such as modernisation and welfare regimes (Aspalter, 2001; Burch & Matthews, 1987; 
Burgess, 1960; Esping-Andersen, 1997, 1999). The foremost theories, altruism 
(support as a response to need) and exchange (support in return for gifts or services 
received), have both found some empirical support in studies on Singapore and Hong 
Kong (K. L. Chou, 2010; Kang, 2008). In the 1990s, two major studies of elderly 
income sources in Singapore found that transfers from children were both prevalent 
and important relative to other incomes sources (A. Chan, 1997; A. Chan, Biddlecom, 
Ofstedal, & Hermalin, 2003). About 85% of older adults aged 60 and above received 
transfers regularly from children living apart, and more older women reported transfers 
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than men. Other income sources such as pensions and rent were cited by just 7-9% of 
older persons. Around 85% of older adults also lived with at least one child in 
Singapore, and co-residence often implied rent-free living and better access to practical 
support in both Hong Kong and Singapore (W. K.-M. Lee, 2004; Mehta, 1999). 
 At the moment, few studies on financial transfers to elderly parents in Hong 
Kong and Singapore examine how the incidence of transfers varies for different elderly 
subgroups, especially by income level and gender. Most of the research focuses on the 
incidence of transfers rather than amounts which can give a more precise indication of 
the impact of such support. As for intergenerational co-residence, little is known about 
the relationship between these living arrangements and income security. There is also 
considerable uncertainty regarding the outlook for future elderly cohorts in Hong Kong 
and Singapore. One message from research on Singapore in the 1990s is that family 
support through co-residence remains strong and has not declined (A. Chan, 1997, 
2005). But on the other hand, there are concerns about the possible impact of 
demographic ageing on such living arrangements (A. Chan, 2005; Martin, 1990). 
Intergenerational co-residence has not been closely studied using more recent data. To 
the author‘s best knowledge, future levels of family support in these two societies have 
also not been analysed using modelling techniques. 
  This study therefore aims to make a number of contributions towards current 
understanding of poverty and family support in old age: 
 
 Drawing on nationally representative survey datasets from Hong Kong and 
Singapore at two points in time (1995/1996 and 2005/2006) that have not been 
analysed together before, it examines older persons‘ income security and how 
this is related to work, access to different income sources including children‘s 
transfers, and living arrangements. This analysis updates and extends previous 
understanding of family support and tracks changes across a decade. 
 
 Throughout the above analysis, the focus is on aspects that have not received 
sufficient attention or have been completely overlooked in the literature, such 
as the incidence and scale of low incomes; the relationship between income 
levels, income sources, and co-residence; the amounts of transfers; the potential 
income effects of co-residence; and the relative positions of men and women. 
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 As the research question concerns prospects, an important contribution of the 
study is towards understanding possible developments in old-age income 
security. This study constructs an original macrosimulation model to estimate 
future trends in the living arrangements of elderly persons, and their access to 
market income and children‘s contributions. Apart from adding to empirical 
understanding, these projections demonstrate an original application of 
macrosimulation to co-residence and income sources. The study also models 
the future availability of children in Hong Kong using aggregate demographic 
indicators. 
 
Public pension systems and outcomes 
In the European and international contexts, there is a wealth of studies on pensions 
within old-age income packages and the effects of pension reforms (N. Barr & 
Diamond, 2009; Grech, 2010b; Holzmann & Hinz, 2005; Pensions Commission, 2004, 
2005; Whitehouse, 2007; Zaidi & Grech, 2007). In Singapore, discussions about the 
Central Provident Fund (CPF) have been critical of the exclusion of economically 
inactive persons; inadequate savings due to pre-retirement withdrawals; and low 
nominal interest rates that are not transparently linked to investment returns (Asher, 
1995, 2000, 2002a, 2004; Cardarelli, Gobat, & Lee, 2000). Analysis of public pensions 
in Hong Kong have criticised the Mandatory Provident Fund‘s (MPF) omission of 
vulnerable groups with weak links to the labour market and the scheme‘s high 
administrative costs (Chow & Chou, 2005; Ho, 1997; Mok, 2000). 
 As data on pension payouts are not available for both systems, researchers have 
used illustrative cases, or hypothetical individuals, to model possible pension outcomes 
under a range of scenarios (N. C. Chia & Tsui, 2012; F. Lui, 1998; McCarthy, 
Mitchell, & Piggott, 2002; Siu, 2002). Several of these have found that Singapore‘s 
public pensions are relatively low by international standards, although the range of 
estimates varies widely. The OECD‘s (2012) multi-country study estimates that for 
workers who join the pension system in 2008 at 20 years old under currently legislated 
pension rules and retire after a full career with stable earnings, the average male earner 
will achieve a replacement rate—the ratio of pensions to pre-retirement earnings—of 
only 13% in Singapore and 34% in Hong Kong, compared to 57% across the OECD 
countries. Other single-country studies have arrived at higher replacement rates for 
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Singapore, ranging from 28% in McCarthy, Mitchell and Piggott‘s (2002) study which 
assumes that some CPF savings are used to purchase housing, to 52% in Chia and 
Tsui‘s (2012) study which simulates wage growth paths and work participation 
profiles using historical data. 
 For understanding the pension systems in Hong Kong and Singapore, the 
existing studies pose several challenges. First, the OECD study is the only one to 
directly compare projected pension outcomes in Hong Kong and Singapore. However 
its estimates for Singapore are based on a conservative and unrealistic assumption that 
the entire permissible amount in the CPF is depleted for housing and other purposes 
before retirement. This explains the low estimated replacement rates. Second, due to 
different assumptions being adopted in single-country studies that separately project 
pension outcomes for Hong Kong and Singapore, their findings are not entirely 
meaningful when reported outside their methodological contexts and cannot be directly 
compared. The wide range of estimates for Singapore alone illustrates how decisions 
about model assumptions can drastically affect the results. Third, most of the existing 
studies are based on static sets of pension rules that do not reflect the impact of 
different cohorts‘ career entry timing relative to historical policy changes such as 
contribution rate adjustments in Singapore and the introduction of new schemes in 
Hong Kong in the past decade. 
 This study therefore attempts a new set of projections of pension outcomes in 
Hong Kong and Singapore which addresses these gaps. The projections are built 
around six base cases of men and women with different levels of education, 
representing different points across the income distribution. Other model parameters 
are held constant for Hong Kong and Singapore and key variables such as life 
expectancy, career length, and the interest rate for calculating annuities are subject to 
sensitivity analyses. Two withdrawal scenarios are applied to Singapore. The first, like 
the OECD study, assumes maximum pre-retirement withdrawal from the CPF for other 
purposes to produce baseline estimates of pension benefits. The second assumes 
average withdrawal based on historical withdrawal patterns. Projections for Hong 
Kong also consider two policy scenarios based on eligibility for a new means-tested 
pension scheme. These scenarios give a more realistic indication of the different 
circumstances that individuals may experience in the two systems. Finally, instead of 
static pension rules, historically accurate rules are used to calculate pension outcomes 
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for the illustrative cases for each year of entry into the pension systems between 1990 
and 2010. 
 
Social security development and reform in East Asia  
European welfare states: The sizeable literature on public policy change is relevant to 
understanding the possibility of reform in Hong Kong and Singapore‘s pension 
systems. In the context of European welfare states, the main explanations for social 
policy development have either been functional or political. Functional arguments 
attribute the growth of pension systems to industrialisation and globalisation 
(Cameron, 1978; Wilensky, 1975), while political arguments emphasise the 
mobilisation of left political power to demand social policies and state capacity to 
provide them (Korpi, 1980, 1989; Skocpol, 1985). More recent research has turned to 
post-industrialism to explain the pressure on welfare generosity (Pierson, 1998), but 
has also identified divergence in national responses depending on the legacy of 
existing policy and institutional structures of policymaking (Bonoli, 2000, 2003; 
Pierson, 2000). For instance, Myles and Pierson (2000) argue that switching from a 
PAYG to a funded pension system creates a ―double payment problem‖ as it requires 
current workers to contribute towards the pensions of current retirees and save for their 
own future retirement, which means such reforms are unlikely to find public support 
and may be politically costly. 
 However these theories do not transpose well into the East Asian context 
because of differences in political environment and history. Functional accounts draw 
on historical developments in specific settings. Industrialisation in East Asia, for 
instance, was not accompanied by a large-scale expansion of social provisions (Chow, 
1985b). Political theories can be equally problematic. In places like Singapore which 
do not have a strong social democratic tradition and where politics is dominated by a 
single party, the power resources perspective can be difficult to apply because of its 
assumptions about the left-right political spectrum and the role of organised labour. 
Moreover the tradition of semi-authoritarian governments in the region has shown that 
state capacity may not always translate into expansive public pension policy in the way 
Skocpol described. Instead it has enabled East Asian governments to realise their 
inherent policy preferences (Fu, 2003), reflecting either local cultural norms or state 
ideologies. Finally institutionalist explanations based on the structure of government or 
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pension system design seem to run ahead of developments in both the politics and the 
pensions of East Asia. 
 East Asia: Instead East Asian studies have explained lean social security 
systems using cultural predispositions towards informal support and governing 
philosophies that are wary of extensive welfare programmes (Chow, 1985b; Jones, 
1993; Ramesh, 1992). In Singapore, a high level of state autonomy and the need for 
political consolidation led to a cautious expansion of public pension provision based 
on mandatory saving (Fu, 2003), while in Hong Kong, the colonial administration 
initially justified a minimalist social welfare approach using Chinese familial traditions 
(Wilding, 1997). But from the 1990s, democratisation across several East Asian 
societies including Hong Kong gave rise to political competition and public demands 
which spurred the growth of social policy (Chow, 1995; Ramesh, 2000).  
 The current literature leaves a number of questions unanswered. First, the 
choice of pension model is not adequately explained. Singapore‘s choice of the CPF 
model has been explained in terms of its compatibility with nation-building. But it can 
be argued that more solidaristic forms of provision such as social insurance or tax-
funded universal pensions would have been equally if not more effective for promoting 
a sense of social unity. Second, if governing ideologies towards social policy were a 
key factor in the choice of pension models, what were the bases of these ideologies? 
Third, if democratisation is important to pension development, why has there been 
more policy activity in recent years in Hong Kong where the government is only 
partially elected, compared to Singapore which has been an electoral democracy since 
1965? 
 To address these issues, this study presents an analysis that accounts for the 
origins and stability of the CPF system in Singapore compared to the initial reliance on 
public assistance and flat-rate allowances in Hong Kong; and recent decades of policy 
inactivity in Singapore despite growing concerns about population ageing and 
retirement income, compared to the policy contestation resulting in the implementation 
of Hong Kong‘s MPF in 2000. The analysis develops an original synthesis of three 
theoretical perspectives. The first is the role of ideas in policy change, both as policy 
paradigms that constrain the range of policy solutions, and as policy discourse through 
which political actors generate new policy strategies. The second is developmentalism, 
based on the notion of the developmental state, which sustains its legitimacy through 
the delivery of economic development while suppressing social spending and the 
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social forces that demand it. The third is democratisation, in particular its effects on the 
tolerance of plural policy discourse that may generate alternatives to current policy. 
 Having surveyed the literature and existing gaps in understanding, and set out 
the areas to which this study hopes to contribute, the next section outlines the structure 
of the study. 
 
1.3 Outline of study 
The main research question is: What are the prospects for old-age income security in 
Singapore and Hong Kong? From this, the rest of the study is divided into three parts, 
each taking on a pair of secondary research questions. Part 1 examines the extent to 
which old-age income security is a problem, asking:  
 
(i) What is the current state of old-age income security in Hong Kong and 
Singapore?  
(ii) How important are public pensions and family support to income security? 
 
 Part 1 begins original analysis of the national survey datasets. The main 
datasets are from the 1995 and 2005 rounds of the National Survey of Senior Citizens 
in Singapore and the 1996 and 2006 rounds of the Hong Kong Population By-census. 
The Singapore surveys targeted households with at least one member aged 55 and 
above, and covered areas such as household composition, work participation, income 
sources, and asset ownership. The two rounds of survey reached almost 5,000 
households each, about 0.5-0.6% of all resident households. Each of the Hong Kong 
by-census datasets captures 1% of all living quarters at the time of data collection 
based on equal probability sampling, covering 62,000 to 69,000 individuals of which 
10% to 13% were elderly. As with most census studies, it captured household 
composition, work participation, and income levels. But as they were not primarily 
targeted at elderly persons, the surveys did not consider income sources in detail, such 
as public pensions or family transfers. Additional data for both populations were 
obtained from other national sources such as the Sample Household Survey in 
Singapore which records the amount of transfers to elderly parents; Hong Kong‘s 
Supplementary Enquiry to the General Household Survey 2000 which contains 
information on income sources and assets; and the Thematic Household Survey 2008 
which has information on income sources and the amount of children‘s transfers in 
 22 
Hong Kong. This is the first time these datasets are being analysed within a common 
comparative framework to answer questions about old-age income security. 
 Chapter 2 starts with a discussion of the demographic trends and projections 
underlying the challenge of income security, and reviews what is currently understood 
about elderly poverty in the literature. It uses the national datasets to analyse work 
participation among different age groups and compares the findings with cohort work 
participation profiles estimated from International Labour Organization (ILO) data. 
Next the chapter looks at individual income levels and the risks of low income by age 
and work participation. Finally it compares access to various income sources such as 
children‘s transfers and public pensions in Hong Kong and Singapore, and for different 
income groups.  
 Chapter 3 looks at the current public pension systems in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. It first describes the background and structure of the two systems. 
Considering how Singapore‘s public pension system allows the diversion of retirement 
savings towards housing, one section is devoted to analysing housing and asset 
ownership in both places, and the opportunities and challenges associated with 
liquidating housing value for retirement income. The chapter then assesses the 
available evidence on pension outcomes, both from empirical data and theoretical 
projections, and highlights how issues of intergenerational sustainability pertain not 
just to the fiscal balance of public pension systems but the configuration of public and 
private income sources for elderly populations as a whole. This leads in to Chapter 4 
which shifts focus to the other pillar of old-age income security, family support.  
 Chapter 4 first reviews the literature on motivations for intergenerational 
exchange to provide a theoretical background for understanding empirical trends. The 
next section presents original projections of the number of surviving children to 
mothers of four birth cohorts between 1944 and 1974 in Hong Kong, as kin availability 
is a primary determinant of the level of support from children. This is followed by 
analyses of intergenerational co-residence patterns based on the national survey 
datasets and how co-residence patterns vary with elderly persons‘ financial 
independence as suggested by labour force participation and individual income levels. 
The chapter then looks at the likelihood of children‘s transfers under different living 
arrangements and draws from several survey datasets to examine the amounts of 
transfers to elderly parents. Finally the chapter compares individual and equivalised 
household incomes in Hong Kong to illustrate the income effects of co-residence with 
 23 
working-age children, which also imply adverse consequences from any decline in 
family support, which is the subject of the next part of the study. 
 Part 2 investigates the prospects for old-age income security by looking into the 
future. It answers two questions: 
 
(iii) How is the level of family support expected to change for future cohorts of 
elderly persons?  
(iv) What are the possible public pension outcomes? 
 
 Chapter 5 first reviews the methodological options for modelling old-age 
income security. For projecting future living arrangements, the main options are to 
combine fertility histories with mortality data by cohort, and macrosimulation which 
first stratifies a base population into cells with similar characteristics, and then applies 
incidence patterns of certain events—which may be directly taken from the base 
population or derived through extrapolation and statistical modelling—to the cell 
matrix. Macrosimulation has been used both in household projections and studies of 
future care and support for elderly persons. To project possible pension outcomes, the 
main options are microsimulation which models the policy experiences and outcomes 
of large samples of individuals and households, and the illustrative cases approach 
which applies policy rules to a set of stylised individuals and then examines the effects 
of varying certain policy and model parameters. The chapter weighs the considerations 
for each of these approaches, explains the choice of macrosimulation and illustrative 
cases for this study, and concludes by outlining the analytical plan for subsequent 
chapters.  
 Chapter 6 is the first of two chapters that present projections of future elderly 
populations and their prospects for income security using original models. The chapter 
constructs a macrosimulation model by combining the national survey datasets from 
1995/1996 and 2005/2006 with population projections by the United Nations and 
labour force projections by the ILO. This model is used to estimate the numbers of 
elderly persons who live with their spouse, their children, both, or neither between 
2005/2006 and 2030. Two change scenarios are adopted. The first assumes that 
patterns of living arrangement by sex, age group, and labour force participation change 
at the same rate as between 1995/1996 and 2005/2006. The second assumes that living 
arrangements change at half this rate. The two scenarios produce a range of estimates 
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to accommodate the unavoidable uncertainty associated with these projections. Next 
the chapter builds on these projections of living arrangement to estimate elderly 
persons‘ access to market income including contributory public pensions, and 
children‘s contributions. The analysis concludes by identifying the likelihood of future 
elderly cohorts to have no access to both market income and children‘s contributions, 
as well as no support through co-residence. 
 Chapter 7 uses illustrative cases to model pension outcomes for six base cases 
of men and women with different levels of education in Hong Kong and Singapore, 
with wage profiles reflecting historical wage data. In each system, two policy scenarios 
are considered, based on eligibility for a means-tested pension scheme that was newly 
introduced in Hong Kong in 2013, and different levels of pre-retirement withdrawals 
from Singapore‘s CPF. The projections also incorporate different years of entry into 
the pensions systems between 1990 and 2010. Sensitivity analyses examine the impact 
of varying assumptions related to life expectancy, career length, and the interest rate 
for calculating annuities. The second part of Chapter 7 uses the gap between the 
projected pension outcomes and various income thresholds to analyse possible 
demands for children‘s support. The analysis considers two types of income 
threshold—aimed at poverty avoidance and consumption smoothing; two forms of 
support—cash transfers from children living apart and income sharing with co-resident 
children; and different family configurations—single elderly men and women as well 
as couples, with one to two children. The results highlight the possible economic strain 
on the available children or elderly persons who are unable to secure such support. 
 The broad messages from Part 2 are that a sizeable proportion of elderly 
persons may be at risk of receiving no family support and that pension outcomes, 
while they are expected to improve, will remain quite low by international standards. 
Given the difficulty of reversing demographic trends, these findings lead to the 
question of how far one might expect the public pension systems to improve. Part 3 of 
the study therefore looks at the political possibilities of an expansion of public pension 
provision. It does this in two steps, guided by these questions: 
 
(v) What factors affect pension policy development in the two societies? 
(vi) What are the pressures for and constraints on reforms to improve the 
generosity of public pensions? 
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 Chapter 8 begins by reviewing the major explanations for social policy 
expansion and reform in the European literature, and highlights how different factors 
are thought to apply to East Asian societies. Several gaps remain in the existing 
accounts of public pension development in Hong Kong and Singapore. The rest of the 
chapter therefore presents an original comparative case study analysis of the factors 
that have influenced pension policy development in Hong Kong and Singapore from 
the 1950s to the 2000s. The analysis divides developments into two periods. Between 
the 1950s and 1980s, different modes of developmentalism operated in Hong Kong 
and Singapore. The more interventionist and autonomous style of governance in 
Singapore implied a compatibility with a large state-run savings-based pension system, 
while Hong Kong‘s government continued to minimise state involvement in social 
welfare by relying on simple assistance and allowance schemes. Then in the 1990s and 
2000s, democratisation in Hong Kong increased plurality in the political arena and 
civil society, enabling policy discourse and competition that led to the introduction of 
the MPF. In the meantime strict controls on political debate in Singapore restricted the 
search for policy alternatives despite public concern about retirement income. This 
analysis not only contributes to historical understanding of the two public pension 
systems but also identifies important policy drivers and dynamics to guide thinking 
about the possibility of future reforms.  
 Chapter 9 uses the two factors of developmental governing logic and 
democratic policy discourse to weigh the potential and constraints for further pension 
reforms in Hong Kong and Singapore against the background of recent developments. 
The discussion focuses on three ―streams‖ of policymaking: the ―problem‖, or public 
demands for change; the ―policies‖, or prioritisation by decision makers; and the 
―politics‖, or the mobilisation of interest groups and political participation to exert 
pressure for reforms. The analysis takes into account findings from recent opinion 
polls, official statements and policy initiatives, and the tension between social 
mobilisation and controls on civil freedoms in both societies. The chapter concludes by 
assessing the overall potential for reforms in each system. 
 The concluding chapter outlines how the key findings from the study shed light 
on the research questions; highlights the empirical, methodological, and conceptual 
contributions; points out the limitations and areas for future research; and sets out the 
key policy messages for Hong Kong and Singapore. There is a prevailing 
understanding that both societies must expect considerable demographic pressure in 
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the coming decades, which will make old-age income provision more important and 
also more challenging. But there is no consensus on whether policy efforts should 
more usefully focus on shoring up traditional modes of family support or building up 
the public pension systems to more adequate standards. This study responds to this 
dilemma by assessing the extent of the income security problem in old age, how it may 
develop in the next two decades, whether public pensions can fill any gaps in family 
support, and the conditions under which pension reform may take place. In doing so, it 
also highlights the considerable cost in terms of financial hardship among elderly 
persons should policy intervention fall short. 
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2. The background and current situation of ageing, work, and 
income security 
 
Hong Kong and Singapore present a distinct variant of the universal ―old-age crisis‖ 
(World Bank, 1994). Pensions research in developed countries is largely concerned 
with public pension provision under conditions of population ageing—both fiscal 
sustainability at the institutional level and income adequacy at an individual level. But 
the nature of the challenge to old-age income security brought on by the demographic 
transformation in Hong Kong and Singapore is different. Compared to the advanced 
economies in Europe, Singapore and Hong Kong are ageing more quickly, offer far 
less generous public pensions, and rely more heavily on family support in the form of 
intergenerational co-residence and cash transfers from adult children. Yet few studies 
on old-age income security in the region directly address the relative and changing 
effects of policy structures and familial mechanisms. Part 1 of this study begins 
assessing these effects by considering in turn demographic, policy, and family factors, 
using a combination of original analyses of national datasets and published data.
 1
 This 
chapter sets out the demographic context of the policy challenge by first summarising 
recent demographic trends in both societies. Next it examines retirement patterns. It 
then analyses the relationship between ageing and income security, focusing on the 
relative income levels and income sources of elderly persons. Throughout the study, 
elderly persons are defined as persons aged 65 and above. 
 
2.1 Demographic trends 
Hong Kong and Singapore are rapidly ageing societies by international standards. 
According to projections by the United Nations (UN, 2010), their populations are 
expected to be among the oldest in the world within two decades by most indicators 
(Table 2.1, Table 2.2).
2
 Hong Kong‘s period life expectancy at 65 years old was 
                                                 
1
 Some of the material in Part 1 of the study has previously been published by the author in Ng (2011). 
2
Demographic projections are built on assumptions about fertility and life expectancy that reflect both 
historical trends and expectations about the future. The UN (2010) makes projections based on a number 
of different scenarios. The trends presented here are for the medium variant: Total fertility is assumed to 
converge on 1.85 for all countries; life expectancy is assumed to continue increasing but at a lower rate 
for countries like Hong Kong and Singapore where it is already high; and recent rates of international 
migration are assumed to continue. Period life expectancy is shown instead of cohort life expectancy. 
The latter takes into consideration expected changes in mortality rates in subsequent years and is a more 
useful measure of life expectancy (Pensions Commission, 2004). It is usually higher than period life 
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already the second longest in the world in 2010, 20 years compared to 18 in the United 
Kingdom (UK). In 2010 the ratio of the 65+ to the 20-64 age-group (i.e. old-age 
dependency) was below 0.2 in both places compared to 0.28 in the UK, ranking 
outside of the top 40 internationally. But by 2030 the UN projects that Singapore and 
Hong Kong will rank 8th and 22nd respectively with ratios at 0.4 and above, 
surpassing that of the UK. The population median age in Singapore may increase by 
nine years over the two decades compared to just one year in the UK, pushing 
Singapore up the international ranking by 27 places. Across all these indicators the two 
populations may become among the oldest in Asia comparable to societies such as 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Macau. 
 
Table 2.1  Population ageing in selected countries between 2010 and 2030 
 Hong Kong Singapore Japan United 
Kingdom 
2010     
Period life expectancy at 65
a
 20 19 21 18 
Old-age dependency              
(ratio of  65+ to 20-64)
b
 
0.18 0.14 0.38 0.28 
Population median age
b
  42 38 45 40 
Total fertility rate
c
 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.8 
2030     
Period life expectancy at 65 22 21 23 20 
Old-age dependency                     
(ratio of 65+ to 20-64) 
0.45 0.40 0.57 0.38 
Population median age 48 47 51 41 
Total fertility 1.5 1.6 1.7 2.0 
Source: (a) Figures are for 2005-10 and 2025-30, from United Nations (2010); (b) From 
United Nations (2011); (c) Figures are for 2005-10 and 2025-30, from United Nations (2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                             
expectancy where life expectancy is rising. But cohort life expectancy figures are not available in the 
UN and national projections for Hong Kong and Singapore. 
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Table 2.2  Selected country rankings for population ageing indicators, 2010 and 2030 
 
Period life expectancy at 
65 
Old-age dependency 
(ratio of 65+ to 20-64) 
Population median age 
2010       
World 1 Japan 1 Japan 1 Japan 
 2 Hong Kong 2 Italy 2 Germany 
 3 Switzerland 3 Germany 3 Italy 
 21 Singapore 53 Hong Kong 6 Hong Kong 
   70 Singapore 43 Singapore 
Asia 1 Japan 1 Japan 1 Japan 
 2 Hong Kong 2 Georgia 2 Hong Kong 
 3 Israel 3 Israel 3 Rep. of Korea 
 5 Singapore 5 Hong Kong 5 Singapore 
   11 Singapore   
2030       
World 1 Japan 1 Japan 1 Japan 
 2 Hong Kong 2 Germany 2 Italy 
 3 Switzerland 3 US Virgin Is. 3 Portugal 
 18 Singapore 8 Hong Kong 6 Hong Kong 
   22 Singapore 16 Singapore 
Asia 1 Japan 1 Japan 1 Japan 
 2 Hong Kong 2 Hong Kong 2 Hong Kong 
 3 Macau 3 Singapore 3 Rep. of Korea 
 5 Singapore   4 Singapore 
Source: Ranking on period life expectancy based on 2005-2010 and 2025-2030, from United 
Nations (2010); other data from United Nations (2011) 
 
 Internationally, demographers observe several waves of population ageing that 
broadly parallel the level of national development (Heller, 2006). The advanced 
industrialised nations in Europe started ageing the earliest and currently have the oldest 
populations. The newly-industrialised economies, including East Asia, are at the 
forefront of a second wave of ageing that will see them overtake most European 
countries before the middle of the century. The developing nations in the rest of Asia 
and the South still have the youngest populations and will not experience the extent of 
population ageing now happening in East Asia for a few more decades. In 1950, the 
old-age dependency ratios in Hong Kong and Singapore were both below the Asian 
average and well below European levels (Figure 2.1). By 2000, Singapore and Hong 
Kong were both above-average in Asia. It is projected that by 2025, their ratios will 
exceed Europe‘s. There will however still be a wide gap between these two 
populations and that of Japan, the oldest in Asia. 
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Figure 2.1  Ratio of 65+ to 15-64-year-olds, 1950 to 2050, percentage 
 
Note: Asia and Europe refer to all United Nations member countries in the respective regions. 
See source for complete list. 
Source: United Nations (2010) 
 
 Underlying this dramatic demographic shift are two separate trends, declining 
fertility and improving life expectancy. The fertility rate in Singapore and Hong Kong 
have been falling for several decades (Figure 2.2). Total fertility, which is the average 
number of children born to a woman over her lifetime, decreased from around five in 
the 1960‘s to sub-replacement levels by the mid-1980‘s. Fertility rates have not 
recovered despite active pro-natal policies particularly in Singapore (Ministry of 
Community Development, 2011), but the trend has flattened in recent years. In 2010 
the total fertility rate was 1.0 in Hong Kong and 1.3 in Singapore, no higher than that 
of Japan, which has one of the world‘s oldest populations. This reflects wider patterns 
in the region. In the last half-century, the average fertility rate has decreased much 
faster in Asia than in Europe. As a result, the gap in fertility rate between the two 
regions has narrowed.  
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Figure 2.2  Total fertility rate, 1960-2050 
 
Note: Asia and Europe refer to all United Nations member countries in the respective regions. 
See source for complete list. 
Source: United Nations (2010) 
 
 The opposite has happened with life expectancy. Measured at birth, life 
expectancy in Singapore and Hong Kong was already higher than the Asian average in 
the 1960‘s, and had risen above European levels by the 1980‘s (Figure 2.3). Life 
expectancy in Hong Kong has matched that of Japan since 2000. A more informative 
indicator for old-age income policymaking is life expectancy at retirement age, 
currently 65 years old in both countries. According to national data, the average life 
expectancy for persons aged 65 years old rose from 15 years to 20 years between 1980 
and 2000 in Hong Kong, and between 1985 and 2010 in Singapore (Census and 
Statistics Department, 2007; Department of Statistics, 2012). The current life 
expectancies of persons aged 65 in Hong Kong and Singapore are well above Asian 
and European averages and are expected to remain so in the coming decades (Figure 
2.4). In 2010, a person at the retirement age of 65 could expect to live for another 18.8 
years in Singapore and 20.4 years in Hong Kong, compared to 20.9 years in Japan and 
just 16.8 years in Europe on average. 
 In European societies that depend on public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions, a 
larger elderly population relative to working-age adults implies a lower financial 
contribution base and higher payouts, which may strain the financial sustainability of 
these pension systems. But for defined contribution (DC) pension systems based on 
individual accounts, like in Singapore and Hong Kong, longer life expectancies would 
require individuals to set aside more savings or retire later, in order to maintain the 
same living standards in old age compared to preceding cohorts. Over time, 
demographic ageing is also experienced at the household level as smaller family sizes, 
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which may result in a greater share of responsibility per adult child to support elderly 
parents. These issues are examined in more detail in Chapter 4. 
 
Figure 2.3  Period life expectancy at birth, 1960-2050 
 
Note: Asia and Europe refer to all United Nations member countries in the respective regions. 
See source for complete list. 
Source: United Nations (2010) 
 
Figure 2.4  Period life expectancy at 65 years old, 2000 to 2050 
 
 
Note: Asia and Europe refer to all United Nations member countries in the respective regions. 
See source for complete list. 
Source: United Nations (2010) 
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Summary 
To summarise the demographic context for Hong Kong and Singapore: 
 
 Their populations were already among the oldest in Asia in 2010 with Hong 
Kong experiencing more advanced ageing than Singapore. Their period life 
expectancy at 65 and population median age followed closely behind Japan‘s. 
But in terms of population age structure they still had lower proportions of 
older persons compared to European countries like Germany and Italy. 
 
 However if current trends persist both populations may experience a dramatic 
transformation in the age composition of their populations over the next two 
decades. Their old-age dependency ratios will rank among the highest in the 
world and are projected to exceed the European average by 2025. Singapore 
will also catch up quickly with Hong Kong on various measures of 
demographic ageing. 
 
 This demographic shift has been driven by falling fertility rates and improving 
life expectancies over the past few decades when the average number of 
children born to a woman over her lifetime decreased from around five in the 
1960‘s to sub-replacement levels by the mid-1980s. 
 
 Regardless of the model of public pension system in place these trends imply 
that greater resources will be required in old age assuming constant retirement 
age. In Hong Kong and Singapore, where there are no PAYG pensions like in 
many European countries, these demographic trends will translate into a greater 
strain on individual savings under DC pension accounts and on family support 
as fewer adult children are available.  
 
 However broad demographic indicators do not fully convey the implications of 
ageing for income security in later life. Harper (2006) has argued that the pressures of 
demographic ageing are period- and cohort-specific, and can be shaped by policy 
intervention. The implications of the above trends must also be understood in the light 
of existing public and informal arrangements for retirement income and how these 
arrangements may themselves change. 
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2.2 Research on ageing and poverty in Hong Kong and Singapore 
The income situations of recent and current cohorts of elderly persons provide a 
starting point for assessing the extent to which longer life expectancies may further 
strain financial resources in old age. Where old age is already associated with low 
relative incomes, more years in retirement may present a serious challenge to income 
security if public pension provision and family support remain unchanged. This section 
reviews the literature on the relative incomes of elderly persons in Hong Kong and 
Singapore and summarises recent quantitative evidence on their income situations.  
 
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong has a long history of income poverty studies that were initially motivated 
by concerns about the adequacy of benefit levels under the Comprehensive Social 
Security Assistance (CSSA) Scheme. In the 1990s, the Hong Kong Legislative 
Council‘s call for a formal review of the CSSA Scheme led to a commissioned study 
by MacPherson (1994, 1998) who used a budget standards approach to derive a 
minimum acceptable standard of living that was found to exceed the CSSA benefit 
rates. In a separate study, Wong and Chua (1996) concluded that about 15.5% of 
households in Hong Kong lived in poverty by analysing the expenditures of low-
income households. These and other studies around the time
3
 paved the way for 
research on particular age groups such as the elderly population. For example La 
Grange and Yung‘s (2002) study adapted Peter Townsend‘s (1979) deprivation index 
to identify the poverty thresholds of single elderly persons by analysing their strategies 
for coping with low incomes, such as cutting back on spending and activities. Based on 
a sample of 400 elderly persons, the authors concluded that HK$7000 a month was 
required to meet minimum living standards, equivalent to about 70% of the median 
work income in the population at the time of the study. 
 Recent official reports indicate that elderly workers and households with 
elderly persons in Hong Kong receive lower incomes than the rest of the population. In 
2006 the median work income of elderly persons was two thirds that of all workers 
(Table 2.3). Despite an increase by almost 10 percentage points over the preceding 
                                                 
3See Lui & Wong (1995), MacPherson & Chan (1996), MacPherson & Lo (1997), and Wong 
(2005). 
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decade this ratio highlights a considerable wage gap between elderly and non-elderly 
workers. The gap in earnings may reflect differences in occupational spread. Whereas 
one-third of older workers were engaged in lower-paying elementary occupations in 
2006, only one-fifth of all workers were in these occupations. Although elderly women 
still earn less, their earnings improved relative to men in 2006. 
 
Table 2.3  Median monthly work income of elderly workers (65+), Hong Kong 1996-
2006, Hong Kong dollars 
 1996 2001 2006 
Men 5,600 6,500 7,000 
Women 4,000 4,200 5,500 
Ratio of women to men (%) 71 65 79 
All elderly workers 5,100 6,000 6,500 
All workers 9,500 10,000 10,000 
Ratio of elderly to all workers (%) 54 60 65 
Source: Census and Statistics Department (2008) 
 
 Moreover household incomes show an opposite trend (Table 2.4). In 1996, the 
median gross income of elderly households was almost 20% lower than that of all 
households. By 2006, this gap had almost doubled, in spite of gains in the relative 
work income of older workers. This may be indicative of a household composition 
effect that will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4—a decline in intergenerational 
co-residence has meant an increase in elderly-only households that tend to have lower 
incomes than households with working-age members. This was also observed by Lau 
(2005) whose analysis of the 2001 Hong Kong census data found that 39-45% of 
elderly persons who lived in larger households with other family members had 
incomes below 60% of median equivalised household income, whereas 75% of elderly 
persons who lived alone fell below this income threshold (Table 2.5).
4
 Aggregate data 
from official reports remain the most readily available source of information about 
ageing and poverty in Hong Kong. But these may conceal heterogeneity within the 
elderly population. For example being male, younger, single, in work, and better 
educated are associated with having higher individual incomes among elderly persons 
(K.L. Chou, Chow, & Chi, 2006a).  
 
                                                 
4
 Lau adopts the equivalence scale from Gordon and others (2000)  which was developed from budget 
studies, instead of the square root scale currently in use by the OECD. Among researchers, there is no 
consensus on what is the best equivalence scale. Atkinson, Smeeding & Rainwater (1995) provide an 
overview of the range of equivalence scales in use and their implications for income calculations. 
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Table 2.4  Median gross monthly household income, Hong Kong 1996-2006, Hong 
Kong dollars 
Actual value 1996 2001 2006 
Elderly households
a
 14,100 12,200 11,100 
All households 17,500 18,700 17,300 
Ratio of elderly to all households (%) 81% 65% 64% 
Note: (a) Households with at least one member aged 65 years old and above. 
Source: Census and Statistics Department  (2008) 
 
Table 2.5  Poverty rates by household type, Hong Kong 2001 
Type of household Percentage with income below 
60% of median equivalised 
household income 
Single person 75 
Two or more elderly members 45 
One elderly member 39 
No elderly member 20 
Source: Based on Lau (2005) 
 
Singapore 
The available literature on poverty among the elderly or even the income situations of 
the general population in Singapore remains rather patchy. In one such study Lee 
(1998) observes that while extreme poverty among the elderly population has largely 
been eliminated in Singapore particular groups such as older women and elderly 
Malays may be at risk of inadequate incomes. However the scope of Lee‘s analysis is 
constrained by lack of access to microdata. Chan, Ofstedal and Hermalin‘s (2002) 
study on income levels and perceived income adequacy among elderly persons in 
Singapore and Taiwan makes use of panel survey data from the late 1990s which 
found considerable fluctuation in incomes over a span of four years and only a weak 
correlation between objective and subjective measures of economic wellbeing. 
However the study does not attempt an objective analysis of income adequacy beyond 
looking at movements across income brackets over time. Other recent studies on 
poverty and ageing in Singapore are more descriptive and do not address income 
security issues in an empirical way (e.g. A. Chan, 2009; Low, 2001; M. T. Yap, 2003) 
 Official studies in Singapore generally do not treat poverty and income equality 
issues directly but provide some indicative data. These suggest that the general income 
situation of elderly persons is a concern even through interpretation is complicated by 
data being captured on different bases across years. Elderly workers earn less from 
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work and elderly persons in general have very low gross incomes. In the mid-1990s 
the median gross income of elderly individuals was just one quarter of the median 
work income of all workers (Table 2.6). In the mid-2000s, 96% of persons aged 75 and 
above had gross incomes that were below the population median work income. Among 
elderly persons who worked, their median work income in 2008 was 40% as much as 
the median worker in the general population. Unequal work incomes persist at the 
household level. The median work income of all elderly households was only 32% that 
of non-elderly households (Table 2.7). The figures further suggest the importance of 
co-residence with working adult children. When only elderly households with work 
income are considered—disregarding elderly-only households with no members in the 
workforce—their median work income increases to 66% that of non-elderly 
households.  
 
Table 2.6  Income and earnings of elderly persons and the working population, 
Singapore, mid-1990s and mid-2000s, Singapore dollars 
 Median monthly 
earnings of working 
population 
Elderly persons (65+) 
1995/96 1600 Gross monthly income Median $400, 
2% had $2000 or more 
2005/06 2000 Gross monthly income 6% of 65-74 and 4% of 
75+ had $2000 or more 
2008 2500 Monthly earnings Median $1000 
Sources: Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports (1995, 2005), Housing and 
Development Board (2010), Ministry of Manpower (2009) 
 
Table 2.7  Median household income from work of elderly and non-elderly 
households, Singapore 2008, Singapore dollars 
  All households Households with work income 
Elderly households
a
 1400 3100 
Non-elderly households 4500 4600 
Ratio of elderly to non-elderly 
households (%) 
32 66 
Note: (a) Households headed by someone aged 65 years and above. A household head is 
someone regarded as such by other household members, usually but not always the most senior 
member. 
Source: Housing and Development Board (2010) 
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Summary 
To summarise what can be gathered from the literature: 
 
 Elderly workers earn less than younger workers in Hong Kong and Singapore, 
about 40% as much in Singapore in 2008 and 65% as much in Hong Kong in 
2006. Elderly persons‘ gross incomes in Singapore are also very low relative to 
population work incomes. In 2005 only 4% of elderly persons aged 75 and 
above had gross incomes above median population earnings.  
 
 Elderly households have lower incomes in both places—in terms of work 
income in Singapore and gross income in Hong Kong. The weakening relative 
income position of elderly households in Hong Kong despite improvements in 
the earnings of elderly individuals suggest possible adverse income effects 
from changes in household structures associated with the broader demographic 
trends outlined at the start of this chapter. 
 
 Existing research signals an overall income disadvantage faced by elderly 
persons, but provides a very limited picture of the nature of that disadvantage. Many 
questions remain as to how work participation and income levels change with age, 
differences between men and women, and the full range of income sources that matter 
to income security in retirement. These are addressed in the following sections through 
original analyses of several national survey datasets. 
 
2.3 Survey datasets 
The discussion from this section onwards makes use of four main datasets that come 
from two repeated cross-sectional surveys, the 1995 and 2005 rounds of the National 
Survey of Senior Citizens in Singapore and the 1996 and 2006 rounds of the Hong 
Kong Population By-census. The Singapore surveys targeted households with at least 
one member aged 55 and above. The two rounds of survey reached almost 5,000 
households each, about 0.5-0.6% of all resident households. The respondents were 
chosen using stratified sampling based on housing type. The data are weighted by age, 
ethnicity, and gender based on the 1990 and 2000 Census of Population. Each of the 
Hong Kong by-census datasets captures 1% of all living quarters at the time of data 
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collection based on equal probability sampling, covering 62,000 to 69,000 individuals 
of which 10% to 13% were elderly. The key variables, their definitions, and coding in 
the analyses to follow are described in Appendix A at the end of this report.  
 The timing of the surveys allows comparisons between Hong Kong and 
Singapore across roughly matching periods. However there were some challenges to 
harmonising the data: 
  
 The data from Hong Kong include all ages but the Singapore survey covers a 
narrower age range which enables comparisons only between elderly persons 
(65+) and older adults (55-64) but not with the working-age (15-64) population 
as a whole.  
 
 The Hong Kong by-census generally has better data on income levels. 
Household income, for example, was captured in both years in Hong Kong but 
only in 1995 for Singapore. This is part of a larger problem of inconsistent data 
structure in the Singapore survey over the two rounds. The analysis of 
household income in a later chapter therefore  focuses on Hong Kong. The 
Hong Kong by-census also records income in exact amounts whereas the 
Singapore survey uses income categories which constrain analysis of 
distribution. There are several options for estimating data points from grouped 
data. One is to adopt the mid-points of income brackets but this is largely 
arbitrary and does not overcome the problem of unbounded top income 
categories. More complex techniques are available to estimate inequality 
measures especially if the category averages are known (Chotikapanich, Rao, 
& Tang, 2006; Cowell, 2000). This study opts to estimate income levels using 
interval regression which is more straightforward to implement and has been 
used to analyse income mobility in Singapore (I. Y. H. Ng, 2007; Stewart, 
1983). The regression tables and a comparison of the estimated and actual 
income distributions are shown in the Appendix to this chapter. 
 
 Thirdly, as the Singapore survey is focused on older persons, it has information 
on income receipts from sources such as children‘s contributions, pensions, and 
annuities. But questions about the exact amounts of income received from each 
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source were not asked. For this, the discussion below relies on additional 
aggregate data from the 2008 Housing and Development Board Sample 
Household Survey which covers public housing residents. But the analysis is 
very limited as it was not possible to gain direct access to the dataset. The 
Hong Kong by-census differentiates only between work and non-work income 
but records the amount of each income type. Given the importance of 
understanding elderly persons‘ income sources, additional analysis was done 
on supplementary data from two other one-off surveys in Hong Kong. The first 
is the 2000 Supplementary Enquiry to the General Household Survey on the 
Socio-demographic, Health and Economic Profiles of Elderly People and Soon-
to-be Old People, which sampled about 0.2% of the population aged 45 years 
old and above, as part of the larger General Household Survey that relied on 
stratified random sampling. The second is the 2008 Thematic Household 
Survey on the Socio-demographic Profile, Health Status and Self-care 
Capability of Older Persons which sampled about 0.4% of households. All 
persons aged 60 years old and above in each household were interviewed. 
These supplementary datasets provide information not only on elderly income 
sources but also amounts. 
 
2.4 Work and retirement 
Work is important to old-age income security because longer careers during working 
age imply more savings under the defined contribution pension systems in Hong Kong 
and Singapore. On the other hand early retirement, often more common among 
women, both lowers pension savings and increases the length of retirement over which 
the savings must be spread. Continuing to work in old age also generates an income 
stream for elderly persons. Raising the retirement age and promoting work among 
healthy elderly persons in line with rising life expectancies are therefore critical 
strategies for improving old-age income security. In Singapore, for instance, the 
government has introduced re-employment legislation for elderly workers and 
increased the eligibility age for withdrawing public pension savings (see Section 9.3). 
 Considering the importance of work, it is examined in different ways 
throughout the study. In Chapter 6, the projections of future living arrangements 
among elderly persons take into account labour force participation, while the 
projections of future access to market income include work income. The modelling of 
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pension outcomes in Chapter 7 adopts different wage levels and career lengths. To 
begin with, this section focuses on how work patterns change with age, how work 
participation has changed over time for successive cohorts, and the differences for men 
and women, based on the survey data. The incidence of low incomes by workforce 
participation status and access to work income are discussed in subsequent sections. 
The analysis is relatively concise as the survey data on work are limited and only a 
minority of elderly persons in Singapore and Hong Kong are still in the workforce, as 
discussed below. A key question here is whether it is reasonable for policymakers to 
expect longer life expectancies to result in more years in work.  
 
Workforce participation among different age groups 
Table 2.8 shows the labour force participation rates for men and women of different 
age groups in the survey years. In general, workforce participation falls away steadily 
from 55 onwards. By comparison to the OECD countries Hong Kong‘s elderly 
workforce participation rates are lower while Singapore‘s are higher (Table 2.9). 
Singaporean men have particularly high workforce participation from 65 onwards at 
22%, compared to 17% among the OECD countries. This is consistent with research 
which shows that Singaporeans are realistic about the need to work more years in order 
to meet retirement needs (Goodman & Harper, 2008). Like in many developed 
countries, women in Hong Kong and Singapore have lower participation rates than 
men, both before and after 65 (Department of Statistics, 2011). For age groups 65 and 
above, around a tenth or less of women were in the workforce compared to up to a 
third of the men. In total, elderly men were three times as likely as women to be in the 
workforce in the two populations, compared to twice as likely in the OECD countries. 
The implications are that women are likely to have lower pension rights as well as less 
work income from 65 onwards, and elderly women can be expected to depend more 
heavily than men on other public and informal income sources, especially children‘s 
contributions.  
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Table 2.8  Labour force participation rate by sex and age, Hong Kong 1996 and 2006, 
Singapore 1995 and 2005, percentage 
Hong Kong 1996 2006 
 Men Women All Men Women All 
18-49 93 66 79 88 72 79 
50-54 92 43 70 87 52 70 
55-59 82 28 57 70 33 51 
60-64 53 15 35 41 14 28 
65-69 29 6 17 20 7 14 
70-74 15 3 9 13 4 8 
75+ 9 1 4 6 2 3 
All 65+ 19 4 10 12 4 8 
Singapore 1995 2005 
 Men Women All Men Women All 
55-59 77 25 51 76 33 54 
60-64 55 17 36 61 30 46 
65-69 32 9 20 33 13 22 
70-74 18 6 11 20 10 15 
75+ 9 2 5 11 3 6 
All 65+ 20 5 12 22 8 14 
Source: Own analysis using data from Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006; 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995, 2005 
 
Table 2.9  Labour force participation rate of elderly persons (65+) in Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and OECD countries, 2005/2006, percentage 
 Hong Kong  
2006 
Singapore  
2005 
OECD countries 
2006 
Men 12 22 17 
Women 4 8 8 
All 8 14 12 
Source: Own analysis for Hong Kong and Singapore using data from Hong Kong Population 
By-census 2006 and Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 2005 ; OECD (2010) 
 
 There are contrasting trends over the 10 years between Hong Kong and 
Singapore. In 1995/1996, both men‘s and women‘s workforce participation were 
higher in Hong Kong for the 55-59 age group but slightly higher in Singapore for the 
older age groups. Compared to 1996, men‘s workforce participation in Hong Kong fell 
noticeably in 2006 by around 9 to 12 percentage points in the 55-69 age range. 
Women‘s participation grew for the 55-59 age group but otherwise remained stable. 
Overall workforce participation in Hong Kong therefore fell for older adults. But in 
Singapore women‘s workforce participation saw strong growth across most age groups 
from 55 onwards between 1995 and 2005. The percentage of women in the workforce 
almost doubled for those aged between 60 and 64. Men‘s workforce participation 
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remained stable except for the 60-64 age group, possibly indicating delayed retirement 
among those in their 60s. 
 The cross-sectional data for 1996 show that between the age groups of 55-59 
and 65-69, men‘s workforce participation in Hong Kong fell from 82% to 29%. But 
matching participation figures for age groups ten years apart in the two survey rounds 
reveals that the decline in work participation as men crossed the retirement age of 65 
was steeper than the cross-sectional data suggest. Disregarding population entry and 
attrition, among the cohort of men born in 1937-41 in Hong Kong, workforce 
participation in fact fell from 82% in 1996 (when they were aged 55-59) to just 20% in 
2006 (when they were aged 65-69). On the other hand, workforce participation 
decreased less quickly with age for Singaporean women born in 1936-40 than the 1995 
data suggest, from 25% in 1995 (when they were aged 55-59) to 13% in 2005 (when 
they were aged 65-69). As a result of the above trends labour force participation in 
Singapore, roughly comparable to Hong Kong‘s in the mid-1990s, exceeded that in 
Hong Kong by between three to 18 percentage points across age groups from 55 
onwards by the mid-2000s. 
 
Workforce participation across cohorts 
In the absence of panel data on workforce participation in the two populations, changes 
in work patterns over the lifetimes of different cohorts may be approximated by 
linking aggregate figures for ascending age groups over successive years. The figures 
below show the labour force participation rates of five cohorts born ten years apart 
between 1930 and 1970 from the age of 15 estimated based on International Labour 
Organization (2012) data. This does not account for changes in cohort membership 
between survey years. 
 Even with missing data points for certain years and incomplete trajectories for 
younger generations, the overall pattern of the data clearly suggests that men‘s labour 
participation has changed very little for cohorts spanning some 40 years in both 
populations (Figure 2.5). In Singapore, labour participation increases only at 60 years 
old, from 32% to 50% between the 1930 and 1940 cohorts. Participation rates at 
younger ages and between other cohorts have remained stable. For Hong Kong, there 
in fact appears to be a fall in work participation at the youngest and oldest ages—men 
may be delaying entry into the workforce and retiring earlier. Only 38% of men born 
in 1970 entered the workforce at 15 years old, compared to more than 50% in 
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preceding cohorts. There is also a decrease in labour force participation at 60 years old 
from 56% to 46% between the 1930 and 1940 cohorts. In terms of actual rates, men‘s 
labour force participation profiles are comparable in Singapore and Hong Kong, 
peaking at close to 100% between the ages of 25 and 45, and falling away to around 
50% by 60 years old. 
 
Figure 2.5  Labour force participation of men by age for birth cohorts 1930-1970 in 
Hong Kong and Singapore, percentage 
Hong Kong 
 
Singapore 
 
Source: Own analysis based on International Labour Organization (2012) 
 
 Women‘s work participation has shown far more dramatic changes, especially 
at younger ages and in Singapore (Figure 2.6). Between the 1930 and 1970 birth 
cohorts in Singapore, women‘s work participation at 20 years old expanded fourfold 
from around 20% to 80%. In Hong Kong, women‘s labour force participation saw 
smaller but still significant gains from around 50% to 80%. The work participation 
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profiles of women in the two populations therefore became very similar for the most 
recent cohorts: participation peaks at around 80% at 20 years old, then halves by 50 
years old, and falls to a fifth or less by 60 years old. Rising work participation for 
women cannot be assumed to continue. Participation gains across cohorts have been 
narrower at higher ages, and in fact appears to be slowing down even at younger ages. 
Compared to changes between earlier cohorts, there is little difference in participation 
rates for the 1960 and 1970 birth cohorts in Singapore up to 30 years old. 
 
Figure 2.6  Labour force participation of women by age for birth cohorts 1930-1970 in 
Hong Kong and Singapore, percentage 
Hong Kong 
 
Singapore 
 
Source: Own analysis based on International Labour Organization (2012) 
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Summary 
To summarise the findings about elderly persons‘ participation in the workforce: 
 
 Workforce participation declines with age and is lower for women in Hong 
Kong and Singapore. In 2005/2006, just 7% to 13% of women were still in the 
workforce by the age of 65-69 compared to 20-33% of men. Elderly men aged 
65 and above were three times as likely as women to be in the workforce. 
 
 Between 1995/1996 and 2005/2006 total workforce participation among older 
adults fell in Hong Kong particularly for men between the ages of 55 and 69, 
but rose in Singapore due to a noticeable increase in women‘s workforce 
participation across all age groups between 55 and 74. 
 
 Comparing workforce participation during the lifetimes of cohorts born 
between 1930 and 1970, men‘s workforce participation has remained 
remarkably stable, apart from an increase from 32% to 50% at 60 years old 
between the birth cohorts of 1930 and 1940 in Singapore, and signs of a delay 
in workforce entry and earlier retirement among men from more recent cohorts 
in Hong Kong. 
 
 Women‘s labour force participation has expanded dramatically across 
successive birth cohorts, particularly at younger ages and in Singapore. At 20 
years old, women‘s work participation has risen from around 20% to 80% in 
Singapore, and from 50% to 80% in Hong Kong. But participation gains are 
smaller at higher ages and appear to be slowing down. 
 
 So far the evidence from Hong Kong and Singapore does not suggest a strong 
link between longer life expectancy and more years in work. This is clearest in the case 
of elderly men in Hong Kong whose workforce participation has decreased between 
1996 and 2006. The Singapore government has in fact found it necessary to introduce 
initiatives to promote work at older ages in recent years.
5
 
                                                 
5
 The Workfare Income Supplement was introduced in 2007 to provide a benefit paid through a mix of 
cash and CPF contribution to workers aged 35 and above whose average monthly work incomes fall 
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2.5 Individual income levels 
The steady fall of workforce participation with age as seen in the analysis so far 
suggests a similar downward age gradient in individual incomes. This is borne out by a 
comparison of median individual gross monthly incomes in Hong Kong and Singapore 
by sex and age (Figure 2.7). Among both populations, individual incomes decline 
dramatically for older persons and are lower for women. In Hong Kong the age 
gradient of median individual income is particularly sharp, falling to 0 or close to zero 
by around 50-55 years old. From 65, incomes for women increase very slightly and 
remain flat for both men and women, and the income gap between men and women 
disappears, suggesting dependence of both genders on receipts of the flat-rate old age 
allowance under the Social Security Allowance Scheme (SSAS). Real incomes grew 
between the 1990s and 2000s across all age groups (55 onwards for Singapore). In 
Singapore the oldest age groups saw the highest income growth. Individual incomes 
were 1.7 times as high in 2005 as compared to 1995 for men aged 75 and above and 
2.6 times as high for women in the same age group. But in Hong Kong, the patterns are 
less clear with the most pronounced gains experienced by women aged 50-54 and men 
aged 65-69. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                             
below a designated floor (CPF Board, 2013b). In 2010 the income floor of $1700  was about 68% of 
median work income. The Retirement and Re-employment Act was enacted in 2013 to mandate 
employers to offer annual re-employment contracts to workers from the statutory retirement age of 62 
(Ministry of Manpower, 2013). 
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Figure 2.7  Median individual gross monthly incomes by sex and age, Hong Kong 
1996 and 2006 (1996 Hong Kong dollars), Singapore 1995 and 2005 (1995 Singapore 
dollars) 
Hong Kong 
  
Singapore 
    
Note: Numbers on horizontal axes denote starting ages in each age group 
Source: Own analysis using data from Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006; 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995, 2005 
 
 The convention in international income studies, such as by the OECD and the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), is to adopt between 40% and 60% of the median 
equivalised household income as a threshold of poverty risk. But as data on 
equivalised household incomes for the general population are not available for 
Singapore, the analysis here adopts various proportions of the median population gross 
work income as convenient approximations of these thresholds. By this measure, 
elderly persons in Hong Kong and Singapore have very low individual incomes that 
suggest a disparity in living standards between the elderly and working populations, 
before any income sharing within households (Table 2.10). Singapore fares worse, 
with 94% of elderly persons receiving individual incomes that are below 0.6 times 
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population median work income in 1995. The older age groups were the most 
disadvantaged—98% of the 75 and above age group had individual incomes below 0.6 
times the population median work income and 94% had incomes below the 0.4 
threshold. The income situation improved slightly in 2005 with smaller proportions of 
elderly persons falling below these thresholds but the vast majority still received 
individual incomes no higher than 0.6 times median population work income. The 
situation is somewhat better in Hong Kong even though most elderly persons still 
receive very low individual incomes relative to the workforce—79% to 82%  had 
individual incomes that are less than 0.4 to 0.6 times the median work income in 1996. 
Like in Singapore, the elderly population‘s relative income positions in Hong Kong 
also improved in 2006, but there was a larger reduction in the proportion of elderly 
persons receiving the lowest relative incomes. The gap between the share of elderly 
persons receiving less than 0.4 median population work income in Hong Kong and 
Singapore therefore opens up from 5 to 10 percentage points by 2005/2006. Using 1.5 
times median population work income as a benchmark of high-income status, Hong 
Kong comes up in a better position than Singapore although the difference was smaller 
by the second survey round. In the mid-1990s, 8% of elderly persons in Hong Kong 
had high incomes compared to none in Singapore. By the mid-2000s, 4% of elderly 
persons in Singapore had high individual incomes compared to just 7% in Hong Kong. 
 
Table 2.10  Percentage of population by age group with individual incomes below 
various proportions of median population gross work income, Hong Kong 1996 and 
2006, Singapore 1995 and 2005 
 Hong Kong 
 1996 2006 
 Below 0.4 Below 0.6 Above 1.5 Below 0.4 Below 0.6 Above 1.5 
65-69 73 77 10 63 72 10 
70-74 79 83 9 68 78 7 
75+ 84 88 6 71 81 6 
All 65+ 79 82 8 68 78 7 
 Singapore 
 1995 2005 
 Below 0.4 Below 0.6 Above 1.5 Below 0.4 Below 0.6 Above 1.5 
65-69 73 88 0 68 84 7 
70-74 86 96 0 78 88 4 
75+ 94 98 0 87 93 2 
All 65+ 84 94 0 78 88 4 
Source: Own analysis using data from Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006; 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995, 2005 
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 Comparing the relative individual incomes of elderly persons inside and out of 
the workforce reveals a few surprising patterns (Table 2.11). As might be expected, 
persons in the workforce are less likely to receive low individual incomes. But 
strikingly in 1995/1996, even among elderly Singaporeans in the workforce, 59% had 
individual incomes below 0.6 times median population gross work income, more than 
double the 27% of the elderly workforce in Hong Kong. This gap grew in the 2000s. In 
Singapore elderly persons outside the workforce became less likely to have low 
incomes but the relative individual incomes of elderly persons in the labour force 
deteriorated. While the proportion of the elderly workforce in Hong Kong who had 
individual incomes below 0.4 times median work income decreased to just 9%, the 
proportion of elderly persons in the Singapore workforce who had incomes below this 
threshold more than doubled to 27%. More than one in four elderly persons despite 
remaining in the workforce in Singapore had very low individual incomes by 
comparison to the working population. These figures highlight that while more elderly 
people are working past retirement age in Singapore, their work has not paid off 
relative to elderly workers in Hong Kong. Harper (2006) has argued that the promotion 
of longer working lives may be an unavoidable policy strategy as life expectancies 
increase, but public provision must also grow in tandem to protect elderly persons who 
are financially vulnerable. The evidence here, that longer careers cannot be assumed to 
result in better individual incomes, provides support for this argument. 
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Table 2.11  Percentage of elderly persons (65+) by workforce participation status with 
individual incomes below various proportions of median population gross work 
income, Hong Kong 1996 and 2006, Singapore 1995 and 2005 
 Hong Kong 
 1996 2006 
 Below 0.4 Below 0.6 Above 1.5 Below 0.4 Below 0.6 Above 1.5 
Out of 
workforce 
86 89 7 73 83 5 
In 
workforce 
14 27 21 9 17 36 
 Singapore 
 1995 2005 
 Below 0.4 Below 0.6 Above 1.5 Below 0.4 Below 0.6 Above 1.5 
Out of 
workforce 
94 99 0 83 90 0 
In 
workforce 
13 59 0 27 57 0 
Source: Own analysis using data from Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006; 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995, 2005 
 
2.6 Income sources 
In the 1990s, two major studies of elderly income sources in Singapore established that 
transfers from children were both prevalent and important relative to other incomes 
sources, and that this changed very little during retirement. Using data from the 1995 
round of the National Survey of Senior Citizens, Chan (1997) found that 85% of older 
adults aged 60 and above received transfers regularly from children living apart, and 
that 91% of older women reported these transfers compared to 77% of the men. A 
follow-up study of the respondents in the 1995 survey four years later found that the 
proportion of older persons (by then aged 64 and above) who cited transfers from 
family and friends as a ―major source of income‖ increased slightly from 79% to 81% 
between 1995 and 1999, while the proportion citing work and business as the main 
income source fell from 15% to 10% (A. Chan, et al., 2003).
6
 Other sources such as 
pensions and rent were cited by just 7-9% of older persons in the two years. There is 
limited understanding of how elderly persons‘ income sources have changed since the 
1990s. There is also little knowledge of how income sources vary for different groups, 
particularly by income level and gender. The following original analysis of data from 
two time points in Hong Kong and Singapore addresses some of these issues. 
                                                 
6
 The 1995 survey asked ―what is your main source of financial support‖ while the 1999 survey asked 
respondents to ―rank your major source of income‖. Both surveys did not offer more detailed definitions 
or guidance to participants. See study for details (A. Chan, et al., 2003). 
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 Different income sources were important to elderly persons in Hong Kong and 
Singapore (Figure 2.8). Despite a decline between 1995 and 2005, about 80% of 
elderly Singaporeans received some income from their children in the two years. Other 
income sources were less common. Work and other kin provided income to about 10% 
of elderly persons, while pensions and public assistance were negligible. Importantly, 
income receipts from the CPF increased from 3% to 12% of the elderly population 
between 1995 and 2005. This raises the important question of whether CPF income 
will be adequate to make up for lower support from children as family sizes become 
smaller. Future access to different income sources is analysed in Chapter 6. In contrast 
to Singapore, elderly persons in Hong Kong were most likely to obtain income from 
the SSAS. In 2000 and 2008, 69% to 73% of the elderly population received benefits 
from this scheme. Children‘s contributions, the most common income source in 
Singapore, were reported by almost 60% of elderly persons in Hong Kong in 2000. 
The 2008 survey distinguished between co-resident children and those living apart 
from their elderly parents, which limits direct comparison with 2000. In 2008, children 
were still the second most common income source in Hong Kong, with 33% of elderly 
persons receiving income from co-resident children and 41% from children living 
apart. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 54 
Figure 2.8  Percentage of elderly persons (65+) who reported income receipts from 
selected sources in Singapore and Hong Kong, late-1990s and late-2000s 
Singapore 
 
Hong Kong 
 
CPF: Central Provident Fund, SSAS: Social Security Allowance Scheme, CSSA: 
Comprehensive Social Security Assistance Scheme, ―Pensions‖ refer to private pensions 
Note: Income from children was not differentiated by living arrangement for 2000. 
Source: Own analysis using data from Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995, 
2005, Supplementary Enquiry to the Hong Kong General Household Survey 2000, and Hong 
Kong Thematic Household Survey 2008. 
 
 The major difference between income sources in Singapore and Hong Kong, 
notwithstanding changes within each population between the survey years, is that 
elderly persons in Singapore were almost singularly dependent on their children for 
income, whereas it was common to draw income from both the children and public 
sources in Hong Kong. Together, the SSAS and the CSSA Scheme (a means-tested 
social assistance programme) provided income to more than 80% of the elderly 
population in Hong Kong. But in Singapore, the CPF and public assistance combined 
provided income to only 3% of elderly persons in 1995 and 13% in 2005. Public 
assistance alone was an income source less than 1% of the time in both years. This 
contrast reveals the vulnerability of older Singaporeans to receding family support. 
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 In Singapore, children contributed income to more than 80% of elderly women 
across all income brackets apart from the highest in 2005, while this proportion ranged 
between 40% and 90% for the men (Figure 2.9). On the other hand, more men received 
income from work than women, especially in the higher income groups. In general, the 
CPF had become a more common income source in 2005 as compared to 1995, but the 
increase from 4% to 19% was larger for men, as compared to the increase from 1% to 
7% for women. Overall the retirement income sources of elderly men in Singapore 
were more dynamic between the two years and had become more varied by 2005. 
While the proportion of men drawing income from children and work both decreased, 
the proportion that turned to the CPF increased, resulting in a wider range of income 
sources across all income brackets. For women, income sources were less diverse to 
begin with and were more static over time. Apart from an increase in the use of CPF 
income of 6 percentage points, and changes in income from children and private 
pensions for those in the highest income bracket, the overall range of women‘s income 
sources remained heavily imbalanced towards a dependence on children. Less than one 
in five elderly women in both years drew income from any other source. 
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Figure 2.9  Percentage of elderly persons(65+) who reported income receipts from 
selected sources in Singapore by income band, 1995 and 2005 
        1995 Men     2005 Men 
 
       1995 Women    2005 Women 
 
 
Income bands for 1995 are (1) <$250, (2) $250-$499, (3) $500-$749, (4) $750-$999, (5) 
$1000-$1249, (6-9) $1250+. For 2005 are (1) $1-$499, (2) $500-$749, (3) $750-$999, (4) 
$1000-$1249, (5-10) $1250+. 
Source: Own analysis using data from Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995, 
2005 
 
 Like in Singapore, children were a more common income source for elderly 
women than for elderly men in Hong Kong, while work and pensions were more 
common for the men in spite of a sharp contraction in the incidence of work income 
from 40-50% in 2000 to 10-40% in 2008 (Figure 2.10). But while the proportion of 
elderly persons in Singapore who received income from their children was either stable 
(for the women) or decreased (for the men) with higher income levels, children‘s 
contributions did not vary consistently with income according to the Hong Kong data. 
In particular for the elderly women in 2008, children‘s contributions became more 
common at higher income levels but came mostly from non-co-resident children. This 
suggests diverse motivations for intergenerational transfers, which may not always be 
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related to financial need or linked to co-residence (see Chapter 4). Income sources 
were also different among low-income elderly persons in the two populations. While 
children were the most common income source even among those in the lowest 
income band in Singapore, less than 6% of the bottom groups in Hong Kong received 
income from their children in 2008. Instead, 96% of them received benefits from the 
SSAS. As receipts from the SSAS decreased in the third and fourth income bands, the 
CSSA became more common, demonstrating how the two schemes provide successive 
layers of income protection. 
 
Figure 2.10  Percentage of elderly persons (65+) who reported income receipts from 
selected sources in Hong Kong by income band, 2000 and 2008 
      2000 Men     2008 Men 
     
      2000 Women    2008 Women 
 
 
 
Income bands for 2000 are (1) $1 to <$1000, (2) $1000-$1999, (3) $2000-$2999, (4) $3000-
$4999, (5) $5000-$9999, (6) $10000-$19999, (7) $20000+. For 2008 are (1) <$1000, (2) 
$1000-$1999, (3) $2000-$2999, (4) $3000-$3999, (5-6) $4000-$5999, (7-18) $6000+. 
Source: Own analysis using data from Supplementary Enquiry to the Hong Kong General 
Household Survey 2000 and Hong Kong Thematic Household Survey 2008. 
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 Personal savings have been documented as an important source of retirement 
income (Leeson & Harper, 2008). Due to unavailable data—savings as an income 
source was not recorded in the 1995 Singapore survey nor in the Hong Kong 
datasets—it is not possible to further analyse savings in this study (except as an asset 
in Chapter 3). What data are available show that in 2005, 38% of elderly Singaporeans 
reported savings as an income source. In Hong Kong, more than 90% of elderly 
persons own some savings (Figure 3.6). Additionally, a 2012 multi-country survey of 
adults aged 25 and above conducted by HSBC (2013a, 2013b) found that cash savings 
was most frequently cited as a possible retirement income source—by 56% of 
respondents in Hong Kong and 69% in Singapore. The respondents also expected 
savings to represent the largest proportion of retirement income—26% in Hong Kong 
and 34% in Singapore, compared to less than 15% from public pensions and less than 
10% from family transfers. But these findings may reflect respondents‘ expectations of 
independence more than the actual significance of savings. In the same HSBC survey, 
29% of respondents in Hong Kong and 41% in Singapore reported not saving at all for 
retirement. Furthermore there is evidence that children‘s transfers are far larger than 
the survey respondents anticipate, taking up almost two thirds of average elderly 
incomes among the two populations in recent years (see Chapter 4). In Singapore, 
elderly persons with lower incomes are also less likely to have savings (Figure 3.6), 
while very high CPF contribution rates may constrain the capacity for private savings 
in general. It is therefore possible to overstate the importance of savings as an income 
source, particularly based on attitudinal data. 
 
Summary 
To summarise the findings on individual income levels and sources: 
 
 Individual incomes fall steeply with age in Hong Kong and Singapore. Women 
generally have lower incomes than men but the gap narrows among the older 
age groups. Between the 1995/1996 and 2005/2006 real incomes grew for 
almost all age groups in the surveys, with elderly Singaporeans experiencing 
the greatest gains. 
 
 Due to the steep age gradient, both elderly populations had very low individual 
incomes relative to the median work income of the working population. 
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Singapore fares worse, with 94% of elderly persons receiving individual 
incomes that are below 0.6 times population median work income in 1995 and 
88% still in this category in 2005 despite improvements during the decade. 
There were smaller proportions of elderly persons falling below these income 
thresholds in Hong Kong but more than two-thirds were still receiving incomes 
below 0.4 times median work income in 2006. 
 
 Strikingly in Singapore the proportion of the elderly workforce receiving 
individual incomes below 0.4 times median work income rose from 13% to 
27% between 1995 and 2005, compared to a reduction from 14% to 9% in 
Hong Kong. Higher workforce participation therefore cannot be taken to imply 
greater income security.  
 
 The most common income source in Singapore was by far children‘s financial 
contributions. Between 1995 and 2005 elderly men‘s access to children‘s 
contributions fell especially in the higher income brackets where work income 
was more common. But at the same time the proportion of elderly men citing 
CPF as an income source grew for almost all income levels. Elderly women 
however continued to depend almost singularly on their children, with less than 
one in five drawing income from alternative sources. 
 
 In Hong Kong both children‘s contributions and the SSAS were available to 
more than half of the elderly population. The SSAS was equally common to 
elderly men and women as a source of income, with lower access among the 
higher income groups. Like in Singapore, work income was more relevant to 
the men. Among the women, those who had access to children‘s contributions 
were in the higher income groups, suggesting the importance of this income 
source. 
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2.7 Summary 
The policy challenge of income security among the elderly populations of Hong Kong 
and Singapore has an important demographic dimension. But in addition to the size 
and proportion of the elderly population, the nature of the policy challenge depends on 
how elderly persons in these societies secure the financial resources they require in old 
age. This chapter focused on the basic relationship between ageing, work, and 
individual incomes. The main findings are: 
 
 The populations of Hong Kong and Singapore are already among the oldest in 
Asia, with period life expectancies at 65 following closely behind Japan‘s. On 
current projections the age composition of the two populations are expected to 
transform in the next two decades, achieving old-age dependency ratios that 
will exceed the European average by 2025. 
 
 These trends imply that greater resources will be required in old age assuming 
constant retirement age. In Hong Kong and Singapore, where there are no 
PAYG pensions like in many European countries, these demographic trends 
will translate into a greater strain on individual savings under DC pension 
accounts and on family support as fewer adult children are available. 
 
 Related to demographic ageing is whether longer life expectancies imply 
longer careers that will provide an adequate income stream past 65. Published 
data indicate that elderly workers earn much less than younger workers in 
Hong Kong and Singapore, about 40% as much in Singapore in 2008 and 65% 
as much in Hong Kong in 2006. There is also evidence from Hong Kong 
suggesting that while elderly persons‘ relative earnings have improved, the 
income effects may not be noticeable as elderly-only households with lower 
combined incomes become more common. 
 
 Based on survey data from 1995/1996 and 2005/2006, workforce participation 
declines steadily with age and is lower for women in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Elderly men aged 65 and above were three times as likely as women 
to be in the workforce in 2005/2006. Total workforce participation among older 
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adults fell in Hong Kong after 1996 particularly for men between the ages of 55 
and 69, but rose in Singapore after 1995 due to a significant increase in 
women‘s workforce participation from the age of 55 to 74. 
 
 Comparing workforce participation during the lifetimes of cohorts born 
between 1930 and 1970, there has been little change to men‘s workforce 
participation but a clear expansion of work among women especially at 
younger ages. But these gains among women are more significant at younger 
ages and have slowed down between recent cohorts. The evidence so far does 
not suggest a strong link between longer life expectancy and more years in 
work. 
 
 Individual incomes fall steeply with age in Hong Kong and Singapore. Women 
generally have lower incomes than men but the gap narrows among the older 
age groups. Using 0.4 times the median population work income as a threshold,  
78% of elderly persons in Singapore and 68% in Hong Kong had low 
individual incomes in 2005/2006. Strikingly in Singapore a quarter of the 
elderly workforce fell below this income threshold compared to just 9% in 
Hong Kong. Higher workforce participation therefore cannot be taken to imply 
greater income security.  
 
 Rather than earnings the most common income source in Singapore was 
children‘s financial contributions. Between 1995 and 2005 elderly men became 
less likely to receive these contributions and more likely to have CPF income. 
But elderly women continued to depend almost singularly on their children, 
with less than one in five drawing income from alternative sources, despite a 
context of expanding work participation among women. In contrast both 
children‘s contributions and the SSAS were available to more than half of the 
elderly population in Hong Kong. The SSAS was equally common to elderly 
men and women as a source of income, with lower access among the higher 
income groups. 
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 The findings in this chapter reveal a larger scale of old-age poverty than was 
previously described in the literature, as well as the relationship between income 
security and age, gender, and work participation. Between the two populations, 
Singapore fared worse than Hong Kong in the 1990s in terms of old-age income 
security, then experienced very slight improvements in the 2000s, but these did not 
change the overall picture. Following the above analysis of the availability of income 
sources, the next two chapters examine in detail the key pillars of public pensions and 
family support. 
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Appendix 2.1 Statistical tables 
 
Table 2A.1  Interval regression estimates of individual income, Singapore 1995 
Variables Coefficients 
Female 1.056 
 
(15.92) 
Age -14.22*** 
 
(0.968) 
Married 304.6*** 
 
(42.74) 
Widowed 188.7*** 
 
(43.91) 
Divorced, separated 156.7** 
 
(65.08) 
Malay -95.31*** 
 
(20.80) 
Indian -91.03*** 
 
(23.96) 
Primary school education 60.88*** 
 
(16.20) 
Secondary school education 314.1*** 
 
(24.25) 
Tertiary education 807.9*** 
 
(38.06) 
Household size -8.227* 
 
(4.555) 
Number of children co-resident 63.57*** 
 
(7.091) 
Number of children living apart 29.96*** 
 
(3.206) 
No work income -586.8*** 
 
(17.25) 
No contributions from children 153.0*** 
 
(14.50) 
Constant 1,462*** 
 
(75.88) 
  Observations 4,707 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2A.2  Interval regression estimates of individual income, Singapore 2005 
Variables Coefficients 
Female  -37.68 
 
(25.64) 
Age -6.692*** 
 
(1.548) 
Married 226.9*** 
 
(58.24) 
Widowed 187.5*** 
 
(61.31) 
Divorced 184.4** 
 
(79.69) 
Separated 794.3*** 
 
(140.5) 
Malay -176.2*** 
 
(36.04) 
Indian -87.42** 
 
(37.88) 
Primary school education 83.14** 
 
(33.81) 
Secondary school education 374.0*** 
 
(28.26) 
Tertiary education 1,609*** 
 
(41.95) 
Household size 41.99*** 
 
(8.463) 
Number of household members in work -39.38** 
 
(15.57) 
Number of children co-resident 42.14** 
 
(17.51) 
Number of children living apart 16.21** 
 
(7.232) 
No work income -710.2*** 
 
(29.28) 
No contributions from children 85.27*** 
 
(27.68) 
No contributions from spouse -82.53** 
 
(37.48) 
Constant 1,326*** 
 
(122.8) 
  Observations 4,343 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2A.3  Distribution of individual incomes based on survey data and estimation by 
interval regression, Singapore 1995 and 2005, percentage 
Singapore 
dollars 
1995  2005 
Actual Estimated  Actual Estimated 
Below 250 19 17 Below 500 37 34 
250-499 30 31 500-749 21 22 
500-749 19 21 750-999 10 10 
750-999 11 9 1000-1249 12 8 
1000-1249 9 12 1250-1499 4 8 
1250-1499 4 6 1500-1999 5 9 
1500-1749 2 2 2000-2499 3 4 
1750-1999 1 1 2500-2999 2 3 
2000 and above 5 1 3000-4999 2 0 
   5000 and above 2 2 
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3. A comparison of public pension systems in Hong Kong and 
Singapore 
 
This chapter considers the first of two key sources of income security in old age, 
public pensions. The second, family support, is discussed in Chapter 4. Public pensions 
are mainly provided through the Central Provident Fund (CPF) in Singapore, and a 
tiered system combining the Social Security Allowance Scheme (SSAS), the 
Comprehensive Social Security Assistance Scheme (CSSA), and the Mandatory 
Provident Fund (MPF) in Hong Kong.
7
 The background and structure of both systems 
are first described below, followed by a discussion of housing and other assets as 
possible alternative sources of retirement income. Next, the chapter reviews the 
evidence on pension outcomes under the two systems. The final section reflects on the 
sustainability of public pensions in Hong Kong and Singapore from the perspective of 
recent debates about intergenerational conflict. 
 
3.1  Public pensions in Hong Kong 
Policy background 
As the policy histories of the public pension systems in Hong Kong and Singapore are 
covered in more detail in Part 3 of the study, the background sections here briefly 
summarise the context of the two systems. 
 Historically the colonial government has played a limited role in social security 
in Hong Kong. MacPherson (1993) observed that the policy stance was ―a convenient 
conjunction of cultural sensitivity and cost-saving‖ (p. 52). The government 
encouraged tradition familial obligations while suppressing the tax burden on 
businesses and social expenditure. Social assistance was only formalised in 1971 with 
the Public Assistance Scheme, which provided means-tested benefits to persons who 
were unemployed or unable to work. This scheme was renamed the Comprehensive 
Social Security Assistance (CSSA) Scheme in 1993. Due to the lack of a public 
                                                 
7
 Separate public pension schemes exist for civil servants in Hong Kong and Singapore. In Singapore 
most public servants except political office holders, long-serving Members of Parliament, members of 
the Administrative Service, and police and military personnel were transferred to the CPF scheme in 
1986 (Low & Aw, 2004). Separate provident fund schemes exist for civil servants and teachers in Hong 
Kong. These generally feature employer (i.e. government) contributions that increase with length of 
service (Civil Service Bureau, 2013; Education Bureau, 2013). Civil service pensions are beyond the 
scope of this study. 
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pension system, the CSSA has traditionally been an important source of income for the 
elderly population. Even in recent years, old age cases still account for more than half 
of the CSSA cases (Figure 3.1). Towards the end of the 1990s the government became 
increasingly concerned about the CSSA caseload which doubled between 1993 and 
1998 (Social Welfare Department, 1998). The cost of the scheme also grew over the 
years to almost 10% of government recurrent expenditure in the 2000s. A 1998 review 
by the Social Welfare Department led to a downward revision of the assistance rates 
but not for elderly applicants. 
 
Figure 3.1  Number of cases under the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance 
(CSSA) Scheme, 1997-2009 
 
Source: Social Welfare Department (2010) 
 
 Soon after the introduction of the Public Assistance Scheme, the Disability and 
Infirmity Allowance was established in 1973 (Chow, 1978, 1985b). This was a tax-
financed demogrant for elderly persons who met the physical criteria, administered on 
a flat-rate basis and without means-testing. As all elderly persons above 75 years old 
were considered infirm, the allowance functioned in effect as a universal basic 
pension. It was renamed the Special Needs Allowance Scheme in 1979 (Brewer & 
MacPherson, 1997). In 1988 the allowance was restructured into a universal Higher 
Old Age Allowance from 70 years old and a means-tested Normal Old Age Allowance 
for persons between 67 and 70. A gradual expansion of the scheme saw the eligibility 
age for the latter allowance reduced from 67 to 66 years old in 1990, and further to 65 
years old in 1991. The scheme was renamed the Social Security Allowance Scheme 
(SSAS) in 1993. 
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 Parallel to these public schemes, voluntary occupational pensions had been 
offered by employers in Hong Kong for many decades, numbering 1,500 schemes by 
the end of the 1970s (Ramesh, 2004). These varied widely in terms of funding and 
benefits. In 1993 the Occupational Retirement Schemes Ordinance (ORSO) was 
passed to regulate these schemes (MPF Schemes Authority, 2012). The law sets broad 
requirements for the schemes to meet their liabilities and on investments and the 
administration of assets. Discussions regarding a national provident fund had begun as 
early as the 1960s under the British administration but legislation for the Mandatory 
Provident Fund (MPF) was only passed in 1995 just before reversion to Chinese rule. 
The scheme started operation in December 2000. To facilitate transition to the MPF 
system, providers of ORSO schemes that were in place by 1995 were allowed to seek 
exemption from the MPF provided their schemes were governed by a trust and 
encompassed benefits for death, disability, and retirement. Members of exempted 
schemes are not required to participate in the MPF.
8
 Workers who voluntarily join new 
occupational pension schemes set up from 1995 onwards are required to subscribe to 
the MPF. The list of MPF-exempted ORSO schemes is therefore capped and will not 
grow. This arrangement extends protection of retirement savings to MPF-exempted 
ORSO scheme participants. Since 2001 ORSO scheme membership has been gradually 
replaced by the MPF (Figure 3.2). Between 2001 and 2013, the number of available 
ORSO schemes has fallen from 6400 to 5200, while the number of participating 
employers has declined from 8800 to 6900 (MPF Schemes Authority, 2001, 2013). As 
the ORSO is gradually being phased out and is already a much smaller system than the 
MPF, it is not covered in the analysis in the rest of this study. 
 
  
                                                 
8
 In organisations that offer MPF-exempted ORSO schemes, their existing staff and new employees who 
join after 2000 are allowed to make a one-time choice between the MPF and the ORSO schemes. For 
the existing staff, the payment of their ORSO benefits will be based on the original ORSO scheme rules. 
But for new employees, upon ceasing employment, they must transfer a share of their accrued ORSO 
benefits – known as the MPF minimum benefits – to a holding MPF account, to be withdrawn according 
to MPF rules. If there are any residual benefits after this transfer, these may be withdrawn according to 
the ORSO scheme rules. 
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Figure 3.2  Employee membership in the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) and 
Occupational Retirement Schemes Ordinance (ORSO) Schemes, Hong Kong 2001-
2010 
 
Source: MPF Schemes Authority (various years) 
 
Policy structure 
Public old-age pensions are accessed through a combination of the CSSA Scheme, the 
SSAS, and the MPF in Hong Kong. Their rules are as such: 
 
 The CSSA Scheme provides the equivalent of a minimum income guarantee 
for households (Social Welfare Department, 2012). Assistance rates are derived 
from the shortfall between household income and a table of prescribed living 
expenses. These expenses comprise a basic component known as standard rates 
that vary by household size, old age, ill health, and disability; top-ups known as 
supplements related to single parenthood, community living for persons with 
severe disability, and transport; and more than thirty types of special grants to 
support diverse household needs such as housing rental, utilities, medical 
rehabilitation, social care services, and children‘s education. Applications are 
further subject to tests of residency and assets. The limits for the latter also 
vary by household size, old age, ill health, and disability. According to the 
latest rates, an elderly couple at 65 years old who earn no income and have less 
than HK$59,000 worth of assets are entitled to HK$5,530 excluding further 
supplements and discretionary grants, equivalent to 46% of the median 
monthly work income of HK$12,000 in 2012 (Census and Statistics 
Department, 2013a). The CSSA Scheme covers approximately 15% of the 
population aged 60 and above. 
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 Up to April 2013, the SSAS provided two types of monthly allowance for old 
age and severe disability. The Normal Old Age Allowance began at 65 years 
old and came with an asset and income test. The combined asset and monthly 
income limits for an elderly couple were HK$281,000 and HK$10,520 
respectively. From 70 years old, all residents were eligible for the universal 
Higher Old Age Allowance. Both allowances were flat rate at HK$1,090 per 
person per month, about 9% of the median work income. The SSAS covers 
55% of the elderly population aged 65 and above. From April 2013, these 
allowances were superceded by the Old Age Living Allowance (OALA). 
Between 65 and 69, the OALA replaces the Normal Old Age Allowance with a 
flat-rate pension that is about twice as high at HK$2,200 and is subject to the 
same means test. From 70 years old,  persons who pass the means test receive 
the OALA while others continue to receive the universal Higher Old Age 
Allowance, which is now simply known as the Old Age Allowance. 
Comparatively, the CSSA Scheme offers more generous benefits than the 
SSAS but is subject to stricter asset criteria. Persons who are already receiving 
assistance from the CSSA Scheme are therefore not entitled to SSAS benefits 
as no one is allowed to be on both schemes at the same time. 
 
 The MPF is a defined contribution, privately managed, provident fund scheme 
(MPF Schemes Authority, 2012). It is compulsory for the majority of workers 
aged between 18 and 65 years old and most self-employed persons. Employers 
and employees each contribute 5% of monthly salary to the employee‘s 
account under a MPF fund, subject to minimum and maximum income levels 
of HK$5,000 and HK$20,000. For workers who earn less than HK$5,000, only 
the employer is required to contribute. Both parties may make additional 
voluntary contributions and the government occasionally makes one-off 
contributions. Trustees are appointed by a regulator to offer MPF schemes, 
each consisting of a spread of funds of different risk levels. The employer 
chooses a scheme for the employees, while each employee decides on the 
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specific fund to invest in.
9
 The MPF Schemes Authority oversees the 
governance aspects of the funds and monitors compliance with statutory 
standards. The trustees appointed under the MPF are required to take out 
professional indemnity insurance to protect scheme members from losses due 
to financial misconduct. The government has also established a statutory 
Compensation Fund with HK$600m seed capital to compensate workers in 
instances where the insurance is insufficient to cover losses. When changing 
employment, workers may transfer their savings and accrued dividends to the 
MPF scheme at the new workplace. The final balance in the provident fund 
account, comprising all contributions plus investment returns, may be 
withdrawn as a lump sum at age 65 or 60 with early retirement. Coverage 
levels under the MPF are very high (Table 3.1). Almost 100% of employees 
and 69% of the self-employed workforce participated in 2012, adding up to a 
total coverage of 95% for the entire employed population (MPF Schemes 
Authority, 2013). 
 
  
                                                 
9
 In March 2013 there were 19 approved trustees offering 41 schemes made up of almost 500 different 
funds (MPF Schemes Authority, 2013). The MPF funds fall into three categories – Master Trust 
Schemes for general employees and the self-employed; Employer-sponsored Schemes for organisations 
with large numbers of staff; and Industry Schemes that are more portable to accommodate labour 
mobility in the catering and construction sectors. All but three schemes belong to the first category. 
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Table 3.1  Coverage of the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) in Hong Kong, 2012 
 Persons 
(thousands) 
Percentage 
Total employed population 18-65 3,600  
Employees 3,200 100 
Exempted from MPF
1
 900 27 
Required to participate in MPF 2,400 73 
Actual participants 2,300 72 
Self-employed 300 100 
Exempted from MPF
2
 4 1 
Required to participate in MPF 300 99 
Actual participants 200 69 
Total required to participate in MPF
3
 2,700 100 
Total actual participants (total coverage) 2,600 95 
Note: Numbers may not add up due to rounding. 
1. Exemptions apply to civil servants, teachers, members of MPF-exempted ORSO schemes, 
domestic employees, some foreign workers, and workers in short-term employment. 
2. Licensed hawkers are exempted. 
3. About 14% of the employed population belong to other retirement schemes while 11% are 
not required to join any retirement schemes. 
Source: MPF Schemes Authority (2013) 
 
3.2  Public pensions in Singapore 
Policy background 
Singapore‘s Central Provident Fund (CPF) was introduced in 1955 by the British 
colonial administration after lengthy deliberations that almost resulted in a social 
insurance scheme (Low & Aw, 2004). The CPF has historically been closely linked 
with nation-building and economic management. As a mandatory centrally managed 
defined contribution scheme with payouts only at retirement, it helped to raise 
resources for infrastructure development following Singapore‘s independence (Hu, 
1986). But not long after, strong economic performance and annual budget surpluses 
meant that the government could fund projects such as public housing from operating 
revenue and no longer needed to tap on CPF funds (Asher, 1985, 1995). Instead the 
savings have been mostly invested abroad by the state-run Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation (GIC). Throughout its history the CPF has been subjected to 
almost continuous parametric adjustment and reform. These changes can be 
summarised as three trends. 
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 In the first few decades and particularly in the 1980s, the CPF scheme 
expanded to incorporate a multitude of other social objectives unrelated to retirement 
(Table 3.2). The most important of these is the Public Housing Scheme which allows 
the use of CPF savings to buy public residential property, accounting for high home 
ownership rates as well as a significant drain on retirement saving. The Medisave 
Scheme diverts about a fifth of monthly CPF contributions for hospitalisation 
expenses, which allows a high ratio of out-of-pocket to public healthcare financing in 
Singapore. From 1986 it was permitted to use a portion of CPF savings for private 
investment in approved financial products. The range of approved investments was 
gradually liberalised subsequently. 
 
Table 3.2  Major policy extensions to Singapore‘s Central Provident Fund (CPF)  
Purpose Year Scheme 
Housing 1968 Public Housing Scheme 
For purchasing public housing 
 1981 Approved Residential Properties Scheme 
For purchasing private housing 
Health 1984 Medisave Scheme 
For hospitalisation and approved treatment expenses 
 1990 Medishield Scheme 
An insurance scheme for catastrophic illnesses 
 2002 Eldershield Scheme 
A severe disability insurance scheme for older adults 
Education 1989 Education Scheme 
Allows loans from individual CPF savings to support 
children through tertiary education 
Investment 1978 Singapore Bus Services Share Scheme 
First approved investment scheme using CPF savings  
 1986 Approved Investment Scheme 
For private investment in approved financial products, 
later expanded and renamed CPF Investment Scheme 
Insurance 1982 Home Protection Insurance Scheme 
To assist family members with mortgage payments in 
the event of permanent incapacity or death 
 1989 Dependents’ Protection Insurance Scheme 
To provide financial support for family members in the 
event of permanent in capacity or death 
Source: Adapted from Asher (2004), Low & Aw (2004), and CPF Board (various years) 
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 The second trend is the fluctuation of contribution and interest rates. As the 
CPF scheme grew to cater for more policy purposes, contribution rates initially rose in 
tandem then became more unpredictable. A stable rate of 10% from 1955 to 1968 grew 
to a high of 50% in 1985 (Figure 3.3). These were followed by three sharp rate cuts in 
1986, 1998, and 2003 in response to economic downturns, as employer contribution 
rates were used as a tool for calibrating wage costs. Critically in the first two rounds of 
rate cuts, contributions to the Special Account that is protected for retirement was 
entirely stopped. Amidst concern about the adequacy of the CPF for retirement, a 
government-appointed committee advised in 2002 against ―using the CPF as a counter-
cyclical, cost-cutting tool, except as a last resort in exceptional economic 
circumstances‖ (Economic Review Committee, 2003, p. 8). Perhaps reflecting a shift 
in thinking among policymakers, the cut in 2003 was more moderate and was to 
Ordinary Account contributions only. From 1962 onwards the CPF‘s nominal interest 
rates also began to show volatility, peaking at 6.5% in the 1970s before falling and 
stabilising at 2.5% from 2000 onwards (4% for the Special Account, Figure 3.4). 
 
Figure 3.3  Central Provident Fund (CPF) contribution rates and allocation, 1955-
2013, percentage of monthly wage 
 
Note: All rates as at January of each year and for the youngest workers. From 1988 older 
workers paid progressively lower contributions. Rates did not change between 1955 and 1968. 
The Special and Medisave Accounts were only introduced in 1977 and 1984 respectively. 
Source: CPF Board (2013a, various years) 
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Figure 3.4  Central Provident Fund (CPF) nominal interest rates, 1955-2013 
 
Note: All rates as at January of each year. Rates did not change between 1955 and 1962. The 
Special Account was introduced in 1977 but rates were the same as for the Ordinary Account 
until 1996. 
Source: CPF Board (2013a) 
 
 Perhaps to counter the diversification of the CPF scheme and lower 
contribution and interest rates over time (Figure 3.4), a number of reforms were 
implemented to safeguard saving for old age. The 1977 introduction of the Special 
Account had already ensured that a portion of contributions would not be accessible 
for non-retirement purposes such as housing (Low & Aw, 2004). Due to the political 
sensitivity of raising the CPF payout age which was then 55, the government instead 
introduced the Minimum Sum Scheme in 1987 which stipulated the retention of a 
minimum amount in the CPF account to finance benefits from 62. Only savings in 
excess of the minimum could be withdrawn at age 55. Thereafter the minimum amount 
was revised upwards periodically and the withdrawal requirements were further 
tightened in 2003 (CPF Board, various years). In 2009 a compulsory annuity scheme 
that pays benefits till death replaced the previous arrangement of spreading payouts 
over a period of 20 years. In 2012 the payout age was increased from 62 to 63 and will 
eventually reach 65 in 2018. 
 
Policy structure 
Under current CPF rules, employees aged up to 35 are required to contribute 20% of 
their monthly salary while employers contribute an additional 16% (CPF Board, 
2013a). Lower contribution rates apply for older employees (Table 3.3). Monthly 
savings are allocated to three separate accounts at different ratios depending on age: 
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the Ordinary Account for housing and other pre-retirement withdrawals, the Special 
Account that is ring-fenced for retirement, and the Medisave Account which finances 
healthcare spending. The administratively determined nominal annual interest on 
savings is 2.5% for the Ordinary Account and 4% for the other two accounts.
10
 Savings 
above S$20,000 in the Ordinary Account and S$40,000 in the Special Account may be 
invested in approved financial products and the profits withdrawn before retirement. 
At the end of 2011 about 27% of CPF members had taken out such investments using 
their Ordinary Account savings while 14% had invested using their Special Account 
savings (CPF Board, various years). At 55 years old, total savings plus interest in 
excess of a minimum sum can be withdrawn as a lump sum. The minimum sum is then 
used to pay the premium for an annuity scheme known as CPF LIFE that provides a 
monthly benefit for life from 63 years old.  
 
Table 3.3 Central Provident Fund (CPF) contribution rates, 2013 
 Contribution 
(% monthly earnings) 
Allocation 
(% monthly earnings) 
Age Employer Employee Total 
Ordinary 
Account 
Special 
Account 
Medisave 
Account 
Up to 35 16 20 36 23 6 7 
36-45 16 20 36 21 7 8 
46-50 16 20 36 19 8 9 
51-55 14 18.5 32.5 13.5 9.5 9.5 
56-60 10.5 13 23.5 12 2 9.5 
61-65 7 7.5 14.5 3.5 1.5 9.5 
Above 65 6.5 5 11.5 1 1 9.5 
Source: CPF Board (2013a) 
 
 Due to the scope and flexibility of possible pre-retirement withdrawals, even 
individuals who make the same level of CPF contributions may eventually have vastly 
different savings left over for retirement. Historical aggregate saving and withdrawal 
data help to illustrate how the CPF has been financed and the distribution of savings 
                                                 
10
 These are also the legislated minimum annual interest rates. Every quarter the rate for the Ordinary 
Account is checked against a weighted sum of 12-month fixed deposit and month-end saving deposit 
interest rates at major local banks and revised if this exceeds 2.5%. The interest rate for the Special and 
Medisave accounts is compared against the 12-month average yield of 10-year government securities 
plus one percent, also on a quarterly basis. While market-related, these rules are essentially arbitrary as 
CPF savings, being held over a much longer time, are not directly comparable to these benchmarks.  
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across various purposes in recent years. While these may yet change in future, the 
historical trend helps to give a sense of the structure of the CPF scheme. Figure 3.5 
shows the annual aggregate saving and withdrawal under the CPF from 2001 to 2010. 
The composition of CPF saving remained quite stable over the period. On average 
wage contributions represent about 77% of total annual saving, while dividends and 
interest account for another 19%. The remaining 3% is made up of government grants 
to support home ownership and other ad hoc transfers, for example as part of ―wealth-
sharing‖ schemes when the economy performs well. The use of CPF saving has shown 
more variation across years. Between 2001 and 2010 public housing and other 
property purchases took up 53% of total annual withdrawals on average, representing 
the greatest single use of CPF savings. The data also suggest a gradual reprioritisation 
of retirement and healthcare over financial investment. Higher health and disability 
insurance spending drove the total withdrawal for healthcare purposes from 3% to 
15%. Although the absolute amount of withdrawals for retirement remained stable, the 
steady fall in withdrawals for other purposes such as investment and properties other 
than public housing meant that retirement withdrawals represented 32% of total annual 
withdrawals in 2010 compared to 11% in 2001, averaging 20% over the period.  
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Figure 3.5  Annual aggregate saving and withdrawal under the Central Provident Fund 
(CPF), 2001-2010 
Saving 
 
Withdrawal 
 
Source: Own analysis based on CPF Board (various years) 
 
 It is also informative to compare the annual flow of withdrawal against saving. 
Between 2001 and 2010, the total amount of withdrawals for housing and other 
properties as a proportion of total saving ranged from 17% (in 2010) to 43% (in 2002) 
and averaged 32%, with a downward trend over time. Withdrawals for investment was 
equivalent to an average of 10% of total saving, also decreasing over time. The decline 
of these withdrawals may be related to broader trends in investment conditions and the 
housing market, as the CPF rules pertaining to them have not been significantly 
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tightened.
11
 Taking the ten-year averages, about 40% of annual saving is deducted for 
non-retirement purposes. This is equivalent to reducing the contribution rate for 
retirement to 22% of monthly wage, rather than the actual rate of 36%. 
 Besides the CPF, Singapore operates a strict means-tested public assistance 
scheme that supports elderly persons who are unable to work, have no stable income, 
and lack family support (Ministry of Social and Family Development, 2013). The 
coverage of the scheme is extremely limited. Between 2007 and 2012, around 3000 
persons received assistance each year, equivalent to less than 1% of the elderly 
population aged 65 and above. The rate of assistance is also very low. In 2012 an 
elderly couple would receive S$700 per month, about 12% of the median monthly 
household income from work.
 12
 As the current scheme is negligible to old-age income 
security for the majority of the elderly population in Singapore (see Chapter 2 on 
income sources), it is not covered in the projections in later chapters. 
 
Summary 
 Elderly persons in Hong Kong depend on three public sources of income. The 
CSSA Scheme provides assistance to make up the difference between 
household income and prescribed living expenses. The SSAS and OALA 
Schemes provide a means-tested allowance for persons aged 65-69, and a 
universal allowance equivalent to a basic pension or a more generous means-
tested allowance from 70 onwards. The MPF is a defined contribution, 
privately managed, provident fund scheme to which the employer and 
employee each contributes 5% of monthly salary. Savings are invested in funds 
chosen by the employee and paid out as a lump sum at age 65. Prior to the 
introduction of the MPF elderly persons were heavily dependent on the CSSA 
Scheme and still make up half of all CSSA cases. The CSSA Scheme covers 
about 15% of the population aged 60 and above while the SSAS, which is less 
generous, covers about 55% of elderly persons aged 65 and above. 
 
                                                 
11
 However an earlier scheme allowing CPF savings to be used for non-residential private property was 
phased out in 2006. 
12
 In 2012 there were 3,047 public assistance recipients, the elderly population size was 378,700, and the 
median monthly household income from work among residence households excluding employer CPF 
contributions was $6000 (Department of Statistics, 2012, 2013b; Ministry of Social and Family 
Development, 2013).  
 80 
 The CPF is the main pillar of old-age income security in Singapore. Although 
the scheme started as a retirement policy, reforms over the years expanded its 
scope to cover housing, health, education, investment, and insurance. 
Historically employers‘ CPF contribution rates have been cut periodically to 
improve wage competitiveness during economic downturns. But concerns 
about the impact on retirement saving has led to reforms to protect a minimum 
sum of savings and to postpone payouts. Currently employers and employees 
each contribute 16% and 20% of monthly salary to the scheme. Contributions 
are divided into accounts for retirement, healthcare, and other usage. 
Administratively determined interest rates of between 2.5% and 4% are paid on 
savings, and withdrawal upon retirement is via compulsory annuity. Between 
2001 and 2010 about half of all CPF withdrawals were for housing while just 
20% were for retirement. 
 
 There are several important differences between the two systems in terms of 
implications for retirement income. First, taken as a whole, the tiered public pension 
system in Hong Kong is more comprehensive and balanced, and offers better 
protection to individuals with disadvantageous work histories. The almost singular 
reliance on the CPF in Singapore exposes some elderly persons to greater risk of 
income insecurity in old age. Second, in practice, CPF contributions for retirement are 
lower than the total contribution rates suggest. This is due to large pre-retirement 
withdrawals for properties and investment, as well as the diversion of contributions 
towards healthcare. Third, although MPF savings are subject to market risk, the system 
allows greater individual choice and transparency. The CPF on the other hand is 
protected from market risk by legislated minimum interest rates. But the rates are low 
and the style of central management may imply political risk. These issues are 
discussed in later sections. 
 
3.3  Housing and asset ownership 
Given that the largest CPF withdrawals are for housing, the policies that link the CPF 
to housing purchase and the potential of housing assets to contribute towards 
retirement income must be considered. This section examines asset ownership using 
the national survey datasets described earlier and reviews recent policy experiences 
with encouraging the liquidation of housing assets in Singapore. Although the 
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diversion of mandatory retirement savings towards housing is more relevant to 
Singapore‘s CPF, comparison with Hong Kong is useful for understanding the patterns 
and scale of asset ownership among both elderly populations and helps to provide a 
more complete picture of financial security.  
 
Asset ownership 
Current CPF rules permit the entire sum of savings in the Ordinary Account to be 
withdrawn to pay for public or private housing, either directly or through monthly 
mortgage payments, up to a threshold or ―valuation limit‖ that varies from 100% of the 
property‘s assessed market value for resale public housing, to 150% of assessed value 
for private housing (CPF Board, 2013a). As a result, Singaporean households may 
have considerable wealth tied up in housing. In a simulation study, McCarthy, 
Mitchell, and Piggott (2002) estimated that in Singapore three quarters of elderly 
persons‘ total wealth are in the form of housing. The data on asset ownership provide 
some corroboration. In Singapore the most common assets owned by elderly persons 
were savings and housing (Figure 3.6). In 2005, 75% of elderly persons had savings 
while 63% owned housing. But in Hong Kong, 97% had savings and just 23% owned 
the property they lived in. 
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Figure 3.6  Percentage of elderly persons (65+) who own assets in Singapore and 
Hong Kong by income band 
Singapore 1995 
 
Singapore 2005 
 
Hong Kong 2000 
 
Singapore 1995: Income bands in Singapore dollars are (1) Less than $250, (2) $250-499, (3) 
$500-749, (4) $750-999, (5) $1000-1249, (6) $1250-1499, (7) $1500-1749, (8) $1750-1999, 
(9) $2000+. Median work income of $1630 falls within band (7). 
Singapore 2005: Income bands in Singapore dollars are (0) None, (1) $1-499, (2) $500-749, 
(3) $750-999, (4) $1000-1249, (5) $1250-1499, (6) $1500-1999, (7) $2000-2499, (8) $2500-
2000, (9) $3000-4999, (10) $5000+. Median work income of $2020 falls within band (7). 
Hong Kong: Income bands in Hong Kong dollars are (1) $1-999, (2) $1000-$1999, (3) $2000-
$2999, (4) $3000-$4999, (5) $5000-9999, (6) $10000-19999, (7) $20000+. Median work 
income of around $10000 falls between bands (5) and (6).  
Source: Own analysis using data from Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995, 
2005; Hong Kong General Household Survey Supplementary Enquiry on the Socio-
demographic, Health and Economic Profiles of Elderly People and Soon-to-be Old People 
2000. 
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 However Figure 3.6 also indicates that asset ownership was highly unequal. In 
Singapore, elderly persons with lower incomes were also poorer in assets. The data for 
both 1995 and 2005 show that individuals from higher income bands were more likely 
to own each of the five types of asset. In 2005, among persons with no income, 31% 
owned the house they were living in, 34% had savings, and fewer than 4% had each of 
the remaining types of asset. About 47% of them had none of the five types of asset. In 
contrast, among elderly persons from the highest income bracket, ownership of 
housing reached 100%, savings 92%, stocks 65%, and business 34%. Similarly, in 
Hong Kong, there is a visible income gradient in asset ownership, particularly for 
occupied property. These suggest that poor income positions were unlikely to be 
reversed by access to financial assets in either population. Furthermore data on the 
value of assets show that in Hong Kong, those with lower individual incomes also 
owned smaller amounts of asset (Figure 3.7).
13
 For instance, in the lowest income 
bracket, the total value of assets owned excluding occupied properties for 52% of 
elderly persons was below HK$10,000, or slightly less than the median monthly work 
income of HK$10,600 that year. But in the highest income bracket, total asset value 
was below HK$10,000 for only 20% of the asset owners. 
 
Figure 3.7  Value of assets owned excluding occupied properties among elderly asset 
owners (65+) in Hong Kong by income band, 2008 
 
Income bands in HK$ are (1) $0-$1999, (2) $2000-$2999, (3) $3000-$3999, (4) $4000-$5999, 
(5) $6000+. Median work income in 2008 was HK$10,600. 
Source: Own analysis using data from Hong Kong Thematic Household Survey 2008. 
 
                                                 
13
 Similar data are not available for Singapore, although a press report has suggested that in 2005 even 
the bottom household income quintile group had average housing equity roughly equivalent to more 
than five years of median work income (H. Y. Tan, 2011). On the other hand, economists have pointed 
out that HDB flats are not allowed to be used as collateral for loans to finance other retirement needs. 
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 Between 1995 and 2005, the inequality of asset ownership may have widened 
in Singapore. While in 1995 the ownership of stocks, insurance, and businesses was 
below 10% for all but the highest income band, a distinct income gradient emerged in 
2005 particularly for stocks (Figure 3.6). Stock ownership in 2005 was close to zero in 
the lowest income bands but rose steadily up to around two thirds in the highest 
income bands. Even at the lower end of the income distribution, elderly persons with 
higher individual incomes experienced greater gains in asset ownership between 1995 
and 2005. Table 3.4 shows that in 1995, ownership of housing and saving were 
comparable for persons with individual incomes that were equivalent to 30-50% and 
50-60% of median population monthly earnings. But by 2005, a gap opened up 
between the two groups. For persons with individual incomes that were 30-50% of 
median earnings, housing ownership rose from 71% to 76% while ownership of 
savings increased from 67% to 82%. But for the 50-60% income group, these rates 
increased from 70% to 85%, and from 68% to 92%, respectively.  
 
Table 3.4  Percentage of lower income elderly persons (65+) in Singapore who own 
assets, 1995 and 2005 
Elderly income as share of 
median gross monthly earnings 
of all workers 
 
30% to 50%  
 
50% to 60% 
 1995 2005  1995 2005 
Housing 71 76  70 85 
Savings 67 82  68 92 
Life insurance 2 10  4 17 
Stocks, shares, bonds 5 5  10 16 
Business 1 0  4 3 
Note: The ratios of elderly incomes to population earnings are approximated from income 
bands. 
Source: Own analysis using data from Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995, 
2005 
 
Housing as a source of retirement income 
For elderly persons who do own assets, the next question is how far these can 
contribute to retirement income. The focus here is again on housing. In theory, housing 
assets can contribute to income security in a variety of ways (Pensions Commission, 
2004): they enable rent-free living; they can generate rental income; they can be sold 
for profit when elderly persons move in with others or downsize to smaller or cheaper 
housing (i.e. trade down); and they can be monetised through equity-release 
instruments like reverse mortgages. Historically, CPF rules were gradually liberalised 
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in order to promote home ownership. But as concern grew about the diversion of 
saving away from retirement in the 1990s, attention turned towards policies to allow 
the liquidation of housing value (see Chapter 8 on these policy developments). Some 
of these policies include: 
  
 Subletting rules have been gradually relaxed and currently permit public flats 
to be rented out provided that a minimum occupancy period has been met 
(Housing and Development Board, various years). 
 
 Since 1998, the public housing authority has been building 30-year lease studio 
flats for persons aged 55 and above, which promotes downsizing to release 
equity from larger properties (H. Y. Tan, 2006). A one-time cash grant called 
the Silver Housing Bonus was introduced in 2012 for elderly persons who 
move into smaller properties.  
 
 Reverse mortgages had been available for private property owners since 1997 
and were cautiously introduced into the public housing sector in 2006 for 
homeowners aged 62 and above with just two commercial providers offering 
both lifelong and term-based options (Housing and Development Board, 
various years; Loo, 2006; G. Ng, 2006)
14
. 
 
 The public housing authority established its own Lease Buyback Scheme in 
2009 which buys back the term of lease in excess of 30 years from 
homeowners aged 62 and above with an upfront lump sum payment and an 
annuity for life (Cheam, 2008, 2009b). This is essentially a reverse mortgage 
scheme that combines term and annuity features, in that the property must be 
vacated after 30 years although the scheme will continue to pay a monthly 
income for life. Homeowners who outlive 30 years may have their lease 
extended or be relocated to rental housing (Housing and Development Board, 
2013). To make the scheme more attractive, the housing authority also adds a 
                                                 
14
 In the previous year policymakers had expressed their doubts about the viability of such schemes as 
they believed that the value of public housing was too low to generate a significant monthly income for 
elderly persons (Leong, 2005). 
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cash grant to the assessed value of the lease and has recently relaxed the 
eligibility criteria. 
 
 These measures have had mixed results. In a national survey of public housing 
residents in 2008, just 12% of elderly persons aged 65 and above cited subletting their 
properties as a source of income, while 8% had traded down and a negligible 2% had 
participated in the Lease Buyback Scheme (Housing and Development Board, 2010). 
In comparison the 55-64 age group who were approaching retirement were less 
favourable towards renting out their properties for retirement income (6%) but were 
more prepared to trade down (16%). The government‘s Lease Buyback Scheme 
remained unpopular among this younger cohort with just 2% expecting to take up the 
option. Other data reported in the press are consistent with these findings. Among 
owners of public flats aged 55 and above in 2013, about one in ten were renting out 
rooms or their entire properties (Yong, 2013). While the uptake of studio flats has been 
strong, the total stock of such flats was just 2,400 in 2009 compared to about 254,000 
flats owned by persons aged 55 and above in 2013 (T. Tan, 2009; Yong, 2013). But the 
worst response by far has been towards reverse mortgages. Reverse mortgages for 
private property owners stopped in 2008, with the main commercial provider having 
issued about 500 loans since these were launched in 1997 (Cheam, 2009a). The first 
commercial reverse mortgage scheme for public housing attracted less than 20 
homeowners in the first two years and has largely been superseded by the government-
run Lease Buyback Scheme since 2009 (Mathi, 2008). While the latter appears to be 
more popular, with 80 participants in the first six months (Foo, 2009), the total 
subscription of less than 500 out of 234,000 eligible households by the end of 2012 
suggests that it is not yet an important strategy for liquidating housing assets among 
elderly households (Chin, 2012; Hui, 2012b). 
 International experience also suggests that the acceptance of equity-release 
schemes among the elderly population and their impact on retirement income security 
cannot be assumed. The first issue, as pointed out in the previous section, is that 
housing equity is often unequally distributed and correlates with income. This is also 
true in the UK even though the value of housing assets rises less than proportionately 
with income levels (Pensions Commission, 2004), which means that housing equity 
has limited potential to elevate low-income elderly persons from poverty or to reduce 
income inequality among the elderly population (Hancock, 1998). A study in the 
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United States has found that because low-income persons also tend to have less 
housing equity, incomes from reverse mortgage annuities would be significant only for 
persons over 85 with short remaining life expectancies (Venti & Wise, 1991). 
Simulations performed by Mayer and Simon (1994) found that reverse mortgage 
annuities can boost the incomes of almost 40% of elderly households by more than 
20%, although these were more likely to be poor households with very low income 
levels. 
 The second issue is that elderly persons may simply prefer to keep their 
housing assets. Venti and Wise (2000) found that most elderly households did not give 
up home ownership, and those who did were likely to have experienced a recent 
catastrophic event such as the death of a spouse. Housing equity served as 
precautionary saving, or a buffer for financial and personal shocks rather than a 
resource for normal living expenses. In the UK, the Pensions Commission (2004) has 
concluded that most housing assets are retained for bequest rather than monetised to 
fund retirement expenses, contributing further to adverse selection problems, small 
markets, and poor interest rates for equity-release products. In Singapore, too, the lack 
of a mature market for reverse mortgages, the uncertainty of housing prices at the point 
of redemption, and the possible effects on housing value should a large number of 
properties be released into the market may pose problems (Asher, 2003; Asher & 
Newman, 2003; R. Chen & Nicolas, 2006). Chia and Tsui (2005) estimate that private 
reverse mortgage schemes may only be able to provide an annuity of around 54% of 
median household income based on the value of a 4-room flat in 2000. The bequest 
motive is also an important consideration. Finch and Mason (2000) have argued that 
inheritance forms an important part of the negotiation of kin relationships in the UK, 
although more recently, Rowlingson (2006) has observed that housing may be 
increasingly perceived as a financial rather than emotional investment and that elderly 
parents have become more open to using housing equity for retirement needs. In 
Singapore, a qualitative study found that bequest is important to Chinese and Indian 
elderly persons (Mehta, 1999). In Hong Kong, there is also evidence that childless 
elderly persons with no bequest concerns are more prepared to take up reverse 
mortgages (K.L. Chou, Chow, & Chi, 2006b). 
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Summary 
 Overall the available evidence suggests that elderly persons with lower 
incomes were less likely to have access to financial assets, owned assets of 
lesser value, and experienced slower gains in asset ownership over time. 
Although housing ownership is much higher in Singapore than in Hong Kong, 
only 31% of elderly Singaporeans with no individual income owned housing in 
2005 compared to 100% of persons in the highest income bracket. In Hong 
Kong, half of elderly persons from the lowest income bracket had assets worth 
less than HK$10,000 in 2008, compared to just a fifth of persons from the 
highest income bracket. Home ownership in Singapore increased by 5 
percentage points between 1995 and 2005 for elderly persons with individual 
incomes equivalent to 30-50% of median earnings, but rose by 15 percentage 
points for those with individual incomes of 50-60% of median earnings. 
 
 The impact of linking the CPF to housing has been to tie up savings in housing 
wealth. In theory, housing ownership can contribute to financial security 
because it enables rent-free living and can generate rental income. Housing 
equity can also be released through trading down and instruments like reverse 
mortgages. However policies to encourage these options have had mixed 
results in Singapore. Only a small proportion of elderly persons has chosen to 
sublet rooms or trade down. Response to reverse mortgages has been even 
poorer. International experience highlights that the inequality of home 
ownership and a preference for keeping housing assets as precautionary saving 
or for bequest may limit the potential of housing ownership as a source of 
retirement income. Arguments that the diversion of individual CPF savings 
towards housing will reliably and substantially benefit old-age income security 
must therefore be treated with caution.  
 
3.4  Pension outcomes: Criticisms and evidence 
Policy critiques 
There is a sizeable literature assessing the adequacy of the public pension systems in 
Hong Kong and Singapore. Much of the Hong Kong literature has been critical of the 
current pension system. The main concern regarding the CSSA and SSAS has been 
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that their rates are insufficient to main an adequate standard of living. Criticisms of the 
MPF go further: 
 
 Mok (2000) argues that the scheme does not offer a layer of basic income 
protection for vulnerable groups with weak links to the labour market, such as 
women and low earners. Drawing from the Chilean experience, he also 
anticipated (as the MPF had just begun operation at the time of his writing) 
high administrative charges due to the portability of the scheme and felt that 
the private management model of the MPF would expose retirement savings to 
excessive market risk. Some of these concerns have since borne out. The return 
to MPF investments has been highly volatile in the first 10 years of the scheme 
(discussed later in this section). A recent study also estimated that the total fees 
and administrative costs of the MPF were about 1.7% of the total assets under 
management from 2010 to 2011, compared to 1.3% in Mexico‘s FORES 
scheme, 1.2% in the Australian superannuation scheme, and 0.8% in the United 
States‘s 401(k) plan (Ernst & Young, 2012).  
 
 Others have argued that the MPF‘s low contribution rates and the time required 
for the scheme to mature suggest that older cohorts of Hong Kongers will find 
little income protection under the scheme, calling instead for a fundamental 
reform of the pension system including an expansion of basic income 
protection and the introduction of a universal pension (Chow & Chou, 2005; 
Ho, 1997; Mok & Sze, 2010). In a particularly critical study, the author went as 
far as to argue that ―The case of Hong Kong‘s MPF tells us that a limited 
democratic polity is an effective institution for safeguarding the interests of the 
bureaucracy and business community‖ (C. K. Chan, 2003, p. 129). 
 
 In the case of the CPF, researchers have remarked on its effectiveness as a 
large and reliable source of funds for public investment which can promote economic 
growth (Asher, 1995). Asher (1995) argues that it encourages individual responsibility 
for social security and avoids the potential ―distortions and welfare losses‖ associated 
with pay-as-you-go systems as it is fully funded. He has also highlighted that the CPF 
makes timely payouts and is generally efficient (Asher, 2004). But mounting concern 
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in the 1990s about the adequacy of the scheme as the main source of retirement 
income was widely covered in the press (Henson & Chung, 1994; Long, 1999) and 
documented in a broad literature critiquing various aspects of the policy‘s design and 
governance: 
 
 Within the overall configuration of the public pension system, individuals are 
expected to rely primarily on the CPF. But like the MPF, the CPF does not 
serve the needs of persons who are economically inactive or disadvantaged
15
. 
Policymakers are careful to say that the CPF provides only a modest level of 
retirement income and should be complemented with other income sources 
(CPF Board, various years). Yet there is very limited public provision outside 
of the CPF while informal kinship support is under threat as families become 
smaller. High contributions to the CPF may also affect the scope for private 
saving especially among low earners (Cardarelli, Gobat, et al., 2000). 
 
 Among CPF members, savings are insufficient to maintain even a minimum 
standard of living for most retirees. Since detailed data on account balances 
upon retirement are not released, this observation is usually based on indirect 
evidence such as average account sizes and the rate of return to savings relative 
to average income growth (e.g. Asher, 2002b, discussed below). Furthermore 
the CPF has no elements of social risk-pooling or redistribution, and both 
inflation and longevity risks are borne by the individual. As an ―alternative to 
the welfare state‖, the CPF system appears to favour larger socio-economic 
goals over individual income security (Asher, 1995, 2002b, 2004). 
 
 Low CPF savings has been attributed to several factors. First, although total 
contribution rates to the CPF are very high by international standards, a large 
proportion of the savings is diverted to other purposes (Cardarelli, Gobat, et al., 
2000). Second, contribution rate adjustments to stabilise the economy has hurt 
                                                 
15
 A wage supplement scheme for low-earning workers aged 35 and above, called the Workfare Income 
Supplement, was introduced in 2007 in an attempt to address this (CPF Board, 2013b). The benefit is 
split between cash and a CPF top-up. But this does not cater for situations where workers have 
intermittent employment rather than persistently low wages. Delaying retirement is another option for 
improving income security. Re-employment legislation was introduced in 2012. From the age of 62, 
older workers must be offered re-employment annually up to 65 years old, eventually to be raised to 67 
(Ministry of Manpower, 2013). 
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accumulation for retirement, especially cuts to Special Account contributions. 
Third the administered interest rates are low. Asher (1995, 2002a, 2002b) has 
found that the basic interest rate of 2.5%, while guaranteed by the government 
and in that sense risk-free, is too low to even protect the principal. In some 
years real interest was negative after accounting for inflation. As Asher argues, 
the payment of short-term interest rates on what are very long-term savings is 
equivalent to an implicit tax on CPF wealth which also has regressive effects 
because lower-income individuals have larger proportions of their wealth tied 
up in their CPF accounts. 
 
 The interest rate policy is one aspect of a larger problem with the governance 
of the CPF. Investment of CPF funds by the GIC is not subject to parliamentary 
oversight or public scrutiny, so CPF members cannot assess the 
correspondence between the government‘s investment returns and their own 
return on savings (Asher, 2004). Asher (2002b) believes that this arrangement 
constitutes a significant political risk to old-age savings. He advocates instead 
―greater transparency, public accountability, autonomy for the provident and 
pension funds, and enforcing internationally comparable accounting and 
disclosure standards‖ (Asher, 2000, p. 27). 
 
Empirical evidence 
One of the drawbacks of the existing literature on the public pension systems in Hong 
Kong and Singapore is the lack of empirical corroboration, a direct result of the 
unavailability of data from public agencies. Both the MPF Schemes Authority and the 
CPF Board do not release information on benefit levels at an individual level. It is 
therefore not possible to analyse pension outcomes across different segments of the 
population. For the MPF even aggregate data on account sizes are not published. The 
only available indication of the health of MPF savings is the annualised internal rate of 
return, which has seen considerable fluctuation between 2001 and 2012, ranging from  
-26% during the financial crisis of 2008 to 30% when markets rebounded the year after 
(MPF Schemes Authority, various years; Figure 3.8). The average rate of return from 
the start of the scheme is 4%. The aggregate figures however conceal possible 
variation at an individual level due to choice of funds, as the performance of different 
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fund types has varied. From 2000 equity, mixed asset, and bond funds have seen 
annualised returns of around 4%, compared to less than 1% for money market funds.  
 
Figure 3.8  Annualised internal rate of return to Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) 
funds, 2001-2012 
 
Source: MPF Schemes Authority (various years) 
 
 Equally for the CPF empirical pension outcomes are not known. But average 
account balances at ages close to retirement help to provide a general picture. Figure 
3.9 shows the average CPF balance for members aged 51-55 expressed as months of 
population median work income. This is the best age group to use as optional 
withdrawals at 55 may distort the distribution of account balances at higher ages. From 
1996 to 2011 the average CPF balance is three years of population median work 
income for men and just two years for women. This amount is clearly inadequate 
considering the period life expectancy at 55 was 27 years for men and 31 for women in 
2011 (Department of Statistics, 2013a). There is a slight increase for men from 35 to 
39 months of median work income and a larger increase for women from 17 to 32 
months. This meant that while women had lower balances throughout the period they 
were beginning to close the gap in recent years. These data provide a useful 
benchmark for the analysis of possible pension outcomes from the CPF. 
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Figure 3.9  Average Central Provident Fund (CPF) balance of members aged 51-55 as 
months of population median work income, 1996-2010 
 
 
Note: Median work income was not reported in 2000 and 2005. 
Source: Own calculations from CPF Board (various years); median work income from 
Ministry of Manpower (various years) 
 
 Another approach to approximate pension outcomes is to make use of the level 
of the minimum sum set by the government, which establishes a target pension saving 
that policymakers deem adequate ―to support a modest standard of living during 
retirement‖ (CPF Board, 2007, p. 22). Table 3.5 shows the pension benefits that the 
target savings translate into under both the old payout arrangement before the 
introduction of compulsory annuity and under the new annuity system, according to 
estimations by the CPF Board.
16
 Comparing two cohorts who turned 55 in 2003 and 
2009, this target saving provides a monthly pension equivalent to 31% of median 
monthly work income for the 2003 cohort and 43% for the 2009 cohort under the old 
Minimum Sum Scheme, according to CPF Board projections. The later cohort 
achieves better payouts because their minimum sum is set higher. But there is a 
considerable gap between the minimum sum target and what individuals actually save. 
For instance, in 2009, only 32% of all individuals who turned 55 achieved the 
minimum sum. Actual average savings of those aged 51-55 was 69% of the minimum 
sum. When the two cohorts are compared using the same projections but based on the 
average account balances of the 51-55 age group, monthly pensions are only around a 
quarter of median work income. The new annuity scheme disadvantages older 
transitional cohorts who cannot pay their annuity premiums a full 10 years before 
                                                 
16
 These calculations are done using an online pension estimator provided by the CPF Board. They could 
not be verified as the underlying formulas are not shown. See Section 3.2 on differences between the old 
and new payout arrangements. 
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payout starts. The 2003 cohort is therefore projected to receive payouts that are about 
10% lower than the 2009 cohort relative to median earnings. For the younger cohort, 
expected monthly pensions from the new scheme are equal to or higher than those 
from the old scheme, depending on whether the target minimum sum is met at 55 years 
old. But they still fall below half of median earnings. Compared to a OECD (2012) 
study that assumes maximum deductions for pre-retirement purposes and therefore 
arrives at replacement rates of below 20% (see next section), these estimations provide 
more realistic benchmarks against which the modelling results in later analysis can be 
compared. 
 
Table 3.5  Estimated monthly pension payouts for cohorts who turned 55 in 2003 and 
2009, nominal values and share of population median gross work income, Singapore 
dollars 
CPF balance 2003  2009 
Old scheme New scheme  Old scheme New scheme 
Minimum Sum target 610 
31% 
390-480 
20-24% 
 1040 
43% 
810-1060 
33-44% 
      
Actual average balance 
of 51-55 age group 
450 
23% 
300-360 
15-18% 
 610 
25% 
580-760 
24-31% 
Note: These payouts are derived using an online calculator on the CPF website. The exact 
actuarial rules for calculating payouts under both schemes are not published. ―Old scheme‖ 
refers to the Minimum Sum Scheme which allows individuals to withdraw as a lump sum any 
savings in excess of a stipulated minimum sum at age 55. This minimum sum is paid out over 
20 years from 65 onwards. In 2013, this scheme will be fully replaced by a ―new scheme‖, the 
CPF LIFE. It is a mandatory annuity scheme that provides a monthly income for life from 65. 
The premium is paid for using the minimum sum at age 55. 
Source: Based on CPF Board (2013a, various years) 
 
Summary 
Critiques of the public pension systems in Hong Kong and Singapore have focused on 
the following: 
 
 The MPF does not offer basic income protection to vulnerable groups with 
weak links to the labour market, such as women and low earners. Investment 
returns are uncertain and scheme portability has contributed to high 
administrative costs by international standards. Some analysts have therefore 
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called for fundamental reforms to the pension system, including the 
introduction of a universal pension. 
 
 Like the MPF, the CPF does not favour persons who are economically inactive 
or disadvantaged. Moreover the high rate of contribution displaces private 
saving and there is limited public provision outside the CPF. Even among CPF 
members, savings may be insufficient to maintain even a minimum standard of 
living for most retirees. This has been attributed to a combination of large pre-
retirement withdrawals especially for housing, periodic contribution rate cuts to 
promote economic recovery, and low administered interest rates. The last 
problem reflects possible governance issues as the investment of CPF funds is 
currently not subject to parliamentary oversight or public scrutiny. 
 
 Some of the arguments remain at a theoretical level due to the lack of empirical 
data on actual pension outcomes. The only available information on the 
outcomes of the MPF indicate that the return on investment has been volatile 
over the last decade, ranging between -26% and 30%. Returns are also different 
across types of fund so individual situations may vary widely depending on 
fund choices. For the CPF, the average account balance at age 51-55 has been 
around three years of population median work income for men and two years 
for women between 1996 and 2011. The average balance has increased 
gradually for women but they still have lower savings on average than men. 
Average CPF account balances for persons aged 51-55 in 2009 translate into 
pensions that are 24-31% of the population median gross wage. 
 
3.5  Pension outcomes: Theoretical projections 
Standardised projections 
Given the difficulties with gathering empirical evidence, projecting theoretical 
replacement rates provides an alternative for studying possible pension outcomes. It is 
also useful in the case of Hong Kong since it will be many years before retirees have a 
full participation record with the MPF. Studies that project pension outcomes 
commonly adopt the income replacement rate as the main indicator, defined as the 
ratio of pension income to pre-retirement income, and can be expressed relative to 
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previous earnings to assess consumption smoothing or relative to a minimal standard 
of living to examine poverty avoidance (N. Barr & Diamond, 2009; Holzmann & Hinz, 
2005).  
 The most comprehensive comparative study of theoretical replacement rates in 
the region is the Asia-Pacific edition of the OECD‘s (2012) Pensions at a Glance. The 
study projects pension entitlements from mandatory pension systems for formal 
private-sector workers, by gender and earnings levels. The projections assume that 
workers join the pension system in 2008 at 20 years old under currently legislated 
pension rules and retire after a full career with stable earnings.
17
 The derived net 
replacement rates (i.e. the ratio of net pension income to net individual lifetime 
average earnings) in Singapore and Hong Kong were found to be low by international 
standards (Table 3.6). The average male earner will achieve a replacement rate of only 
13% in Singapore and 34% in Hong Kong, compared to 57% across the OECD 
countries.
18
 Singapore performs particularly poorly, even by regional comparison. The 
replacement rate for the average male earner in Singapore is less than half that of 
Malaysia, and less than a third of the rate in Korea. Whereas pension systems in the 
OECD countries offer higher income replacement to lower earners, pension 
entitlements in Singapore are proportional to earnings. 
 The OECD estimates show how, when modelling CPF benefits, the treatment 
of pre-retirement withdrawals such as for housing is particularly important because 
they can take up a substantial proportion of total savings. The flexibility built into CPF 
rules for this purpose theoretically accommodates diverse modelling assumptions. In 
this case, the OECD‘s approach of omitting the Ordinary Account, which can 
potentially be entirely used up for housing, is equivalent to reducing monthly 
contribution by 79% based on 2012 rates. The resulting pension replacement rates are 
therefore likely to be conservative. Chapter 7 presents original projections based on 
more realistic assumptions about pre-retirement withdrawals. 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Different assumptions about economic conditions such as wage growth and inflation are applied to 
different clusters of countries categorised according to recent economic trends, but it is assumed that all 
countries will converge towards a common set of baseline assumptions—drawn from the OECD 
countries—over 40 years. 
18
 For Singapore, the projections are based on the CPF. For Hong Kong, they include the SSAS and the 
MPF, but not the CSSA. 
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Table 3.6  Projected net income replacement rates in different pension systems, 
percentage 
 Ratio of net pension income to                                                 
net individual lifetime average earnings for men 
(Women, where different) 
 With half average earnings With average earnings 
OECD (34) 72 (71) 57 (56) 
United Kingdom 54 32 
Korea 64 42 
Hong Kong 39 (34) 34 (33) 
Malaysia 30 (27) 30 (27) 
Singapore 13 (11) 13 (11) 
Source: OECD (2012), assuming maximum permissible pre-retirement withdrawals for 
Singapore‘s Central Provident Fund 
 
 Replacement rates are only slightly lower for women in both countries. But 
given that these are theoretical replacement rates, they are likely to conceal gender 
gaps in attained pension incomes due to different work patterns between men and 
women. Pension systems that have a tight link between contributions and benefits 
disadvantage women who tend to have less continuous careers, lower earnings, and an 
earlier retirement age (Frericks, Knijn, & Maier, 2009; Leitner, 2001). Women also 
have longer retirements on average due to higher life expectancy and widows in 
particular may become financially vulnerable. In contrast to some European public 
pensions such as in the United Kingdom, the CPF and MPF do not offer credits to 
women in respect of their care responsibilities. Women may be particularly at risk of 
old-age income insecurity in Singapore because there are no universal pensions to 
protect the low-income. The projections in Chapter 7 adopt actual wage levels by sex 
as a starting point and incorporate sensitivity analyses around rates of wage growth 
and career length to better reflect women‘s experiences. 
 
Single-country studies 
Other than the OECD‘s comparative study, single-country studies have examined the 
MPF and CPF. These are described in more detail in Chapter 5 (Table 5.1). The 
discussion here briefly reviews the findings from selected studies. For Hong Kong, 
analysis has focused on differences between older and younger cohorts with different 
lengths of participation in the MPF. Assuming 3% real wage growth and 4% real rate 
of return on savings, Lui (1998) estimated that MPF pensions will replace between 5% 
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(for the oldest workers) and 187% (for the youngest) of the wage at entry age. 
Adopting wage at entry age as the referent inflates the income replacement rate 
especially for more recent cohorts and is less informative than using either lifetime 
average wage or last drawn wage, because it does not reflect changes in living 
standards during the transition to retirement. Using varying rates of real wage growth 
from 1% to 3%, Siu (2002) estimated final income replacement rates of between 67% 
and 114% for the full-career worker. Neither study considered the impact of wage 
levels. 
 Comparatively there is a much larger literature on projected CPF outcomes. 
The Singapore literature often attempts to offer a closer representation of local policy 
conditions given the CPF‘s uniqueness as a pension instrument, but has so far not 
considered the impact of historical policy changes, such as to contribution and interest 
rates, on different cohorts of elderly persons. All of the studies cited below are based 
on static policy rules. 
 
 A study by Chen and Wong (1998) calculated pension entitlements as 
annuitised benefits and compared these against a living standard benchmark of 
roughly 40% average wage. They found that under most assumptions, CPF 
pensions would be adequate for retirement, but lower earners came closer to 
the subsistence threshold.  
 
 A IMF country report on Singapore estimated the income replacement rate 
achievable under the CPF with a full career from 20 years old and average 
income based on the 15-19 age group in 1995 that grows at a real rate of 4% 
annually (Cardarelli, Gobat, et al., 2000). The model uses planned contribution 
rates as of 2000 (i.e. 40% up to age 54 and decreasing thereafter) and assumes 
2% real return to saving. It also incorporates housing purchase at 30 years old 
financed by a 20% cash payment and a 25-year mortgage for the remaining 
cost both paid out of the CPF, as well as withdrawals for health, education, and 
personal investment at average levels. With a retirement age of 65, these 
conditions result in a base case replacement rate of 37% (presumably based 
on last-drawn income although this was not stated) which can reach 83% with 
no housing withdrawal or fall to 23% with expensive housing. 
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 The issue of housing purchase is the focus of a study by McCarthy, Mitchell 
and Piggott (2002) who model both the earnings replacement rate and housing 
wealth for a range of hypothetical cases. The base case starts a full career from 
22 with annual earnings of S$30,000 (roughly equivalent to male median 
earnings in 2000) which grows at a real rate of 2%. CPF contribution is based 
on 2000 rates with annual real interests of between 0 and 1.5% for different 
CPF accounts. Housing purchase takes place once the CPF saving is sufficient 
for the cash down payment and further CPF saving funds mortgage payments 
up to the maximum amount allowed for this purpose. They estimate that upon 
retirement at 62 the base case achieves a final earnings replacement rate of 
28% (30% if retiring at 65) but also has housing wealth that is almost four 
times as much as CPF wealth, based on real housing returns of 4%. Increasing 
the allocation of CPF contributions to the Special Account from 4% to 8% 
boosts the replacement rate to just 30%, whereas doubling the subsidy for 
buying public housing increases the rate to 49%. 
 
 A recent study undertaken by independent academics commissioned by the 
Singapore government arrives at more favourable findings using the latest CPF 
rules and administrative data not usually available in the public domain (N. C. 
Chia & Tsui, 2012). The model differs from past studies in several ways: (i) it 
simulates wage growth paths for men and women at the 30th, 50th, and 70th 
wage percentile using Labour Force Survey data from 2001-2011, that peak at 
around 40 years old before tapering off with age; (ii) instead of full careers, 
lower levels of labour participation are assumed based on historical CPF 
contribution records from 1981; (iii) the annuitisation of CPF savings is 
calculated by the CPF Board based on two currently available annuity plans 
that retirees must choose from. 2012 contribution and interest rates are applied. 
The projections also incorporate housing purchase at 30 years old, with CPF 
savings fully utilised for the cash down payment and the subsequent 30-year 
mortgage. The model arrives at gross replacement rates of 52% for the male 
median case and 50% for women using wages at 55 as the denominator, but 
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notes that replacement rates may fall by up to 30 percentage points if each case 
chooses housing that is larger by just one size.  
 
Summary 
Given the lack of empirical data on pension outcomes, studies have modelled these 
outcomes using a range of approaches. Their main findings are: 
 
 Under standardised assumptions, both Hong Kong‘s and Singapore‘s public 
pension systems do not fare well by regional and international standards. An 
OECD study estimates that the combined benefits from the MPF and SSAS in 
Hong Kong are equivalent to about 34% of average lifetime earnings for men 
receiving average work incomes throughout their career, and 33% for women. 
The CPF provides even less, at just 13% for men and 11% for women. 
 
 Other single-country studies focusing on the MPF have estimated that the 
scheme will replace between 5%-187% of initial wage for successive cohorts 
of retirees; or between 67% and 114% of final income under different rates of 
real wage growth. 
 
 For the CPF several studies have incorporated housing purchase since a large 
proportion of CPF savings are withdrawn before retirement for this purpose. 
Depending on assumptions about earnings, pre-retirement withdrawals, and 
other parameters, earlier studies have estimated an income replacement rate of 
between 28% and 37%. A more recent study with a distinctive methodological 
approach estimates replacement rates of around 52% 
 
 For the purposes of understanding the relative performance of the pension 
systems in Hong Kong and Singapore, the current literature poses several challenges. 
First, the OECD study is the only one to directly compare projected pension outcomes 
in the two systems. However its estimates for Singapore are likely to be very 
conservative as it assumes that the entire CPF Ordinary Account is depleted before 
retirement. This partly explains why Singapore‘s replacement rates are much lower 
than those in Hong Kong and other countries in the region. Second, while there are a 
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number of single-country studies that separately project pension outcomes for Hong 
Kong and Singapore, their findings are not entirely meaningful when reported outside 
their methodological contexts and therefore cannot be directly compared. The wide 
range of estimates for the CPF alone illustrates how decisions about model 
assumptions on a vast array of parameters covering work patterns, earnings, policy 
rules, participation history (including pre-retirement withdrawals), mode of payout, 
and the economic environment can drastically affect the results. The effects of 
individual parameters are also not always straightforward to interpret. For example, in 
Chia and Tsui‘s (2012) study that arrived at unusually high replacement rates, some of 
their assumptions have an upward bias (e.g. adopting current contribution rates), others 
depress estimates (e.g. assuming incomplete careers), while several are difficult to 
assess as they make use of unpublished information (e.g. on wage growth paths and 
annuitisation formulas). Third, most of the existing literature does not examine the 
impact of entry timing by incorporating historically accurate rules. This is a serious 
omission as the CPF has undergone regular rate adjustments while Hong Kong 
introduced major new schemes—such as the MPF and OALA—in the past decade. 
Under these conditions, comparing static sets of pension rules does not fully depict the 
relative positions of successive cohorts of retirees. Some of these methodological 
issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 and guide the design of the original 
projections in Chapter 7.  
 
3.6  Intergenerational conflict and sustainability 
From one point of view, much of the debate about the fiscal sustainability of public 
pension in European welfare states does not seem applicable to Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Whereas the sustainability of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems is 
sensitive to demographic fluctuations that affect the total flows of contributions from 
the working population and payouts to pensioners, the CPF and MPF are fully-funded 
savings and do not incur public spending other than administrative costs and minor 
transfers. Instead, these provident funds represent significant resources for government 
investment in the case of Singapore and for boosting commercial pension markets in 
Hong Kong (C. K. Chan, 2003; Hu, 1986). In 2009, the total balance of all CPF 
accounts was equivalent to nearly 60% of GDP. 
 But sustainability can also be understood in a broader sense of social stability 
and fairness over time. Researchers have therefore examined the potential for 
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intergenerational conflict, or whether welfare policy design over time promotes 
distinct generations of lifetime ―winners‖ and ―losers‖ (Thomson, 1991). Thomson 
argues that in New Zealand, there exists a ―selfish generation‖ born during 1920-1945 
who contributed less than the total benefits they obtained from the welfare system over 
their lifetime, due to rapid welfare expansion in the postwar years and the subsequent 
ageing of the welfare state to favour older persons. Younger generations are in the 
opposite position of putting in more than they will stand to receive. Scholars of 
political economy have also warned that generational conflict, or ―chrono-politics‖, 
may replace class conflict, increase the rigidity of welfare institutions, and prevent the 
reform of maladaptive policies (Bonoli, 2005; Esping-Andersen, 1999). 
 While the idea that welfare policy should promote generational equity appears 
intuitive and is persuasive from a philosophical point of view, the generational conflict 
thesis has been challenged from several angles. First, empirical analysis does not 
always produce conclusions that support the notion of intergenerational inequity. 
Generational accounting techniques provide a way to assess the fiscal balance between 
generations (Cardarelli, Sefton, & Kotlikoff, 2000) and estimate intergenerational 
transfers based on the consumption and income of different age groups (Ermisch, 
1989). Following this line of analysis, Hills (1995) has shown that in the case of the 
United Kingdom, only the generation born between 1901 and 1921 made a net gain 
from the welfare state. In 1995, it was too soon to tell the position of later cohorts 
without making projections, but they were expected to break-even in terms of their 
aggregate taxes and benefits. Second, public opinion studies that examine age-related 
differences in the level of support for social spending in Europe have found that 
differences based on country and class are often more significant (Blome, Keck, & 
Alber, 2009; Busemeyer, Goerres, & Weschle, 2009). In the Anglo-Saxon welfare 
states, for example, support for pension spending is higher among middle-aged than 
elderly persons. Third, empirical research on family exchanges points to strong 
generational solidarity as seen in regular exchanges of monetary gifts and practical 
help between elderly parents and their children in many parts of Europe (Attias-Donfut 
& Arber, 1999; Kohli, 1999). In particular, researchers have found that public pension 
benefits are partly shared with younger generations when pensioners give financial 
support to their adult children (see next chapter). Blome et al. (2009) therefore argue 
that generational conflict is a myth that results from focusing only on public transfers. 
They argue that private transfers actually strengthen generational solidarity. Fourth, 
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Blome et al. (2009) also believe that age is unlikely to become a divisive factor in 
welfare politics like social class, because every person is connected through familial 
ties to older generations and will eventually grow old—―tensions  arising from 
institutional categories are then softened, because social policy questions always have 
specific application to one‘s own parents‖ (p. 260). 
 In the context of pensions, Grech (2010a) proposes a broader concept of social 
sustainability to assess pension reforms. Instead of asserting a priori the existence of 
generational conflict, he develops an innovative framework that combines the twin 
objectives of pensions to achieve income adequacy and alleviate poverty, with the two 
major constraints of intergenerational balance and financial sustainability. He 
evaluates intergenerational balance by comparing the pension wealth of current and 
future generations, and assesses financial sustainability by comparing the contributions 
they need to make to fund these payments. To date, this is the only framework that 
combines primary pension objectives with concerns about generational balance to 
evaluate potential reform outcomes. The sophistication of this line of analysis serves 
further to illustrate that the intergenerational balance implied by any set of pension 
rules is unlikely to be transparent to average citizens, and that the notion of 
intergenerational conflict may be more academic than practical (Attias-Donfut, 2000). 
As Attias-Donfut argues, public opposition to pension reforms is more likely to be 
motivated by a threat to personal pension entitlements rather than by an encompassing 
calculus of benefits paid out by the welfare state across generations. 
 The issue of intergenerational sustainability and conflict has not entered into 
the East Asian pensions literature for a number for reasons. The defined-contribution 
pensions in Singapore and Hong Kong do not channel resources from working adults 
to the elderly population via the welfare state. Any imbalance in pension entitlements 
across generations is therefore likely to be seen as a matter of individual responsibility 
rather than policy deficiency. The current elderly cohorts are also not particularly 
favoured by the public pension systems. In fact, the direction of generational inequity 
may be opposite. Data on CPF savings and self-reported membership show that older 
cohorts of Singaporeans have less income protection from the CPF, due to lower 
contribution rates in the past (CPF Board, various years). The oldest retirees would 
also have had shorter membership with the CPF. In the case of Hong Kong‘s MPF, 
workers who had joined the labour force before the MPF was introduced would 
similarly have lower savings for retirement. Reflecting this concern, both governments 
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have in recent years made several ad hoc payments into the pension accounts of older 
citizens (K. W. Chan, 2012; CPF Board, various years). 
 But there may be less explicit generational links within the MPF and CPF 
systems. Asher (2002a, 2002b) has argued that since the CPF lends the entire fund to 
the government and pays administered interest rates that are not decided by market 
performance, it resembles an earnings-related PAYG system in that the government 
debt eventually has to be serviced by future taxpayers when payout to older cohorts are 
due. Reforms to the CPF in 1987 also introduced a mechanism for topping up the 
accounts of family members (Low & Aw, 2004). The gradual easing of top-up rules 
led to a doubling of the number of donors as well as amount of transfers between 2007 
and 2008 alone (CPF Board, various years). This provision highlights that even within 
defined-contribution systems based on individual accounts, demographic pressure and 
familial obligations imply an increasing burden on younger generations who have to 
set aside a larger amount of pension savings for a longer retirement especially in 
anticipation of having less support from their own children in future, as well as take on 
a larger responsibility for their parents since there are fewer siblings. This burden, not 
unlike the double payment problem commonly associated with the movement from 
pay-as-you-go to defined-contribution systems, is likely to increase unless public 
pension provision expands. 
 
3.7  Summary 
 Elderly persons in Hong Kong have access to three public pension sources: (i) 
the CSSA Scheme which provides assistance to make up the difference 
between household income and prescribed living expenses; (ii) the SSAS 
Scheme which provides a means-tested allowance from age 65 and either a 
universal allowance or a means-tested allowance at a higher rate from 70; and 
(iii) the MPF which draws contributions of 5% of monthly salary each from the 
employer and employee, and pays out total savings and investment returns at 
age 65 as a lump sum. In Singapore the CPF is the main pillar of old-age 
income security but also caters for other purposes like housing and health. 
Employers and employees each contribute 16% and 20% of monthly salary to 
the scheme. Total savings plus interest calculated using administrative rates 
may be withdrawn via compulsory annuity from 63, to be raised to 65 
eventually. Between 2001 and 2010 about half of all CPF withdrawals were for 
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housing while just 20% were for retirement, although the latter share has been 
on the rise. Taken as a whole, the public pension system in Hong Kong is more 
comprehensive and balanced, and offers better protection to individuals with 
disadvantageous work histories.  
 
 CPF provisions for housing mean that elderly persons are more likely to own 
housing assets in Singapore than in Hong Kong. However housing and asset 
ownership may be highly unequal in both places. The evidence suggests that 
elderly persons with lower incomes were less likely to have access to financial 
assets, owned assets of lesser value, and experienced slower gains in asset 
ownership over time. Only 31% of elderly Singaporeans with no individual 
income owned housing in 2005 compared to 100% of persons in the highest 
income bracket. In Hong Kong, half of elderly persons from the lowest income 
bracket had total assets worth less one month‘s median work income in 2008, 
compared to just a fifth of persons from the highest income bracket. Asset 
ownership is therefore unlikely to reverse the relative financial positions of 
low-income elderly persons. 
 
 Even for persons who own housing, the conversion of their housing assets into 
retirement income cannot be assumed. In theory, housing assets can contribute 
to financial security because they enable rent-free living, can generate rental 
income, and can be liquidated through trading down and instruments like 
reverse mortgages. However policies to encourage these options have had 
mixed results in Singapore. In 2008, only 12% of elderly persons had sublet 
their properties for income and 2% had participated in the government Lease 
Buyback Scheme. Even among the younger 55-64 generation, just 2% expected 
to use the scheme in old age. This is consistent with evidence from other 
countries that elderly persons often prefer to keep their housing assets as 
precautionary saving and for bequest. 
 
 Critiques of the public pension systems in Hong Kong and Singapore have 
focused on the lack of protection for vulnerable groups with weak employment 
histories, especially in Singapore. The high administrative costs of the MPF 
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have been highlighted as a concern. The CPF has further been criticised for 
offering inadequate income protection in retirement due to large pre-retirement 
withdrawals, periodic contribution rate cuts to promote economic recovery, and 
low administered interest rates. But empirical data to support these arguments 
are lacking. The only available information on the outcomes of the MPF 
indicate that the return on investment has been volatile over the last decade, 
ranging from -26% to 30%. For the CPF there is some evidence that savings 
are inadequate. The average account balance at age 51-55 has been around 
three years of population median work income for men and two years for 
women between 1996 and 2011. These are extremely low considering the 
period life expectancy at 55 was 27 years for men and 31 years for women in 
2011. 
 
 An alternative approach to understanding possible pension outcomes is through 
projections for hypothetical cases. Under standardised assumptions, both Hong 
Kong‘s and Singapore‘s public pension systems do not fare well by regional 
and international standards. An OECD study estimates that the combined 
benefits from the MPF and SSAS in Hong Kong are equivalent to about 34% of 
lifetime average earnings for men receiving average work incomes throughout 
their career, and 33% for women. The CPF provides even less, at just 13% for 
men and 11% for women. Other single-country studies have produced different 
results. For the CPF, studies incorporating  housing purchase have arrived at 
income replacement rates of between 28% and 52%. These studies face several 
limitations. The OECD‘s comparative study adopts a very conservative 
assumption of maximum pre-retirement withdrawals from the CPF which is 
likely to underestimate pension outcomes. Other single-country studies of 
Hong Kong and Singapore do not start from the same model parameters and 
therefore arrive at widely varying results that are not directly comparable. 
Furthermore most studies assume static rules that do not reflect historical 
policy changes and the impact of entry timing. The projections in Chapter 7 
aim to address some of these limitations. 
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 Studies on Hong Kong and Singapore have not generally assimilated into the 
wider debate in the pensions literature about sustainability. This debate firstly 
concerns the fiscal sustainability of public pension systems as demographic 
changes weaken the contribution base and increase demands on payouts. But 
sustainability is also understood in terms of social stability and the potential for 
intergenerational conflict due to welfare policies that promote distinct 
generations of lifetime winners—who take out more from the welfare state than 
they put in—and lifetime losers. Some of the early claims about selfish 
generations have since been challenged by a range of empirical evidence and 
theoretical arguments.  
 
 On the surface, fiscal sustainability issues associated with pay-as-you-go 
pension systems do not seem to apply to fully funded schemes like the CPF and 
MPF that do not channel resources directly from working-adults to the elderly 
population. But there may be less explicit generational links within the MPF 
and CPF systems that raise questions about sustainability. It has been argued 
that since the CPF lends the entire fund to the government and pays 
administered interest rates, it resembles an earnings-related pay-as-you-go 
system where the government debt eventually has to be serviced by future 
taxpayers. Moreover even within defined-contribution systems based on 
individual accounts, demographic pressure and familial obligations imply an 
increasing burden on younger generations who have to set aside a larger 
amount of pension savings for a longer retirement especially in anticipation of 
having less support from their own children in future, as well as take on a 
larger responsibility for their parents since there are fewer siblings. This burden 
is akin to the double payment problem commonly associated with the 
movement from PAYG to defined-contribution systems, and is likely to 
increase unless public pension provision expands.  
  
 The next chapter examines the issue of sustainability more closely as it turns to 
the topic of familial obligations and support under the pressures of demographic 
ageing. 
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4. The role of family support: Availability of children, 
intergenerational co-residence, and financial transfers 
 
The discussion so far has highlighted a decrease in work participation and individual 
incomes with age and the limitations of public pensions as a source of income security 
during old age in Hong Kong and Singapore. This chapter shifts the focus to the 
remaining major source of financial security, family support. It is concerned with how 
family support in the form of adult children‘s co-residence and cash transfers makes a 
difference to the elderly population. The discussion begins with a review of the 
literature on why children support their elderly parents, to provide a theoretical 
backdrop for interpreting the empirical findings in the rest of the chapter. This is 
followed by original analyses of trends in the availability of children to elderly parents 
among recent cohorts, patterns of intergenerational co-residence and financial 
transfers, and elderly household incomes in  Hong Kong and Singapore. The empirical 
work draws on the same 1995/1996 and 2005/2006 survey datasets used in earlier 
chapters and several additional data sources. 
 
4.1 Why children support their elderly parents 
The factors that may influence the extent of family support for elderly persons have 
been extensively debated in the literature. Albertini, Kohli and Vogel (2007) have 
suggested that these can be broadly categorised into structural, institutional, and 
cultural factors that reside within and beyond the family (Table 4.1). Structural factors 
such as demography, household composition, and individual income levels may affect 
the need and capacity for family support. Institutional factors such as social policies 
may incentive family transfers or even, in some instances, penalise family members 
who withhold such support. Cultural factors may account for gender roles in providing 
support, as well as differences in practices across communities and societies. Of these, 
the literature in general and East Asian research more particularly have been 
dominated by three main clusters of explanation: individual, cultural, and societal 
factors. The rest of this section reviews these explanations. Demography is analysed 
separately in Section 4.2. 
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Table 4.1  Factors that affect intergenerational transfers 
 Macro (outside family) Micro (within family) 
Structural Demography, labour force, 
income distribution 
Household composition, 
education, occupational status, 
income 
Institutional Legal obligations on transfers, 
taxation, social security policies 
Household division of labour 
Cultural Family, gender, and age values Attitudes and practices 
Source: Albertini, Kohli & Vogel (2007) 
 
Individual factors: Altruism and exchange 
The foremost theories about transfer motives, both of cash and services, are altruism 
and exchange. Altruism interprets transfers as a response to the elderly parent‘s needs, 
which may be indicated by factors such as income level, health status, extent of 
disability, and widowhood. Exchange theory proposes that financial support is offered 
by children in return for services received, such as care or household chores, or in 
repayment of an earlier financial gift or investment, such as in the children‘s 
education. Historically the two perspectives have been competitive. Early theoretical 
work by Becker (1974) modelled behaviour where the head of the family makes cash 
transfers to family members to offset any fluctuations in the distribution of income 
within the family. This form of intra-family altruism has the potential to neutralise 
policy interventions that redistribute resources across generations (Barro, 1974). On 
the other hand, in defence of exchange theory, Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers 
(1985) proposed that bequests are used strategically by parents to obtain services from 
their children, seen in more frequent contacts with children among parents with greater 
wealth to bequeath. Cox (1987) also argued that inter-vivos transfers serve as 
payments for services exchanged between family members. 
 There is now a large body of evidence supporting the motivations of both 
altruism and exchange. The two theories are usually tested using the operational logic 
that altruism predicts an increase in the likelihood and amount of financial transfers 
when the recipient‘s income is lower, whereas the exchange model suggests that 
transfers are less likely to occur when the recipient has higher income but the amounts 
will be higher when they do (Cox & Rank, 1992). The exchange model further requires 
a positive correlation between transfers in one direction and some form of service 
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rendered in return. Empirical research suggests that these motivations vary for 
different directions and types of transfer:
19
 
 
 Using data from the United States, Altonji, Hayashi & Kotlikoff (1996) found 
that higher parental incomes and assets decreased the likelihood and size of 
transfers from children, which is consistent with the compensatory principle of 
altruism. A study by McGarry and Schoeni (1997) showed that among siblings, 
those with lower incomes were consistently more likely to receive cash 
transfers from their parents regardless of family size and even when exchanges 
over many years are taken into account. In both studies, the authors found no 
evidence that providing services predicted receiving transfers. More recently, 
Karagiannaki (2011) found a similar correlation between the child‘s current 
income and transfers from parents using British data.  
 
 On the other hand, in Cox & Rank‘s (1992) study, help given to parents and the 
frequency of contact were positively associated with the children‘s probability 
of receiving transfers. The study also used geographical distance between non-
co-resident parents and children to distinguish the workings of altruism and 
exchange, arguing that living further apart increases the cost and lowers the 
likelihood of giving practical assistance, but should not affect the flow of 
transfers if the latter is motivated solely by altruism. Instead, the data showed 
that distance had an inverse relationship with the probability of transfers to 
children, suggesting an underlying exchange process. 
 
 Varied cross-national evidence has recently emerged from the Survey of 
Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) which studies persons 
aged 50 and above in 19 European countries. The study has found that while 
financial transfers were not more likely for elderly parents in poor health, 
practical support was (Attias-Donfut, Ogg, & Wolff, 2008a). More than two-
thirds of elderly persons with the most severe disability received practical 
                                                 
19
 Research in Western societies has mostly focused on cash gifts from elderly parents to adult children 
in return for services performed, as this cycle of exchange is more common than children providing cash 
contributions to their parents as is the case in Hong Kong and Singapore. This difference is addressed in 
the later discussion on cultural factors. 
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support, whereas only a quarter of other elderly persons did (Attias-Donfut, 
Ogg, & Wolff, 2008b). At the same time, elderly persons who became disabled 
or contracted a long-term illness were more likely to provide financial 
transfers, possibly in exchange for in-kind support and care. There is both a 
response to need and a cycle of exchange, when different types and directions 
of transfer are taken into account. The authors concluded that ―the family 
situation, demographic events, health as well as economic resources affect the 
propensity both to give and receive money, although the SHARE data evidence 
a limited role for all these factors‖ (Attias-Donfut, et al., 2008a, p. 188).  
 
 In the East Asian literature, studies that explicitly test theories of altruism and 
exchange suggest that the mixed dynamics of altruism and exchange may also 
apply here. In Singapore, elderly persons who are widowed, not working, and 
less educated are more likely to receive cash transfers from their children 
(Kang, 2008). At the same time, elderly parents who help with household 
chores are more likely to receive financial contributions, but not parents who 
provide advice or financial assistance to their children. In Hong Kong, access 
to alternative income sources such as transfers from relatives, the 
Comprehensive Social Security Allowance (CSSA) scheme, and private 
pensions predict smaller amounts of transfers from children, whereas 
subgroups that tend to have lower individual incomes (see Chapter 2 and 
section 4.3) such as women, widows, and elderly persons living with their 
children are likely to receive larger transfers (K. L. Chou, 2010). At the same 
time, Chou argues that exchange motives may be present, as elderly parents 
who owned some types of asset received higher amounts of transfers. 
 
 There are similar debates over whether intergenerational co-residence is 
predicted by the level of needs.
20
 An early study investigated a dramatic rise in the 
percentage of persons living alone between 1950 and 1976 using time series data for 
different states in the USA (Michael, Fuchs, & Scott, 1980). It found that the 
generosity of state social security payments (i.e. pensions) to survivors predicted the 
proportion of widows aged 65 and above who were living alone, although other 
                                                 
20
 See Grundy (1992) for a concise summary of the main factors identified in the literature. 
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variables like median income and poverty levels among elderly women were not 
significant. Pampel (1983), studying data from around the same time, found that 
income alone explained less than 15% of the increase in persons living alone. However 
his study was concerned with all adults aged 25 and above, not elderly persons. While 
transfers have a clear direction, an additional challenge when analysing co-residence is 
that it may be meeting the needs of either generation. Several studies have argued that 
living arrangements reflect adult children‘s needs for housing and support before they 
are able to finance an independent lifestyle (Aquilino, 1990; Ward, Logan, & Spitze, 
1992). They found that parental characteristics such as marital status, health, and 
educational level were not significant predictors of co-residence, but having unmarried 
children was: 2% of parents with no unmarried children lived with their children, 
compared to 63% of parents with three or more unmarried children. In 
intergenerational households, parents performed more household tasks on average than 
the children did. These households were also more likely to live in homes owned by 
the parents. 
 The debate about altruism and exchange, however, has yet to overcome some 
fundamental conceptual challenges to understanding and detecting transfer motives. As 
Cox and Rank (1992, p. 306) point out, ―reciprocity is not conclusive evidence for 
exchange because it is also consistent with two-way altruism‖. It has been suggested 
that altruism may be impure in the sense that a family member may be motivated to 
provide help by the ―warm glow‖ felt afterwards (1989). The motivations for 
interactions within the family may not be as distinct or explicit as research seems to 
presume. Across the European countries included in the SHARE study, respondents 
were most likely to cite ―no specific reason‖ for receiving transfers rather than other 
need- or exchange-based explanations (Attias-Donfut, et al., 2008b). In her synthesis 
of the early anthropological literature on the United Kingdom (UK), Finch (1989) 
observed that people take into account diverse considerations such as genealogical 
proximity, likeability, past and prospective reciprocity, and the context of the demand 
when deciding whether to fulfil kinship obligations to lend support. Help-giving tends 
to involve a process of negotiation between two parties where the potential recipient 
has to define a balance between accepting help and maintaining a sense of 
independence. Theories focusing on the individual alone may therefore provide only a 
partial picture of intergenerational transfers. 
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Cultural factors: Generations and gender in an Asian context 
Just as Finch (1989) noted more explicit kinship obligations among the South Asian 
communities in the UK, research on intergenerational exchange in East Asian societies 
has traditionally paid special attention to local cultural norms based on principles of 
familial responsibility.
21
 Most of this body of research links the flow of resources 
across generations to Confucianist teachings.
22
 Early examples include Chow‘s (1987) 
study of Western and Chinese social welfare where he argued that culture determines 
how societies interpret the objectives of social policy. He observed that in Western 
countries, the state is responsible for redistribution based on the rights of social 
citizenship and equality between individuals. But public social welfare in Chinese 
societies is perceived as an act of state benevolence. Instead, the family and wider 
kinship network assume primary responsibility for taking care of its members. Jones 
(1993) was among the first to argue that the central role of the family marks the 
distinctiveness of East Asian social policy, coining the term Confucian welfare states 
in recognition of the social and policy influence of Chinese heritage in these societies. 
A strong patrilinear tradition, where sons assume primary filial responsibility 
regardless of marital status whereas married daughters are expected to devote 
themselves to the wellbeing of the husband‘s family, is sometimes regarded as a key 
aspect of Confucianist traditions (Hermalin & Yang, 2004). Such customs have been 
observed in the patterns of intergenerational co-residence in Hong Kong and Singapore 
(see section 4.3).  
 Research on different Asian societies has also found other cultural factors such 
as religiosity and ethnicity to be significant predictors of levels of co-residence (W. K.-
M. Lee, 2004; Martin, 1989). This flags the cultural diversity within supposedly 
Confucianist societies such as Singapore. In a study by Ofstedal, Knodel, and 
Chayovan (1999), they found that in Singapore 77% of Chinese elderly persons who 
had adult sons in 1995 lived with their sons, compared to 47% who lived with their 
daughters. But among the Malays, the gender difference was less obvious, with 68% 
living with their sons and 63% with their daughters. The gender difference among 
Chinese families was even more pronounced in the case of married children. For 
                                                 
21
 A similar explanatory approach focuses on cultural ―tastes‖ or preferences (Lesthaeghe, 1983). 
Beresford and Rivlin (1966), for example, refer to an intrinsic consumer demand for privacy among 
American families which explains the prevalence of nuclear households. Macro-trends in co-residence 
are therefore interpreted as changes in lifestyles and social fads. 
22
 See review in Fu (2008). 
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Chinese elderly fathers without a co-resident spouse, the proportion living with their 
married sons was 2.7 times as high as that living with married daughters. But for 
Chinese elderly mothers who were without a spouse, this ratio was 3.6. Among all 
Chinese elderly parents, the ratio of those living with their single sons as compared to 
single daughters was only around 1.3. The corresponding ratios for Malay elderly 
persons were much narrower, ranging from 0.9 to 1.2, suggesting that there was no 
clear preference to live with either sons or daughters. 
 A major drawback of cultural explanations is that, on their own, they do not 
fully depict the tension that societies experience between cultural ideals, policy aims, 
and popular practices (Martin, 1990). Martin has pointed out that that historically, 
patriarchal ideals were not uniformly achieved across China, while their influence was 
relatively recent in Korea and Japan. Furthermore the governments in these societies 
had initiated reforms that were against the grain of Confucianist traditions, such as 
promoting the equality of women. On the other hand, in Singapore, the government 
actively promulgates family values as an Asian virtue, and has adopted a range of 
policies to encourage family support for elderly persons: children are allowed to top up 
the Central Provident Fund (CPF) accounts of their parents; there are subsidies for 
children who purchase public housing near to their parents‘ home; and under the 
Maintenance of Parents Act, children may be brought to Court by their parents for 
failing to provide financial support. Yet fewer elderly persons have expressed a 
preference to live with their adult children in recent years (Housing and Development 
Board, 2010), consistent with the downward trend in expectations about children‘s 
support in many Asian societies (Croll, 2008). Without accounting for these 
countervailing forces, and especially when it is not subjected to empirical 
investigation, culture can come across as a post hoc explanation or theory of last resort 
(H. Chang, 2007).
23
 
 
Societal factors: Modernisation and welfare regimes 
Underlying the body of research on cross-national patterns in family support for 
elderly persons (Albertini, et al., 2007; Kohli, 1999; Saraceno & Keck, 2010) is a 
                                                 
23
 For example, in a recent study to test normative obligations of support to elderly parents in Singapore, 
Kang (2008) reasoned that since several socio-economic variables did not predict transfers from 
children in regression analysis, cultural influences must therefore have been at work. Deploying culture 
as a residual explanation in this way is not fully satisfactory. 
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larger debate on the theory of modernisation and the effects of policy on 
intergenerational exchange within the household. Modernisation theory expects 
industrialisation and development to gradually replace traditional familial care 
arrangements with the solidaristic provisions of the welfare state (Burgess, 1960; 
Cowgill, 1972). An economic interpretation is that rising incomes allow individuals to 
purchase ―goods‖ traditionally found within the household, such as companionship and 
personal care, from the market instead (Burch & Matthews, 1987). This promotes the 
growth of market alternatives to household goods which encourages further household 
nuclearisation. Developing societies may therefore expect to experience the same 
social changes as they follow the path of modernisation set by the industrialised 
societies. But others have argued that societies and families do not respond to social 
transformation in the same way because of other factors such as demography and local 
kinship patterns (Hashimoto, 1991; Thornton & Fricke, 1987). Empirical research so 
far has shown that family support even in the industrialised societies has not fully 
given way to state support and that family members across generations still exchange a 
wide range of resources and services (Kohli, Künemund, & Vogel, 2008).  
 Recent debates have turned to whether an encroaching welfare state will 
eventually ―crowd out‖ family functions. Apprehension towards the erosion of family 
support is a common theme in the political discourse of Hong Kong and Singapore.
24
 
There is also some evidence in the East Asian context that more generous public 
pensions may displace family provision. Panel studies in Taiwan found that elderly 
respondents gradually switched from family to public income sources as the public 
pension system expanded during the 1990s, with national-level schemes having a 
stronger effect than county-level ones (Biddlecom, Hermalin, Ofstedal, Chang, & 
Chuang, 2001; Fu, 2008). A study on the income sources of elderly persons in 1995 
found that owning CPF savings predicts lower access to children‘s contributions (A. 
Chan, 1999), although this demonstrates the displacement of family provision by 
formal rather than publicly funded programmes.  
 However Kunemund and Rein (1999) have argued that because family transfers 
to elderly persons are motivated not just by needs, but also reciprocity and affection, 
even comprehensive welfare states cannot crowd out the role of the family. Instead 
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 See Chow (1978), Wilding (1997) for Hong Kong and Balakrishnan (2008, March, 2009, February) 
for Singapore. 
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state provisions that channel resources such as pension benefits to elderly persons may 
affect the direction of family transfers, ―crowding in‖ family exchange by enabling 
elderly parents to give assistance to their children and grandchildren. In fact, Chou 
(2010) argues that in Hong Kong, the anticipation of bequest may explain why elderly 
parents who have savings in public pension schemes also receive larger transfers from 
their children. Overall, in both Hong Kong and Singapore, crowding out is not a 
serious threat to informal income sources as public pensions remain underdeveloped. 
Moreover, while crowding out by policy provision may have implications for the 
strength of family bonds, its effects from an old-age income security perspective are 
not necessarily negative. The substitution of familial transfers with state support may 
be positive for income security if such support is sustainable and effectively reaches 
those who lack financial independence. The more worrying risk for the elderly 
populations in Hong Kong and Singapore is that as norms of familial obligation 
change and access to mandated retirement savings improves, the population segments 
that experience an erosion of family support are not the same ones that acquire greater 
pension rights. This issue is examined in Chapter 6 which models the possible income 
sources for future elderly cohorts. 
 Compared to the modernisation and crowding out theories, the political 
economy literature on welfare regimes offers a more nuanced and systematic approach 
to assessing the roles of the state, the family, and the market. Esping-Andersen‘s 
influential work in 1990 identified three clusters of welfare regimes among the 
advanced economies, based on the organisation of welfare production between the 
state and the market. Countries were differentiated based by the degree of de-
commodification, or how far welfare state provisions reduce individual dependence on 
the labour market for welfare needs. Since then some scholars have proposed 
modifications such as a fourth cluster comprising the South European welfare states, 
while others have argued that this regime typology is overly focused on the male 
breadwinner and should take into account further dimensions such as gender (Lewis, 
1992), age, and generational relations (Lynch, 2006; Saraceno & Keck, 2010). Further 
to de-commodification, there is a growing body of research on the role of the family in 
informal welfare production based on the notion of de-familialisation, or the extent to 
which welfare state provisions reduce individual dependence on the family (Esping-
Andersen, 1999). A full characterisation of welfare regimes is now understood to 
require consideration of three intersecting dimensions – the welfare producer (state, 
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market, or family), the welfare consumer group (differentiated by characteristics such 
as gender, age, and labour market participation), and the type of welfare resource 
(benefits or services, as well as policy domain). The balance of welfare production 
even within the same welfare system may differ depending on the consumer group and 
type of welfare in question. The role of the family must therefore be understood within 
the larger context of this complex matrix. One example of this approach is Blome, 
Keck and Alber‘s (2009) comprehensive study comparing state and family provisions 
for elderly persons and families with children, in terms of both benefits and services, in 
France, Italy, Sweden, and Germany.  
 East Asian welfare is seldom comprehensively studied in this manner. Most of 
the research output focuses on documenting state provisions by policy area while 
limited work has been done on the balance of state and family welfare for specific 
target groups (e.g. Aspalter, 2001, 2002; Holliday & Wilding, 2003; Ramesh, 2004; K. 
Tang, 2000). But there are several exceptions. Jacobs‘s (1998) study systematically 
compares both public and private social spending in social security, health, housing, 
and education across East Asia using aggregate statistics. The study found that social 
security spending in Singapore and Hong Kong were almost entirely private, because 
public pensions are savings-based and non-contributory social assistance is limited. 
Kwon (1999) drew on microdata from national surveys in Korea and Taiwan to 
compare the role of private and public transfers in elderly households at different 
income deciles. In both countries, private transfers are more important sources of 
income than social insurance and means-tested benefits, especially for poorer families. 
 Apart from the substantive findings, a major contribution of the welfare regime 
literature is in highlighting the fit and complementarity between different sets of 
welfare institutions.
25
 These complementarities have implications for the sustainability 
and vulnerabilities of individual welfare regimes, because they are based on different 
assumptions about the division of responsibility between the state, the market, and the 
family (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Hong Kong and Singapore are often regarded as 
familialistic regimes, but despite some early interest, countries in the region have never 
been convincingly situated within the welfare regime typology used in Europe. 
Scholars have separately referred to the liberal, conservative, and familialistic 
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 The term ―institutional complementarity‖ was first used by Hall and Soskice (2001) in their work on 
varieties of capitalism, in which they also highlighted the fit between particular configurations of 
market, labour, and welfare institutions. 
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tendencies of East Asian welfare states (Aspalter, 2001; Esping-Andersen, 1997, 
1999). Others have proposed distinct types for this region, such as Confucian (Jones, 
1993), as mentioned earlier, or productivist (Holliday, 2000).
26
 While it is beyond the 
scope of this review to fully debate East Asia‘s regime type (or types), a cursory 
comparison of Singapore and Hong Kong with other established welfare regime types 
on Esping-Andersen‘s two major dimensions of de-commodification and de-
familialisation shows why East Asian welfare states are difficult to place (Table 4.2). 
In terms of de-commodification, Singapore and Hong Kong resemble the liberal 
regime in their use of stringent means-tested benefits. But in terms of de-
familialisation, they bear similarities to the regime in Southern Europe. In fact, social 
spending data and intergenerational co-residence rates suggest that they are more 
liberal than the Anglo-Saxon liberal regime and more familialistic than Southern 
Europe (Börsch-Supan et al., 2008; International Labour Organization, 2010). Social 
welfare for elderly persons is therefore achieved through a set of complementary 
strategies. First, defined contribution pensions and economic policy promote elderly 
employment and welfare production through the labour market. Second, 
intergenerational family support is a key source of old-age income, especially for those 
with low lifetime work income. Third, the state avoids replacing either market or 
family welfare functions, such as through comprehensive state pensions. 
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 Jones (1993) directly compares East Asia to Esping-Andersen‘s three worlds of welfare in her 
description of the Confucianist welfare state as: ―Conservative corporatism without (Western-style) 
worker participation; subsidiarity without the Church; solidarity without equality; laissez-faire without 
libertarianism: an alternative expression of all this might be ‗household economy‘ welfare states – run in 
the style of a would-be traditional, Confucian, extended family‖ (p.214). The productivist welfare 
regime—a reference to the political economy literature on productivism—is based on the observation 
that East Asian governments prioritise economic development above all else. Some scholars have 
argued that East Asian governments do not subjugate social welfare to economic development, but 
rather pursue a programme of shared growth that seeks to raise living standards through rapid economic 
development (Birdsall & Haggard, 2000; Hort & Kuhnle, 2000). 
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Table 4.2  Locating Singapore and Hong Kong as a welfare regime 
 De-commodification De-familialisation 
Social democratic High de-commodification, 
universal public benefits 
High de-familialisation, 
comprehensive public services 
Southern Europe
a
 Moderate de-commodification, 
status-based transfers 
Low de-familialisation,  
family-dependent 
Liberal Low de-commodification, 
means-tested benefits 
Moderate de-familialisation, 
market-based services  
Hong Kong, 
Singapore 
Low de-commodification, 
means-tested benefits 
Low de-familialisation,       
family-dependent 
Note: (a) Esping-Andersen‘s orginal typology included conservative welfare regimes. The 
Southern Europe cluster is a sub-type identified later by other scholars as a familialistic variant 
in Continental Europe. It is included here as it offers a more relevant comparison with Hong 
Kong and Singapore. 
Source: First three regime types based on Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), own analysis for 
Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 
 Under these conditions, Hong Kong and Singapore may face the vulnerabilities 
of both the liberal and Southern European welfare regimes. Already, the challenge of 
social stratification faced by the liberal welfare states has surfaced in Hong Kong and 
Singapore in the form of income inequality levels that are higher than in the United 
States (United Nations Development Programme, 2010). Income inequality between 
elderly and non-elderly persons in Singapore and Hong Kong has been discussed in 
Chapter 2. Esping-Andersen (1999) also argues that the familialistic regimes in 
Southern Europe have experienced an overall reduction in welfare for families and 
individuals because they continue to place heavy care expectations on the family 
despite changes in family structure and gender roles. This signals a possible risk to 
relying on adult children as the main pillar of income security in Singapore and Hong 
Kong, especially at a juncture of social change. The rest of this chapter assesses 
empirically the role of the family in providing for elderly persons and identifies early 
signs that this model of old-age income security may not be sustainable in these 
societies.  
 
Summary 
While the focus of this study is not on explaining family support for elderly persons, 
the review in this section helps to provide theoretical perspective on the stability of a 
familial model of income security, and on the findings in later sections. In summary 
the review found that: 
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 At the individual level, the two dominant explanations of family transfers have 
been altruism and exchange. The altruism argument is that transfers are a 
response to need, whereas exchange theory proposes that children‘s financial 
contributions are a reciprocal gesture for gifts and services from their parents. 
In Europe and the United States there has been evidence that both having needs 
and giving practical help increase the probability of receiving transfers, even 
though much of the research has been about parents‘ cash gifts to their children 
rather than the other way round. There is also some evidence of altruism and 
exchange motives at work within families in Singapore, even though both 
theories appear to simplify the complex considerations behind the flow of 
resources across generations and within households. 
 
 At the society level, culturally-defined kinship obligations have attracted much 
scholarly attention. An influential argument from the late 1980s is that 
Confucianist principles of filial responsibility woven into Chinese traditions 
account for the family‘s role in providing for elderly persons in societies like 
Hong Kong and Singapore. Within this framework, assumptions about the 
son‘s greater role in caring for the parents have some empirical basis. But the 
cultural argument faces difficulties reconciling variations in popular practices 
and the effects of policy intervention. 
 
 From a macro-policy perspective, it has been argued that modernisation ushers 
in welfare states that displace the family‘s care role. However state-financed 
public pensions in Hong Kong and Singapore have not grown significantly 
despite economic development. In fact there is a distinct risk that as family 
support recedes, public pensions may not be adequate to fill the gap. Current 
understanding from welfare regime research suggests that Hong Kong and 
Singapore may be less de-commodified than the liberal regimes and less de-
familialised than the Southern European regimes, leaving them highly 
vulnerable to any setbacks to family welfare production. 
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4.2 Availability of children 
One of the most direct determinants of family support in old-age is whether and how 
many children are available. Although having children is not necessarily the same as 
receiving support, research evidence has consistently found kin availability to be a 
useful predictor of co-residence. Elderly persons with more surviving children are 
more likely to co-reside with one (Martin, 1989), are less likely to live alone (Wolf, 
1984), and have more social contact with other persons (Bachrach, 1980). Chou (2010) 
has also found that the number of children significantly predicts the amount of 
transfers to elderly parents in Hong Kong. It is therefore important to understand the 
demographic dynamics that may affect the availability of children.  
 There have been two major demographic shifts in industrialised societies in the 
past half century—a dramatic reduction in fertility and sustained improvements to 
mortality (Michael Murphy, 2010). Hong Kong and Singapore too have had steadily 
increasing life expectancies and declining fertility since the 1970s. Some researchers 
believe that these developments will result in future elderly persons having fewer adult 
children who can provide social and practical support (A. Chan, 2005; M. T. Yap, 
Thang, & Traphagan, 2005). But studies done on kin availability in the UK and 
subsequently extended to France and Finland point to a more complex interaction of 
demographic factors, with results that are often not self-evident from broad trends 
(Michael Murphy & Grundy, 2003; Michael Murphy, Martikainen, & Pennec, 2006). 
The number of children available to elderly persons depends on fertility, both in terms 
of the number of children and the parents‘ age at childbearing, as well as mortality, 
which affects the likelihood that the children are still alive when the parents are at very 
advanced ages. For example using detailed fertility histories collected in census studies 
combined with historical and projected mortality for individual cohorts, Murphy and 
Grundy (2003) modelled the proportion of parents with surviving children in the UK 
from 1911 to 2050. They found that while lower fertility levels will affect the number 
of available children for women aged 70 years and below, better survival chances 
among the adult children will offset these effects for elderly parents aged 80 years and 
above. The net result is that over the next quarter century, successive cohorts of elderly 
persons in the UK are more likely to have at least one surviving child. This body of 
research highlights that the prospect of having surviving children can only be 
understood by studying the unique coincidence of mortality and fertility trends for 
specific cohorts within individual populations. 
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The broad picture based on aggregate indicators 
For Hong Kong and Singapore, published aggregate indicators provide the first clues. 
Table 4.3 shows selected period and cohort demographic indicators related to 
marriage, fertility, and life expectancy for both populations from the 1980s. The rate 
and timing of marriage also matter because childbearing is commonly preceded by 
marriage in these societies.
27
 The data on Hong Kong show that the rate of marriage 
fell sharply from 77 marriages per 1000 unmarried women in 1981 to just 18 marriages 
in 2011. This downward trend may be partly driven by an older population age 
structure that means fewer women around the age of marriage, as well as delayed 
marriage. Age at first marriage increased by five years over the period. But on a cohort 
basis, the percentage of women ever married has also fallen for the cohorts about to 
reach 65. Assuming childbearing is associated with marriage this trend alone will have 
an impact on the proportion of elderly persons with no children.  
 In terms of fertility there is a clear trend of later childbearing, with the median 
age at first childbearing closely tracking the median age of first marriage. Importantly 
total fertility fell steadily between 1981 and 2001 then improved in 2011 as more 
women from mainland China are choosing to give birth in Hong Kong in recent years 
(Census and Statistics Department, 2012b). On average, women born in 1931 had 5 
children by age 50, but women born in 1961 had just 1.6 children. The last but one 
column shows the combined effect of fewer and later marriages, and delayed and 
lower fertility. Among the 1941 cohort of women only 6% had no children by age 50. 
For the 1961 birth cohort this had surged to 23%. While fertility fell, period life 
expectancy at birth went in the opposite direction, showing a remarkable gain of nine 
years in just three decades. 
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 Data on the proportion of children born to single mothers are not available for both Hong Kong and 
Singapore. But an official report on Hong Kong notes that ―virtually all births in Hong Kong are 
associated with marriage‖ (Census and Statistics Department, 2012b, p. 97). The same report explains 
that the youngest women among all married women have the highest fertility rate because of ―the 
propensity of marriage as a result of premarital pregnancy‖ (p. 38).  
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Table 4.3 Marriage, fertility, and life expectancy indicators for Hong Kong and Singapore 
(a) Hong Kong 1931-2011 
 Marriage  Fertility Life 
expectancy at 
birth 
 Number of 
marriages per 
1000 unmarried 
women 
Women‘s 
median age at 
first marriage  
% women 
ever married 
by age 45-49 
 Median age 
at first child 
bearing 
Total fertility 
rate 
Average 
number of 
children born 
by age 50 
% women 
with no 
children by 
age 50 
Birth cohort         
1931 - - 96  - - 5.0 - - 
1941 - - 98  - - 3.4 6 - 
1951 - - 96  - - 2.2 9 - 
1961 - - 88  - - 1.6 23 - 
Period values         
1981 77 24 -  25 1.9 - - 75 
1991 61 26 -  28 1.3 - - 78 
2001 27 28 -  29 0.9 - - 82 
2011 18 29 -  30 1.2 - - 84 
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(b) Singapore 1930-2010 
 Marriage  Fertility Life 
expectancy at 
birth 
 Number of 
marriages per 
1000 unmarried 
women 
Women‘s 
median age 
at first 
marriage 
% women ever 
married by age 
45-49 
 Median age 
at first child 
bearing 
Total 
fertility rate 
Average 
number of 
children born 
by age 44 
% women 
age 50+ with 
no children 
Birth cohort         
1930 - - 97  - - - - - 
1940 - - 96  - - 3.7 - - 
1950 - - 93  - - 2.2 - - 
1960 - - 87  - - 1.9 - - 
Period values         
1980 69 24 -  - 1.8 - - 72 
1990 61 25 -  - 1.8 - - 75 
2000 50 26 -  29 1.6 - 3.8 78 
2010 37 28 -  30 1.2 - 4.4 82 
Sources: Census and Statistics Department (2012b, 2012d) , Department of Statistics (2001, 2010, 2012), United Nations (2008a, 2008b) 
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 The demographic indicators for Singapore point to a similar situation as Hong 
Kong, but with a slightly slower rate of decline in marriage and fertility. The rate of 
marriage decreased steadily from 69 per 1000 unmarried women in 1980 to 37 in 2010 
while the median age of first marriage rose from 24 to 28. On a cohort basis there was 
a gradual decline in the proportion of women ever married by age 45-49 between the 
birth cohorts of 1930 and 1950, then a sharper fall for the 1960 cohort that will reach 
retirement age in the next decade. The period fertility indicators suggest a downward 
trend: total fertility fell from 1.8 to 1.2 between 1980 and 2010 while the percentage of 
women aged 50 and above with no children increased slightly over the past 10 years. 
Among cohorts of women born between 1940 and 1960 , their average number of 
children born by the age of 44 decreased from 3.7 to 1.9. During this time period life 
expectancy at birth grew by 10 years. For both Hong Kong and Singapore the opposite 
fertility and mortality trends make it difficult to infer the availability of children in old 
age from aggregate data alone. 
 
Modelling the number of surviving children using cohort mortality data 
For Hong Kong the analysis of the number of surviving children can be extended by 
combining cohort fertility and mortality data and taking into account different 
childbearing timings. The approach below follows the broad logic in Murphy and 
Grundy‘s (2003) study but is considerably simplified as individual-level data on 
fertility histories are not available. So the analysis starts instead with the average 
number of children ever born to women of particular cohorts and then calculates 
attrition using cohort mortality data and projections. As the timing of childbearing by 
cohort is not known, including both the age at first childbearing and the duration 
between births, it is assumed for convenience that all the births to a mother take place 
at the same age. This results in an underestimation of the number of surviving children 
since in reality higher order births encounter lower probabilities of death than their 
older siblings in any given year. But the results from the analysis as shown below 
suggest that this underestimation is trivial. Additionally since the gender proportions of 
aggregate fertility figures are unknown the analysis takes the average of male and 
female mortalities when calculating attrition. The same modelling procedure could not 
be repeated for Singapore as cohort mortality data are only available for up to the last 
five years.  
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 Table 4.4 summarises the main results of the analysis which covers women 
from four cohorts born 10 years apart between 1944 to 1974 in Hong Kong. The oldest 
of these cohorts turned 65 in 2009. The average number of children born to women by 
50 years old fell steeply from 3.55 for the oldest cohort to 1.19 for the most recent. The 
two rightmost columns in the table show the estimated numbers of surviving children 
that mothers have when they reach the retirement age of 65 and then 85. Assuming the 
mother‘s age of childbearing remains at 20, the results indicate that the key 
determinant of the number of surviving children is the average number of children 
born to mothers whereas the children‘s improving mortality is relatively marginal and 
insufficient to offset the fertility gap across cohorts. A mother born in 1944 has 3.55 
children on average, of whom 3.40 are estimated to survive by the time she turns 65 
and 3.20 by the age of 85, with a total attrition of 0.35 children due to mortality. In 
comparison the average attrition of children whose mothers were born in 1974 is just 
0.07 over 85 years. However because the 1974 cohort of mothers have just 1.19 
children on average the final number of surviving children is still lower than earlier 
cohorts. 
 Even when childbearing is assumed to be delayed for later cohorts, the 
children‘s mortality gains from the wider age gap with their mothers is still too 
negligible to alter the overall decline in the availability of children across cohorts. For 
the 1974 cohort, delaying childbearing till 29 years old increases the number of 
surviving children from 1.12 to 1.16 when the mother reaches 85 years old, but this is 
still lower than the 1.29 to 3.20 surviving children for mothers of earlier cohorts by the 
same age. Figure 4.1 illustrates this dynamic more clearly. The children‘s mortality 
results in downward slopes in the number of surviving children as mothers age. 
Improvements to mortality means that the gradient of the slope becomes shallower for 
later cohorts while delays in childbearing further narrow the gap between the numbers 
of surviving children by age 85. But overall, the funnel shape of the graph is barely 
detectable and the availability of children still falls considerably across cohorts. From 
the graph it can be seen that even a delay of childbearing by up to nine years does not 
help to offset the fertility gap across cohorts. Spacing out the births within each cohort 
in a more realistic model is unlikely to significantly alter the shape of the projections. 
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Table 4.4  Estimated numbers of surviving children when mothers born in 1944-1974 
reach ages 65 and 85, Hong Kong 
Mother‘s 
birth year 
(year when 
age 65) 
Number of 
children 
born to 
mothers by 
age 50 
Mother‘s 
age at 
childbirth 
Surviving children 
when mother 
reaches age 65 
(children‘s attrition 
from mortality) 
Surviving children 
when mother 
reaches age 85 
(children‘s attrition 
from mortality) 
1944 (2009) 3.55 20 3.40 
(0.15) 
3.20 
(0.35) 
1954 (2019) 2.00 20 1.92 
(0.08) 
1.83 
(0.17) 
  23 1.94 
(0.06) 
1.86 
(0.14) 
1964 (2029) 1.35 20 1.32 
(0.03) 
1.26 
(0.09) 
  26 1.33 
(0.02) 
1.29 
(0.06) 
1974 (2039) 1.19 20 1.17 
(0.02) 
1.12 
(0.07) 
  29 1.18 
(0.01) 
1.16 
(0.03) 
Note: Figures for number of children born to mothers from 1964 and 1974 cohorts based on 
national projections, see sources. Children‘s mortality rates are held constant before 1971 and 
after 2041 as data are unavailable outside this period. 
Source: Own calculations, based on fertility data in Census and Statistics Department (2010a) 
and mortality data in Census and Statistics Department (2012c, 2013b) 
 
Figure 4.1  Estimated numbers of surviving children by mother‘s age for mothers born 
in 1944-1974, Hong Kong 
 
Note: Children‘s mortality rates are held constant before 1971 and after 2041 as data are 
unavailable outside this period. 
Source: Own calculations, based on fertility data in Census and Statistics Department (2010a) 
and mortality data in Census and Statistics Department (2012c, 2013b) 
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 Unlike Murphy and Grundy‘s (2003) study the above analysis does not derive 
the proportions of mothers with different numbers of children. Understanding the 
proportion of elderly mothers with no children, and therefore no access to an important 
source of support, would have been particularly useful but was not possible as the 
projections here were based on aggregate data. Chapter 6 extends the analysis here by 
presenting a more detailed model that directly considers the proportions of future 
elderly persons who live with their children or draw income from them. 
 Two important conclusions emerge from these projections. First the 
comparison with the UK shows that a continuous rise in life expectancy is more likely 
to contribute to greater numbers of surviving children in populations where fertility 
fluctuates or falls more gradually, and even then only when the parents are very old. 
Total fertility in the UK in fact rose from 2.14 to 2.68 between 1926 and 1960, while 
the mean age of childbearing fell from 28 for the 1926 cohort to 26 (1946 cohort) 
before rising back to 28 (1960 cohort) (Michael Murphy & Grundy, 2003). For the 
women of these cohorts, the number of children ever born fell less dramatically, from 
2.18 to 1.96, and only after the 1946 cohort. As a result, the availability of children is 
expected to improve in the decades ahead. In contrast, over roughly the same 
timeframe of three decades, the average number of children born to women in Hong 
Kong shrunk from 3.55 to 1.19. The overall fertility trend was steep and unidirectional 
for the birth cohorts between 1944 and 1974. Therefore improving mortality is not 
expected to offset lower fertility. Second, previous research has documented that the 
effects of having more children on the likelihood of co-residence may taper off at 
higher parities (Bachrach, 1980). In Hong Kong, Chou (2010) found that having three 
or more children does not significantly increase the amount of transfers to elderly 
parents compared to two or fewer children. He concludes from this ―ceiling effect‖ that 
lower fertility may not have as great an impact on support for elderly parents as 
commonly presumed. However the projections here show that from 2019 onwards, the 
retiring cohorts may have an average of fewer than two children—falling short of the 
ceiling. The availability of children is therefore likely to remain an important influence 
on family support. 
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Summary 
The discussion in this section has focused on the number of surviving children to 
elderly persons as a direct determinant of the availability of family support. 
 
 The number of surviving children depends both on fertility—the number of 
children born to mothers of each cohort and the timing of child bearing, as well 
as mortality—the likelihood that the adult children are alive when the parents 
become very old. Research done in the UK has found that the cohorts of 
mothers now approaching retirement age are more likely to have at least one 
surviving child when they are aged 80 and above due to improving mortality 
among their children. 
 
 Demographic indicators for Hong Kong and Singapore show a steady trend of 
fewer and later marriages for women, as well as delayed and lower fertility. 
But at the same time there have been impressive gains in life expectancy. These 
opposite trends make it difficult to infer the availability of children in old age. 
 
 Therefore the number of surviving children for women born between 1944 and 
1974 in Hong Kong was modelled by combining cohort fertility and mortality 
data on an aggregate basis. The main finding was that falling fertility is the key 
determinant of the number of surviving children whereas the effect of 
children‘s improving mortality is relatively marginal. On average, mothers 
born in 1944 may have 3.40 children by age 65 and 3.20 by 85, compared to 
1.18 and 1.16 children for mothers born in 1974. The analysis highlights that 
improving mortality is likely to make a difference to the availability of children 
only when fertility falls more gradually, but not among populations like Hong 
Kong where fertility has fallen continuously and steeply. Although the 
availability of children may have a ―ceiling effect‖ on the amount of transfers 
to elderly persons, the parities of retiring cohorts from 2019 onwards are likely 
to fall below this ceiling of three or more children.  
 
  
 130 
4.3 Intergenerational co-residence 
It is widely acknowledged that intergenerational co-residence is a common 
arrangement in East Asian families. In an early study, Chan (1997) observed from the 
1995 National Survey of Senior Citizens that 85% of older adults aged 60 and above 
lived with at least one child in Singapore. Living arrangements were also relatively 
stable during retirement, with around 13% of elderly persons switching between co-
resident and non-co-resident arrangements (A. Chan, 2005). However there were 
cultural variations. The elderly Chinese and Indians in Singapore—but not elderly 
Malays—were more likely to live with their sons than their daughters (M.B. Ofstedal, 
J Knodel, & N Chayovan, 1999, see discussion in Section 4.1). Co-residence often 
implies access to a range of resources. In Singapore, almost 80% of older adults aged 
60 and above have meals with their co-resident children ―often‖, and elderly parents 
are more likely to receive physical care from co-resident than non-co-resident children 
(A. Chan, 1997; Mehta, 1999). In Hong Kong, co-residence usually means that elderly 
parents are able to live rent-free and do not have to pay for food and utilities (W. K.-
M. Lee, 2004). 
 However there are two gaps in the current understanding of intergenerational 
co-residence in Hong Kong and Singapore. First there is ambivalence regarding the 
outlook for elderly persons‘ living arrangements. One message from earlier research 
on Singapore is that family support through co-residence remains strong and has not 
declined, although these claims were based on data from a very short period in the late 
1990s (A. Chan, 1997, 2005). On the other hand, there have been concerns about the 
possible impact of demographic ageing on such living arrangements (A. Chan, 2005; 
Martin, 1990). Both positions have not been empirically corroborated in recent years. 
Second, living arrangements are rarely cross-analysed with economic variables such as 
work participation and income level, which may help to reveal the vulnerability of 
particular elderly subgroups. The following original analysis of the national survey 
datasets described in Chapter 2 addresses these gaps. This section first reviews the 
extent of intergenerational co-residence in Hong Kong and Singapore before 
examining its relationship with financial dependence in old age. The next two sections 
look at financial support from children under different living arrangements and the 
combined household resources potentially available to elderly persons. 
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Overall levels of co-residence in Hong Kong and Singapore
1
 
Between the 1990s and 2000s, co-residence with adult children remained the norm for 
the majority of the elderly populations in Hong Kong and Singapore, with higher 
levels in Singapore (Figure 4.2). In the mid-2000s, 59% of elderly persons in Hong 
Kong and 72% in Singapore were living with their children. But over the 10 years 
there was a decrease in co-residence, with Singapore experiencing a sharper decline of 
12 percentage points compared to 5 percentage points in Hong Kong. There was a 
corresponding increase in the proportion of elderly persons living alone or with their 
spouse only, from 29% to 38% in Hong Kong and from 12% to 26% in Singapore. 
These downward trends appear to be common to many industrialised societies even 
though different countries may start at different levels. Co-residence with children has 
also declined in Europe and is generally lower than in East Asian societies (Börsch-
Supan, et al., 2008). In 2005 the proportion of elderly parents aged 60-69 who were 
living with their children ranged from 5% in Sweden to 41% in Italy. 
 
Figure 4.2  Living arrangements of elderly persons (65+) in Hong Kong and 
Singapore 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006; 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995, 2005 
 
                                                 
1
 Aggregate figures on recent living arrangements by sex and age are available from published reports 
on both Hong Kong and Singapore (Census and Statistics Department, 2008; Department of Statistics, 
2001, 2006; Ministry of Community Development, 1995) but these do not permit further analysis such 
as on income levels and sources under different living arrangements. For consistency, the discussion of 
living arrangements throughout this section draws from original analyses of the national survey datasets 
rather than published aggregate data. 
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 There have been consistent gender and age differences in living arrangements. 
In general, women were more likely to live with their children especially without the 
spouse, while men were more likely to live with their spouse with or without the 
children (Figure 4.3). This is partly due to women‘s longer life expectancies and 
younger ages at marriage than their husbands. Between 1996 and 2006, the gender 
difference narrowed in Hong Kong as levels of co-residence fell for all elderly persons, 
but to a greater extent for women. But in Singapore, as co-residence decreased for the 
elderly population, men who already had lower levels of co-residence in 1995 
experienced a sharper decline in 2005. This resulted in a wider gender gap. Among 
men aged 70-79, the proportion who did not live with their children almost doubled 
between the two years. 
 In Hong Kong co-residence with the children was less likely for the older age 
groups. This is surprising considering that physical care needs tend to increase with 
age. For instance in 1996, 70% of women aged 65-69 were living with their children, 
compared to only 57% of women aged 80 and above. This may be related to nest-
leaving as adult children set up home with their own families (Martin, 1989). The 
patterns for Singapore are less clear. In 1995 there appeared to be no significant age 
effects on the choice to live with children, with the total share of elderly persons living 
with children varying by no more than 4 percentage points across the age groups for 
either men or women. However age appeared to be related to a higher likelihood of 
living with children only rather than with both the spouse and the children. In 2005 
there was greater variance in the total share of persons living with their children across 
age groups—14 percentage points for men and 8 percentage points for women. For 
women, the percentage living with children increased with age. But the likelihood of 
co-residence for the men fell between the ages of 65 to 79 before rising for the 80 and 
above age group. These data do not allow a separation of cohort and age effects but 
they do raise questions about the stability of intergenerational co-residence as a social 
norm and suggest that such living arrangements can no longer be assumed to be 
regular feature of life in old age.
2
 
                                                 
2
 In both populations a small proportion of elderly persons lived with persons other than their spouse 
and children, such as grandchildren, siblings, other more distant kin, or friends. This group was 
relatively small in Singapore. But among women aged 80 and above in Hong Kong in 1996, one in five 
belonged to this category. While this may suggest a lack of children‘s support for the oldest women, it 
may also reflect their ability to find alternative care arrangements. Even though the proportion of 
women living under these arrangements fell in 2006, this may be an area for further research. 
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Figure 4.3  Living arrangements of elderly persons (65+) in Hong Kong and 
Singapore by gender and age 
(a) Hong Kong 
1996 
 
2006 
 
(b) Singapore 
1995 
2005 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006; 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995, 2005 
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Variations in co-residence by children’s gender and marital status 
The survey datasets allow analysis of co-residence not just by parents‘ gender, as is 
usually presented in published sources, but also by children‘s gender and the presence 
of the children‘s spouse. This is an important aspect of intergenerational relations 
considering assumptions about patrilinear obligations in Chinese and Confucianist 
culture. Table 4.5 shows the distribution of living arrangements for elderly persons 
who co-resided with their children in Hong Kong and Singapore. Overall, co-residence 
with sons was more common than with daughters. Out of all the elderly persons living 
with their children in both Hong Kong and Singapore in 2005/2006, about 60% were 
living with their sons while less than a third were living with their daughters. But 
whether spouses were present appears to matter, both of the children and the parents. 
Elderly parents without their spouse were more likely to live with sons and their 
spouses, whereas elderly couples were more likely to live with sons only. Daughters 
with spouses on the other hand were the least likely to live with their parents. This 
arrangement accounted for under 10% of co-resident elderly persons in Hong Kong 
and Singapore. The two populations differed in one respect. Among elderly persons 
not living with their spouse, the distribution of living arrangements was very similar 
for men and women in Singapore, but was more varied for Hong Kong both between 
the sexes and across years. 
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Table 4.5  Household composition of elderly persons (65+) who co-reside with 
children, Hong Kong 1996 and 2006, Singapore 2005, percentage 
 Elderly persons not living 
with spouses 
Elderly persons 
living with 
spouses 
All 
 Men Women All  
Hong Kong      
1996      
Sons only 30 25 26 32 29 
Sons and their spouses
1
 35 41 40 20 29 
Daughters only 11 12 12 19 15 
Daughters and their spouses 10 12 12 5 8 
Sons and daughters
2
 14 10 11 24 18 
Total
3
 100 100 100 100 100 
2006      
Sons only 34 26 27 38 34 
Sons and their spouses 24 33 31 16 23 
Daughters only 18 22 21 26 24 
Daughters and their spouses 7 10 9 2 5 
Sons and daughters 17 10 11 17 14 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Singapore      
2005      
Sons only 27 25 26 32 27 
Sons and spouses 33 32 32 16 33 
Daughters only 16 16 16 19 16 
Daughters and spouses 9 12 12 6 9 
Sons and daughters 15 14 14 28 15 
Total
2
 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: 1) Refers to spouses living in the same household, not marital status. 
2) With or without their spouses 
3) Figures may not add up to 100 due to rounding. 
Source: Own calculations using data from Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006; 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 2005 
 
 Between 1996 and 2006 in Hong Kong, there were some shifts within these 
broad patterns. Single children took on a greater role in sharing their households with 
their elderly parents. In 1996, 44% of co-resident elderly parents resided with either 
single sons or single daughters only. This increased to 58% in 2006. This may be a 
consequence of there being fewer children, and later marriage among younger 
generations resulting in a greater availability of single children. In particular co-
residence with single daughters only rose by nine percentage points. While this was 
one of the least likely living arrangements in 1996, a quarter of co-resident elderly 
persons were living in the same household as their single daughters in 2006, 
overtaking the share of elderly persons living with sons and their spouses. This echoes 
trends in other Asian societies, including China, India, and Korea, of a growing 
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recognition of daughters as important care providers as elderly parents have fewer 
children—and therefore fewer sons—available (Croll, 2008). In the context of Hong 
Kong, this development has not been noted in earlier research on differences in co-
residence based on children‘s gender (Knodel & Debavalya, 1997; M.B. Ofstedal, et 
al., 1999).  
 The above analysis provides some support for the argument that sons assume 
greater responsibility than daughters for the care of elderly parents through co-
residence, and that this gap widens once the children set up families of their own. But 
the differences between Singapore and Hong Kong and changes in Hong Kong within 
a short span of 10 years suggest that cultural and gender norms of care responsibility 
cannot be narrowly defined. These norms are capable of responding to other forces 
such as demographic changes. 
 
Co-residence and financial dependence 
 Remaining in the labour force in old age offers possible additional work 
income. Using work as a proxy for financial independence, Figure 4.4 shows the 
likelihood of elderly persons to live with their children by labour force participation 
status. Only a small minority of elderly persons in Hong Kong and Singapore, 
especially women, remain in the workforce (see Chapter 2). But those who were in the 
workforce were less likely to be co-resident with their children. This difference 
diminished for both populations by 2005/2006 but was still distinct for elderly men 
and women in Singapore. 
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Figure 4.4  Percentage of elderly persons (65+) who lived with their children by 
labour force participation status, Hong Kong 1996 and 2006, Singapore 1995 and 2005 
          Hong Kong     Singapore 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006; 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995, 2005 
 
 An examination of individual income levels provides a better understanding of 
the relationship between elderly persons‘ financial means and living arrangements. 
Figure 4.5 shows the mean individual gross monthly incomes of the elderly 
populations in Hong Kong and Singapore in 1995/1996 and 2005/2006. There are a 
number of interesting variations between genders and across the two populations. In 
Hong Kong elderly persons living with their children had relatively lower incomes, 
regardless of the presence of the spouse. Living apart from the children is especially 
indicative of having higher individual incomes for elderly women. While women had 
lower incomes than men in any living arrangement, the widest gap in individual 
incomes was between elderly men and women who lived with their spouse only. In 
1996 the average individual income of men living with their spouse only was 
HK$7100, compared to HK$1700 for women. This gap narrowed in 2006 as the 
income of men living with their spouse only fell to HK$5900 while that of women rose 
to HK$2100 in 1996 value. Nonetheless the income difference is suggestive of 
women‘s dependence on their spouses among elderly couples who lived apart from 
their children. 
 In Singapore elderly persons living with their children and not their spouse had 
some of the lowest average incomes, which appears to support the argument that co-
residence may be a way to achieve better income security. But elderly couples who 
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lived with their children had among the highest incomes in both years. Instead the 
absence of the spouse is more consistently linked with having low individual incomes, 
which raises concerns particularly for elderly persons living with neither their spouse 
nor their children. In contrast to elderly women living on their own in Hong Kong who 
had the highest individual incomes among women, this group fared poorly in 
Singapore, with the lowest average income of any category of elderly persons in both 
years. Despite strong gains in real incomes between 1995 and 2005, overall individual 
income patterns by living arrangement remained remarkably stable. 
 
Figure 4.5  Mean individual gross monthly incomes of elderly persons (65+) by sex 
and living arrangements, Hong Kong 1996 and 2006, Singapore 1995 and 2005 
 
Hong Kong 
1996 Hong Kong dollars  
 
Singapore 
1995 Singapore dollars 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006; 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995, 2005 
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 Besides comparing individual incomes among elderly persons, these incomes 
can be analysed in relation to the working population to provide an indication of their 
living standards relative to the rest of society. The low-income threshold used here is 
40% of the median population work income. As Chapter 2 highlighted, many elderly 
persons have low incomes by this standard. So it is not unexpected that the majority of 
elderly persons also have low incomes across most types of living arrangement (Figure 
4.6). The observations here generally confirm what was indicated by Figure 4.5 above. 
Elderly persons living with their children only were most likely to have low relative 
incomes in Hong Kong and Singapore. In the four rounds of survey, 82-93% of elderly 
persons in this category had individual incomes below the 40% threshold. In Singapore 
elderly persons who lived with their spouse were less likely to have low incomes. But 
even among this group, two thirds had low incomes in 2005. In Hong Kong living 
apart from the children was more likely to indicate higher individual incomes. This 
was especially clear in 2006 when 37% of elderly persons living with neither the 
spouse nor the children had individual incomes below 40% of the median population 
work income, compared to 77% among persons living with both their spouse and their 
children and 82% among persons living with their children only. 
 Adopting income standards based on the working population reveals other 
differences between Hong Kong and Singapore. Although elderly persons in Singapore 
achieved real gains in individual income between 1995 and 2005, their income 
situation relative to the working population did not improve substantially over this 
period and in fact worsened for elderly persons living on their own. On the other hand 
while real income growth was slower for elderly persons in Hong Kong, the proportion 
with low individual incomes relative to the working population fell for all types of 
living arrangement and most noticeably for elderly persons living on their own. The 
income position of this group is the biggest difference between the two populations. 
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Figure 4.6  Percentage of elderly population (65+) with individual incomes below 
40% median population income in Hong Kong and Singapore, by living arrangement 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006; 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995, 2005 
 
Summary 
The two main messages from this section are that firstly, earlier optimism about the 
persistence of intergenerational co-residence may have been misjudged. Co-residence 
has fallen visibly in both Hong Kong and Singapore over just ten years. Secondly, the 
cross-analysis of living arrangements with individual incomes suggests that this 
downward trend may pose more serious risks to elderly persons who are more 
vulnerable in the first place.  
 
 Co-residence with adult children remained the norm for the majority, with 
more than half of the elderly persons in Hong Kong and two-thirds in 
Singapore living with their children in 2005/2006. But there had been a 
decrease in co-residence between the 1990s and 2000s of about ten percentage 
points, which meant a rise in the likelihood of living alone or with the spouse 
only. On the whole, women were more likely to be co-resident with their 
children. This gender gap widened in Singapore over the ten years, with a 
doubling of the proportion of elderly men aged 70-79 not living with their 
children. 
 
 Co-residence appears to vary by children‘s gender and partnership status. Out 
of all the elderly persons living with their children in Hong Kong and 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Hong Kong 1996 Hong Kong 2006 Singapore 1995 Singapore 2005
Neither
Spouse
Child
Both
 141 
Singapore in 2005/2006, about 60% were living with their sons while less than 
a third were living with their daughters. Daughters with a spouse present were 
the least likely to live with their parents. But between 1996 and 2006 in Hong 
Kong, co-residence with single daughters only rose by nine percentage points 
to overtake the proportion of elderly persons living with sons and their spouses. 
This casts some doubt on more deterministic interpretations of cultural and 
gender norms in these societies. 
 
 In Hong Kong elderly persons living with their children had relatively lower 
incomes, regardless of the presence of the spouse. Living apart from the 
children was indicative of having higher individual incomes. Among elderly 
women, those living with neither their spouse nor their children had the highest 
individual incomes. But in Singapore, elderly persons living with their children 
only had lower incomes, not persons living with both their spouse and their 
children. Instead elderly persons living with neither their spouse nor their 
children had the lowest incomes, particularly the women. In 1995 and 2005, 
more than 90% of elderly persons living with their children only had individual 
incomes equivalent to less than 40% of the median population income in 
Singapore. Since co-residence may be a way of accessing financial security for 
elderly persons with low individual incomes, any decline in co-residence may 
also put them at greater risk of financial hardship.  
 
4.4 Financial transfers 
Financial exchanges with elderly parents in different countries 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, previous research has found that in Singapore the majority 
of elderly persons receive regular transfers from their adult children and that women 
are more likely to receive transfers than men (A. Chan, 1997; A. Chan, et al., 2003). 
Published data also show that in Singapore, the incidence of financial support from 
adult children is eroding. In 1995, 84% of elderly persons received regular cash 
contributions from their children and about 80% cited children as their main source of 
financial security (Table 4.6). By 2005, fewer than 80% depended on their children for 
financial help and less than two thirds regarded their children as their main financial 
source. Directly comparable data have not been published for Hong Kong. Instead 
separate studies have documented the provision of financial support from the 
 142 
perspective of the adult children instead of the elderly parents. Between 30% and 70% 
of adult children gave financial support to their parents in 1999 and 2009 (Table 4.7).  
 
Table 4.6  Percentage of elderly persons exchanging financial resources with children 
in Singapore, 1995-2008 
Year Parents‘ age Receiving from children Giving to children 
1995 65+ 84 29 
2005 65-74 76 - 
 75+ 78 - 
2008 65+ 68 - 
Note: The 1995 and 2005 surveys asked about ―regular cash contributions‖, while the 2008 survey 
asked about ―financial sources to meet old-age needs‖. 1995 based on co-resident children only. 
Other years based on all children. 
Source: Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports (1995, 2005), Housing and 
Development Board (2010). 
 
Table 4.7  Percentage of adult children exchanging resources with parents in Hong 
Kong, 1999 and 2009 
Year Children‘s 
age 
Financial transfers Social support 
Giving to 
parents 
Receiving 
from parents 
Giving to 
parents 
Receiving 
from parents 
1999 15+ 30 - - - 
2009 18+ 39-70 15 13 7 
Note: 1999 based on all adults with or without surviving parents; Yes/No responses; any amounts 
to co-resident parents; and only contributions above a minimum to non-co-resident parents. 2009 
based on adults with surviving parents only. 39% gave financial support ―very often‖ or ―often‖, 
while an additional 31% contributed ―occasionally‖. 
Sources: Census and Statistics Department  (2003, 2010c) 
 
 Despite different bases of calculation, the data on total family exchanges in 
Singapore and Hong Kong show clear differences when compared with Europe. In 
Singapore and Hong Kong, the older generations are net recipients in the family (Table 
4.6, Table 4.7). In the case of Hong Kong, net transfers are upward from adult children 
to older parents in terms of both financial and time resources.
3
 Table 4.8 shows data on 
Germany and Italy as examples, but the trend is similar across most parts of Europe, 
with differences only in the magnitude of exchanges across countries (Albertini, et al., 
2007). Here, the net flow of financial resources is downward from older parents to 
adult children. On average in Europe, less than 5% of parents receive money regularly 
                                                 
3
 A 2006 survey found that in Hong Kong, older adults are net providers of financial and practical 
support—primarily to their children but also other family members—up to their 60s, when they become 
net recipients (Leeson & Harper, 2007). 
 143 
from their children. But social support mainly flows upward from adult children to 
their parents. Elderly parents therefore hold a more balanced and less dependent role in 
the family, both contributing and receiving help. 
 
Table 4.8  Percentage of older adults (50+) exchanging resources with children in 
Germany and Italy, 2004 
 Financial transfers Social support 
Receiving 
from children 
Giving to 
children 
Receiving 
from children 
Giving to 
children 
Germany 4 27 23 12 
Italy 2 16 12 7 
Source: Albertini, Kohli, & Vogel (2007) 
 
 Although adult children give less direct financial support to their parents in 
Europe, working-age adults transfer financial resources to elderly parents indirectly 
through social security contributions to pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems 
(Attias-Donfut & Arber, 1999; Blome, et al., 2009). This policy mechanism for 
transferring financial resources across generations is much weaker in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, as seen in the discussion of their public pensions in Chapter 3. There is also 
a difference in timing. In Europe, there is a cyclical flow of financial resources 
between two generations within any one time period, mediated by public pension 
systems. But in Hong Kong and Singapore, the flow of financial resources between 
generations is unidirectional—upward—within a single time period. The ―circle‖ of 
exchange is only complete when one considers that in the next time period, the new 
cohort of elderly parents will in turn expect financial support from their adult children 
(Mehta, 1999). The differences in family exchanges between Hong Kong and 
Singapore on the one hand, and European countries on the other, are therefore in the 
transfer channels, directions, and time periods implied in their respective generational 
contracts, which are sometimes obscured in more generalised cultural accounts of East 
Asian social policy. 
 
Children’s financial transfers by living arrangement 
The current understanding of financial transfers to elderly parents in Hong Kong and 
Singapore is limited in two ways. First, few studies examine how the incidence of 
transfers varies for different elderly subgroups. Second, much of the East Asian 
sociology literature focuses on the incidence of transfers rather than amounts. As an 
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exception, a useful recent study that avoids both of these problems found that elderly 
women, widows, and persons living with their children were likely to receive larger 
transfers from their children in Hong Kong (K. L. Chou, 2010). The rest of this section 
extends current understanding by presenting original analysis of the incidence of 
children‘s financial transfers under different living arrangements and transfer amounts, 
using microdata from the national surveys mentioned earlier and additional data 
sources. 
 In 1995 and 2005, elderly persons in Singapore who co-resided with their 
children were more likely to rely on their children‘s financial contributions and less 
likely to receive income from all other sources, compared to elderly persons who did 
not live with their children (Figure 4.7). Elderly persons who were not co-resident with 
their children had more diverse income sources, such as other kin, work, pensions, and 
the CPF. But this gap in the diversity of income sources diminished between 1995 and 
2005, suggesting that even those elderly persons who were not living with their 
children had come to be more reliant on children‘s support. Over the 10 years, the 
proportion of non-co-resident elderly persons who received income from their children 
increased from 54% to 60%, while access to other sources such as work and other kin 
decreased by about 10 percentage points. 
 The receipt of public assistance in Singapore was slightly higher among elderly 
persons who were not co-resident. In 1995 and 2005, 4% and 2% of non-co-resident 
elderly persons received public assistance respectively, while only around 0.1% of co-
resident elderly persons did. Although this partially reflects the eligibility criteria for 
public assistance which includes the absence of family support, it also suggests that 
independent living in old age may arise from two sets of opposite financial 
circumstances—as a choice enabled by financial independence or as a reflection of 
financial destitution in the absence of family support. 
 Co-resident elderly persons in Hong Kong were similarly more likely to 
receive income from their children and less likely to derive income from other sources 
such as work, pensions, and other kin. There are also interesting receipt patterns for the 
CSSA and Social Security Assistance Schemes (SSAS) by living arrangement. Co-
resident elderly persons were more likely to receive the SSAS than the CSSA (which 
assesses eligibility on a household basis) because they tend to have lower individual 
incomes but higher household incomes due to working-age children in the household. 
On the other hand, elderly persons who lived on their own were more likely to qualify 
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for the CSSA than the SSAS (which is means-tested on an individual basis from the 
age of 65 to below 70) because they had higher individual incomes but lower 
household incomes. Depending on their living arrangements and financial situation, 
elderly persons in Hong Kong had recourse to one scheme or the other. 
 
Figure 4.7  Percentage of elderly persons (65+) who reported income receipts from 
selected sources in Singapore and Hong Kong by living arrangements, 1990s and 
2000s 
 
Singapore 
 
Hong Kong, 2000 
 
CPF: Central Provident Fund. SSAS: Social Security Allowance Scheme.  
CSSA: Comprehensive Social Security Assistance Scheme.  
Source: Own calculations using data from Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995, 
2005, and Supplementary Enquiry to the Hong Kong General Household Survey 2000. 
 
Amount of transfers from children 
Current knowledge about the amounts of cash transfers from adult children to elderly 
parents is limited by the availability of data. In Singapore‘s National Survey of Senior 
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Both the 1996 and 2006 By-census in Hong Kong did not ask detailed questions about 
income composition. Therefore for the analysis below, additional data had to be 
obtained from other sources. The first is the Housing and Development Board‘s 2008 
Sample Household Survey in Singapore, which covers about 7900 households and is 
weighted to represent the population residing in public housing. Direct access to the 
microdata was not possible but the housing authority provided several useful aggregate 
indicators about children‘s transfers. For Hong Kong, this study obtained on-site 
access to microdata from the 2008 Thematic Household Survey for a limited duration, 
which includes grouped data on transfers. The following are the key findings. 
 Singapore: In Singapore transfers from children were equivalent to more than 
half of the average individual income of elderly persons in 2008 (Table 4.9), based on 
the average individual income of elderly persons in the 2005 National Survey of 
Senior Citizens adjusted for inflation between 2005 and 2008. Men and elderly persons 
in the bottom half of the distribution of household incomes received slightly more but 
the differences were not statistically significant. As mentioned earlier, elderly persons 
living apart from their children in Singapore tend to have greater financial 
independence—they have higher individual incomes and more diverse income sources. 
Table 4.9 shows that they also received larger amounts of transfers from children 
(statistically significant at 0.05 level)—68% of average individual income compared to 
58% among elderly persons who co-resided with their children. This offers some 
corroboration for the prediction in exchange theory that cash transfers are less likely 
when recipients have higher pre-transfer incomes but are larger in amount when they 
do occur (see Section 4.1). But while co-resident elderly persons may receive smaller 
amounts of transfers from children, they often benefit from other in-kind support such 
as rent-free living, meals, and utilities (W. K.-M. Lee, 2004; Mehta, 1999). 
 Data from 1995 show the distribution of children‘s transfers as a proportion of 
elderly persons‘ individual incomes (Table 4.10). The most striking observation is that 
in 1995, children‘s transfers exceeded 75% of individual income for three quarters of 
all elderly persons. Generally elderly persons who were women, aged 70 and above, 
living with their children, and whose individual incomes were below 40% of the 
median population work income received transfers that represented bigger proportions 
of their total income. But this is largely a reflection of their lower individual incomes 
than the size of transfers (see Figure 4.5).  
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Table 4.9  Mean monthly transfers received from all children by elderly persons (65+) 
living in public housing, as percentage of elderly persons‘ average individual income, 
Singapore 2008 
Sex  
Men 64 
Women 61 
Living arrangement  
With children 58 
Not with children 68 
Elderly household income distribution 
Bottom half 65 
Top half 61 
Note: 82% of households lived in public housing in 2010 (Department of Statistics, 2012). 
Source: Own calculations; mean transfers based on communication with Housing and 
Development Board, average total individual income of all elderly persons based on data from 
the National Survey of Senior Citizens 2005 adjusted for inflation. 
 
Table 4.10  Distribution of elderly persons (65+) by the proportion of individual 
income made up of children‘s transfers, Singapore 1995, percentage 
  None Less than 
25% 
25 to 
49% 
50 to 
75% 
More 
than 
75% 
All elderly persons 5 7 5 4 75 
Sex Men 9 12 5 5 65 
 Women 3 4 5 3 83 
Age 65-69 7 9 6 5 70 
 70-74 4 6 4 4 79 
 75+ 6 6 4 3 77 
Living 
arrangement 
With neither 20 7 6 1 32 
Spouse only 10 13 5 4 59 
Child only 2 6 4 3 84 
With both 5 9 6 6 74 
Individual 
income 
Below 40% 
median 
population 
work income 
3 4 3 3 85 
 40% or more 21 25 15 8 24 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995 
 
 Hong Kong: Data from the 2008 Thematic Household Survey in Hong Kong 
make two important contributions to the understanding of children‘s transfers. First 
they provide the only available empirical breakdown of elderly persons‘ individual 
incomes by specific sources. Second they distinguish between transfers from co-
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resident children and those living apart, whereas the analysis so far has been in terms 
of the co-residency status of the elderly parents. Figure 4.8 shows that children who 
were not co-resident in fact contributed a larger amount than co-resident children—
33% of elderly persons‘ average income in 2008 compared to 25%, based on the 
average total individual income of elderly persons in the 2006 Hong Kong By-census 
adjusted to 2008 value. In the literature, this has been interpreted as a possible 
compensatory arrangement, where children who do not share their housing with 
elderly parents perceive an obligation to provide larger transfers as an alternative form 
of ―care‖ (W. K.-M. Lee, 2004). Altogether transfers from children were equivalent to 
almost two thirds of elderly persons‘ average individual income, very close to levels in 
Singapore. Work income accounted for 18%, while other sources such as allowances 
from the CSSA Scheme, private pensions, and transfers from other kin represented less 
than 10% each. 
 There are suggestions of altruistic transfer motives here, seen in the larger 
amounts received by elderly women and persons outside the labour force (Figure 4.9). 
Transfers from children living apart may also be calibrated according to need, taking 
into consideration the in-kind benefits and lower expenditures that co-resident elderly 
persons may enjoy. The amount of such transfers was smaller for elderly persons in 
more supportive living arrangements. Hence elderly persons living alone had the 
largest transfers from non-co-resident children, followed by those living with a spouse, 
living with children, and finally living with both the spouse and the children. Co-
resident elderly persons already benefit from income sharing within productive 
households. The data here show that they also receive sizeable amounts of transfers 
from children both living together and apart, highlighting the multiple income 
protective effects of intergenerational co-residence. 
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Figure 4.8  Estimated proportions of elderly persons‘ (65+) average individual income 
from different sources, Hong Kong 2008 
 
CSSA: Comprehensive Social Security Assistance Scheme.  
Source: Own calculations; average income from each source for all elderly persons estimated 
using mid-points of income bands based on data from the Thematic Household Survey 2008, 
average total individual income of all elderly persons based on data from the Hong Kong 
Population By-census 2006 adjusted for inflation. 
 
Figure 4.9  Estimated mean monthly transfers received by elderly persons (65+) from 
children co-resident and living apart, Hong Kong 2008, Hong Kong dollars 
 
Source: Own calculations using mid-points of income bands based on data from the Thematic 
Household Survey 2008 
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Summary 
 There are clear differences of channel, direction, and timing in the exchange of 
resources between elderly parents and their adult children in Hong Kong and 
Singapore compared to European societies. In Hong Kong and Singapore 
families, elderly parents are net recipients of cash transfers, with around 80% 
citing adult children as their main source of income in Singapore. In Europe, 
they are more likely to provide than to receive financial help—on average only 
5% of elderly parents receive financial contributions from their children. This 
reflects better financial means due to European public pension systems. 
Whereas intergenerational exchange takes place primarily within the household 
in East Asian societies, such exchanges are mediated by the welfare state in 
Europe. 
 
 In both Hong Kong and Singapore, elderly persons who lived with their 
children were more likely to report children‘s contributions as a source of 
income compared to elderly persons who lived on their own or with the spouse 
only. Co-resident elderly persons were also less likely to have access to other 
types of income, such as from work and private pensions. This is consistent 
with findings in the previous section that co-residence often signals lower work 
participation and individual incomes. Children‘s contributions are therefore not 
just common to elderly persons in general, but are especially important to 
elderly persons who have less financial independence. 
 
 In Singapore transfers from children were equivalent to more than half of the 
average individual income of elderly persons living in public housing in 2008. 
As predicted by exchange theory, elderly persons not living with their children 
may be less likely to receive transfers, but those who did also received larger 
amounts. The 1995 survey data also show that as a proportion of individual 
income, children‘s transfers were equivalent to more than 75% for three 
quarters of all elderly persons. In Hong Kong about 33% of elderly persons‘ 
average income in 2008 came from non-co-resident children, while a further 
25% came from co-resident children. The total of almost two thirds is 
comparable to amounts in Singapore. Elderly persons with lower financial 
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independence, such as women and persons outside the labour force, received 
more. Given the prevalence and size of children‘s transfers, and their particular 
importance to more financially vulnerable elderly persons, the lower 
availability of children due to demographic changes can be expected to impact 
on income security in old age.
4
 
 
4.5 Elderly income security at the household level 
So far the analysis of elderly incomes has been at the individual level. But one of the 
implications of co-residence with children is that elderly persons will have access to 
greater resources through income sharing within the household. This section looks at 
the combined household resources potentially available to elderly persons, a topic 
which has not been addressed in the literature so far. Parts of the analysis are for Hong 
Kong only as amounts of household income are not recorded in the Singapore surveys. 
 
Household sizes 
Figure 4.10 shows how average household size and number of working household 
members vary with age in Hong Kong and Singapore in 1995/1996 and 2005/2006. In 
Hong Kong household sizes decrease with age. In 1996 the average household size 
was 4.1 for persons aged 18 to 49 and just 3.5 for elderly persons aged 65 and above. 
Perhaps more importantly, the average number of household members in work peaked 
at 2.2 around the ages of 50 to 55 then fell steadily with age to a low of 1.3 for persons 
70 years old and above. This is consistent with the lower levels of intergenerational co-
residence at higher ages as observed earlier in the chapter. The same patterns were 
repeated in 2006 but there was also an overall decrease in both total household size 
and the number of members in work. In Singapore, where levels of co-residence with 
children did not change significantly with age, total household sizes remained stable 
across age groups.  But in other respects the trends are similar to Hong Kong—the 
average number of working household members decreased with age and households 
                                                 
4
 Another dimension that falls beyond the scope of this study is that while lower fertility increases the 
ratio of elderly persons (aged 65+) to working-age adults (aged 15-64), it also reduces the burden of 
dependency from young children (below 15). Total dependency in fact fell quite dramatically from 70% 
to 30% between 1970 and 2010 in Hong Kong and Singapore (UN, 2013). This trend has been observed 
by Goodman and Harper (2008) for Singapore and has also been documented in the UK (Pensions 
Commission, 2004). Elderly persons may have fewer adult children, but these adult children will each 
have fewer children of their own, such that overall demand on the resources of productive family 
members may not necessarily increase. 
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became smaller over time. The lower likelihood of work in the households of older 
persons can be expected to have an impact on elderly incomes calculated on a 
household basis. 
 
Figure 4.10  Average household size and number of working household members by 
age, Hong Kong 1996 and 2006, Singapore 1995 and 2005  
Hong Kong 
 
Singapore 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006; 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995, 2005 
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Comparison of individual and household incomes 
A central question underlying the analysis of co-residence, assuming equal income 
sharing within households, is how living with adult children transforms the income 
positions of elderly persons. Equivalised household income provides an estimate of the 
potential resources available to elderly persons from other household members by 
taking into consideration economies of scale within households. The following 
calculations for Hong Kong adopt the square root scale, following the OECD 
convention in recent income studies (see OECD, 2008)
5
. Figure 4.11 compares median 
individual and equivalised household incomes by age for Hong Kong in 2006 (the 
1996 data are not shown as they present a broadly similar picture). Chapter 2 has 
already shown that elderly persons had lower individual incomes than the below-65 
population and that individual incomes decreased with age. But there are two major 
differences when incomes are assessed on a household basis. First the older age groups 
experience the most noticeable gains when household resources are combined, even 
though incomes are boosted across all ages. For example, persons aged 70 and above 
had median individual incomes of around HK$700 but equivalised household incomes 
of about HK$6000. Second the position of women relative to men improves greatly. In 
fact women in all age categories outside of 55-69 had slightly higher equivalised 
household incomes than men. Not only does co-residence have an income protective 
effect for the elderly population as a whole, it could also potentially cancel out the 
gender gap in individual incomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Very limited data from Singapore illustrate such scale economies. In 2007-2008 the average monthly 
household expenditure per person was $1600 in a single member household and $940 in households 
with 6 or more members (Department of Statistics, 2009). 
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Figure 4.11  Individual and household incomes by age and sex, Hong Kong 2006, 
Hong Kong dollars 
Median individual gross monthly incomes 
 
Median equivalised monthly household incomes 
 
Source: Own analysis using data from Hong Kong Population By-census 2006 
 
 Table 4.11 compares individual and household incomes by age, gender, and 
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corroborate what is already shown in Figure 4.11. Calculating incomes on a household 
basis improves the income position of elderly persons relative to persons aged 18 to 
64. In 1996 younger persons had individual incomes that were 12.5 times that of 
elderly persons but household incomes that were less than 1.5 times as high. This 
remained true in 2006 even though the gap in household incomes between elderly and 
younger persons became slightly wider. 
 Intergenerational co-residence also benefits the income situations of elderly 
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children had the highest median individual income but the lowest median household 
income, whereas elderly persons who co-resided with their children had the lowest 
median individual income and the highest median household income. This lends 
support to the altruism perspective of co-residence as a response to need. Earlier 
analyses had already argued that aged parents who were less financially independent 
were more likely to live with their children. The analysis here provides some empirical 
support that this living arrangement could have contributed significantly to these 
parents‘ income security. 
 Table 4.11 further highlights possible income consequences from changing 
household composition as inter-generational co-residence became less common in 
2006. Compared to 1996, the median equivalised household income of elderly persons 
who lived with their spouses fell by just 4-5% in real terms and either remained stable 
or increased for elderly persons with other living arrangements. But taken as a whole, 
the median household income for all elderly persons aged 65 and above shrunk by 
16% over this period, a result of the increasing trend towards elderly households with 
no adult children and therefore lower combined incomes. 
 
Table 4.11  Median individual gross monthly incomes and equivalised monthly 
household incomes by age, sex, and living arrangements, Hong Kong 1996 and 2006, 
1996 Hong Kong dollars 
 1996 2006 
Individual 
income 
Equivalised 
household 
income 
Individual 
income 
Equivalised 
household 
income 
Age 18-64 7,500 11,000 7,800 12,300 
Age 65 and above 600 7,700 700 6,500 
Men 600 7,600 1,000 6,300 
Women 600 7,800 700 6,700 
Living with neither 2,100 3,500 3,100 3,500 
Living with spouse 600 3,800 1,000 3,600 
Living with child 600 9,200 700 10,300 
Living with both 600 9,500 700 9,100 
Source: Own analysis using data from Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006 
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 Apart from boosting the incomes of certain groups of elderly persons relative to 
others, income sharing within households can alter the spread of elderly persons within 
the population income distribution. Table 4.12 shows, separately for different living 
arrangements, how elderly persons within each individual income quintile group are 
redistributed across household income quintile groups in 1996 and 2006. The matrices 
reveal clear differences by living arrangement. In 1996 a large majority of elderly 
persons not in co-resident households belonged to lower quintile groups in the 
population distribution of household incomes than they were in within the distribution 
of individual incomes. From the second to the top individual income quintile groups, 
62% to 84% fall into lower quintile groups when their incomes are measured on a 
household basis. While 45% of non-co-resident elderly persons from the bottom 
individual income quintile group belong to higher household income quintile groups, 
no more than 9% of other elderly persons do better when their incomes are assessed at 
a household level. This illustrates how the sharing of incomes in elderly-only 
households, where members had low or no incomes, might have weighed down the 
income positions even of elderly persons who had adequate individual incomes to 
begin with. 
 The picture for elderly persons who lived with their children is vastly different. 
Compared to elderly persons who did not live with their children, lower proportions of 
co-resident elderly persons are in lower income quintile groups on a household basis 
than they are on an individual basis. Instead, for persons in the lowest individual 
income quintile group, 77% belong to higher household income quintile groups. Even 
for other elderly persons higher in the individual income distribution, income sharing 
within households improves their relative situation, with a third to half doing better 
within the household income distribution. 
 The same trends can be seen in 2006 with a few minor changes. For non-co-
resident elderly persons belonging to the bottom 20% in the individual income 
distribution, a larger proportion remains in the bottom 20% of the household income 
distribution compared to 1996. The income effects of co-residence remain strong for 
elderly persons with low individual incomes although others from the third and fourth 
individual income quintile groups become more likely to fall into lower household 
income quintile groups. 
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Table 4.12  Elderly persons (65+) within the population distribution of personal and 
equivalised household incomes, Hong Kong, percentage 
1996 
Individual income 
distribution 
Equivalised household income distribution Total 
Lower quintile 
groups 
Same quintile 
group 
Higher quintile 
groups 
Elderly persons not living with children 
Bottom quintile group - 55 45 100 
2nd 84 7 9 100 
3rd 89 2 9 100 
4th 92 8 0 100 
Top quintile group 62 38 - 100 
Elderly persons living with children 
Bottom quintile group - 23 77 100 
2nd 25 26 49 100 
3rd 40 22 38 100 
4th 43 27 30 100 
Top quintile group 55 45 - 100 
2006 
Individual income 
distribution 
Equivalised household income distribution Total 
Lower quintile 
groups 
Same quintile 
group 
Higher quintile 
groups 
Elderly persons not living with children 
Bottom quintile group - 78 22 100 
2nd 91 5 3 100 
3rd 93 4 3 100 
4th 87 11 1 100 
Top quintile group 50 50 - 100 
Elderly persons living with children 
Bottom quintile group - 27 73 100 
2nd 25 28 47 100 
3rd 52 21 27 100 
4th 55 23 23 100 
Top quintile group 37 63 - 100 
Source: Own calculations using data from Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006 
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Summary 
This section demonstrated the income effects of intergenerational co-residence in 
several ways, assuming equal income sharing within the household: 
 
 Measuring incomes on an equivalised household basis, as an illustration of 
income sharing,  dramatically boosts the income positions of elderly persons. 
The downward age gradient observed for individual incomes becomes less 
steep and the income gap between genders disappears, suggesting that the 
oldest persons and women may benefit most from living with their children. 
 
 Adopting a household instead of individual income perspective also puts 
elderly persons in a more favourable position relative to working-age persons 
aged 18-64. In 1996 younger persons had individual incomes that were 12.5 
times that of elderly persons but household incomes that were less than 1.5 
times as high. Intergenerational co-residence also reverses the income 
situations of elderly persons who lived with their children relative to those who 
did not. In 2006 elderly persons living with neither the spouse nor the children 
had the highest median individual income but the lowest median household 
income, whereas elderly persons who co-resided with their children had the 
lowest median individual income but the highest median household income. 
 
 On the whole, co-resident elderly persons of all individual income levels were 
far more likely than non-co-resident persons to move up the income 
distribution when the distribution is switched from an individual to a household 
basis. While the sharing of incomes in elderly-only households where members 
had low or no incomes weighs down the income positions of elderly persons, 
income sharing in intergenerational households with working-age members is 
more likely to improve elderly persons‘ income situations. 
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4.6 Summary 
This chapter examined the role of family support in old-age income security, focusing 
on the availability of adult children, the levels and patterns of intergenerational co-
residence, and the incidence and impact of children‘s cash contributions. The 
discussion is set against a theoretical background of children‘s motivations for 
supporting their elderly parents. 
 
 Factors affecting children‘s support can be divided into those at the level of the 
individual, the society, and policy. The two main individual factors are 
altruism—response to the parents‘ needs, and exchange—reciprocity for some 
form of gift from the parents. There is evidence of both types of process in the 
international and Singapore literatures, although both theories appear to 
simplify the complex considerations behind the flow of resources across 
generations. At the societal level, cultural norms based on Confucianist 
traditions have been used to explain intergenerational exchange in East Asian 
populations. But the cultural argument does not address tensions between 
cultural ideals, popular practices, and policy incentives. From a policy 
perspective, it has been suggested that modernisation ushers in market 
alternatives and welfare states that displace the family‘s role. However family 
support remains common in industrialised societies and state-financed public 
pensions in Hong Kong and Singapore have not grown significantly despite 
economic development. Current understanding from welfare regime type 
research suggests that Hong Kong and Singapore may be less de-commodified 
than the liberal regimes and less de-familialised than the Southern European 
regimes, leaving them particularly vulnerable to a decline in family support. 
 
 The number of surviving children is a primary determinant of family support. It 
depends on the number of children born to mothers of each cohort and the 
likelihood that the adult children are alive when the parents become very old. 
Opposite trends in Hong Kong and Singapore—decreasing fertility and 
improving life expectancies—make it difficult to read off kin availability 
outcomes directly from summary demographic indicators. For Hong Kong, the 
original analysis in this section incorporating demographic parameters by 
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cohort suggests that the number of surviving children that mothers have when 
they reach 65 will decrease from 3.4 to 1.2 between the birth cohorts of 1944 
and 1974. Improvements to mortality will not be sufficient to make up for the 
steep and continuous fall in fertility. 
 
 Further original analysis was done on nationally representative datasets. The 
first form of support from children is co-residence. While it is well-recognised 
that co-residence with adult children is common in East Asian societies, the 
analysis here resulted in several important new findings. Contrary to 
expectations in the literature in the 1990s, co-residence declined by around ten 
percentage points between 1995/1996 and 2005/2006 to about 60% in Hong 
Kong and 70% in Singapore. Co-residence also varied by children‘s gender and 
partnership status, with about 60% of elderly parents living with their sons and 
less than a third living with their daughters. Daughters with a spouse present 
were the least likely to live with their parents. But between 1996 and 2006 in 
Hong Kong, co-residence with single daughters rose by nine percentage points 
to overtake the proportion of elderly persons living with sons and their spouses, 
suggesting some fluidity to gender norms. 
 
 In Hong Kong elderly persons living with their children had relatively lower 
individual incomes regardless of the presence of the spouse. Living apart from 
the children was indicative of having higher individual incomes. But in 
Singapore, elderly persons living with their children only had relatively lower 
incomes, while women living with neither their spouse nor their children had 
the lowest incomes. In 1995 and 2005, more than 90% of elderly persons living 
with their children only had individual incomes equivalent to less than 40% of 
the median population income in Singapore. Co-residence with children may 
therefore be a way of accessing income security for the least financially 
independent persons, although the income implications of having a spouse 
present is different for elderly persons in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 
 The second form of support is children‘s cash contributions. The literature 
indicates higher incidence of upward transfers to parents in East Asian societies 
as compared to Europe. But the analysis here also found that the amount of 
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transfers is considerable. Among both populations, transfers from children 
were equivalent to almost two thirds of the average individual income of 
elderly persons. The Hong Kong data showed that co-resident elderly parents 
received transfers from children both living together and apart. About 33% of 
elderly persons‘ average income in 2008 came from non-co-resident children, 
while a further 25% came from co-resident children. There is some evidence of 
altruistic motivations, as women and low-income persons received larger 
contributions.  
 
 Income sharing within intergenerational households dramatically improves the 
financial position of elderly persons. This is illustrated by comparing 
equivalised household incomes to individual incomes, assuming equal income 
sharing. When incomes are measured on a household basis, the downward age 
gradient observed for individual incomes becomes less steep and the income 
gap between genders disappears, suggesting that the oldest persons and women 
may benefit most from living with their children. In 1996 younger persons in 
Hong Kong had individual incomes that were 12.5 times that of elderly persons 
but household incomes that were less than 1.5 times as high. Intergenerational 
co-residence also reverses the income situations of elderly persons who lived 
with their children relative to those who did not. In 2006 elderly persons living 
with neither the spouse nor the children in Hong Kong had the highest median 
individual income but the lowest median household income, whereas elderly 
persons who co-resided with their children had the lowest median individual 
income but the highest median household income. 
 
 The theoretical review and data analysis in this chapter cast new light on the 
challenge of old-age income security in Hong Kong and Singapore. Family support as 
an altruistic process has been visible in many ways, not least the greater likelihood for 
elderly persons with lower individual incomes to receive such support. But by the 
same token, financially dependent elderly persons may also be hardest hit by any 
erosion of family support, of which there are already clear signs. It is now apparent 
that family support as a pillar of retirement income provision is not as resilient as 
cultural accounts often suggest. The most noticeable indication is the fall in 
intergenerational co-residence over the short span of a decade. The analysis of the 
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number of available children in Hong Kong suggests that this trend may continue in 
the coming decades. At the same time, as shown in Chapter 3, public pensions in Hong 
Kong and Singapore remain very lean. Policy initiatives to facilitate the liquidation of 
housing assets for retirement income in Singapore have also seen little success. Instead 
of social policy crowding out or in family provision, here a support gap may be 
opening up as pension policies are slow to catch up with demographic trends and 
compensate for receding informal support. Part 2 of this study takes on these critical 
issues by directly modelling future living arrangements, income sources, and pension 
outcomes. 
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5. Modelling old-age income prospects 
 
As discussed in Chapters 2 to 4, the two key pillars of old-age income security in Hong 
Kong and Singapore are public pensions and family support in the form of 
intergenerational co-residence and cash contributions. Between the 1990s and 2000s, 
older persons became more likely to report income receipts from the Central Provident 
Fund (CPF) in Singapore, while the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance 
(CSSA) Scheme and the Social Security Allowance Scheme (SSAS) in Hong Kong 
remained among the most common income sources. While family support was high, 
there were signs that levels of co-residence with adult children were receding. Current 
demographic trends suggest that the availability of children to future retirees will 
continue to fall, with implications for both household income sharing and financial 
support for elderly parents. The financial security of future elderly cohorts is likely to 
depend on the interaction of these trends.  
 So far, no study has analysed the possible future living arrangements of elderly 
persons in Hong Kong and Singapore, or the likelihood of access to different income 
sources. As for pension outcomes, a number of studies have projected the possible 
pension replacement rates in the two systems, as briefly reviewed in Chapter 3. But 
they have three main shortcomings: the only study to compare the two systems (by the 
OECD) adopts conservative and possibly unrealistic assumptions about pre-retirement 
withdrawals under the CPF; single-country studies have diverse and sometimes opaque 
parameters that result in a wide range of estimates which are also not directly 
comparable; and most studies assume static rather than historically accurate rules that 
can better reflect the impact of entry timing on pension outcomes. This chapter 
therefore reviews the methodological options for studying the prospects for old-age 
income security in Hong Kong and Singapore, laying the basis for the original 
projections to follow. First, in terms of family support, it considers methods for 
projecting kin availability, household composition, and the availability of support to 
elderly persons. Next, for pensions, it discusses issues related to measuring pension 
outcomes and the main projection approaches. The chapter concludes by outlining the 
methodological framework for Chapters 6 and 7. 
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5.1 Modelling kin availability with fertility and mortality data 
One way to estimate the availability of children to elderly parents is to combine 
fertility histories with mortality data by cohort. The distribution of a given age cohort 
of women by the number of available children in a particular year can be derived from 
the probabilities of different numbers of live births to that cohort and the probabilities 
of the children surviving between birth and that year. This approach has been used to 
project the availability of children to women aged 60 and above in Britain, France, and 
Finland (Michael Murphy & Grundy, 2003; Michael Murphy, et al., 2006). For 
example, using data on births by mother‘s age from around 1910 to 2000 and cohort 
life tables based on age-specific mortality rates and projections up to about 2060, 
Murphy and colleagues (2006) were able to estimate the proportions of women from 
birth cohorts between 1920 and 1960 with different numbers of surviving children up 
to the age of 90. They found that in Britain, Finland, and France, the proportion of 
women with no living children in old age is higher for the earliest and most recent 
cohorts, and lowest for birth cohorts between 1940 and 1950. Across the 1960 cohorts 
of women, those in Britain are most likely to have no living children when they 
become elderly. They are also able to examine the sensitivity of these projections to 
fluctuations in fertility and mortality. This method has the advantage of simple data 
requirements and is relatively straightforward to implement. However nationally 
representative microdata on fertility histories over a substantial period are not available 
for Hong Kong and Singapore. What can be done using aggregate data was earlier 
shown in the modelling of kin availability in Hong Kong (see Chapter 2). 
 
5.2 Household projections using macrosimulation 
Macrosimulation (also called the cell-based approach) is similar to participation ratio 
methods in demography that are commonly used for population projections (George, 
Smith, Swanson, & Tayman, 2004). The basic model involves first stratifying a base 
population into cells that share common characteristics (such as by sex, age group, and 
marital status) and then applying the incidence patterns of certain events (such as 
disability in old age, living arrangements, or social security receipts) across the cells in 
the base sample to later cohorts. Population-level outcomes can be derived by 
aggregating results from all the cells. Variations on this basic model may incorporate 
extrapolation of historical trends and statistical modelling of relationships between cell 
characteristics and the event of interest. 
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 Early examples of this approach are household projection studies that use the 
headship rate method to help government agencies plan for public housing and other 
services (Kono, 1987). This method applies the headship rate, or ratio of heads of 
household to number of persons in each sex-age category, to population projections in 
order to estimate future changes in the number of households. Typically it is assumed 
that headship rates by sex and age remain constant. But in reality family nuclearisation 
related to urban migration, real income growth, and higher labour force participation 
may cause the headship rate to increase unevenly across population subgroups. To 
account for this possibility, dynamic headship rates based on an extrapolation of 
historical patterns of change, regression of socioeconomic variables, and national 
agencies‘ normative planning targets have also been used (United Nations, 1973). 
There are several shortcomings to the headship rate method (Kono, 1987; Zeng, 
Vaupel, & Wang, 1998). The notion of a household head is often based on self report 
and is not easy to define. The approach does not clearly specify the links between 
household numbers and underlying demographic factors like fertility, mortality, and 
marriage. Adopting household heads as a reference marker also does not accommodate 
more complex household forms like joint headship, or what is known as doubling-up 
in demography, or address the transfers of headship from parent to child in 
multigenerational households. These are serious limitations for the purposes of this 
study, given its interest in the fluidity of household structures and sizes due to 
changing patterns of intergenerational co-residence. 
 In a study of nine European countries, Gaymu, Ekamper and Beets (2008) 
make projections of the living arrangements and health status of persons aged 75 and 
above up to 2030.
6
 The projections are done in three steps. First they adopt the 
population projections by sex, age, and marital status from Kalogirou and Murphy 
(2006).
7
 Next the prevalence ratios of poor health for each combination of sex, age, 
and marital status are obtained from additional European and national datasets to 
incorporate health status into the projections from step one. Finally these projections 
are combined with the distribution of elderly individuals by sex, age, marital status, 
                                                 
6
 This study was part of a larger European Community funded project called Future Elderly Living 
Conditions in Europe (FELICIE). The nine countries included in this study are Belgium, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, England and Wales, Italy, Portugal, and the Czech Republic. 
7
 These projections are generated using a multistate demographic model which applies mortality and 
nuptiality transition rates calculated from historical data to a base population (Kalogirou & Murphy, 
2006). 
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and living arrangement in the base year
8
. The study found that in general, older 
persons with good health are more likely to live alone or as couples. But between 2000 
and 2030, the critical demographic factor is a rise in the proportion of older persons 
who are married. Since married persons almost always live as couples regardless of 
health status, the projections indicate that the percentage living as couples will increase 
from 48% to 60% among men aged 85 and above and from 25% to 41% for women 
aged 75 and above. As living arrangements are categorised into alone, couples, others, 
and institutions, the findings do not address co-residence with children specifically. 
 Zeng and colleagues (1997; 1998) propose what they call an extended cohort-
component approach that models year-to-year transitions between demographic and 
household statuses under a stricter accounting framework. First the base population is 
divided into a matrix based on age, sex, race, marital status, completed fertility, 
number of co-resident children, and number of co-resident parents. A series of 
accounting constraints and assumptions are then built into equations that calculate 
transition probabilities across these categories, to ensure internal consistency. For 
instance the number of children living with either parent after divorce must be equal to 
the total number of children living with both parents before the divorce. Apart from 
data on the base population, the model also relies on two additional types of data: (i) 
recent historical data for age-specific demographic events such as marriage, 
childbearing, departure from the parental home, migration, and death; and (ii) 
population-level parameters to constrain the projections, such as total fertility, mean 
age of first marriage, and migration flows. Importantly the model designates a 
reference person in each household, usually an older woman, who is defined by the 
availability of her spouse and the number of parents and children living in the same 
household. The distribution of future household structures and sizes can therefore be 
obtained by tracking the characteristics of these reference markers throughout the years 
of projection. This approach has been used to make projections of older persons‘ living 
arrangements in China and the United States (Zeng, Land, Wang, & Gu, 2013; Zeng, 
Wang, Jiang, & Gu, 2008).  
 
                                                 
8
 The authors use a technique called entropy maximisation as described in Willekens (1999). 
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5.3 Projecting future care and support using macrosimulation 
From the late 1990s, the Personal Social Services Research Unit (PSSRU) at the 
London School of Economics began developing a research programme on future long-
term care demand and financing for elderly people in the UK using macrosimulation. 
The original model divided the 1995 population into cells by sex, age, household type, 
and dependency level, drawing on survey data from various sources like the General 
Household Survey and population census (Wittenberg, Pickard, Comas-Herrera, 
Davies, & Darton, 1998). This was then combined with population projections from 
the Government Actuary‘s Department to estimate the distribution of elderly persons 
across cells up to 2031. A series of multivariate models were used to determine the 
probability of receiving care for each cell, from which aggregate care demand and 
expenditures were calculated. The original study projected that the number of elderly 
people in the UK would increase by almost 57% between 1995 and 2031, resulting in a 
61% growth in the demand for long-term care. Since then, the model has been 
continuously updated, integrated with cross-national studies (Comas-Herrera et al., 
2006), and extended to incorporate the supply of care (Pickard, 2008). 
 Beyond informal care, macrosimulation has also been used to project public 
expenditure trends in the UK using households rather than individuals as units 
(Propper, 1993). The study divided each cohort into cells based on household 
characteristics such as the age and occupation of the head, and the total number of 
adults. Public expenditure per cell was calculated using service utilisation and cost 
data from other studies and then grossed-up to reflect actual population sizes. The 
study found that while there were distinct relationships between age and occupational 
group with total transfers, the relative per capita expenditure on health and education 
across age groups was expected to remain stable throughout the period of projection.  
 
Summary 
The level of support received by elderly parents depends on the availability of children 
and their willingness to co-reside or provide cash transfers. Kin availability for current 
and future cohorts can be estimated using historical fertility and mortality data. But 
these are not available for Hong Kong and Singapore. An alternative approach is 
macrosimulation, which has been extensively used in demography to model future 
household characteristics and the levels of care required by and available to elderly 
persons. While macrosimulation techniques vary widely in the level of complexity, 
 169 
this approach‘s key elements such as stratification of a base sample, extrapolation of 
historical trends, and statistical modelling of prevalence ratios can be adapted for 
analysing living arrangements and income sources. These are incorporated into the 
projections in Chapter 6. 
 
5.4 Assessing pension outcomes  
The assessment of public pension systems depends firstly on their aims. The 
theoretical rationale for governments to establish pension systems is market failure 
through individual myopia (or inadequate saving for retirement) and limited 
availability of financial products (Holzmann & Hinz, 2005). Through public pension 
schemes, the government can also organise income redistribution both over the life 
cycle and from the rich to the poor, and promote social solidarity. In general, public 
pensions have two aims: at the national level, redistribution for poverty relief; and at 
the level of individuals and households, insurance and consumption-smoothing 
between working life and retirement (N. Barr & Diamond, 2009; Whitehouse, 2007). 
The adequacy of pension systems can therefore be assessed against these aims. The 
World Bank argues that additionally, healthy pension systems must be fiscally 
sustainable; robust to possible demographic, political, and economic shocks; and 
compatible with economic development. But pension research is usually more focused 
on three individual-level indicators (OECD, 2012; Whitehouse, 2007): 
 
 Pension replacement rate measures the ratio of pension entitlements to 
individual earnings. Gross replacement rates are based on gross earnings, while 
net replacement rates account for taxes and social security contributions. The 
level of earnings may be taken at career end or averaged over the lifetime.  
 
 Relative pension level measures pension entitlements as a proportion of 
average economy-wide earnings, which reflects current living standards. It also 
addresses the fact that very high replacement rates for very low income persons 
may not actually lift them out of poverty. 
 
 Pension wealth is the discounted value of the lifetime stream of pension 
benefits. It is sensitive to the pension eligibility age, life expectancy, and 
 170 
indexation arrangements that adjust pension payouts during retirement 
according to price or wage fluctuations, and as such is particularly useful for 
estimating the total cost of pension entitlements in defined benefit systems that 
do not cap payouts based on total individual savings as do defined contribution 
schemes. 
 
 Finding a benchmark for an adequate replacement rate is not straightforward. 
Various International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions recommend a target net 
replacement rate of between 40% and 55% (Holzmann & Hinz, 2005). A multi-country 
survey of adults aged 25 and above found that on average, the expected ―comfortable‖ 
replacement rate was 66% in Singapore and 83% in Hong Kong (HSBC, 2013a, 
2013b). The Pensions Commission (2004) in the United Kingdom (UK) argued that it 
is difficult to fix a level of pension adequacy as replacement rates need to be higher for 
people on lower incomes in order to reach an acceptable standard of living and because 
they are less likely to have private savings. Survey findings from the UK showed that 
desired replacement rates range from 350% for persons with the lowest current income 
to 57% among those with top current incomes. Consumption patterns may also change 
during retirement, as certain expenditures such as for commuting and recreation fall. 
Empirical expenditure data do not help to resolve the issue as they do not separate the 
availability of resources from actual need. The Pensions Commission therefore 
adopted benchmarks of 67% for median earners, 50% for top earners, and 80% for the 
lowest earners. 
 Grech (2013) has observed that indicators such as replacement rate and relative 
pension level only reflect pension outcomes at single points in time. Pension wealth, 
on the other hand, measures the effects of pension age, longevity, and indexation rules 
on pension generosity that replacement rates do not reveal. For example, measuring the 
lifetime pension income stream in terms of years of average wage shows that across 
ten European Union countries, women‘s longer life expectancies do not translate into 
equivalent differences in pension wealth compared to men, even assuming full careers 
and similar wages. However the projected replacement rates for these countries are 
similar for both genders. The disparity is most apparent in countries where retirement 
periods are long and pension entitlements are not indexed to wages. 
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5.5 Microsimulation 
Microsimulation has been used to study both future patterns of kinship and possible 
pension outcomes. This approach models large samples of micro-units (i.e. individuals, 
couples, or households) and the changes they experience from a longitudinal 
perspective. Models may vary in the way they set up the micro-database: some are 
drawn from representative cross-sectional surveys while others are synthetically 
created; base samples may cover a range of ages or focus on a single cohort. There are 
two types of microsimulation, static and dynamic. In static microsimulation, 
alternative conditions are applied to a representative sample of the population to enable 
scenario analysis. For example, the POLIMOD, a tax-benefit model first developed at 
the University of Cambridge in 1993, has been used recently to study the impact of 
benefits on alleviating child poverty in London, and to simulate the measures 
necessary to achieve poverty elimination targets (Buck, Sutherland, & Zantomio, 
2007). A newer static model is the EUROMOD, which can be used to study the effects 
of tax-benefit rules on household income, distributional outcomes, and public budgets 
across the countries of the European Union, including pension benefits and 
expenditures (Mantovani, Papadopoulos, Sutherland, & Tsakloglou, 2005). As static 
microsimulation models do not account for changes to the composition of the base 
sample, they are less useful for modelling changes over the long term.  
 Dynamic models synthetically age the base sample by interacting randomly 
generated numbers with transition probabilities to simulate life cycle events such as 
marriage and separation, employment, disability, receipt of services and benefits, and 
death. The composition of the base sample is therefore fluid and experiences attrition, 
making it suitable for analysing policy effects that can only be seen over a long period 
(Pensions Commission, 2005). An early example is the LIFEMOD, which simulated 
the life histories of a synthetic cohort of 4000 individuals in Britain, and was used to 
study the effects of the welfare state from a life cycle perspective (Falkingham & Hills, 
1995).  
 Murphy (2010; 2011) has used the Berkeley SOCSIM microsimulation model 
to project changes in kinship networks in England and Wales from the time of the first 
demographic transition when fertility and mortality both fell in the late 1800s, up to 
the second demographic transition around the 1960s characterised by lower and more 
fragile nuptiality. An initial population sample of 40,000 was subjected to fertility, 
nuptiality, and mortality events based on randomly generated variables and the actual 
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probabilities of these events in historical data. An interesting finding was that 
children‘s mortality especially at older ages had a greater impact on the availability of 
children in earlier cohorts, but has since become so low that parents‘ fertility is the 
major determinant of the number of surviving children.  
 The UK Pensions Commission has also used the Pensim2 microsimulation 
model to analyse the prospects for the existing pension system, the implications of 
reforms such as changes to pension ages, and the workability of a national pension 
savings scheme (Pensions Commission, 2005). The model tapped on large amounts of 
data on individual labour market and pension contribution histories from three 
different data sources.  
 While microsimulation can be a powerful tool for projecting long-term policy 
effects, its data requirements make it challenging to implement. This is especially so in 
Hong Kong and Singapore where longitudinal data required to understand the 
probabilities of life events and transition across different statuses on a cohort basis are 
not available. The time and computing resources required for microsimulation also 
make it difficult to fit within the scope of this study, within which the projections are 
only one component. 
 
5.6 Projecting pension outcomes for illustrative cases 
An alternative approach for modelling possible pension outcomes with fewer data 
requirements is to use illustrative cases, also known as model cases or hypothetical 
individuals. This approach computes pension entitlements by applying policy rules to a 
set of stylised individuals. Individual models may vary in terms of the range of policy 
rules being assessed and the complexity of case profiles. For instance the effects of 
reforms can be examined by comparing pension outcomes under old and new rules. 
The characteristics of the illustrative cases may also be based on simple assumptions 
or more closely linked to empirical data. Early examples of this approach were 
motivated by the need to standardise the calculation of pension outcomes across 
countries for comparative analysis and used cases that were not highly differentiated. 
Various studies by Horlick (1970), Haanes-Olsen (1978), and Aldrich (1982) examine 
the pension replacement rates in multiple countries for recently retired hypothetical 
workers with full careers and average earnings. In comparison, McHale‘s (1999) study 
of the G7 countries included a greater range of cases. He modelled men and women 
separately, constructed age-earnings profiles from other data sources, calculated the 
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discounted present value of pension benefits using rules from before and after reforms, 
and included cases from two cohorts retiring at different points in relation to reform 
timings. 
 In more recent comparative literature, the scope of analysis using illustrative 
cases has broadened considerably. A study by the OECD (2001) calculated pension 
outcomes for individuals with 0.3 to 5 times the economy-wide average earnings, 
making it possible to compare how pension rights vary with earnings across nine 
OECD countries. The model was also used to project possible pension outcomes in the 
future based on current and legislated rules. The development of the APEX (Analysis 
of Pension Entitlements across Countries) model at the OECD in the mid-2000s made 
it possible to compare countries on a range of standardised pension indicators, by 
computing pension entitlements based on the policy parameters that are in force in 
each country and a set of universal assumptions. This resulted in the Pensions at a 
Glance series of reports that compares all the OECD countries, including a 12-country 
Asia Pacific edition (2011, 2012). The APEX model was also used in a large-scale 
World Bank study of retirement income systems in 53 countries (Whitehouse, 2007). 
 There are two major considerations when using illustrative cases. The first is a 
lack of representativeness, or how relevant the chosen cases are to the actual 
population (Grech, 2013; Whitehouse, 2003). While this limitation cannot be 
completely overcome, there are several strategies for improving the salience of 
hypothetical individuals. The most direct way is to increase the number of cases being 
modelled, usually to cover a wider range of earnings. The OECD does this by covering 
an earnings range relative to the economy-wide average, while Grech‘s (2010a) study 
on European pension reforms uses nine illustrative cases to represent each of the 
deciles within the population wage distribution and varies the assumptions regarding 
labour market histories. The realism of case profiles can also be improved by 
incorporating key life events and diversity in other individual characteristics that are 
relevant to the research question. For instance, Bridgen, Meyer, and Riedmüller‘s 
(2007) study of six European pension systems is based on a set of 15 cases that 
represent different risk biographies, each with a unique configuration of level of 
qualification, years of employment, lifetime wage, type of employer, partnership 
chronology, and number of children. Pensions are also calculated for couples by 
pairing up different combinations of cases. An (2009), following Rake (2000), 
constructed case profiles with dynamic earnings for women with different levels of 
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education and marital and fertility histories. She first used survey data to estimate a 
statistical model for the relationship between basic socio-demographic variables and 
earnings, and then derived the age-earnings profiles of the cases using fitted values 
from the model. 
 A less mentioned issue concerning representativeness is that most studies apply 
static (usually current) policy rules to illustrative cases, or at best two sets of rules 
reflecting conditions before and after reforms. This is equivalent to simulating 
―experimental‖ policy conditions and can help to reveal the implications of particular 
policy configurations. But in reality, individuals do not experience a frozen policy 
landscape. Instead their participation in a pension system over the course of their 
working lives intersects with historical policy changes, such that successive cohorts in 
fact experience a moving timeframe of policy rules. How much difference this makes 
to projected pension outcomes depends on the frequency and extent of changes to the 
pension system. In the case of Singapore, volatile contribution rates including several 
steep cuts suggest that historical policy changes need to be taken into account (see 
Chapter 3). Similarly in Hong Kong, the introduction of the MPF in 2000 can be 
expected to affect pension outcomes, with the impact dependent on the length of 
participation. 
 A second related consideration is that results for hypothetical individuals may 
be highly dependent on model assumptions. This is best illustrated by studies using 
this method to project benefits from Singapore‘s CPF and Hong Kong‘s MPF. Table 
5.1 summarises the case profiles, economic parameters, treatment of contributions and 
withdrawals, and pension outcomes of key studies on the CPF and MPF from 1998 to 
2013. The studies vary on almost every important parameter in the calculation of 
pension outcome: the starting age of work ranges from 18 to 25; retirement age from 
62 to 65; remaining life expectancy from 15 to 20 years; the rate of inflation from 1% 
to 5%; and contribution rates for the CPF from 33% to 40% of monthly wage. 
Including sensitivity analyses can help to make the impact of these assumptions more 
transparent. But still, due to different assumptions, the replacement rates generated 
from these models vary widely and are not directly comparable. Estimates for the CPF 
range from about 30% of final earnings (K.-L. Lim, 2001; McCarthy, et al., 2002) to 
85% for the lowest earners in Hui (2012a).  
 The studies in Table 5.1 also highlight a critical issue in the modelling of the 
CPF—assumptions regarding withdrawals for housing. The flexibility of CPF rules 
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means that out of the total monthly contribution of 36% of individual wage (based on 
the current rate for persons below 35), the amount going to retirement may range from 
just 6% if the maximum amount is withdrawn for housing and other permitted uses, to 
29% if there are no pre-retirement withdrawals at all. This leaves considerable room 
for discretion when modelling CPF outcomes. At one extreme, the OECD (2012) 
assumes that the maximum permissible amount is withdrawn for housing and other 
purposes, resulting in what are most likely underestimated pension replacement rates 
of 6-13%. An alternative at the other extreme is to include total housing asset value 
when calculating pension outcomes. But this is equally unrealistic in view of the 
difficulties associated with policies to liquidate housing value (see Chapter 3).
9
 For 
most persons, the actual level of withdrawal for housing probably lies somewhere in 
between the two extremes. One way to build this into the analysis is to estimate 
withdrawals based on historical housing prices, as done in Cardarelli, Gobat, and Lee 
(2000); McCarthy, Mitchell and Piggott (2002); and Chia and Tsui (2012). But given 
the range and volatility of housing prices and the level of housing mobility in 
Singapore (R. Chen & Nicolas, 2006; McCarthy, et al., 2002), the amount of 
uncertainty in any assumptions regarding housing choice suggests that the effort of 
such estimations is probably not worthwhile. The analysis in Chapter 7 therefore 
adopts a more straightforward approach of deducting a proportion of monthly 
contributions based on the ratio of aggregate withdrawals to contributions in the past 
decade, following Lim (2001) and Chen & Nicholas (2006), but also calculating results 
for two levels of assumed withdrawal to illustrate the impact of this parameter on 
pension outcomes. 
 
Summary 
The motivations for embarking on an original analysis of possible pension outcomes in 
Hong Kong and Singapore in the following chapters are threefold: the major existing 
comparative study of the two systems adopts unrealistically conservative estimates for 
the CPF; single-country studies adopt varying assumptions that lead to a wide range of 
estimated pension outcomes which are difficult to compare; and studies rarely 
incorporate historically accurate pension rules that reflect the impact of entry timing. 
                                                 
9
 Chia & Tsui (2012) come closest to this extreme in one of their model scenarios that includes imputed 
rent in the calculation of pension benefits. 
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In terms of methodological options, the main techniques for studying possible pension 
outcomes based on a given set of pension rules are microsimulation and illustrative 
cases. While microsimulation is a powerful tool for modelling the implications of 
pension rule changes for a given population and can incorporate complex changes to 
the base sample as it ages, the amount of data and other practical resources it requires 
makes it unsuitable for this study. The illustrative cases approach is simpler to 
implement and can flexibly accommodate diverse assumptions about the policy 
environment and individual biography. Representativeness can also be improved by 
increasing the range of cases and relating case profiles to empirical data. For this 
study, empirical age-earnings profiles could not be constructed as survey microdata for 
Singapore only cover persons aged 55 and above. But historical aggregate wage data 
can be used to inform assumptions about wage levels and growth rates, to make the 
hypothetical cases more relevant. Historically accurate pension rules can also be 
introduced into the projections. A particularly important assumption when modelling 
the CPF is pre-retirement withdrawals for housing. Subsequent analysis in this study 
assumes that a certain proportion of monthly contributions but not the entire 
permissible amount goes towards housing. 
 
5.7 Summary and next steps 
There are several gaps in the existing comparative literature on pension outcomes in 
Hong Kong and Singapore. So far, elderly persons‘ future living arrangements and 
income sources have not been analysed, while various studies of possible pension 
outcomes adopt unrealistic assumptions about the CPF, fail to consider the impact of 
entry timing, or produce a very wide range of results that are difficult to compare.  
This chapter therefore reviewed common methods for projecting future support for 
elderly persons and possible pension outcomes, in order to develop an analytical plan 
for subsequent chapters. The methods reviewed include modelling kinship availability 
from fertility and mortality data, macrosimulation techniques, microsimulation, and 
using illustrative cases. Due to various data limitations, macrosimulation and 
illustrative cases are found to be most suitable for the purposes of this study. Chapters 
6 and 7 will implement these two approaches following these steps: 
 
 In Chapter 6, macrosimulation is first used to project the future living 
arrangements of elderly persons up to 2030, defined in terms of whether they 
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live with both their spouse and their children, their children only, their spouse 
only, or neither. The underlying sample is based on the United Nations 
population projections, while the prevalence ratios of the different living 
arrangements are taken from the national survey datasets used in earlier 
chapters. In successive phases, the projections then incorporate labour 
participation projections from the ILO and an extrapolation of historical 
patterns of change in living arrangements between the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
 Finally the macrosimulation builds in a regression model of elderly persons‘ 
income sources again based on the survey data. This produces estimates of the 
proportions of elderly persons with access to market income including public 
pensions, or children‘s financial transfers. This is an original application of the 
macrosimulation approach which, to the author‘s best knowledge, has not been 
used to model access to income sources in this way. 
 
 Chapter 7 considers the possible pension outcomes for persons with access to 
this income source. Pension outcomes are estimated for a set of illustrative 
cases. Taking into account the need for representativeness and empirical 
relevance, pensions are calculated for three men and three women with 
different educational levels, totalling six base cases each across the income 
distribution for Hong Kong and Singapore. Wage levels are based on historical 
data. 
 
 A major limitation in previous studies is that they adopt a static set of policy 
rules which do not represent the historical experiences of different cohorts as 
the timing of their careers intersect with policy rule changes. The second set of 
projections break with this practice by adopting historically accurate pension 
rules starting from 1990 and 2000, and compare the results with projections 
using 2010 rules held constant. 
 
 A second challenge in projecting CPF pension outcomes has been the treatment 
of pre-retirement withdrawals. Chapter 7 addresses this by calculating two sets 
of results throughout, based on two different withdrawal scenarios. Sensitivity 
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analyses are also done for other parameters such as the rate of wage growth, 
retirement age, life expectancy, and the interest rate for calculating annuities. 
 
 To illustrate the implications of the projected pension outcomes, the final step 
of analysis estimates the demands for children‘s support based on the gap 
between the level of pension benefits and various income standards for poverty 
avoidance and consumption smoothing. The analysis considers both one-child 
and two-children scenarios, and support in the form of transfers from non-co-
resident children and income sharing with co-resident children. 
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Table 5.1   Studies of Singapore‘s Central Provident Fund (CPF) and Hong Kong‘s Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) using illustrative cases 
Study Case profile Economic 
parameters 
Contribution and 
interest rates 
Pre-retirement 
withdrawals 
Pension outcomes 
Comparative study of Hong Kong and Singapore 
OECD, 2012 Range of 0.5-2 times 
2008 average earnings 
for men/women, 2% 
real wage growth pa 
 
HK: Continuous career 
20-50/60/65, 
remaining life 
expectancy 20 years  
 
 
SG: Continuous career 
20-52/57/62, 
remaining life 
expectancy 19 years 
 
2.5% inflation pa, 
2% annuity 
discount rate 
Int: 3.5% real 
 
 
 
 
Con: 10% 
 
 
 
 
 
Con: Total 34.5%, 
lower for older 
persons (2008 
rates) 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
Full withdrawal for non-
retirement purposes, i.e. 
Ordinary/Medisave Acct 
savings disregarded 
 
 
 
 
 
Annuity replaces 17-39% 
of lifetime average 
earnings for men (lower 
for higher earners) and 16-
34% for women 
 
Annuity based on Special 
Acct savings, replaces 6-
13% of lifetime average 
earnings for men (lower 
for higher earners) and 6-
11% for women 
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Study Case profile Economic 
parameters 
Contribution and 
interest rates 
Pre-retirement 
withdrawals 
Pension outcomes 
Studies of Hong Kong’s MPF 
Lui, 1998 Entry age 20-60, 3% 
real wage growth pa, 
continuous career from 
entry age to 65, 
remaining life 
expectancy 15 years 
 
4-7% annuity 
return 
Con: 10% 
Int: 4-7% real 
- Annuity replaces 5-187% 
of wage at entry age with 
4% investment return 
(lower for older entrants) 
or 7-476% with 7% return 
Siu, 2002 Entry age 18-60, 1-3% 
real wage growth pa, 
continuous career from 
entry age to 65, 
remaining life 
expectancy 15 years 
 
5% annuity return Con: 10% 
Int: 5% real 
- Annuity replaces 5-126% 
of final salary with 1% 
real wage growth (lower 
for older entrants) or 5-
72% with 3% real wage 
growth 
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Study Case profile Economic 
parameters 
Contribution and 
interest rates 
Pre-retirement 
withdrawals 
Pension outcomes 
Studies of Singapore’s CPF 
Cardarelli, 
Gobat, & Lee, 
2000 
1995 average work 
income, 4% real wage 
growth pa, full career 
20-retirement (age not 
specified) 
2.6% nominal 
mortgage rate, 4% 
annuity return 
Con: Total 40%, 
lower for older 
persons (1998 
rates) 
Int: 2% real 
Average withdrawals for 
healthcare/ education/ 
private investment, 
purchase of public 
housing at 30, average 
public housing prices (2-, 
3-, and 4-room), 25-year 
mortgage 
Annuity based on savings 
in Ordinary/Special/ 
Medisave Accts, replaces 
23-44% of pre-retirement 
income for different levels 
of housing withdrawal 
Swailes, 2000 Range of 1-6 times 
1999 median work 
income, 3% real wage 
growth pa 
(Not specified) Con: 1989-1999 
rates then held 
constant thereafter 
Int: 3.1% real 
Housing purchase at 
affordable prices (not 
specified) 
Annuity based on savings 
in Ordinary/Special Accts, 
replaces 10-35% of pre-
retirement work income 
Lim, 2001 Ages 40/45/50 with 
monthly wages 
S$1000-S$3000 
(covering more than 
half of CPF members 
in 1997), 7.7% 
nominal wage growth 
pa, continuous career 
from current age to 62, 
remaining life 
expectancy 15 years 
4% annuity return Con: Total 40%, 
lower for older 
persons (1998 
rates) 
Int: Ordinary Acct 
3.3%, Special Acct 
4.8%, nominal 
Withdrawals for non-
retirement purposes 
estimated at 45-60% 
Annuity based on savings 
at 55 (under old rules) in 
Ordinary/Special Accts, 
replaces 30-40% of final 
wage given 45% 
withdrawal (lower for 
older cohorts) or 27-33% 
final wage with 60% 
withdrawal 
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Study Case profile Economic 
parameters 
Contribution and 
interest rates 
Pre-retirement 
withdrawals 
Pension outcomes 
McCarthy, 
Mitchell & 
Piggott, 2002 
1999 average earnings, 
2% real wage growth 
pa, full career 22-62, 
life expectancy based 
on Singaporean 
annuitant tables 
2.5% inflation pa, 
4% real return on 
property pa, 2.6% 
nominal mortgage 
rate, 5% nominal 
annuity rate 
Con: Total 40%, 
lower for older 
persons  
Int: Ordinary Acct 
0%, Special Acct 
1.5%, real 
No withdrawal at 55, 
purchase of 4-room flat 
and upgrade to 5-room 
flat, 1998 average public 
housing prices, 25-30-
year mortgage 
Annuity based on savings 
in Ordinary/Special Accts, 
replaces 28% of final 
earnings (17-49% under 
alternative scenarios) and 
296% of subsistence 
income based on 
Minimum Sum 
requirements 
Chen & 
Nicolas, 2006 
Low/middle/high 
income cases for 5-
year age groups 20-59, 
based on 2004 average 
wages by occupational 
group and average acct 
balance, 4-8% real 
wage growth pa, 
continuous career from 
current age to 62, 
remaining life 
expectancy 20 years 
 
1-5% inflation pa Con: Total 33%, 
lower for older 
persons (according 
to long-term targets 
announced in 2003) 
Int: Ordinary Acct 
2.5%, Special Acct 
4%, nominal 
Withdrawals for housing/ 
healthcare/education 
estimated at 40-55% 
Annuity based on savings 
in Ordinary/Special/ 
Medisave Accts, compared 
against (i) subsistence 
income (ii) final salary (iii) 
2004 single-person 
household expenditure of 
1st/3rd/5th quintile group. 
At 40% withdrawal, 
benefits replace less than 
60% of final salary for all 
cases and below 
subsistence for older 
cohorts 
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Study Case profile Economic 
parameters 
Contribution and 
interest rates 
Pre-retirement 
withdrawals 
Pension outcomes 
Chia & Tsui, 
2012 
2012 wages for men 
and women at 30th/ 
50th/70th percentile, 
wage growth 
simulated from 2001-
2011 age-earnings 
profile, careers 23-65 
(women) or 25-65 
(men) with 
unemployment 15-
22% of the time each 
year 
1.8% inflation pa, 
2.6% nominal 
mortgage rate 
Con: Total 36%, 
lower for older 
persons (2012 
rates) 
Int: Ordinary Acct 
2.5%, Special Acct 
4%, additional 1% 
for first $60,000, 
nominal 
Purchase of public 
housing at 30, 2011 
average public housing 
prices (3-, 4-, and 5-
room), 30-year mortgage 
Annuity based on savings 
in Ordinary/Special Accts, 
as calculated by CPF 
annuity plans (not shown), 
replaces 46-65% (men) 
and 45-62% (women) of 
earnings at 55 (lowest for 
P70 cases), reductions to 
net replacement of 12-32 
percentage points with 
housing upgrade 
Hui, 2013 2010 median work 
income for three 
educational levels, 
wage growth estimated 
from age-earnings 
profile, careers 24-65 
with 0-2 
unemployment spells, 
life expectancy 85 
3% inflation pa, 
2.6% nominal 
mortgage rate, 4% 
annuity return 
Con: Total 36%, 
lower for older 
persons (2011 
rates) 
Int: Ordinary Acct 
2.5%, Special Acct 
4%, additional 1% 
for first $60,000, 
nominal 
No withdrawal at 55, 
excess Medisave Acct 
contributions transferred 
to Special Acct, purchase 
of public housing at 30, 
maximum prices 
afforded by savings, 30-
year mortgage 
Annuity based on savings 
in Ordinary/Special/ 
Medisave Accts, replaces 
39-85% of final earnings 
(lowest for most 
educated), 22-57% with 
housing purchase, 34-42% 
with two unemployment 
spells 
Source: Own summary based on indicated sources 
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6. Future elderly populations 
 
This chapter projects the future distribution of the elderly populations in Hong Kong 
and Singapore by living arrangement and their access to market income and financial 
contributions from their children, using macrosimulation techniques. These projections 
are done from the point of the most recent national surveys for which microdata are 
available—2005 in Singapore and 2006 in Hong Kong—up to 2030. As the projections 
rely on patterns in the survey data, they are not done for a longer period over which the 
survey data may become less relevant and realistic. The first section presents basic 
projections that combine the United Nations (UN) population projections with patterns 
of living arrangement observed in the national survey data in 2005 and 2006. In the 
second section, the projections incorporate more dynamism—labour force 
participation is assumed to change according to projections by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), and patterns of living arrangement are assumed to change at rates 
related to actual changes observed in the national survey data between 1995/1996 and 
2005/2006. The third section builds on the dynamic projections of living arrangements 
to estimate access to different income sources among future elderly persons. 
 
6.1 Future living arrangements according to basic projections 
For the basic projections, the elderly population is divided into 24 cells or categories 
based on sex, age group, and living arrangements (Table 6.1). The elderly population 
size by age and sex in each year between 2005/2006 and 2030 is drawn from the UN 
population projections (UN, 2011). The 24 cells in the national survey samples are 
then grossed up to the UN population numbers to project living arrangements up to 
2030. This involves weighting each of six clusters of cells with the same sex and age 
group so that it achieves its corresponding population size in the UN projections. This 
step essentially assumes that that the relationship between living arrangement, sex, and 
age group in the national survey data remains constant throughout the period of 
projection. This simplifying assumption, which will be relaxed in subsequent 
projections, helps to estimate the effects of expected demographic change alone on 
elderly living situations as observed in 2005/2006. 
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Table 6.1 Variables used to divide elderly populations into 24 cells  
Variables Levels Values 
Sex Women 
Men 
From United Nations 
population projections 
Age 65-69 
70-74 
75+ 
From United Nations 
population projections 
Living arrangements Neither spouse nor child 
Spouse only 
Child only 
Both spouse and child  
From 2005/2006 national 
survey data, held constant 
 
 The results of the basic projections are driven by the UN population projections 
and the distribution of elderly persons‘ living arrangements in the mid-2000s. The UN 
(2010) makes projections for several different demographic scenarios. The one 
adopted here is the medium variant: total fertility is assumed to converge on 1.85 for 
all countries; life expectancy is assumed to continue increasing but at a lower rate for 
countries like Hong Kong and Singapore where it is already high; and recent rates of 
international migration are assumed to continue. As shown in Figure 6.1, although the 
total numbers of elderly persons are expected to rise quickly in Hong Kong and 
Singapore in the period up to 2030, the age composition of the elderly populations 
does not alter significantly for most of the period. In both places the only noticeable 
deviation happens at around 2025 when the growth in the youngest 60-65 age group 
slows down relative to the other age groups. In Singapore where population sizes by 
age group are much closer, the number of elderly persons aged 75+ overtakes those 
aged 65-69 for the first time at around 2025. But the overall demographic makeup by 
age group remains relatively stable. Similarly patterns of living arrangements by sex 
and age in the mid-2000s do not show steep variations. It can be seen from Table 6.2 
that the largest difference between the total proportion of persons aged 65-69 and older 
age groups who live with their children is only around eight percentage points in Hong 
Kong and five in Singapore, with no consistent patterns by age and sex. 
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Figure 6.1 United Nations (UN) projections of elderly populations in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, 2005-2030, thousands 
        Hong Kong      Singapore 
 
Source: UN (2011) 
 
Table 6.2  Elderly populations by sex, age, and living arrangements, Hong Kong 2006 
and Singapore 2005, percentage 
  Men Women 
  65-69 70-74 75+ 65-69 70-74 75+ 
Hong Kong Alone 14 12 16 13 17 29 
 Spouse 25 31 30 25 23 12 
 Child 6 7 15 28 34 47 
 Both 55 50 38 35 26 12 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Singapore Alone 8 11 13 12 17 15 
 Spouse 24 24 22 13 8 5 
 Child 8 18 27 40 59 71 
 Both 60 47 38 36 17 9 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Own calculations from Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 2005 and Hong 
Kong Population By-census 2006 
 
 The stability in the underlying population projections and living arrangement 
data account for smooth trends in the basic projections. Table 6.3 shows the projected 
living arrangements of elderly persons in Hong Kong and Singapore from 2005/2006 
to 2030 based on expected demographic changes while keeping constant the 
distribution of types of living arrangement within sex-age categories. In both places 
elderly men are most likely to live with both their spouse and children. By 2030, 
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440,000 men in Hong Kong and 310,000 men in Singapore fall within this category. In 
contrast elderly women are most likely to live with their children only, with 460,000 in 
Hong Kong and 440,000 in Singapore expected to do so in 2030. In total the most 
common expected living arrangement in 2030 is with children only in Singapore but 
with both spouse and children in Hong Kong. Across the different living arrangements 
the elderly population in Hong Kong is projected to increase by about 2.6 times in 
Hong Kong and 3.7 to 4.0 times in Singapore. 
 
Table 6.3  Basic projections of elderly persons‘ (65+) living arrangements in Hong 
Kong and Singapore, 2005/2006-2030, thousands 
  Men Women All Ratio 2030 
to 2005/ 
2006 
  2005/ 
2006 
2030 2005/ 
2006 
2030 2005/ 
2006 
2030 
Hong Kong Alone 60 140 100 260 160 390 2.5 
Spouse 110 270 80 230 190 500 2.6 
Child 40 100 170 460 210 560 2.6 
Both 180 440 100 280 280 720 2.6 
Total 390 940 450 1230 840 2170 2.6 
Singapore Alone 20 70 30 110 50 180 3.9 
Spouse 40 150 20 60 60 210 3.8 
Child 30 120 110 440 140 560 4.0 
Both 80 310 40 140 120 450 3.7 
Total 170 640 200 750 360 1390 3.9 
Source: Own calculations based on medium variant of United Nations (2011) population 
projections and distributions of living arrangement by sex-age categories in Singapore 
National Survey of Senior Citizens 2005 and Hong Kong Population By-census 2006 
 
6.2 Future living arrangements according to dynamic projections 
The next set of projections introduces two new factors. First, considering government 
interest to promote longer working lives and the rise in work participation in both 
populations in recent years (see Chapter 2), it is unrealistic to assume constant labour 
force participation rates. So projections of labour force participation by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO, 2012) are combined with the UN population 
projections to provide the basic elderly population numbers by sex, age, and labour 
force participation status up to 2030. This increases the number of cells in the 
underlying cell configuration to 48 (Table 6.4). Second the assumption that patterns of 
living arrangement do not change after 2005/2006 is relaxed. Instead the projections 
assume that living arrangements change within each of the twelve clusters of cells of 
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the same sex, age group, and labour force participation status at rates related to actual 
changes between 1995/1996 and 2005/2006 as observed in the national survey data. 
 
Table 6.4  Variables used to divide elderly populations into 48 cells  
Variables Levels Values 
Sex Women 
Men 
From United Nations 
population projections 
Age 65-69 
70-74 
75+ 
From United Nations 
population projections 
Labour force 
participation 
Not in labour force 
In labour force 
From International Labour 
Organization (ILO) projections 
Living arrangements Neither spouse nor child 
Spouse only 
Child only 
Both spouse and child  
From national survey data in 
1995/1996 and 2005/2006 
 
 The ILO‘s (2012) labour force projections from 2005 to 2020 for men and 
women aged 65 and above in Hong Kong and Singapore are shown in Figure 6.2. As 
the ILO projections stop at 2020, participation rates are held constant from 2020 to 
2030 in the analysis below. The ILO projections are also not differentiated by age so 
the distributions of labour force participation across elderly age groups are based on 
the national survey data in 2005/2006. On the whole, labour force participation is 
expected to rise, with much higher rates in Singapore than in Hong Kong and for 
elderly men compared to women. On the basis of 2005/2006 survey data, this may 
contribute towards less co-residence with children as elderly persons in the workforce 
were less likely to have lived with their children compared to those who were not in 
the workforce, especially in Singapore (Table 6.5). 
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Figure 6.2  Labour force participation rates of elderly persons (65+) in Hong Kong 
and Singapore according to International Labour Organization (ILO) projections, 
2005-2020, percentage 
 
     Hong Kong     Singapore 
 
Source: International Labour Organization (2012) 
 
Table 6.5  Percentage of elderly persons (65+) who lived with their children,  
Singapore 2005 and Hong Kong 2006 
 In workforce Not in workforce 
Hong Kong 57 59 
Singapore 58 74 
Source: Own calculations from Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 2005  
and Hong Kong Population By-census 2006 
 
 Living arrangements changed dramatically between 1995/1996 and 2005/2006 
as discussed in Chapter 3. To better reflect these trends, two rates of linear change in 
living arrangements by age, sex, and labour force participation are extrapolated from 
the survey data and fitted into the projections. The first assumes that living 
arrangements continue to change at a ―fast rate‖ equal to that between 1995/1996 and 
2005/2006. The second assumes that living arrangements after 2005/2006 change at a 
―slow rate‖ half of that from 1995/1996 to 2005/2006. The implications of using these 
different rates are illustrated in Figure 6.3, which shows the assumed trends in living 
arrangements for one cluster of cells representing women aged 70-74 in Hong Kong 
who are in the labour force. The fast rate drives a wider divergence between the 
proportions of persons with different living arrangements than the slow rate until the 
kink in 2020 when certain cell sizes reach the lower constraint of 0.  
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Figure 6.3  Projected living arrangements up to 2030 for women aged 70-74 who are 
in the labour force in Hong Kong, based on different assumed rates of change  
 
Source: For 1996 and 2006, own calculations based on Hong Kong Population By-Census 
1996 and 2006. From 2006 onwards, own projections based on medium variant of United 
Nations (2011) population projections, International Labour Organization (2012) labour force 
projections, and changes to living arrangements by age, sex, and labour force participation as 
extrapolated from national survey data. Fast trend is based on linear change at the same rate as 
during 1996-2006 and slow trend is based on half this rate. 
 
 Figure 6.4 shows projections that apply the fast rate of change in living 
arrangements. There are a number of significant developments. In both populations, at 
the start of the projections, co-residence with children was more common than non-co-
residence. But by 2030, living with the spouse only becomes the most likely 
arrangement. During this period, Singapore experiences more dramatic change as co-
residence falls from 72% to 47% compared to a decline from 59% to 48% in Hong 
Kong. The most striking difference between the two populations is a much steeper rise 
in the number of persons living with neither the spouse nor the children in Singapore. 
Between 2005 and 2030, the number of elderly persons living alone in Singapore 
increases from 45,000 to 296,000, an increase of 6.6 times. In Hong Kong, this 
increase is from 154,000 to 348,000, or 2.3 times. 
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Figure 6.4 Dynamic projections of elderly persons‘ (65+) living arrangements in Hong 
Kong and Singapore, 2005/2006-2030  
Hong Kong 
 
 
Singapore 
 
Source: Own calculations based on medium variant of United Nations (2011) population 
projections, International Labour Organization (2012) labour force projections, and changes to 
living arrangements by age, sex, and labour force participation at the same rate as between 
1995/1996 and 2005/2006 as observed in the Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 
1995 and 2005 and the Hong Kong Population By-census 1996 and 2006. 
 
 Projections at the fast rate of change also suggest different trends in living 
arrangements for men and women. Between 2006 and 2030 co-residence with children 
becomes less likely for both elderly men and women in Hong Kong, declining by 10 
percentage points for men and 12 for women (Figure 6.5). Co-residence with children 
falls below half for men by 2026 and for women by 2028. Men continue to be more 
likely to be staying with a spouse only due to shorter life expectancies and higher ages 
at marriage than women. In 2030, 43% of men live with their spouse only compared to 
34% of women. In contrast, the patterns of co-residence up to 2030 are much more 
dynamic in Singapore and the differences between the sexes greater. The proportion of 
elderly men living with their children decreases from 66% to 36%, and of women from 
77% to 56%. By 2030, just 5% of elderly men live with their children only, compared 
to 17% in 2005. The proportion of elderly women living with neither their spouse or 
their children is expected to almost double from 14% to 27%. 
 
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Alone
Spouse
Child
Both
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Alone
Spouse
Child
Both
 192 
Figure 6.5 Dynamic projections of elderly persons‘ (65+) living arrangements by sex 
in Hong Kong and Singapore, 2005/2006-2030 
Hong Kong 
Men 
 
Women 
 
Singapore 
Men 
 
Women 
 
Source: Own calculations based on medium variant of United Nations (2011) population 
projections, International Labour Organization (2012) labour force projections, and changes to 
living arrangements by age, sex, and labour force participation at the same rate as between 
1995/1996 and 2005/2006 as observed in the Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 
1995 and 2005 and the Hong Kong Population By-census 1996 and 2006. 
 
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
With both
With child only
With spouse only
With neither
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
With both
With child only
With spouse only
With neither
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
With both
With child only
With spouse only
With neither
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
With both
With child only
With spouse only
With neither
 193 
 
 Even with a more conservative assumption that living arrangements change at a 
slower rate from 2005/2006, the overall shape of the projections is not dramatically 
different, in that the relative likelihood of co-residence declines over the period. But 
results such as the surge in the number of persons living with the spouse only are 
delayed and no longer surface within the timeframe of the projections. Figure 6.6 
compares the projected numbers of elderly persons by whether they are living with 
their children under the fast and slow assumed rates of change in living arrangements. 
The graphs show how far the differences in projections widen over time. The 
projections for Singapore are more sensitive to the assumed rates of change as there 
were larger shifts in the pattern of living arrangements here between the 1990s and 
2000s, as compared to Hong Kong. In both places, adopting the fast rate of change 
results in a quicker decline in co-residence (bottom of the darker band in graph) and 
steeper rise in the number of persons not living with children (top of lighter band), 
with the number of co-resident elderly persons falling below half at around 2025 in 
Hong Kong and 2022 in Singapore. Assuming the slower rate of change results in a 
more gradual decline in co-residence (top of darker band) and slower increase in non-
co-residence (bottom of lighter band), and the two lines show convergence but no 
longer intersect within the projection time-frame. By 2030, the estimated proportion of 
elderly persons not living with their children is 5 percentage points lower under the 
slower rate of change compared to the faster rate in Hong Kong, and 11 percentage 
points lower in Singapore. 
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Figure 6.6 Range of projections of elderly persons‘ (65+) living arrangements in Hong 
Kong and Singapore based on different assumed rates of change, 2005/2006-2030, 
thousands 
Hong Kong 
 
 
Singapore 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on medium variant of United Nations (2011) population 
projections, International Labour Organization (2012) labour force projections, and changes to 
living arrangements by age, sex, and labour force participation at two assumed rates: the fast 
rate, equal to the rate of change between 1995/1996 and 2005/2006 as observed in the 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995 and 2005 and the Hong Kong Population 
By-census 1996 and 2006; and the slow rate, which is half of the fast rate. 
 
 An international comparison lends some perspective. Table 6.6 shows the rates 
of intergenerational co-residence in selected European countries. The available data are 
for persons aged 50 and above, which may include co-resident children who have yet 
to leave the parental home and therefore overestimate co-residence rates for elderly 
persons aged 65 and above. Nonetheless, even at the fast rate of change, projected co-
residence levels with adult children in Hong Kong and Singapore by 2030 are still 
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higher than in these European countries in 2004. Whereas intergenerational co-
residence in Hong Kong and Singapore is almost 50% in 2030, the rate for Spain—a 
society often associated with familialistic Southern European traditions—is just 40% 
in 2004. In central European societies such as Germany and Switzerland, co-residence 
is even less prevalent, at 14-20%. As for Sweden, where extensive social policy 
performs some of the usual familial functions, co-residence is just 9%. From this point 
of view, even the fast rate of change assumed in the projections does not seem to lead 
to implausible results. 
 
Table 6.6 Elderly persons‘ co-residence with adult children: Projected levels for Hong 
Kong and Singapore compared to actual levels for selected European countries, 
percentage 
 Hong Kong Singapore 
Age 65+ Slow rate Fast rate Slow rate Fast rate 
2005/06 59 59 72 72 
2030 53 48 58 47 
Age 50+ Spain Germany Switzerland Sweden 
2004 40 14 20 9 
Source: For Europe, Albertini, Kohli & Vogel (2007). For Hong Kong and Singapore, own 
calculations based on medium variant of United Nations (2011) population projections, 
International Labour Organization (2012) labour force projections, and changes to living 
arrangements by age, sex, and labour force participation at two assumed rates: the fast rate, 
equal to the rate of change between 1995/1996 and 2005/2006 as observed in the Singapore 
National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995 and 2005 and the Hong Kong Population By-census 
1996 and 2006; and the slow rate, which is half of the fast rate. 
 
 There are two other ways to examine how realistic the projections are. First, as 
these projections are done separately for men and women, an important check is how 
closely the numbers of men and women living with their spouse tally. According to the 
projections, by 2030, the ratio of elderly men to elderly women living with their 
spouse will be 1.1 in Hong Kong and 1.8 in Singapore. Ratios larger than one are to be 
expected as husbands are usually older and so for men who are just above 65, their co-
resident wives may fall below 65 and therefore not count towards the elderly 
population. Empirically, in national survey data from the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, 
the ratio of elderly men to elderly women co-resident with their spouses ranged 
between 1.7 and 2.3 in Hong Kong and Singapore. The gender ratios of persons co-
resident with their spouses as implied in the projections therefore appear to fall within 
an acceptable range.  
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 A second and more direct way to test the projections is to compare the results 
with recent survey data. The most up to date information on elderly persons‘ living 
arrangements are from census studies in 2010 in Singapore and 2011 in Hong Kong. 
These provide empirical data exactly five years from the start of the projections. Table 
6.7 compares living arrangements by sex based on the basic projections in the previous 
section, the dynamic projections above at the fast and slow rates, and actual census 
data: 
 
 For Hong Kong, the projections are very accurate at this five-year point. The 
basic projections deviate the most from the empirical distribution, but still only 
by no more than three percentage points. The dynamic projections at the slow 
rate are a slight improvement, reducing the difference to two percentage points. 
Projections assuming the fast rate produce the best results—an almost exact fit 
with the census data except for a one percentage point difference in the 
proportions of elderly men and women living with both their spouse and 
children.  
 
 The projections for Singapore show greater deviation from the census data. The 
basic projections are widest off the mark—the estimated proportion of women 
living with children only is 57% compared to 46% in the census data. As for 
the dynamic projections, the slow rate assumption produces a smaller 
underestimation of total co-residence among elderly women (61% compared to 
58% under the fast rate and 63% in the census data), while the fast rate 
assumption generates a smaller overestimation of total co-residence among the 
men (72% compared to 74% under the slow rate and 70% in the census data). 
For elderly persons as a whole, the slow rate projections underestimate total co-
residence by two percentage points while the fast rate projections overestimate 
co-residence by two percentage points, compared to the actual rate of 67%. The 
actual rate of change in the pattern of living arrangements between 2005 and 
2010 may therefore lie somewhere between these two assumed rates. 
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Table 6.7 Projected and actual living arrangements of elderly populations (65+), Hong 
Kong 2011 and Singapore 2010, percentage 
   Projected Actual 
   Basic Dynamic, 
slow rate 
Dynamic, 
fast rate 
Hong Kong Men Alone 15 14 14 14 
  Spouse 29 31 32 32 
  Child 11 10 9 9 
  Both 46 46 46 45 
  Total 100 100 100 100 
 Women Alone 23 22 22 22 
  Spouse 17 19 20 20 
  Child 39 38 36 36 
  Both 21 21 22 21 
  Total 100 100 100 100 
 All Alone 19 18 18 18 
  Spouse 23 24 26 26 
  Child 26 25 23 23 
  Both 32 33 33 33 
  Total 100 100 100 100 
Singapore Men Alone 11 12 12 11 
  Spouse 23 27 30 26 
  Child 17 14 12 12 
  Both 49 47 46 51 
  Total 100 100 100 100 
 Women Alone 14 16 17 16 
  Spouse 8 9 10 14 
  Child 57 54 51 46 
  Both 20 20 21 24 
  Total 100 100 100 100 
 All Alone 13 14 15 14 
  Spouse 15 17 19 19 
  Child 39 36 33 31 
  Both 33 33 32 36 
  Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Own calculations for projections. Basic projections based on medium variant of 
United Nations (2011) population projections and distributions of living arrangement by age-
sex categories in the Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 2005 and the Hong Kong 
Population By-census 2006. Dynamic, slow rate projections based on UN population 
projections, International Labour Organization (2012) labour force projections, and changes to 
living arrangements by age, sex, and labour force participation at half the rate as between 
1995/1996 and 2005/2006 as observed in the Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 
1995 and 2005 and the Hong Kong Population By-census 1996 and 2006. Dynamic, fast rate 
projections are similar to the slow rate projections, except that living arrangements change at 
the same rate as observed in the survey data. Actual figures from Department of Statistics 
(2010) and Census and Statistics Department (2012a). 
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Summary 
So far, this chapter has presented two sets of projections of elderly persons‘ living 
arrangements in Hong Kong and Singapore. Combining the UN population projections 
with patterns of living arrangement by sex-age categories in the mid-2000s, the basic 
projections suggest elderly subgroups in different living arrangements will increase 
evenly between 2005/2006 and 2030. But these projections lack dynamism and do not 
sufficiently account for non-demographic change, particularly to work participation 
and living arrangement patterns over time. 
 The second set of projections incorporates projections of labour force 
participation by the ILO, which anticipate an upward trend in both populations, and 
changes to living arrangements by age, sex, and labour force participation status 
between 1995/1996 and 2005/2006 as observed in national survey data. The latter is 
applied using two rates—the same extent of change as between the 1990s and 2000s 
(i.e. the fast rate), and half of this rate (i.e. the slow rate). The projections suggest a fall 
in co-residence with children in both populations, with Singapore experiencing a 
steeper decline. By 2030, co-residence would have fallen from 59% to 48% in Hong 
Kong and from 72% to 47% in Singapore. Among elderly men in Singapore, the 
proportion living with their children falls from two thirds to about one third. The total 
number of elderly persons living alone in Singapore increases 6.6 times from 45,000 to 
296,000, compared to just twice in Hong Kong. These trends are more gradual under 
the slow rate: the estimated proportion of elderly persons not living with their children 
by 2030 is 5 percentages points lower in Hong Kong and 11 percentage points lower in 
Singapore. A comparison of projected with actual distributions in 2010/2011 shows 
that estimations using the fast rate are almost an exact fit for Hong Kong, whereas 
developments in Singapore may fall somewhere between the fast and slow rates. 
 A possible factor that may affect living arrangements is behavioural adaptation 
among elderly persons. In the context of gender roles in caring for elderly parents in 
East Asian societies, Ofstedal, Knodel and Chayovan (1999) have argued that the risks 
posed by smaller family sizes may be ameliorated by adaptive fertility behaviour 
among parents with the most rigid preference—such as having more children to 
increase the chances of having a daughter, greater flexibility in life choices including 
living arrangements, or a loosening of traditional attitudes. In Hong Kong where the 
availability of children has fallen, the proportion of elderly persons living with single 
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daughters has already increased relative to those living with sons (see Chapter 4). To 
the extent that these trends are manifest in the survey data of the 1990s and 2000s, they 
would have influenced the above projections. But other unanticipated behavioural 
responses may yet emerge in the coming years. 
 
6.3 Access to market income and children’s contributions 
The next stage of projections models elderly persons‘ access to income sources 
incorporating the projections of living arrangements from the previous section. The 
projections are based on the same cell structure defined by sex, age group, labour force 
participation, and living arrangements (see Table 6.4). To understand the relationship 
between these personal characteristics and income sources, a multinomial logistic 
regression model was fitted into the national survey data. For Singapore the same 2005 
survey dataset was used as in previous sections. But for Hong Kong the 2006 
population by-census has no information on elderly persons‘ income sources. 
Therefore the regression analysis was carried out on data from a separate nationally 
representative survey conducted in 2008 covering about 10,000 households.
1
  
 Apart from data availability there were two other considerations when the 
predictor variables were chosen. The first was their relevance to the outcome variable, 
access to income sources. Living arrangements as coded in the cell structure includes 
both co-residence with children and with spouses. The survey data analysis from Part I 
of this study suggests a connection between co-residence with children and receipt of 
children‘s financial contributions. Co-residence with a spouse both indicates living 
arrangement and serves as a proxy for marital status. Labour force participation has 
obvious implications for access to market income such as wages and pensions. The 
second consideration is the small sample sizes of the survey datasets that provide the 
templates for the projections. Dividing the cells any further would have resulted in 
very low cell numbers that may affect the reliability of the projections. 
 Although the amount of income receipts from these sources are of interest, the 
survey datasets do not record exact levels of income by sources. The following 
analysis therefore focuses on access to different income sources. The outcome variable 
                                                 
1
 More extensive use of the Thematic Household Survey on Socio-demographic Profile, Health Status 
and Self-care Capability of Older Persons 2008 dataset was not possible as the data agency permitted 
on-site access only, which meant that all analysis had to be completed on the agency‘s premises within a 
limited time. 
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was coded with four levels in the regression analysis: (1) neither market income nor 
children‘s contributions (where market income includes salary, public and private 
pensions, annuities, rent, and dividends), (2) children‘s contributions only, (3) market 
income only, and (4) both market income and children‘s contributions. The coding of 
income sources reflects findings from earlier survey data analysis. Market income and 
children‘s contributions are the most frequently cited income sources among elderly 
persons in the two populations. Other possible income sources such as contributions 
from other kin and public transfers are therefore omitted. The main public pensions in 
Singapore and Hong Kong, namely the Central Provident Fund (CPF) and Mandatory 
Provident Fund (MPF), are regarded here as market income since both schemes are 
based on mandatory savings deducted from monthly earnings. However due to the 
small number of persons in receipt of these pensions, they are not analysed separately 
but only in combination with other market income sources. Both regression models 
were significant at the 0.001 level (see statistical output in Appendix 6.1). Values 
representing the cell characteristics were then fitted into the regression model to derive 
the probabilities of the various income source scenarios, which were used as 
proportions to calculate the distribution of persons by income source within each cell.  
 This approach essentially assumes that the relationships between the cell 
variables and income sources between 2005/2006 and 2030 remain as they were in 
2005 for Singapore and 2008 for Hong Kong. These relationships are shown in Figure 
6.7 as the variations in income scenarios across the 48 cells used in the projections. For 
clarity of presentation, the graph shows average proportions for six clusters of cells 
each representing the same sex and age group. There is considerable variation across 
the cell clusters both between Hong Kong and Singapore and within each population. 
Access to market income diminishes with age in both populations but is especially low 
for women in Singapore. The likelihood of having neither market income nor 
children‘s contributions increases with age and is slightly higher in Hong Kong on 
average. Singaporean women have the greatest probability of receiving children‘s 
contributions only across all subgroups. 
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Figure 6.7 Estimated probabilities of access to market income and children‘s 
contributions by cell cluster based on 2008 and 2005 survey data in Hong Kong and 
Singapore 
 
Note: Cells 1-8: Women aged 65-69 (with different labour market participation status and 
living arrangements),    Cells 9-16: Women aged 70-75, Cells 17-24: Women aged 75+, Cells 
25-32: Men aged 65-69, Cells 33-40: Men aged 70-74, Cells 41-48: Men aged 75+. 
Source: Own calculations, based on fitted values from regression of income source on sex, age, 
labour force participation, and living arrangements in Thematic Household Survey on Socio-
demographic Profile, Health Status and Self-care Capability of Older Persons 2008 and 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 2005 
 
 The results of the projections are in Table 6.8. Based on the assumptions, for 
both Hong Kong and Singapore, the projections suggest an increase in access to 
market income and lower availability of children‘s contributions by 2030, signalling a 
decline in the traditionally important role of children in providing for elderly parents. 
The proportion of elderly persons with any amount of market income increases from 
9% to 12% in Hong Kong, and from 26% to 30% in Singapore, while the total 
proportion with children‘s contributions falls from 62% to 61% in Hong Kong, and 
from 75% to 69-70% in Singapore. Whether the fast or slow rate of change is adopted 
for the underlying projections of living arrangement makes very little difference to the 
distribution of the elderly populations by access to these income sources (no more than 
one percentage point difference), although in terms of absolute numbers, the fast rate 
results in more elderly persons having neither market income nor children‘s 
contributions, fewer having children‘s contributions, and for Singapore, more persons 
with access to market income. The most striking trend pertains to persons with access 
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to neither market income nor children‘s contributions. The relative size of this group 
falls very slightly in Hong Kong but still reaches almost one third of the elderly 
population. In Singapore, this group represents a smaller proportion of 14% in 2005 
but grows to 15-16%. By 2030, around 653,000-662,000 elderly persons in Hong 
Kong and 208,000-222,000 elderly persons in Singapore may have access to neither 
market income nor children‘s contributions. 
 
Table 6.8 Projected elderly populations (65+) in Hong Kong and Singapore by access 
to market income and children‘s financial contributions, 2005/2006-2030, thousands 
(a) Hong Kong 
 Men  Women  All  
(percentage of total) 
Slow rate 2006 2020 2030  2006 2020 2030  2006 2020 2030 
Neither 128 202 304  129 211 349  257 
(31%) 
414 
(30%) 
653 
(30%) 
Child 199 312 459  302 495 804  501 
(60%) 
807 
(58%) 
1263 
(58%) 
Market 51 98 144  11 31 51  62 
(7%) 
129 
(9%) 
194 
(9%) 
Both 14 25 37  7 16 27  21 
(2%) 
42 
(3%) 
64 
(3%) 
Fast rate 2006 2020 2030  2006 2020 2030  2006 2020 2030 
Neither 128 204 306  129 214 356  257 
(31%) 
418 
(30%) 
662 
(30%) 
Child 199 310 456  302 492 796  501 
(60%) 
802 
(58%) 
1250 
(58%) 
Market 51 98 144  11 31 51  62 
(7%) 
129 
(9%) 
195 
(9%) 
Both 14 26 38  7 17 28  21 
(2%) 
43 
(3%) 
66 
(3%) 
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(b) Singapore 
 Men  Women  All  
(percentage of total) 
Slow rate 2005 2020 2030  2005 2020 2030  2005 2020 2030 
Neither 22 53 93  27 66 115  49 
(14%) 
119 
(14%) 
208 
(15%) 
Child 78 167 266  141 312 505  218 
(60%) 
478 
(56%) 
771 
(55%) 
Market 31 91 147  11 35 59  41 
(11%) 
127 
(15%) 
206 
(15%) 
Both 35 86 136  19 47 74  54 
(15%) 
134 
(16%) 
210 
(15%) 
Fast rate 2005 2020 2030  2005 2020 2030  2005 2020 2030 
Neither 22 55 98  27 70 124  49 
(14%) 
125 
(15%) 
222 
(16%) 
Child 78 163 256  141 306 493  218 
(60%) 
469 
(55%) 
748 
(54%) 
Market 31 93 151  11 38 64  41 
(11%) 
131 
(15%) 
215 
(15%) 
Both 35 87 136  19 46 72  54 
(15%) 
133 
(16%) 
208 
(15%) 
Note: Child refers to direct cash transfers to elderly parents. Market refers to market income 
such as salary, public and private pensions, annuities, rent, and dividends. 
Source: Own calculations. Underlying projections of living arrangement based on medium 
variant of United Nations (2011) population projections, International Labour Organization 
(2012) labour force projections, and changes to living arrangements by age, sex, and labour 
force participation at two assumed rates: the fast rate, equal to the rate of change between 
1995/1996 and 2005/2006 as observed in the Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 
1995 and 2005 and the Hong Kong Population By-census 1996 and 2006; and the slow rate, 
which is half of the fast rate. Income sources estimated by regression on selected individual 
variables in the 2005/2006 national survey datasets. See text for explanation. 
 
 Combining the earlier projections of living arrangements with the above 
analysis of income sources enables the identification of potentially vulnerable groups 
of elderly persons. Figure 6.8 charts the number of elderly persons with no access to 
market income and children‘s financial contributions, and who are also not co-resident 
with their children. Between 2010 and 2030, the size of this group grows from 153,000 
to 390,000 in Hong Kong under the slow rate, or from 156,000 to 426,000 under the 
fast rate. In Singapore, the increase is from 31,000 to 126,000 persons under the slow 
rate, or from 34,000 to 158,000 under the fast rate. In both places, the risks of income 
insecurity increases: as a proportion of the total elderly population, this vulnerable 
group increases from 17% to 18-20% in Hong Kong and from 6% to 9-11% in 
Singapore. 
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Figure 6.8 Projected elderly populations (65+) in Hong Kong and Singapore with no 
access to market income and children‘s contributions and who do not live with their 
children, 2010-2030, thousands 
 
Hong Kong 
 
Singapore 
 
Note: Market income includes salary, public and private pensions, annuities, rent, and 
dividends. 
Source: Own calculations. Projections of living arrangement based on medium variant of 
United Nations (2011) population projections, International Labour Organization (2012) 
labour force projections, and changes to living arrangements by age, sex, and labour force 
participation at two assumed rates: the fast rate, equal to the rate of change between 1995/1996 
and 2005/2006 as observed in the Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995 and 
2005 and the Hong Kong Population By-census 1996 and 2006; and the slow rate, which is 
half of the fast rate. Income sources estimated by regression on selected individual variables in 
the 2005/2006 national survey datasets. See text for explanation. 
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Summary 
This section built on the earlier projections of living arrangements by estimating access 
to two main types of income among elderly persons—children‘s contributions and 
market income including public pensions. Assuming the relationship between access to 
these income sources and individual characteristics remains the same as in 2005 for 
Singapore and 2008 for Hong Kong, the projections suggest that during 2005/2006-
2030, the proportion of elderly persons with market income will increase from 7% to 
9% in Hong Kong and from 11% to 15% in Singapore, while the total proportion with 
children‘s contributions falls from 62% to 61% in Hong Kong, and from 75% to 69% 
in Singapore. But despite better overall access to market income, the proportion with 
neither market income nor children‘s contributions also increases slightly in Singapore 
from 14% to 15-16%, depending on underlying assumptions about how living 
arrangements change. Furthermore, the proportion of elderly persons at greater risk of 
income insecurity, because they do not have access to neither type of income and are 
not living with their children, may increase from 17% to 18-20% in Hong Kong, and 
from 6% to 9-11% in Singapore. 
 These projections cast new light on commonly held notions that higher labour 
force participation and educational achievements in successive cohorts in societies 
such as Singapore will mean that elderly persons, especially women, will have better 
access to market income and public pension systems in retirement, or that children will 
have greater means to support their parents even if there are fewer children available 
(e.g. A. Chan, 2005; C.-J. Tan, 2012, April). Chapter 2 has already shown that in both 
Hong Kong and Singapore, the expansion of lifetime labour force participation has 
stopped for men among the coming cohorts of retirees, and appears to be slowing 
down for women. Women‘s access to CPF income had also increased very little 
relative to men‘s between 1995 and 2005. The above projections, which incorporate 
the ILO‘s assumptions of further growth in labour force participation, show that while 
market income may indeed become available to more elderly persons in future as 
children‘s support declines, the total proportion of elderly persons with neither type of 
income may stagnate in the case of Hong Kong, or even grow in the case of Singapore.  
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6.4 Summary 
 Taking into account expected changes in demographic structure and labour 
force participation, and the historical trend in living arrangements by age, 
sex, and labour force participation status between the 1990s the 2000s, the 
projections in this chapter suggest a decrease in co-residence with children 
in both Hong Kong and Singapore. At the start of the projections, living 
with children only or with the spouse and children were the most common. 
But by 2030, the most common arrangement is to live with the spouse 
only. 
 
 The decline in co-residence with children is much sharper in Singapore, 
falling from 72% to 47% compared to a decline from 59% to 48% in Hong 
Kong between 2005/2006 and 2030. The proportion of elderly men living 
with their children in Singapore decreases from 66% to 36%, while the 
total number of elderly persons living with neither the spouse nor the 
children increases by 6.6 times from 45,000 to 296,000, compared to just 
twice in Hong Kong.  
 
 If the assumed rate of change in living arrangements by age, sex, and 
labour force participation status is halved, co-residence declines more 
gradually. The estimated proportion of elderly persons not living with their 
children is 5 percentage points lower in Hong Kong and 11 percentage 
points lower in Singapore by 2030 compared to proportions under the full 
rate. 
 
 Further projections based on a constant relationship between income 
sources and other personal characteristics as observed in national survey 
data in 2005/2008 indicate an increase in the proportion of elderly persons 
with access to market income from 7% to 9% in Hong Kong and from 11% 
to 15% in Singapore, while the total proportion with children‘s 
contributions falls from 62% to 61% in Hong Kong, and from 75% to 69% 
in Singapore.  
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 But there is also a rise in the proportion of elderly persons with access to 
neither market income nor children‘s contributions from 17% to 18-20% in 
Hong Kong, and from 6% to 9-11% in Singapore, depending on the 
underlying assumptions about how living arrangements change. By 2030, 
the size of this group may rise to 662,000 (30% of elderly population) in 
Hong Kong and 222,000 (16% of elderly population) in Singapore. 
 
 To further isolate groups at risk of income insecurity, the projections of 
living arrangements and income sources were combined. This revealed an 
upward trend in the proportion of elderly persons with no access to market 
income and children‘s financial contributions, and who are also not co-
resident with their children. Between 2010 and 2030, this group grows 
from 6% to 11% of the total elderly population in Singapore and from 17% 
to 20% in Hong Kong. 
 
 So far the projections have only addressed income sources. As market income 
including public pensions is expected to grow in importance, the next chapter turns to 
look at income sizes by analysing possible public pension benefits and the implications 
for demands on children‘s financial resources. 
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Appendix 6.1 Statistical tables 
 
Table 6A.1 Multinomial logistic model for elderly persons' (65+) income sources in 
Singapore 
(N=2663) 
Income source  B Std. Error z P>|z| 
Children's 
contributions 
only 
Constant 0.353 0.179 1.98 0.048 
Men -0.644 0.136 -4.73 0.000 
Age 65-69 (ref)     
70-74 0.227 0.183 1.24 0.215 
75+ -0.273 0.150 -1.82 0.069 
In labour force -0.967 0.239 -4.04 0.000 
Living with neither (ref)     
Living with spouse only 1.635 0.217 7.54 0.000 
Living with children only 1.683 0.163 10.33 0.000 
Living with both 2.183 0.196 11.12 0.000 
Market 
income only 
Constant -1.190 0.247 -4.82 0.000 
Men 0.573 0.199 2.88 0.004 
Age 65-69 (ref)     
70-74 -0.013 0.235 -0.06 0.956 
75+ -0.681 0.215 -3.17 0.002 
In labour force 2.173 0.227 9.56 0.000 
Living with neither (ref)     
Living with spouse only 0.724 0.273 2.65 0.008 
Living with children only -0.445 0.267 -1.67 0.095 
Living with both 0.799 0.248 3.22 0.001 
Both Constant -1.442 0.261 -5.52 0.000 
Men 0.493 0.173 2.84 0.004 
Age 65-69 (ref)     
70-74 0.052 0.213 0.24 0.809 
75+ -0.900 0.190 -4.73 0.000 
In labour force 1.013 0.230 4.40 0.000 
Living with neither (ref)     
Living with spouse only 1.640 0.290 5.66 0.000 
Living with children only 1.568 0.250 6.26 0.000 
Living with both 1.863 0.268 6.96 0.000 
Note: Reference category is Neither children's contributions nor market income. 
Based on data from the Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 2005. 
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Table 6A.2 Multinomial logistic model for elderly persons' (65+) income sources in 
Hong Kong  
(N=828420) 
Income source  B Std. Error Wald Sig. 
Children's 
contributions 
only 
Constant 1.123 0.007 28778.608 0.000 
Men -0.448 0.005 7823.210 0.000 
Age 65-69 0.168 0.006 698.112 0.000 
70-74 0.130 0.006 476.390 0.000 
75+ (ref)     
In labour force 0.271 0.082 10.996 0.001 
Living with neither -1.066 0.007 21346.107 0.000 
Living with spouse only -0.549 0.007 5493.958 0.000 
Living with children only 0.057 0.007 64.270 0.000 
Living with both (ref)     
Market 
income only 
Constant -3.484 0.020 29604.306 0.000 
Men 1.038 0.015 4976.012 0.000 
Age 65-69 0.869 0.016 2871.913 0.000 
70-74 0.678 0.016 1721.649 0.000 
75+ (ref)     
In labour force 7.368 0.070 11071.912 0.000 
Living with neither -0.176 0.018 91.742 0.000 
Living with spouse only -0.045 0.019 5.804 0.016 
Living with children only -0.158 0.019 69.590 0.000 
Living with both (ref)     
Both Constant -2.932 0.021 18938.385 0.000 
Men 0.355 0.017 457.535 0.000 
Age 65-69 0.499 0.019 726.442 0.000 
70-74 -0.356 0.022 257.617 0.000 
75+ (ref)     
In labour force 6.321 0.071 7874.083 0.000 
Living with neither -1.256 0.026 2333.375 0.000 
Living with spouse only -0.250 0.022 132.916 0.000 
Living with children only -0.060 0.021 8.251 0.004 
Living with both (ref)     
Note: Reference category is Neither children's contributions nor market income. 
Based on data from the Thematic Household Survey on Socio-demographic Profile, Health 
Status and Self-care Capability of Older Persons 2008. 
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7. Future pension outcomes 
 
The previous chapter focused on the possible compositions of future elderly 
populations in Hong Kong and Singapore in terms of living arrangement and access to 
different types of income source. The analysis suggested an increase in the proportions 
of elderly persons without support from their children either through co-residence or 
direct cash transfers by 2030. This implies a greater role for market income sources in 
retirement, including public pensions. This chapter therefore turns to two key 
questions regarding the pension systems in Hong Kong and Singapore. First, what are 
the possible pension outcomes? Second, what as a result are the demands for children‘s 
support? The first section describes the model cases and assumptions. The next 
presents the core pension outcome projections using historical rules and varying rates 
of wage growth. The findings from these projections are then subjected to alternative 
career, life expectancy, and interest rate scenarios. Finally, section four examines what 
levels of support are expected from children based on the projected pension outcomes. 
 
7.1  Model assumptions and parameters 
Illustrative cases by sex and education 
The pension projections in this chapter focus on six cases of men and women with 
different levels of education: primary school or less (M1 and W1 representing men and 
women respectively), secondary school (M2 and W2), and tertiary education (M3 and 
W3). Distinguishing the cases by educational level improves representation across the 
income distribution and makes the results more intuitive to interpret. These cases are 
assigned the actual gross median monthly wages of employed persons in the respective 
educational categories in Hong Kong and Singapore in 2010. The wage levels and the 
proportions of workers they represent are shown in Table 7.1. In both places, M1 and 
W1, the lowest educated cases, represent just over 10% of the employed workforce. 
Roughly similar proportions of workers have secondary and tertiary education in 
Singapore, just below 50% each. But in Hong Kong, just one third of workers have 
tertiary education. Instead M2 and W2 represent the almost 60% of workers who have 
secondary education. This is partly due to the different categorisation of persons with 
post-secondary but non-degree qualifications in the two places. As they represent a 
smaller group at the top of the educational attainment spectrum, the median wages of 
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M3 and W3 in Hong Kong are 1.6 to 2.1 times the median wage of all employed 
persons, compared to 1.3 to 1.7 times in Singapore. The chosen cases are therefore 
illustrative of the situations of workers with different qualifications in the two places, 
but are not strictly equivalent. The overall pattern of relative wages for the other cases 
is similar:  M1 and W1 receive wages of 0.4 to 0.8 times the median wage of the 
employed workforce,  while M2 and W2 receive wages of 0.7 to 1.0 times the 
workforce median wage. 
 
Table 7.1  Median gross monthly wage by sex and education in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, 2010 
 Sex and 
education 
Median gross 
monthly wage 
(dollars in 
national currency) 
Ratio to 
median wage 
of all workers 
Percentage of 
employed 
workforce 
Hong Kong M1 9,000 0.8 6 
 M2 11,000 1.0 30 
 M3 23,000 2.1 17 
 W1 5,500 0.5 6 
 W2 8,000 0.7 27 
 W3 18,000 1.6 15 
 All workers 11,000 1.0 100 
Singapore M1 1,500 0.5 7 
 M2 2,100 0.8 24 
 M3 4,500 1.7 25 
 W1 1,000 0.4 6 
 W2 1,800 0.7 18 
 W3 3,500 1.3 21 
 All workers 2,700 1.0 100 
M1: Men with primary education or less, M2: Men with secondary education,  
M3: Men with tertiary education, and similarly for women W1-3 
Source: Report on Labour Force in Singapore 2010, Tables 20 and 27 (Ministry of Manpower, 
2011); Quarterly Report on General Household Survey (April to June 2010), Table 5.3 (Census 
and Statistics Department, 2010b); communication with Hong Kong Censtatd. 
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Policy scenarios 
For Hong Kong, the pension projections take into account three different schemes
1
 : 
 
 The Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) based on contributions of 10% monthly 
wage, with nominal interest rate fixed at 4% per year, following Singapore‘s 
nominal interest rate for Central Provident Fund (CPF) savings from 2000 
onwards
2
   
 The universal Old Age Allowance (OAA) under the Social Security Assistance 
Scheme (SSAS) from 70 years old 
 An additional flat-rate means-tested scheme known as the Old Age Living 
Allowance (OALA) from 65 years old 
 
 Since individuals who qualify for the more generous OALA are taken off the 
OAA scheme, projections are done for two scheme combinations: the MPF and OAA, 
and the MPF and OALA. 
 For Singapore, three Central Provident Fund (CPF) scenarios based on 
different amounts of pre-retirement withdrawal for housing are considered
3
: 
 
 The ―maximum withdrawal‖ scenario assumes that the entire Ordinary Account 
is used up before retirement, leaving only the Special Account for retirement; 
this is equivalent to an actual contribution rate of 5% monthly wage (in terms 
of 2010 rates for workers up to 35 years old) 
 The ―average withdrawal‖ scenario assumes that the average amount of 
withdrawals is made from the Ordinary Account before retirement, leaving 
33% of the Ordinary Account and the whole Special Account for retirement, 
equivalent to an actual contribution rate of 13% monthly wage. 
                                                 
1
 See scheme details in Chapter 3. In reality, many elderly persons also rely on the Comprehensive 
Social Security Assistance Scheme (CSSA) which provides benefits based on household means tests 
(K.L. Chou, Chow, & Chi, 2004). The CSSA has been left out of the analysis here as it is not strictly an 
old-age pension scheme. 
2
 Returns to the MPF depend on the individual‘s choice of fund to invest the savings and the market 
performance of these funds. Since these are variable and to facilitate comparison, it is assumed that MPF 
funds earn the same rate of interest as the CPF at 4%. Between 2001 and 2012, the average annual 
return for the MPF was 3.6% (see Chapter 3).  
3
 See Chapter 3 for details of the CPF and discussion of housing withdrawals in general, and Chapter 5 
for the treatment of such withdrawals in previous studies. 
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 The ―no withdrawal‖ scenario assumes the whole of the Ordinary and Special 
Accounts are available for retirement, equivalent to an actual contribution rate 
of 28%. 
 
 For most of the projections that follow, results are reported only for the 
―maximum withdrawal‖ and ―average withdrawal‖ scenarios. While the former results 
in unrealistic underestimations of pension outcomes, it sets an informative lower 
bound in the estimations since the regulations protect only the Special Account from 
pre-retirement withdrawals. The ―maximum withdrawal‖ scenario is therefore the legal 
minimum which individuals must retain for retirement. The ―average withdrawal‖ 
scenario is based on the estimated ratio of aggregate withdrawals for housing and other 
properties to total Ordinary Account saving between 2001 and 2010
4
, which works out 
to 67% on average. This serves as the upper bound of the projections. As the 
assumption of ―no withdrawal‖ is quite unlikely in practice, and its inclusion would 
increase the range of projected outcomes to the extent that they would not be very 
meaningful to analyse, it is only reported near the end of section 7.2. 
 For both Hong Kong and Singapore, pension contribution wage floors and 
ceilings are based on 2010 rules and increased in line with wages. 
 
Other model parameters 
The following assumptions, pegged at levels adopted in the OECD‘s (2012) Pensions 
at a Glance report series, apply to the base cases at the start of the projections but most 
of them will be gradually relaxed in the analysis: 
 
 nominal wage growth of 4.55% per annum 
 full careers from 20 to 65 years old 
                                                 
4
 The published aggregate data on savings are not separated into the three different accounts—Ordinary, 
Special, and Medisave—in the CPF Annual Reports. There is no straightforward way to estimate the 
amount of saving going into the Ordinary Account since contribution rates as well as the allocation of 
monthly contributions into the accounts vary by age. For convenience, the estimation of Ordinary 
Account saving here was based on the contribution rates and allocation for workers aged between 35 
and 45 since this lies roughly in the middle of the age range of the workforce assuming full careers from 
20 to 65. 
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 life expectancies are calculated from national projections of period life 
expectancy from 65: 80 and 86 years for men and women in Hong Kong, and 
80 and 84 years in Singapore 
 interest rate for calculating annuities at 2% 
 price inflation at 2.5% 
 
7.2  Core projections: Historical rules, different wage growth rates, and policy 
changes 
Base cases 
As a first step, Table 7.2 shows the projected pension outcomes for the base cases, 
expressed as a percentage of final individual gross wage (or the gross pension 
replacement rate) and as a percentage of the median gross wage of all employed 
persons (or the gross relative pension level). They follow the existing and legislated 
pension rules in 2010 applied in perpetuity and answer the question: what might one 
expect to receive from these pension systems based on today‘s rules? It is clear that 
Hong Kong offers more generous pensions, replacing 27-36% of final individual wage  
across the six cases under the MPF and OAA, or up to 45% under the OALA instead. 
Replacement rates range between 15-19% in Singapore under the more conservative 
assumption of maximum housing withdrawal and barely reach a third even assuming 
average housing withdrawal.
5
 In terms of poverty avoidance, both systems fare poorly. 
Only the most highly educated men in Hong Kong, represented by M3, achieve 
pensions that reach two-thirds of the median gross wage. For the other cases in Hong 
Kong and all cases in Singapore, the relative pension level is no more than half of 
median wage.  
 Men uniformly achieve better pension outcomes than women due to the 
assumed gender wage differences. Although W1 achieves the highest replacement rate 
of all cases in Hong Kong at 45%, this is more a reflection of the low final wage 
against which the pensions are compared. Of more importance is that relative to 
median gross wage, M2‘s pensions are about one and a half times that of W2 in both 
systems. Wage differences by educational level also have a visible impact. M3 and W3 
receive pensions of two to three times that of M1 and W1 when measured against 
                                                 
5
 The estimates under the maximum withdrawal scenario are close to those of the OECD, while 
estimates based on the average withdrawal scenario are not far from the results of other studies and the 
available empirical benchmarks. See Chapter 3. 
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median gross wage. Table 7.2 further illustrates the inherent uncertainty associated not 
just with these projections but also with the nature of these pension systems. Pension 
outcomes vary widely depending on eligibility for the OALA in Hong Kong and the 
amount of non-retirement withdrawals from the CPF. It is equally significant that even 
under the more generous scenario of ―average withdrawal‖, both replacement rates and 
pension levels for the CPF are lower than in the less generous MPF and OAA scenario 
in Hong Kong. 
  
Table 7.2  Projected pension outcomes for careers starting in 2010 according to 
pension rules in 2010, Hong Kong and Singapore 
  M1 M2 M3 W1 W2 W3 
Hong Kong 
MPF,   
OAA 
Gross replacement rate             
(% final individual gross wage) 
36 36 30 32 30 27 
Gross relative pension level    
(% median gross wage) 
30 36 62 16 22 44 
Hong Kong 
MPF, 
OALA 
Gross replacement rate 
 
44 42 33 45 38 31 
Gross relative pension level 
 
36 42 68 22 28 50 
Singapore 
CPF 
maximum 
withdrawal 
Gross replacement rate 
 
19 19 19 15 15 15 
Gross relative pension level 10 15 31 6 10 20 
Singapore  
CPF 
average 
withdrawal 
Gross replacement rate 
 
30 30 30 25 25 25 
Gross relative pension level 16 23 50 9 17 32 
MPF: Mandatory Provident Fund, OAA: Old Age Allowance, OALA: Old Age Living 
Allowance, CPF: Central Provident Fund. Case M1: Men with primary education or less, M2: 
Men with secondary education,  M3: Men with tertiary education, and similarly for women 
W1-3. Projections assume starting wages based on 2010 wage levels; 4.55% nominal wage 
growth; full careers from 20 to 65; period life expectancies of 80/86 for men/women in Hong 
Kong and 80/84 in Singapore; inflation at 2.5%; and interest rate of 2% for calculating 
annuities. 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Historical rules 
The projections above are for a mostly static policy environment with the exception of 
a few legislated contribution rate changes for the CPF after 2010 and do not reflect 
historical changes to pension regimes. Alternatively, pension outcomes can be 
calculated based on moving timeframes of historical pension rules starting from 1990 
and 2000 (and held constant after 2012 since further changes are unknown). This 
models the pension experiences of those cohorts whose careers span 1990-2035 and 
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2000-2045. For Singapore, this incorporates gradually rising contribution rates 
particularly for older CPF members in more recent years. In Hong Kong, the 
introduction of the MPF in 2000 means that individuals who started working before 
then would have missed out on contributing to the scheme during part of their career. 
Table 7.3 shows that for both men and women, pension outcomes improve for the 
younger cohorts. For the 2000 cohort in Hong Kong, the first to be able to participate 
in the MPF for the whole of their careers, the pension replacement rates achieved by a 
combination of the MPF and the OAA are about four to seven percentage points higher 
than for the 1990 cohort. The relative pension levels also show how the MPF favours 
persons with higher wages. Across cohorts, W1 to W3 see gains of 2 to 8 percentage 
points compared to the 5 to 11 percentage points by M1 to M3. Pension outcomes are 
the same for the 2000 and 2010 cohorts (see Table 7.2) as the pension rules do not 
change after 2000. In Singapore the upward trend of pension replacement rates and 
relative pension levels is sustained between the 1990 and 2010 cohorts but the 
difference is less dramatic than in Hong Kong. This is perhaps not surprising given 
how low the pension benefits are even for the youngest cohort. Between the 1990 and 
2010 cohorts, pension replacement rates increase from 13% to 15% for women and 
from 16% to 19% for men in the maximum withdrawal scenario. There are similar 
gains of about two percentage points assuming average withdrawal. Improvements are 
more marginal for cases with lower education. Over two decades the relative pension 
level of W1 rises from 5% to just 6% while that of W3 rises from 17% to 20% with 
maximum withdrawal. 
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Table 7.3  Projected pension outcomes for careers starting in 1990 and 2000 according 
to historical pension rules, Hong Kong and Singapore 
  M1 M2 M3 W1 W2 W3 
Hong Kong 
MPF,   
OAA 
Career 1990-2035       
Gross replacement rate             
(% final individual gross wage) 
30 29 24 28 25 22 
Gross relative pension level                            
(% median gross wage) 
25 29 51 14 18 36 
Career 2000-2045       
Gross replacement rate 36 36 30 32 30 27 
Gross relative pension level                          30 36 62 16 22 44 
Hong Kong 
MPF, 
OALA 
Career 1990-2035       
Gross replacement rate 38 36 27 40 34 26 
Gross relative pension level                          31 36 57 20 24 42 
Career 2000-2045       
Gross replacement rate 44 42 33 45 38 31 
Gross relative pension level                          36 42 68 22 28 50 
Singapore 
CPF 
maximum 
withdrawal 
 
Career 1990-2035       
Gross replacement rate 16 16 16 13 13 13 
Gross relative pension level                          9 12 27 5 9 17 
Career 2000-2045       
Gross replacement rate 18 18 18 15 15 15 
Gross relative pension level                          10 14 29 5 10 19 
Singapore  
CPF 
average 
withdrawal 
Career 1990-2035       
Gross replacement rate 28 28 28 23 23 23 
Gross relative pension level                          15 22 47 8 16 30 
Career 2000-2045       
Gross replacement rate 29 29 29 24 24 24 
Gross relative pension level                          16 23 48 9 16 31 
MPF: Mandatory Provident Fund, OAA: Old Age Allowance, OALA: Old Age Living 
Allowance, CPF: Central Provident Fund. Case M1: Men with primary education or less, M2: 
Men with secondary education,  M3: Men with tertiary education, and similarly for women 
W1-3. Projections assume starting wages based on 2010 wage levels; 4.55% nominal wage 
growth; full careers from 20 to 65; period life expectancies of 80/86 for men/women in Hong 
Kong and 80/84 in Singapore; inflation at 2.5%; and interest rate of 2% for calculating 
annuities. 
Source: Own calculations 
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Varied wage growth rates 
 So far the projections have assumed uniform rates of wage growth for all the 
model cases. In reality the wages of women and individuals with lower education have 
grown more slowly in Hong Kong and Singapore in recent years. Data from Singapore 
suggest that on average, men and women with primary education aged 41 in 2011 
would have experienced actual wage growth of 2% and 1% per year respectively from 
2002 onwards, compared to 6% and 4% for their contemporaries with tertiary 
education (Table 7.4). A longer data series from Hong Kong shows a similar pattern. 
Individuals with tertiary education in Hong Kong experienced average annual wage 
growth of 8-9% between 1990 and 2011 compared to just 3-5% for persons with 
primary education.  These trends underlie the rising income inequality in both places in 
recent times (MOM, 2011). To reflect the impact of varied labour market experiences 
and wage divergence over time, the next set of projections recalculates the pension 
outcomes for the 1990, 2000, and 2010 cohorts from earlier projections but using 
faster rates of wage growth for men and cases with higher education as indicated in 
Table 7.4. 
 
Table 7.4  Annual nominal wage growth for persons aged 41 in 2011 in Hong Kong 
and Singapore and assumed nominal wage growth for model cases, percentage 
Actual 
Men Women 
Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Hong Kong   
(from 1990) 
5 6 9 3 4 8 
Singapore    
(from 2002) 
2 3 6 1 3 4 
Assumed M1 M2 M3 W1 W2 W3 
 5 6 7 3 4 5 
Source: Own calculations based on Report on Labour force in Singapore (Ministry of 
Manpower, various years) and  communication with Hong Kong Censtatd 
 
 With more realistic wage growth assumptions, the differences in replacement 
rates stretch further, falling for higher earners and rising for lower earners. For Hong 
Kong, this accentuates the downward gradient of pension replacement rate by 
education already seen in the earlier projections (Table 7.5). Due to higher final wages, 
the replacement rates for M3 are depressed to about 10% under the MPF and OAA, or 
one third of M1‘s replacement rates, compared to about four fifths under uniform wage 
growth. In Singapore this inverse relationship between education and pension 
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replacement now emerges whereas replacement rates were the same for M1-3 and for 
W1-3 in previous projections. In both systems, the slowing of wage growth at the 
lower end leads to particularly high replacement rates for women, surpassing those for 
men. The highest replacement rates for W1 in Hong Kong increase from 45% to 74%, 
whereas the rates for men fall from 44% to 39%. Assuming average withdrawal, W1 in 
Singapore now achieves replacement rates of up to 36% compared to 27% for men. 
But measuring pension amounts relative to median gross wage reveals a contrasting 
picture. Varying the rates of wage growth result in a fall in women‘s pension levels 
and a rise in men‘s pension levels, with the exception of the highest earning M3 cases 
due to the wage ceilings for MPF and CPF contributions. 
 
Table 7.5  Projected pension outcomes for careers starting in 1990, 2000, and 2010 
according to historical pension rules with varied wage growth rates, Hong Kong and 
Singapore 
(a) Hong Kong 
  M1 M2 M3 W1 W2 W3 
Nominal annual wage growth (%) 5 6 7 3 4 5 
Hong Kong 
MPF,    
OAA 
Career 1990-2035       
Gross replacement rate             
(% final individual gross wage) 
28 23 9 41 28 20 
Gross relative pension level                            
(% median gross wage) 
27 42 51 11 16 39 
Career 2000-2045       
Gross replacement rate 33 26 11 50 34 24 
Gross relative pension level                          33 49 62 13 20 47 
 Career 2010-2055       
 Gross replacement rate 33 26 11 50 34 24 
 Gross relative pension level                          33 49 62 13 20 47 
Hong Kong 
MPF, 
OALA 
Career 1990-2035       
Gross replacement rate 34 26 10 65 39 23 
Gross relative pension level                          34 48 57 17 22 45 
Career 2000-2045       
Gross replacement rate 39 30 12 74 45 27 
Gross relative pension level                          39 55 68 19 26 53 
 Career 2010-2055       
 Gross replacement rate 39 30 12 74 45 27 
 Gross relative pension level                          39 55 68 19 26 53 
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(b) Singapore 
  M1 M2 M3 W1 W2 W3 
Nominal annual wage growth (%) 5 6 7 3 4 5 
Singapore  
CPF 
maximum 
withdrawal 
Career 1990-2035       
Gross replacement rate 15 12 6 18 15 12 
Gross relative pension level                          10 17 27 3 8 19 
Career 2000-2045       
Gross replacement rate 16 13 6 21 16 13 
Gross relative pension level                          11 19 29 4 9 21 
 Career 2010-2055       
 Gross replacement rate 17 14 7 22 17 14 
 Gross relative pension level                          11 20 31 4 9 22 
Singapore  
CPF 
average 
withdrawal 
Career 1990-2035       
Gross replacement rate 26 21 10 34 26 21 
Gross relative pension level                          17 30 47 6 14 33 
Career 2000-2045       
Gross replacement rate 26 21 10 35 27 22 
Gross relative pension level                          17 31 48 6 14 34 
Career 2010-2055       
Gross replacement rate 27 22 11 36 28 22 
Gross relative pension level                          18 31 50 7 15 35 
MPF: Mandatory Provident Fund, OAA: Old Age Allowance, OALA: Old Age Living 
Allowance, CPF: Central Provident Fund. Case M1: Men with primary education or less, M2: 
Men with secondary education,  M3: Men with tertiary education, and similarly for women 
W1-3. Projections assume starting wages based on 2010 wage levels; full careers from 20 to 
65; period life expectancies of 80/86 for men/women in Hong Kong and 80/84 in Singapore; 
inflation at 2.5%; and interest rate of 2% for calculating annuities. 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Policy changes 
The analysis so far has suggested how policy changes may affect pension outcomes: 
younger cohorts benefit more from recent reforms, while certain scheme combinations 
and scenarios—the MPF and OALA compared to the MPF and OAA, and average 
CPF housing withdrawal compared to maximum withdrawal—generate better pension 
rights. Figure 7.1 compares more explicitly the impact of these two factors, career 
timing and pension system design. The charts show the gross pension replacement 
rates, separately for M2 and W2, for cohorts starting their careers in each year between 
1990 and 2010 under three policy scenarios. In Hong Kong, these scenarios are: (i) a 
pension system with the OAA only, if the MPF and OALA have not been introduced; 
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(ii) a pension system with the OAA and MPF from 2000 onwards, but without the 
OALA; and (iii) a pension system with the MPF from 2000 onwards and the OALA. 
For Singapore, the three scenarios are based on different levels of pre-retirement CPF 
withdrawal for housing as explained at the start of the chapter: (i) maximum 
withdrawal, depleting the Ordinary Account and leaving only the Special Account for 
retirement; (ii) average withdrawal, leaving 33% of the Ordinary Account in addition 
to the Special Account; and (iii) no withdrawal, leaving the entire Ordinary and 
Special Accounts for retirement. 
 
Figure 7.1  Gross pension replacement rates under different policy scenarios for 
careers starting between 1990 and 2010, Hong Kong and Singapore 
(a) Hong Kong 
Men with secondary education (Case M2) 
 
Women with secondary education (Case W2) 
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(b) Singapore 
Men with secondary education (Case M2) 
 
Women with secondary education (Case W2) 
 
MPF: Mandatory Provident Fund, OAA: Old Age Allowance, OALA: Old Age Living 
Allowance, Scenarios for Singapore refer to assumed levels of pre-retirement withdrawal for 
housing under the Central Provident Fund (CPF). Projections assume starting wages based on 
2010 wage levels; 6% nominal wage growth for M2 and 4% for W2; full careers from 20 to 
65; period life expectancies of 80/86 for men/women in Hong Kong and 80/84 in Singapore; 
inflation at 2.5%; and interest rate of 2% for calculating annuities. Replacement rates are the 
ratios of pension benefits to individual final wages. 
Source: Own calculations 
 
 In Singapore, recent parametric adjustments to protect the retirement saving 
component of the CPF—mainly an increase in the allocation of contributions towards 
the Special Account—slightly lift replacement rates for successive cohorts under the 
maximum withdrawal scenario which is wholly based on the Special Account. For 
men, these rates rise from 12% for the 1990 cohort to 14% for the 2010 cohort, 
compared to 15-17% for women. Under a more realistic assumption of average 
amounts of withdrawal, replacement rates increase to 21-22% for men and 26-28% for 
women, still showing a gentle upward slope over time. But the trend becomes flat in 
the no withdrawal scenario which takes into account both the Ordinary and Special 
Accounts. Men‘s replacement rates remain at 40% for cohorts between 1990 and 2010, 
while women‘s replacement rates in fact fall slightly before returning to 52%. This 
shows that although rate adjustments to the Special Account favour retirement saving, 
once other contribution and interest rate changes to the Ordinary Account are taken 
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into consideration, parametric adjustments to the CPF over the years do not have a 
consistently positive effect on pension outcomes. More importantly, any gains from 
fine-tuning contribution rates and later career timing are very slight compared to the 
gaps between the withdrawal scenarios. These show that a more critical factor for 
improving pension outcomes is to address current pension system design which allows 
the depletion of large amounts of savings for other purposes such as housing. 
 The results for Hong Kong illustrate the effects of fundamental reforms to 
pension system design. Under the OAA only scenario, replacement rates remain 
constant at around 2% for men and 7% for women regardless of career timing. The 
addition of the MPF significantly boosts the replacement rates to 23% for men and 
28% for women in the 1990 cohort. These rates rise to 26% and 34% respectively by 
the 2000 cohort who are the first to have a full participation record with the MPF. The 
introduction of the OALA in 2013 means that, for persons who qualify through the 
means test, replacement rates increase to 26-30% for men and more noticeably to 39-
45% for women across the 1990-2010 cohorts. Therefore in Hong Kong, while career 
timing and proximity to reforms have a slightly positive effect on pension outcomes, 
major changes to pension system design through the introduction of additional 
schemes have been the primary driver of improvements to pension rights. 
 
7.3 Sensitivity analyses: Career length, life expectancy, and interest rate for 
calculating annuities 
Shorter careers for women 
The first factor that may affect pension outcomes is career length. This can be 
examined by altering the model assumptions underlying the projections in Table 7.5.   
As shown in Chapter 2, despite increasing labour force participation among women, 
total participation rates are still lower then men‘s and fall below 50% by 55-59 years 
old. Additionally education may be an important factor in women‘s workforce 
participation. Data from the 2010 Labour Force Survey in Singapore show that while 
labour force participation levels among men with different educational levels were 
almost indistinguishable, women with higher education were more likely to be in the 
workforce across all age groups (Figure 7.2). The next set of pension projections 
therefore incorporates two additional scenarios for W1-3, retirement at 60 and 55 years 
old. Of the three cases the implications of shorter careers for women with lower 
education, W1 and W2, are of particular interest. In accordance with the rules of the 
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two pension systems which designate the payout age as 65, the model assumes that 
contributions to the MPF and CPF stop at the retirement age in each scenario, but that 
the total balance in individual accounts continue to accrue interests until benefits are 
paid out. 
 
Figure 7.2  Labour force participation by age and education in Singapore, 2010 
    Men               Women 
 
Source: Ministry of Manpower (2010) 
 
 Although shorter careers mean less pension contributions, they also imply 
lower final individual wages. The relationship between career length and pension 
replacement rate is therefore not straightforward. Table 7.6 shows that earlier 
retirement leads to lower gross replacement rates and relative pension levels for 
women in Hong Kong in both the OAA and the OALA scenarios. In general five fewer 
working years corresponds with a one to two percentage point reduction in pensions on 
both measures for W1 and W2. This increases the gap between men and women‘s 
pension outcomes. For instance if W2 in the 2000 cohort retires at 55 instead of 65, she 
achieves a combined MPF and OAA pension that is just 16% of median gross wage 
(instead of 20%) compared to M2‘s 49%. While women with tertiary education may be 
less likely to retire early than women with less education, the cost of doing so in Hong 
Kong is greater in terms of relative pension level. In the 1990 cohort, W3‘s MPF and 
OAA pensions are equivalent to just 29% of the median wage if she retires at 55 years 
old, compared to 34% at 60 years old, and 39% at 65 years old. In contrast, pension 
outcome changes due to fewer years of work are smaller and less consistent in 
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
1
5
-1
9
2
0
-2
4
2
5
-2
9
3
0
-3
4
3
5
-3
9
4
0
-4
4
4
5
-4
9
5
0
-5
4
5
5
-5
9
6
0
-6
4
6
5
-6
9
7
0
+
Primary Secondary
Degree
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
1
5
-1
9
2
0
-2
4
2
5
-2
9
3
0
-3
4
3
5
-3
9
4
0
-4
4
4
5
-4
9
5
0
-5
4
5
5
-5
9
6
0
-6
4
6
5
-6
9
7
0
+
Primary Secondary
Degree
 225 
Singapore. As contribution rates are much lower at higher ages, the CPF contributions 
foregone are smaller compared to the differences in final wages due to fewer years in 
work. Younger retirement ages therefore lead to slightly higher pension replacement 
rates but lower relative pension levels. In all cases these outcomes do not vary by more 
than one to two percentage points. 
 
Table 7.6  Projected pension outcomes for women with shorter careers starting in 
1990, 2000, and 2010 according to historical pension rules with varied wage growth 
rates, Hong Kong and Singapore 
(a) Hong Kong 
  Retirement age W1 W2 W3 
Hong Kong 
MPF,   
OAA 
Career 1990-2035     
Gross replacement rate             
(% final individual gross wage) 
60 39 27 19 
55 37 26 18 
Gross relative pension level                            
(% median gross wage) 
60 10 15 34 
55 9 13 29 
Career 2000-2045     
Gross replacement rate              60 48 34 24 
55 46 33 24 
Gross relative pension level                          60 12 18 42 
55 11 16 37 
Career 2010-2055     
Gross replacement rate 60 48 34 24 
55 46 33 24 
Gross relative pension level                          60 12 18 42 
55 11 16 37 
Hong Kong 
MPF, 
OALA 
Career 1990-2035     
Gross replacement rate 60 64 39 23 
 55 62 38 22 
Gross relative pension level                          60 16 21 40 
 55 15 19 35 
Career 2000-2045     
Gross replacement rate 60 73 45 27 
 55 71 45 27 
Gross relative pension level                          60 18 24 48 
 55 17 22 43 
Career 2010-2055     
Gross replacement rate 60 73 45 27 
 55 71 45 27 
Gross relative pension level                          60 18 24 48 
  55 17 22 43 
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(b) Singapore 
  Retirement age W1 W2 W3 
Singapore  
CPF 
maximum 
withdrawal 
Career 1990-2035     
Gross replacement rate 60 18 15 13 
 55 18 16 14 
Relative pension level 60 3 8 18 
 55 3 7 17 
Career 2000-2045     
Gross replacement rate 60 21 17 14 
 55 21 18 15 
Relative pension level 60 4 8 20 
 55 4 8 19 
Career 2010-2055     
Gross replacement rate 60 22 18 15 
 55 22 19 16 
Relative pension level 60 4 9 21 
 55 4 9 20 
Singapore  
CPF 
average 
withdrawal 
Career 1990-2035     
Gross replacement rate 60 34 28 23 
 55 33 28 24 
Relative pension level 60 6 14 32 
 55 6 13 30 
Career 2000-2045     
Gross replacement rate 60 35 28 24 
 55 34 29 25 
Relative pension level 60 6 14 33 
 55 6 13 31 
Career 2010-2055     
Gross replacement rate 60 36 30 24 
 55 36 30 26 
Relative pension level 60 7 14 34 
 55 6 14 32 
MPF: Mandatory Provident Fund, OAA: Old Age Allowance, OALA: Old Age Living 
Allowance, CPF: Central Provident Fund. Case W1: Women with primary education or less 
(nominal wage growth 3%), W2: Women with secondary education (4%),  W3: Women with 
tertiary education (5%). Projections assume starting wages based on 2010 wage levels; period 
life expectancies of 86 in Hong Kong and 84 in Singapore; inflation at 2.5%; and interest rate 
of 2% for calculating annuities. 
Source: Own calculations 
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Longer life expectancies 
When life expectancies improve, the annuity stream generated from a fixed amount of 
individual savings in systems like the MPF and CPF has to last longer. The result is a 
smaller pension in each period of payout. The modelling so far has been based on 
national projections of the period life expectancy of persons at age 65 which do not 
take into account the possibility of further improvements to life expectancy during the 
lifetime of current cohorts. Table 7.7 shows the impact of a one year increase in life 
expectancies on pension outcomes. For the 2010 cohort in Hong Kong, this decreases 
the gross pension replacement rate by 0.6 to 2.1 percentage points for men and by 0.9 
to 2.7 percentage points for women, with larger reductions if individuals receive the 
OALA as compared to the OAA. The impact on relative pension levels is also greater 
for the OALA cases. Overall M1-3 see their pensions fall by 1.8 to 3.7 percentage 
points and W1-3 by 0.5 to 2.0 percentage points relative to median gross wage. Longer 
life expectancies similarly imply smaller pensions in Singapore but the decline is less 
sharp. Across all cases, replacement rates fall by 0.4 to 1.5 percentage points while 
pension levels decrease by 0.2  to 2.7 percentage points. For both systems an increase 
in life expectancy has a greater impact on the pension levels of men and cases with 
higher wages, and a greater impact on the pension replacement rates of cases with 
lower wages. 
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Table 7.7  Change in projected pension outcomes with a one year increase in life 
expectancy for careers starting in 2010 according to pension rules in 2010 with varied 
wage growth rates, Hong Kong and Singapore, percentage points 
  M1 M2 M3 W1 W2 W3 
Hong Kong 
MPF, OAA 
Gross replacement rate             
(% final individual gross wage) 
-1.8 -1.4 -0.6 -1.8 -1.3 -0.9 
 Gross relative pension level                            
(% median gross wage) 
-1.8 -2.6 -3.3 -0.5 -0.7 -1.7 
Hong Kong 
MPF, OALA 
Gross replacement rate 
 
-2.1 -1.6 -0.6 -2.7 -1.7 -1.0 
Gross relative pension level                          -2.1 -2.9 -3.7 -0.7 -0.9 -2.0 
Singapore  
CPF 
maximum 
withdrawal 
Gross replacement rate 
 
-0.9 -0.7 -0.4 -0.9 -0.7 -0.6 
Gross relative pension level                          -0.6 -1.1 -1.7 -0.2 -0.4 -0.9 
Singapore  
CPF average 
withdrawal 
Gross replacement rate 
 
-1.5 -1.2 -0.6 -1.5 -1.2 -0.9 
Gross relative pension level                          -1.0 -1.7 -2.7 -0.3 -0.6 -1.5 
MPF: Mandatory Provident Fund, OAA: Old Age Allowance, OALA: Old Age Living 
Allowance, CPF: Central Provident Fund. Case M1: Men with primary education or less 
(nominal wage growth 5%), M2: Men with secondary education (6%),  M3: Men with tertiary 
education (7%), and similarly for women W1-3 (wage growth 3-5%). Projections assume 
starting wages based on 2010 wage levels; full careers from 20 to 65; inflation at 2.5%; and 
interest rate of 2% for calculating annuities. Change in pension outcomes based on a starting 
point of 80/86 years of period life expectancy for men/women in Hong Kong and 80/84 in 
Singapore. 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Higher interest rate for calculating annuities 
The various projections so far are based on a 2% interest rate for calculating annuities, 
following the rate adopted in OECD (2012). In reality, MPF savings are paid out as a 
lump sum and allowance rates under the OAA are adjusted periodically but not 
explicitly pegged to either prices or wages. CPF annuity payments are also subject to 
yearly reviews according to principles that are not fully disclosed (see CPF Board, 
2013a). Standardising the formula for annuitising total retirement savings in the 
projections above therefore helps to make the outcomes of the two pension systems 
more comparable. But this rate also affects pension outcomes, particularly for cases 
with the highest and lowest education. Raising the interest rate to 4%, as in Lim 
(2001), boosts both pension replacement rates and relative pension levels (Table 7.8). 
For the 2010 cohort, replacement rates increase by up to 7 percentage points in both 
places, with M1 and W1 experiencing the largest gains. Relative pension levels 
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increase the most for M3 and W3, by 8-9 percentage points. The shifts are larger for 
Hong Kong. Under the more generous scenario of MPF and OALA, replacement rates 
now reach 33% for M2 and 51% for W2. But in Singapore, the replacement rates for 
equivalent cases even under the average withdrawal scenario are still just 25% and 
34%. 
 
Table 7.8  Projected pension outcomes using 4% interest rate for calculating annuities 
for careers starting in 2010 according to pension rules in 2010 with varied wage 
growth rates, Hong Kong and Singapore 
Pension outcomes at 4% interest (percentage) 
Difference from outcomes  
at 2% interest (percentage points) M1 M2 M3 W1 W2 W3 
Hong Kong 
MPF, OAA 
Gross replacement rate             
(% final individual gross wage) 
37 30 12 57 40 28 
+4 +4 +2 +7 +6 +5 
Gross relative pension level                            
(% median gross wage) 
37 56 71 14 23 56 
+4 +7 +9 +2 +3 +9 
Hong Kong 
MPF, OALA 
Gross replacement rate 44 33 13 81 51 31 
 +5 +4 +2 +7 +6 +5 
Gross relative pension level         43 62 78 21 29 62 
 +5 +7 +9 +2 +3 +9 
Singapore  
CPF 
maximum 
withdrawal 
Gross replacement rate 20 16 8 27 21 17 
 +3 +2 +1 +4 +3 +3 
Gross relative pension level                          13 23 36 5 11 26 
 +2 +3 +5 +1 +2 +4 
Singapore  
CPF average 
withdrawal 
Gross replacement rate 31 25 12 43 34 27 
 +4 +3 +2 +7 +5 +4 
Gross relative pension level                          20 36 58 8 18 42 
 +3 +5 +8 +1 +3 +7 
MPF: Mandatory Provident Fund, OAA: Old Age Allowance, OALA: Old Age Living 
Allowance, CPF: Central Provident Fund. Case M1: Men with primary education or less 
(nominal wage growth 5%), M2: Men with secondary education (6%),  M3: Men with tertiary 
education (7%), and similarly for women W1-3 (wage growth 3-5%). Projections assume 
starting wages based on 2010 wage levels; full careers from 20 to 65; period life expectancies 
of 80/86 for men/women in Hong Kong and 80/84 in Singapore; and inflation at 2.5%. 
Source: Own calculations 
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Summary 
The results of the projections for the middle cases M2 and W2, or men and women 
with secondary education, are summarised in Figure 7.3. Assuming 2010 gender wage 
differences; nominal wage growth of 6% per annum for men and 4% for women; full 
careers from 20 to 65; period life expectancies of 80/86 for men/women in Hong Kong 
and 80/84 in Singapore; inflation at 2.5%; and interest rate of 2% for calculating 
annuities: 
 
 On the whole, Hong Kong offers more generous pensions than Singapore. The 
replacement rate for men in the 1990 cohort is 23-26% in Hong Kong and 12-
21% in Singapore, depending on eligibility for the OALA and the amount of 
CPF housing withdrawals. Relative to median gross wage, men‘s pensions are 
42-48% in Hong Kong but only 17-30% in Singapore. 
 
 Men generally achieve higher pensions relative to median gross wage but 
poorer replacement rates. Women on the other hand have better replacement 
rates due to lower final wages, but these conceal very low amounts of pensions. 
In Hong Kong, the 1990 cohort of women receive pensions that are half of 
men‘s or about 16-22% of median gross wage. Strikingly, women‘s pensions in 
Singapore are just 8-14% of median gross wage, also about half of what men 
achieve. 
 
 Major reforms to pension system design in Hong Kong through the 
introduction of the MPF and OALA have boosted pension outcomes for all 
cohorts from 1990 to 2010 compared to the previous OAA-only regime. The 
younger 2010 cohort who spend a longer period under the new systems also 
experience replacement rate and pension level gains of 4-7 percentage points 
over the 1990 cohort. In Singapore, recent CPF contribution rate adjustments 
result in small increases in replacement rate and pension level for the younger 
cohort of about 1-2 percentage points under the maximum and average 
withdrawal scenarios. But replacement rates remain flat over time under the no 
withdrawal scenario and the major challenge to pension adequacy remains the 
current system design allowing large pre-retirement withdrawals. 
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 Longer life expectancy lowers pension outcomes. For the 2010 cohort, an 
increase of one year in life expectancy causes replacement rates to fall by 2 
percentage points in Hong Kong and 1 percentage point in Singapore. Relative 
pension level also falls by 1-3 percentage points in Hong Kong and 1 
percentage point in Singapore. 
 
 Shorter careers result in smaller total pension contributions and therefore lower 
pension levels. But the effects on replacement rate are inconsistent because 
both final wages and pension contributions fall. Focusing on women, who are 
more likely to stop working before 65 than men in both places, a reduction of 5 
years of work for the 2010 cohort decreases the pension level by 2 percentage 
points but does not change the pension replacement rate in Hong Kong. In 
Singapore, where contribution rates are much lower at higher ages, women‘s 
pension replacement rate improves by 2 percentage points with a shorter career 
but relative pension level decreases by 1 percentage point. 
 
 Increasing the interest rate for calculating annuities boosts both replacement 
rates and relative pension levels. At a 4% interest rate instead of 2%, 
replacement rates increase by 3 to 6 percentage points for cases with secondary 
education in Hong Kong, while relative pension levels increase by 3 to 7 
percentage points. In Singapore, the gains are 3 to 6 percentage points in 
replacement rate and 3 to 5 percentage points in relative pension level. 
 
 There is greater uncertainty in pension outcomes associated with the amount of 
housing withdrawals under the CPF than due to eligibility for the OALA in 
Hong Kong. As the OALA is a flat-rate allowance, it adds six percentage 
points to the pension level relative to average earnings of all persons who 
qualify. It also boosts women‘s pension replacement rates by about a third. In 
Singapore, the differences in pension outcomes between the maximum and 
average withdrawal scenarios are much wider. With average withdrawal and 
more savings left for retirement, both replacement rates and pension levels 
increase by about 60% compared to the maximum withdrawal scenario. But 
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even with average withdrawal, pension outcomes are still much lower than in 
Hong Kong. 
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Figure 7.3  Summary of projected pension outcomes for persons with secondary 
education according to historical pension rules, Hong Kong and Singapore 
(a) Hong Kong 
        Pension replacement rate (%)       Relative pension level (%) 
 
    MPF and OAA  Increase if based on MPF and OALA 
 
(b) Singapore 
        Pension replacement rate (%) Relative pension level (%) 
 
     CPF, maximum withdrawal for housing  
     Increase if based on average withdrawal 
 
MPF: Mandatory Provident Fund, OAA: Old Age Allowance, OALA: Old Age Living 
Allowance, CPF: Central Provident Fund. Starting wages based on 2010. Projections for ―older 
cohort‖ assume full careers 20-65 starting in 1990; nominal wage growth of 6% for men and 
4% for women; period life expectancies of 80/86 for men/women in Hong Kong and 80/84 in 
Singapore; inflation at 2.5%; and 2% interest rate for calculating annuities. ―Younger cohort‖ 
refers to careers starting in 2010. ―Life expectancy +1‖ adds one year to life expectancies, 
―Career -5‖ based on continuous careers 20-60, ―Interest +2%‖ calculates annuities based on 
4% interest rate, all for the younger cohort. 
Source: Own calculations 
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7.4  Demands for children’s support 
Previous chapters have examined survey data which suggest the importance of adult 
children to the income security of elderly persons as well as a decline in children‘s 
support. This section approaches these issues from another angle, asking the question: 
given the projected amounts of public pensions, how much additional support will 
elderly persons need from their children? This demand can be estimated from the gap 
between the projected pension outcomes and various income standards, assuming 
elderly persons do not have access to any other sources of income. This is a new 
approach to interpreting pension outcomes that is particularly helpful for 
understanding the income security of older people in Hong Kong and Singapore, but 
also potentially useful for other populations where children are a critical source of 
retirement income. Cross-national studies typically model individuals only for brevity 
(e.g. OECD, 2009; Grech, 2010), while smaller scale comparative and single country 
studies that model couples and children usually focus on dependant‘s and survivor‘s 
pensions or the impact of parenthood on work patterns (e.g. Meyer, Bridgen, and 
Riedmüller, 2007; An, 2009). 
 The following projections adopt two types of income standard and examine 
two possible support scenarios. The income standards are: (i) 40-60% of median gross 
wage to reflect the poverty avoidance objective of pensions; and (ii) 40-60% of 
individual final wage as a measure of consumption smoothing. The support scenarios 
are: (i) one or two non-co-resident children who provide support through transfers; and 
(ii) one or two co-resident children who provide for their parents through income 
sharing within the household. The scenario of two co-resident children can also 
represent households where elderly parents are living with one adult child and his or 
her spouse. Otherwise, for simplicity, it is assumed that co-resident children are single 
and that there are no other persons living in the same household. The projections also 
do not consider instances where one child is co-resident and another is not.  
Accordingly, in the first support scenario, the demand for transfers from non-co-
resident children is derived from the difference between projected pensions (from 
earlier sections) and income standards. Where there are two children, they share this 
demand equally. In the second support scenario, the demands on co-resident children 
are calculated based on the principle that the total individual incomes of co-resident 
children added to the parents‘ projected pensions must meet the various income 
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standards. In scenarios where households have more than one person (i.e. elderly 
couples, or lone elderly persons with one or two co-resident children), incomes are 
equivalised using the square root scale. All demands for support are expressed relative 
to the median gross wage for comparability. 
 The projections focus on nine cases that start their careers in 2010 and 
therefore participate in the public pension systems following the rules in 2010: M1-3 
and W1-3 as in previous projections and three couples CP1-3 formed by M1 and W1, 
M2 and W2, and M3 and W3, respectively. The assumption that partners tend to have 
equivalent educational backgrounds is largely corroborated by survey data from 
Singapore, although men with primary education became more likely to marry women 
with better educational qualifications between 2000 and 2010 (Table 7.9). The 
assumed family sizes of up to two children line up with the fertility trends in the two 
populations. In Hong Kong, the number of children born to women by the age of 50 
fell from 2.2 for the 1950 cohort of women to 1.6 for the 1960 cohort. The equivalent 
indicators for Singapore are 2.2 and 1.9 children respectively (but by the age of 44 
rather than 50; see Chapter 4 for discussion of number of surviving children). 
 
Table 7.9  Couples‘ educational qualifications in Singapore, 2000 and 2010, 
percentage 
 Husband Wife 
Lower Same Higher Total 
2000 Primary or less - 54 46 100 
 Secondary 26 40 34 100 
 Degree 32 68 - 100 
2010 Primary or less - 33 67 100 
 Secondary 10 53 37 100 
 Degree 23 77 - 100 
Source: Department of Statistics (2011) 
 
Demands for children’s support for poverty avoidance 
Below, the results for poverty avoidance are presented first, followed by the findings 
for consumption smoothing. For poverty avoidance, the focus is on the amounts of 
transfers elderly persons need from children living apart in order to reach 40-60% of 
median wage, and the individual incomes co-resident children must achieve so that 
equivalised household incomes including parents‘ pensions meet these targets. 
 Hong Kong: In Hong Kong, to achieve 60% of median wage with two children, 
the highest earning cases require little or no support through transfers, while their co-
 236 
resident children each has to achieve an income of less than a third of the median gross 
wage (Table 7.10). Elderly men without their spouses (M1-3) fare particularly well, 
with even M1 requiring transfers per child that are no more than 14% of the median 
gross wage. Single elderly mothers need more support. W1 and W2 require transfers of 
about a fifth of the median gross wage, whereas the demands for support by W3 are 
very similar to those for M2. Among the couples, only CP1 requires significant 
transfers of 14-20% of the median gross wage. This also means that W2 becomes less 
dependent on the children if she has a co-resident spouse. The incomes expected of co-
resident children are at least twice as much as the transfers, but these are to be pooled 
within households of which the children are also members, rather than straight 
deductions from the children‘s financial resources. With a trend towards less 
intergenerational co-residence as suggested in Chapters 4 and 6, the demands for 
transfers may become increasingly important compared to income sharing with co-
resident children. 
 For lower earning cases, lower living standards are perhaps more realistic. The 
median wage of workers represented by W1 and W2, for instance, were only about 0.4 
and 0.7 times the population median wage in 2010 respectively (see Table 7.1). At 
lower standards, the amount of transfers required falls noticeably. To achieve 50% of 
median wage, only W1 requires transfers equivalent to more than 15% of the median 
wage and co-resident children‘s incomes to be above 33% of the median wage. At the 
40% standard, only the lowest earning M1, W1, W2, and CP1 require any transfers at 
all. On the other hand, demands are much higher with just one child instead of two. 
Expected transfers per child double, reaching what seem to be unfeasible amounts for 
W1, W2, and CP1. For the 60% standard, W1 requires transfers that are almost half the 
median wage, while CP1 and W2 need transfers of 27-40%. Even at the lowest 40% 
living standard, W1 still needs transfers that are 21-27% of median wage. If the child 
is co-resident, the highest demands are for the income to reach around two thirds of the 
median gross wage. 
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Table 7.10  Projected demands for children‘s support for poverty avoidance based on 
projected pension outcomes according to pension rules in 2010, Hong Kong, 
percentage of median gross wage 
 Equivalent relative 
pension level                 
(% median gross wage) 
Transfers from children 
living apart (per child) 
Income of co-resident 
children (per child) 
 1 child 2 children 1 child 2 children 
Target individual income: 60% median gross wage 
M1 33-39 21-27 11-14 46-52 33-36 
M2 49-55 5-11 3-6 30-36 24-28 
M3 62-68 - - 16-23 18-21 
W1 13-19 41-47 21-24 66-72 43-46 
W2 20-26 34-40 17-20 59-65 39-42 
W3 47-53 7-13 3-6 31-38 25-28 
CP1 32-41 27-39 14-20 46-59 31-37 
CP2 48-57 4-16 2-8 23-36 20-26 
CP3 77-86 - - - 0-5 
50% median gross wage 
M1 33-39 11-17 6-9 32-38 24-27 
M2 49-55 0-1 0-1 16-22 16-19 
M3 62-68 - - 2-9 9-12 
W1 13-19 31-37 16-19 52-58 34-37 
W2 20-26 24-30 12-15 45-51 30-33 
W3 47-53 0-3 0-1 17-24 17-20 
CP1 32-41 13-25 6-13 29-41 21-27 
CP2 48-57 0-2 0-1 6-18 10-16 
CP3 77-86 - - - - 
40% median gross wage 
M1 33-39 1-7 1-4 18-24 15-18 
M2 49-55 - - 2-8 7-10 
M3 62-68 - - - 0-4 
W1 13-19 21-27 11-14 38-44 25-28 
W2 20-26 14-20 7-10 31-37 22-25 
W3 47-53 - - 3-9 8-11 
CP1 32-41 0-11 0-6 11-24 11-17 
CP2 48-57 - - 0-1 0-6 
CP3 77-86 - - - - 
The upper and lower limits of each range of estimates are based on combined pension 
outcomes from the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) with the Old Age Allowance (OAA), 
and from the MPF with the Old Age Living Allowance (OALA), the latter combination being 
more generous. Case M1: Men with primary education or less (5% nominal wage growth), 
M2: Men with secondary education (6%),  M3: Men with tertiary education (7%), and 
similarly for women W1-3 (wage growth 3-5%). CP1-3: Couples formed by M1 and W1, M2 
and W2, and M3 and W3 respectively. Pension projections assume starting wages based on 
2010 wage levels; full careers from 20 to 65; period life expectancies of 80/86 for 
men/women; inflation at 2.5%; and interest rate of 2% for calculating annuities. Non-co-
resident children provide support through transfers, co-resident children through income 
sharing. Required transfers are the difference between projected pensions and income targets. 
Required income of co-resident children plus projected pensions equals income targets. 
Incomes of couples and co-resident families are equivalised using the square root scale. 
Source: Own calculations 
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 Singapore: The results for Singapore illustrate the implications of low pensions 
and the uncertainties associated with housing withdrawals (Table 7.11). All the cases 
require some transfers to reach even the lowest living standard in these projections. 
Unlike in Hong Kong, single elderly men in Singapore fare only slightly better than 
the women. To achieve 60% of the median wage with two children, less educated 
single elderly fathers, M1 and M2, require transfers per child of 14-24% of the median 
wage, compared to 23-28% required by W1 and W2. Whereas the women in Hong 
Kong fare better within couples rather than alone, CP1‘s demand for transfers are in 
fact higher than W1‘s in Singapore, around 30-35% compared to 27-28%. For most of 
the lower earning cases, M1, W1-2, and CP1-2, the incomes required of co-resident 
children are close to half of the median wage.  
 At the lowest income standard of 40% of the median wage, the amount of 
transfers required in Singapore reaches levels similar to those for a living standard of 
60% in Hong Kong. The amounts required by the highest earning cases fall to below 
10% of the median wage, while the highest transfers required by the men is just 14% 
of the median wage. But W1 and CP1 still require transfers close to 20% of the median 
wage. If there is just one child instead of two, then the demands for children‘s support 
appear rather implausible even for a 50% living standard: the transfers required per 
child for W1 are 43-46% of the median wage, while those for CP1 are as high as 56% 
with maximum housing withdrawal. Co-resident children must achieve incomes that 
are about two thirds of median gross wage for M1, W1, and CP1. These very high 
amounts imply financial hardship either for the elderly parents, their children, or the 
joint household. 
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Table 7.11  Projected demands for children‘s support for poverty avoidance based on 
projected pension outcomes according to pension rules in 2010, Singapore, percentage 
of median gross wage 
 Equivalent relative 
pension level                 
(% median gross wage) 
Transfers from children 
living apart (per child) 
Income of co-resident 
children (per child) 
 1 child 2 children 1 child 2 children 
Target individual income: 60% median gross wage 
M1 11-18 42-49 21-24 67-74 43-46 
M2 20-31 29-40 14-20 53-65 36-42 
M3 31-50 10-29 5-14 35-54 27-36 
W1 4-7 53-56 27-28 78-81 49-50 
W2 9-15 45-51 23-25 70-76 45-47 
W3 22-35 25-38 12-19 49-63 34-41 
CP1 11-17 60-70 30-35 80-89 48-52 
CP2 20-33 39-56 19-28 58-75 37-46 
CP3 38-60 0-32 0-16 18-51 17-33 
50% median gross wage 
M1 11-18 32-39 16-19 53-60 34-38 
M2 20-31 19-30 9-15 39-51 28-33 
M3 31-50 0-19 0-9 21-40 18-28 
W1 4-7 43-46 22-23 64-67 40-41 
W2 9-15 35-41 18-23 56-62 36-39 
W3 22-35 15-28 7-20 35-49 26-32 
CP1 11-17 46-56 23-28 62-71 38-42 
CP2 20-33 24-42 12-21 40-58 27-36 
CP3 38-60 0-18 0-9 1-33 7-23 
40% median gross wage 
M1 11-18 22-29 11-14 39-46 26-29 
M2 20-31 9-20 4-10 25-37 19-25 
M3 31-50 0-9 0-4 6-25 10-19 
W1 4-7 33-36 17-18 50-52 31-33 
W2 9-15 25-31 13-15 42-47 27-30 
W3 22-35 5-18 2-9 21-35 17-24 
CP1 11-17 32-41 16-21 45-54 28-32 
CP2 20-33 10-28 5-14 23-40 17-26 
CP3 38-60 0-3 0-2 0-16 0-13 
The upper and lower limits of each range of estimates are based on pension outcomes 
assuming maximum and average withdrawal for housing, the latter scenario resulting in more 
generous pensions. Case M1: Men with primary education or less (5% nominal wage growth), 
M2: Men with secondary education (6%),  M3: Men with tertiary education (7%), and 
similarly for women W1-3 (wage growth 3-5%). CP1-3: Couples formed by M1 and W1, M2 
and W2, and M3 and W3 respectively. Pension projections assume starting wages based on 
2010 wage levels; full careers from 20 to 65; period life expectancies of 80/84 for 
men/women; inflation at 2.5%; and interest rate of 2% for calculating annuities. Non-co-
resident children provide support through transfers, co-resident children through income 
sharing. Required transfers are the difference between projected pensions and income targets. 
Required income of co-resident children plus projected pensions equals income targets. 
Incomes of couples and co-resident families are equivalised using the square root scale. 
Source: Own calculations 
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 Just how relevant and realistic is this worrying picture? First, the thresholds 
adopted for the analysis in this section do reflect actual income standards among large 
segments of recent elderly cohorts. As discussed in Chapter 2, the majority of the two 
elderly populations have very low individual incomes. In 2005/2006, about 80% of 
elderly persons in Hong Kong and 90% in Singapore had personal incomes that were 
below 60% of median population work income. Even when the income standard is 
lowered to 40% of median work income, 70% in Hong Kong and 80% in Singapore 
fall short. Second, there is some empirical basis for expecting significant dependence 
on children‘s transfers. The figures in Table 7.9 indicate that if elderly persons are to 
achieve individual incomes equivalent to exactly 60% of median wage, their children‘s 
transfers will represent up to 78% of individual income in Hong Kong and 93% in 
Singapore. For a lower income standard of 40%, children‘s transfers will make up a 
maximum of 45% of individual income in Hong Kong and 60% in Singapore. By 
comparison, empirical data show that on average children‘s transfers make up about 
60% of elderly persons‘ individual income in Hong Kong and two thirds in Singapore 
(see Chapter 2). The estimates in this section therefore do not appear to be wide off the 
mark. 
 A more fundamental challenge is that the children of elderly persons with less 
education and lower pension entitlements face heavier demands for support than 
children whose parents are more financially independent. Whether they are able to 
respond to these demands depends on how far they can improve on their parents‘ 
income achievements, which is a question of intergenerational income mobility. 
Research on income mobility in Hong Kong and Singapore is very limited and cross-
national comparison is complicated by differences in methodology, and the age 
profiles of the children and parents across studies (Blanden, 2009). However a recent 
study on Singapore estimated an un-scaled income elasticity in the range of 0.14-0.28 
compared to 0.09-0.17 in the UK, France, and Germany, or a scaled elasticity of 0.58-
1.20 compared to 0.21 in Canada (Ng, 2007), where higher elasticity indicates a tighter 
link between parents‘ and children‘s income. These suggest that income mobility in 
Singapore may be relatively low by the standards of other advanced economies. If 
children‘s incomes are strongly predicted by their parents‘, then the projected demands 
for children‘s support are unlikely to be always met or will imply a considerable 
economic strain on the children themselves. 
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Demands for children’s support for consumption smoothing 
Table 7.12 shows the projected gross pension replacement rates for the nine cases and 
their demands for children‘s support in order to achieve income replacement of 40-
60%. Here, the pattern of demand for children‘s support is opposite to that for poverty 
avoidance. Lower earning cases in Singapore, M1, W1, W2, and CP1, require transfers 
below 20% of the median wage to achieve 60% replacement rate. For 40% 
replacement, the transfers required for these cases fall below 10% of the median wage. 
The estimates are similar for Hong Kong. While the burden of support on children is 
low, these replacement standards conceal the inadequate amounts of income among the 
lower earning cases, for whom the poverty avoidance function of pensions may be 
more relevant. On the other hand, the support required for M3 and CP3 to reach 60% 
replacement appears to be unrealistically high. In Singapore, the required transfers are 
116% of the median wage for M3 given average housing withdrawal and 146% for 
CP3. If the children are co-resident, then the individual incomes required of each of 
them are more than twice the median wage for these cases. Even for 40% replacement, 
M3 and CP3 still require transfers of 69-79% and 83-99% of the median wage 
respectively, and co-resident children‘s individual incomes must reach about 1.5 times 
median wage. The demands for support are even higher in Hong Kong. M3 and CP3 
need transfers of 144-183% of the median wage in order to achieve 60% income 
replacement. The incomes required of co-resident children are around 2.8 times 
median wage. At a lower income replacement standard of 40%, the transfers required 
for these cases are around 84-104%, and the incomes of co-resident children must 
reach about 1.7 times the median wage. 
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Table 7.12  Projected demands for children‘s support for consumption smoothing 
based on projected pension outcomes according to pension rules in 2010 in Hong 
Kong and Singapore, percentage of median gross wage 
(a)  Hong Kong 
 Gross pension 
replacement rate         
(% final gross wage) 
Transfers from children 
living apart (per child) 
Income of co-resident 
children (per child) 
 1 child 2 children 1 child 2 children 
Target individual income: 60% individual final wage 
M1 33-39 21-27 10-13 45-52 32-35 
M2 26-30 57-63 28-31 103-109 69-72 
M3 10-12 287-294 144-147 435-441 274-277 
W1 50-74 0-3 0-1 3-9 4-7 
W2 34-45 9-15 4-7 23-29 17-20 
W3 24-27 66-72 33-36 115-121 76-80 
CP1 36-46 17-30 9-15 34-46 24-30 
CP2 28-33 65-78 33-39 98-110 63-69 
CP3 14-15 353-366 177-183 460-472 275-281 
50% individual final wage 
M1 33-39 11-17 5-8 31-38 24-27 
M2 26-30 38-44 19-22 76-83 53-56 
M3 10-12 228-234 114-117 351-357 223-226 
W1 50-74 - - 0-5 2-5 
W2 34-45 3-9 1-4 15-21 12-15 
W3 24-27 46-52 23-26 87-93 59-62 
CP1 36-46 5-17 2-9 19-31 15-21 
CP2 28-33 41-53 20-27 68-81 46-52 
CP3 14-15 274-286 137-143 363-375 219-225 
40% individual final wage 
M1 33-39 1-7 0-4 17-24 15-18 
M2 26-30 19-26 10-13 50-56 37-40 
M3 10-12 169-175 84-88 267-273 171-174 
W1 50-74 - - 0-2 0-2 
W2 34-45 0-3 0-2 7-13 7-10 
W3 24-27 26-32 13-16 59-65 42-45 
CP1 36-46 0-5 0-2 3-16 6-13 
CP2 28-33 16-29 8-14 38-51 28-35 
CP3 14-15 195-207 97-104 266-278 163-169 
  
 243 
(b)  Singapore 
 Gross pension 
replacement rate         
(% final gross wage) 
Transfers from children 
living apart (per child) 
Income of co-resident 
children (per child) 
 1 child 2 children 1 child 2 children 
Target individual income: 60% individual final wage 
M1 17-27 21-28 11-14 38-44 25-28 
M2 14-22 55-67 27-33 91-103 59-65 
M3 7-11 232-251 116-126 349-368 220-229 
W1 22-36 4-7 2-3 9-12 6-8 
W2 17-28 17-22 8-11 30-36 20-23 
W3 14-22 60-73 30-37 99-113 65-71 
CP1 18-29 26-35 13-18 37-46 23-28 
CP2 15-24 72-89 36-45 98-116 60-69 
CP3 8-14 292-325 146-162 377-410 224-241 
50% individual final wage 
M1 17-27 15-22 7-11 28-35 19-23 
M2 14-22 41-52 20-26 70-82 47-53 
M3 7-11 185-204 93-102 283-302 179-188 
W1 22-36 3-5 1-3 6-9 5-6 
W2 17-28 11-17 6-9 22-28 15-18 
W3 14-22 44-57 22-29 77-90 51-58 
CP1 18-29 17-27 9-16 27-36 17-22 
CP2 15-24 52-69 26-35 74-92 46-55 
CP3 8-14 229-262 115-131 300-332 180-196 
40% individual final wage 
M1 17-27 8-15 4-8 19-26 14-17 
M2 14-22 26-38 13-19 50-62 34-40 
M3 7-11 138-157 69-79 216-235 138-148 
W1 22-36 1-3 0-2 4-6 3-4 
W2 17-28 6-12 3-6 15-21 11-14 
W3 14-22 28-41 14-21 54-68 37-44 
CP1 18-29 9-18 5-9 17-26 11-16 
CP2 15-24 32-50 16-25 50-67 32-41 
CP3 8-14 166-199 83-99 223-255 135-151 
For Hong Kong, the upper and lower limits of each range of estimates are based on pension 
outcomes from the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) with the Old Age Allowance (OAA), 
and from the MPF with the Old Age Living Allowance (OALA), the latter combination being 
more generous. For Singapore, the limits are based on pension outcomes assuming maximum 
and average withdrawal for housing, the latter scenario resulting in more generous pensions. 
Case M1: Men with primary education or less (5% nominal wage growth), M2: Men with 
secondary education (6%),  M3: Men with tertiary education (7%), and similarly for women 
W1-3 (wage growth 3-5%). CP1-3: Couples formed by M1 and W1, M2 and W2, and M3 and 
W3 respectively. Pension projections assume starting wages based on 2010 wage levels; full 
careers from 20 to 65; period life expectancies of 80/86 for men/women in Hong Kong and 
80/84 in Singapore; inflation at 2.5%; and interest rate of 2% for calculating annuities. Non-
co-resident children provide support through transfers, co-resident children through income 
sharing. Required transfers are the difference between projected pensions and income targets. 
Required income of co-resident children plus projected pensions equals income targets. 
Incomes of couples and co-resident families are equivalised using the square root scale. 
Source: Own calculations 
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Summary  
This section examined the potential demands for children‘s support based on the 
projected pension outcomes earlier, assuming no other sources of income, no other 
persons in the household, and that non-co-resident children support their parents by 
making transfers while co-resident children provide support through income sharing.  
 
 Figure 7.4 summarises the estimated demands for moderate standards of 
poverty avoidance and consumption smoothing at 50%; cases with secondary 
education (M2, W2, and CP2); and the one child scenario. It shows that in 
Hong Kong, single women require much higher levels of support than men and 
couples for poverty avoidance. W2 requires transfers of 24-30% median wage 
compared to just 1-2% for M2 and CP2. A child co-resident with W2 has to 
achieve an individual income of 45-51% of the median wage, compared to just 
6-18% if W2 lives with a spouse M2. But in Singapore, the risks of financial 
hardship are more widespread due to lower pension rights. For poverty 
avoidance, even M2 requires transfers of 19-30% of the median wage, while 
W2 and CP2 require transfers of more than 40% median wage. 
 
 Figure 7.4 also shows that for consumption smoothing, the patterns of demand 
are more similar for Hong Kong and Singapore, although Singaporean cases 
still need more support. Because of lower final wages, W2 in both systems 
require relatively lower levels of support to reach 50% income replacement—
transfers of around 3-9% of the median wage in Hong Kong and 11-17% in 
Singapore. Instead, higher earning M2 requires transfers of up to 44% in Hong 
Kong and 52% in Singapore.  
 
 Overall the findings in this section indicate that lower earning elderly persons 
are likely to require substantial family support to reach the poverty avoidance 
target of 60% median wage. Alternatively, at more realistic levels of transfers 
of less than a fifth of median wage with two children, elderly persons must 
accept lower standards of living of 50% of median wage in Hong Kong and 
40% in Singapore. Having one fewer child doubles the demands for transfers 
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per child, raising these requirements to seemingly impractical levels for many 
cases. To reach a living standard of 60% median wage with one child, W1 in 
Hong Kong will require transfers equivalent to almost half of the median wage, 
while CP1 in Singapore will need transfers of up to 70% median wage.
6
 
 
 Higher earning cases will achieve replacement rates of 60% only with large 
amounts of transfers and require significant support even for 40% replacement. 
M3 and CP3 require transfers of 69-79% and 83-99% of the median wage 
respectively in Singapore, and transfers of 84-88% and 97-104% in Hong 
Kong, to reach a replacement rate of 40% with two children. The two pension 
systems therefore appear unlikely to be able to fulfil the objectives either of 
poverty avoidance for lower educated older persons, or consumption smoothing 
for higher educated persons, without considerable and in cases implausibly 
high levels of support from children.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Chou‘s (2010) analysis of Hong Kong data indicates that the impact of the availability of children on 
the amount of transfers to elderly parents shows a ceiling effect—having more than three children does 
not significantly increase the amount of transfers. However the average fertility in both Hong Kong and 
Singapore does not reach this threshold. The projections in this section illustrate that within the more 
realistic range of 1-2 children, having one fewer child could significantly raise the potential burden of 
support. 
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Figure 7.4  Summary of estimated demands for children‘s support for persons with 
secondary education according to historical pension rules, Hong Kong and Singapore 
(a) Hong Kong 
             Poverty avoidance            Consumption smoothing 
  
   MPF and OALA Increase if based on MPF and OAA 
 
(b) Singapore 
             Poverty avoidance      Consumption smoothing 
 
    CPF,  average withdrawal for housing 
    Increase if based on maximum withdrawal 
 
MPF: Mandatory Provident Fund, OAA: Old Age Allowance, OALA: Old Age Living 
Allowance, CPF: Central Provident Fund. Couples (CP2) formed by men (M2) and women 
(W2) with secondary education. See text for details of pension projections. Poverty avoidance 
target is 50% median gross wage; consumption smoothing target is 50% individual final wage. 
All cases assumed to have one child available. Non-co-resident child provides support through 
transfers, co-resident child through income sharing. Required transfers are the difference 
between projected pensions and income targets, equivalised for CP2. Required income of co-
resident child plus projected pensions, equivalised with a factor of two for M2 and W2 and a 
factor of three for CP2, equals income targets. Square root scale used for equivalisation. All 
demands expressed as percentage of median gross wage.  
Source: Own calculations 
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7.5  Summary 
This chapter projected possible pension outcomes under a range of scenarios for six 
illustrative cases: three men and three women with primary, secondary, and tertiary 
education. The potential demands for children‘s support were then estimated based on 
the gaps between these pension outcomes and various income standards, under 
different household configurations and support scenarios. 
 
 Hong Kong offers more generous pensions than Singapore. Among cases 
with secondary education, men who start their careers in 1990 achieve 
replacement rates of 23-26% in Hong Kong compared to 12-21% in 
Singapore, depending on eligibility for the OALA and the amount of CPF 
housing withdrawals. Relative to the median gross wage, men‘s pensions 
are 42-48% in Hong Kong but only 17-30% in Singapore.  
 
 Men and cases with better education achieve higher relative pension levels 
but poorer replacement rates. Women have better replacement rates but 
very low pension amounts, about half of men‘s. The 2010 cohort of women 
with secondary education receive pensions that are 20-26% of median 
gross wage in Hong Kong, and 9-15% in Singapore, compared to men‘s 
49-55% in Hong Kong and 20-31% in Singapore. 
 
 The introduction of the MPF and OALA in Hong Kong has boosted 
pension outcomes for all cohorts between 1990 and 2010, but the younger 
2010 cohort also gain 4-7 percentage points in replacement rate and 
pension level over the 1990 cohort. In Singapore, CPF contribution rate 
adjustments improve pension outcomes for the younger cohorts by just a 
few percentage points and only under some withdrawal scenarios. Current 
system design allowing generous pre-retirement withdrawals remains a 
major challenge and creates greater uncertainty for retirement income 
security. 
 
 For the 2010 cohort, an increase of one year in life expectancy causes 
replacement rates to fall by 2 percentage points  in Hong Kong and 1 
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percentage point in Singapore, and relative pension level to decrease by 1-
3 percentage points in Hong Kong and 1 percentage point in Singapore. 
For women, a reduction of 5 years of work decreases the pension level by 
2 percentage points in Hong Kong but improves the replacement rate by 2 
percentage points in Singapore. Calculating annuities using a 4% interest 
rate instead of 2% raises replacement rates by 3-6 percentage points in both 
systems. 
 
 In Hong Kong, single women require much higher levels of support from 
children than men and couples do for poverty avoidance. With one non-co-
resident child, women with secondary education require transfers 
equivalent to 24-30% median wage compared to just 1-2% for men and 
couples to achieve an income of 50% median wage. But in Singapore, the 
risks of financial hardship are more widespread due to lower pension 
rights. To achieve the same target of 50%, even men with secondary 
education require transfers of 19-30% of the median wage, while women 
and couples with secondary education require transfers of more than 40% 
median wage. 
 
 In terms of consumption smoothing, higher earning cases will achieve 
replacement rates of 60% only with large amounts of transfers and require 
significant support even for 40% replacement. Men and couples with 
tertiary education require transfers of 69-79% and 83-99% of the median 
wage respectively in Singapore, and transfers of 84-88% and 97-104% in 
Hong Kong, to reach a replacement rate of 40%. 
 
 Overall, lower earning elderly persons are likely to require substantial 
family support in addition to their pension benefits in order to reach the 
poverty avoidance target of 60% median wage. At more realistic levels of 
transfers from children, say less than a fifth of the median wage, elderly 
persons with two children must accept lower standards of living of 50% 
median wage in Hong Kong and 40% in Singapore. Having one fewer 
child doubles the demands for transfers per child, raising these 
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requirements to seemingly impractical levels for many cases. To reach a 
living standard of 60% median wage with one child, women with primary 
education or less in Hong Kong require transfers equivalent to almost half 
of the median wage, while a couple with primary or lower education in 
Singapore needs transfers of up to 70% median wage.   
 
 The two pension systems therefore appear unlikely to fulfil both the 
objectives of poverty avoidance for lower educated older persons and 
consumption smoothing for higher educated persons without considerable 
and in some cases implausibly high levels of support from children.  
 
 It has been argued in Chapter 4 that family support is integral to old-age 
income security in Hong Kong and Singapore. However such support is weakening 
and the projections in Chapter 6 suggest further decline in intergenerational co-
residence and the emergence of a sizeable proportion of elderly persons who will have 
access to neither market income nor children‘s contributions after retirement. The 
burden therefore appears to fall increasingly on public pension systems. Yet the 
analysis in this chapter highlights potentially low pension rights, particularly in 
Singapore, that are still built on assumptions of strong family support. Housing 
ownership, sometimes suggested as a source of income security for elderly 
Singaporeans, is not a guarantee of retirement income because of the unequal 
distribution of housing assets and the problems associated with equity release 
measures (see Chapter 3). The best chance of shoring up the income security of future 
elderly cohorts may therefore lie in substantial reforms to the two pension systems to 
improve their generosity. Part 3 of the study examines the possibility of such reforms 
and the factors that may constrain them. 
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8. The context of public pension policies 
 
So far the discussion in this study has been about the functional prospects of old age 
income security—whether it has been adequate for recent generations of elderly 
persons and if it will be so for future cohorts. Overall the analysis points to gaps in 
income security and pressures to improve public pension provision. Policymaking is 
fundamentally a political process that involves factors and constraints with a separate 
dynamic from functional needs.  Part 3 of the study therefore turns to the political 
prospects of income security—whether public pensions can potentially grow to make 
up for declining family support. Chapter 8 adopts a comparative case study approach 
to examine the context of public pension policies in Hong Kong and Singapore from 
the 1950s to the 2000s.
7
 The chapter begins with a review of the major theoretical 
explanations for the development of social security policies in the advanced 
democracies and East Asia. From these, a theoretical framework combining ideas, 
developmentalism, and democratisation is developed to interpret pension 
policymaking in Hong Kong and Singapore. This framework is applied to explain 
pension adoption in the early phase, followed by pension adaptation in recent decades. 
The chapter concludes with a reiteration of the factors that matter to the making of 
pension policies in the two places. While this chapter engages with key theoretical 
concepts in the literature on social policy change in East Asia, the primary task in the 
context of this study is to provide a theoretical and historical basis for discussing the 
potential for further expansion of public pensions, which is taken up in Chapter 9. 
 
8.1  Explaining public pension policy in the advanced democracies and East Asia 
Explaining public pension policy in the advanced democracies 
In the theoretical literature on social policy in the mature welfare states, a distinction is 
drawn between functional theories that imply a convergence of welfare policy 
directions across countries due to international forces such as globalisation or post-
industrialism, and political theories that emphasise unique national conditions such as 
state capacity, organised interests, and institutional legacies that result in persistently 
divergent policy developments. Theories of welfare policy change also reflect their 
                                                 
7
 While detailed historical process-tracing is beyond the scope of the study, the analysis refers to 
primary sources such as press reports, parliamentary and political speeches, and official documents 
where appropriate. 
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historical context. Just as burgeoning welfare states in the first half of the twentieth 
century were associated with industrialisation, the challenge of welfare reform and 
austerity in more recent times has provided fertile ground for explanations based on 
institutional constraints. The salience of historical sequence and context is succinctly 
captured by Pierson (1996) when he argues that the old class-based politics of credit-
claiming between the political left and right during the era of welfare expansion has 
been replaced by a new broad-based politics of blame avoidance where large welfare 
constituencies matter more than left power for the defence of welfare institutions. Each 
strand of theory can therefore be thought of as being bisected by a historical axis that 
differentiates between theories of welfare adoption and of welfare adaptation. 
 Functional arguments interpret policy as a rational response to the exigencies 
of wider, usually economic, circumstances. According to the logic of industrialism, for 
example, modernisation and economic advancement increased the concentration of 
urban populations and rendered traditional family- and community-based systems of 
social provision inadequate (Cutright, 1965; Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison, & Myers, 1960; 
Wilensky, 1975). These traditional systems were therefore gradually replaced by state-
organised welfare. By contrast globalisation, defined as an increase in the mobility of 
capital and finance and the trans-nationalisation of production and trade, has been 
argued to be a contributor to both welfare expansion and retrenchment. Earlier research 
suggested that among developed countries that are more exposed to the vagaries of the 
international economic system, governments have had to develop more advanced 
systems of social protection for its citizens (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1998). But 
recently other scholars have argued that globalisation constrains social policy in 
advanced welfare states in at least three ways: it limits the ability of governments to 
pursue national economic strategies for growth; it disrupts collective bargaining 
traditions by weakening the position of organised labour in relation to international 
capital; and it poses a threat of ―social dumping‖ that compels governments to 
suppress the social wage (Huber & Stephens, 1998; Mishra, 1999). Pierson (1998) 
argues that instead of globalisation, the pressures of austerity stem from post-
industrialism, involving a slowing of productivity growth related to the shift from 
manufacturing- to service-based economies, the maturation of existing welfare 
commitments, and demographic ageing. These arguments apply not just to the 
development of pension systems but social policy in general. Functional theories face 
several criticisms: they are apparently deterministic, do not cope well with cross-
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national variation among countries experiencing similar universal pressures, and often 
fail to address the resilience of welfare states after decades of purported crisis. In all of 
these areas political theories provide more direct answers. 
 The body of theory dealing specifically with pension development is usually 
referred to as pension politics. One of the earlier explanations of pension development 
can be found in Esping-Andersen‘s (1990) well-known study of welfare regimes. 
Using data on public pensions as well as other social spending, he shows that working 
class mobilisation, the influence of Catholicism, and the depth of authoritarian political 
culture can account for the distinction between the social democratic, conservative, and 
liberal welfare regimes. Although the study was not primarily concerned with the 
historical emergence of public pensions in the European democracies, it demonstrates 
how public pension outlay as a component of national social policy can be explained 
by political factors including the influence of left power. This approach echoes the 
power resources perspective which argues that the level of political power wielded by 
the working class and their political representatives—trade unions and left parties—
affect the extent of state involvement in redistributive social policy (Korpi, 1980, 
1989).  
 At around the same time an alternative state-centred reading of social policy 
emerged, using the history of public pensions in the United States as an example to 
show that the capacity of national governments to implement policy is a key 
determinant of the scale of social welfare institutions (Skocpol, 1985). Comparing the 
adoption of social security policies in Britain and the United States in the early 
twentieth century, Orloff and Skocpol (1984) show that the United States failed to 
institutionalise post-Civil War pension arrangements as permanent national policies 
despite relatively favourable conditions such as supportive unions because the civil 
service lacked bureaucratic expertise, policy implementation was complicated by 
patronage politics, and the leading political parties were not competing on the basis of 
policy programmes like in Britain. This interpretation gave emphasis to the role of the 
government in policymaking instead of portraying pension policy as the direct 
outcome of competition among a plurality of interest groups in society.  
 Once pension systems are in place, a different set of factors affects the path of 
subsequent policy development. The institutionalist perspective has been influential in 
explaining the connection between institutions, defined as  ―formal or informal 
procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure 
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of the polity‖ (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 938), and policy outcomes. There are two main 
institutionalist arguments in the pensions literature. First institutions as the structure of 
government and policymaking rules may determine the range of available veto points 
(Tsebelis, 2002), or channels for blocking the passage of policies and laws, and ―affect 
both the degree of pressure an actor can bring to bear on policy and the likely direction 
of that pressure‖ (Hall, 1986, p. 19). In a comparative study of Western European 
countries, Bonoli (2000) argues that constitutional structure and corporatist traditions 
can affect the style and scale of pension reform. In parliamentary systems with large 
single-party majorities like Britain that offer few veto points, or opportunities for 
external parties to influence policy decisions, pension reform has tended to reflect 
more closely the will of the government, sometimes in the face of stiff political 
opposition. But in political systems with a separation of powers such as Switzerland or 
a corporatist culture such as Germany, pension reforms have had to be negotiated in a 
more consensual manner and often required the government to cede concessions to key 
opponents.  
 Secondly institutions in terms of pension system design may mediate external 
policy pressures and constrain the options available to national governments, favouring 
incremental rather than radical change and policy stability in the long run. Existing 
policies may also generate legacy effects or feedback in the form of long-term 
commitments that redefine the incentives of political actors (Pierson, 1993, 1996). A 
switch from a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) to a funded pension system, for example, creates 
a ―double payment problem‖ as it requires current workers to contribute towards the 
pensions of current retirees and save for their own future retirement, which is unlikely 
to find public support (Myles & Pierson, 2000). This makes a switch away from 
PAYG systems politically costly and may explain why European countries with 
extensive PAYG public pensions have tended to introduce only incremental parametric 
reforms. Comparing countries that depend primarily on social insurance pension 
systems funded on a PAYG basis with those that have multipillar systems combining a 
basic state pension with funded private schemes, Bonoli (2003) shows that while 
population ageing has spurred social insurance systems to scale back spending on 
public pensions and introduce new funded schemes, it has not led to major reforms in 
multipillar systems. In response to labour market changes such as less stable careers 
and higher participation among women, social insurance systems have introduced 
contribution credits whereas multipillar systems have expanded the scale of 
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occupational pensions. Constraints from existing pension system design therefore 
result in path dependent reforms unique to national settings rather than cross-national 
convergence on functionally optimal choices. This explanation reflects the influence of 
Pierson‘s (2000) work on the new politics of welfare, where the beneficiaries of social 
policy become powerful political constituents that resist welfare retrenchment. Unlike 
policy development which offers opportunities for credit claiming, social policy 
cutbacks depend on politicians balancing electoral survival with policy goals. 
 
Explaining public pension policy in East Asia 
In 1986 Midgley observed that ―established theories of welfare and industrialisation 
have been abstracted from the historical experience of the Western countries and no 
attempt has been made to assess their empirical validity with reference to the newly 
industrialising countries (NICs) of the Third World‖ (p.225). Since then the literature 
on East Asian social policy has grown considerably.
8
 But the theoretical fit of 
European pension analysis to East Asian states like Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore remains under-examined. While a full discussion of this topic is beyond the 
scope of this study, reviewing the major issues can help to bring out salient features in 
the context of East Asian pension policy. To begin with, functional accounts do not 
travel well because they draw on historical developments in specific settings. 
Industrialisation in East Asia, for instance, was not accompanied by a large-scale 
expansion of social provisions (Chow, 1985b). Instead these countries are still 
regarded as very lean welfare states by international standards (Jacobs, 2000). Political 
theories can be equally problematic. In places like Singapore which do not have a 
strong social democratic tradition and where politics is dominated by a single party, 
the power resources perspective can be difficult to apply because of its assumptions 
about the left-right political spectrum and the role of organised labour. While it may be 
argued that the subjugation of trade unions in these societies has been a factor in the 
under-development of social policy (Deyo, 1987), left power does not offer the same 
theoretical leverage when unions in the European sense do not in fact exist. This 
region of strong semi-authoritarian governments has shown that state capacity may not 
always translate into expansive public pension policy in the way Skocpol described. 
                                                 
8
 See for example Fu & Hughes (2009), Low & Aw (2004), Midgley & Tang (2010), Ramesh (2004), 
Tang (2000), White & Goodman (1998). 
 256 
Instead it has enabled East Asian governments to realise their inherent policy 
preferences (Fu, 2003), reflecting either local cultural norms or state ideologies. 
Finally institutionalist explanations based on the structure of government or pension 
system design seem to run ahead of developments in both the politics and the pensions 
of East Asia. Bonoli‘s conceptual dichotomy of multipillar and social insurance 
pension systems do not capture for instance Singapore‘s single-pillar Central Provident 
Fund (CPF) system. More fundamentally, the logic of electoral punishment at the core 
of several institutionalist perspectives applies more readily to mature European 
democracies than East Asian states where social mobilisation and popular demands are 
managed differently.  
 Perhaps for the above reasons, the East Asian pensions literature has focused 
on a different set of political and ideational explanations across two phases of policy 
development: an initial phase of contained adoption followed by a second period of 
adaptation when some states ramped up their pension provision while others held the 
line.
9
 
 One of the dominant theoretical perspectives is that the introduction of public 
pensions in East Asia is related to the role of the state. In his account of the politics of 
pensions in Hong Kong and Singapore, Fu (2003) argues that both governments had 
high levels of autonomy from popular and political pressure which allowed them to 
implement policies closely aligned to their inherent policy preferences, which 
disfavoured extensive social spending. This autonomy resulted from having non-
elected governments (up to 1965 in Singapore), weak trade unions, various de-
politicisation strategies used by the ruling elite, and politically disengaged immigrant 
populations. Economic success and improvements to living standards further 
strengthened the position of the political leadership and promoted social stability. 
Additionally, in Singapore, political uncertainty from the communist threat and the 
abrupt attainment of nationhood resulted in the adoption of the CPF model which 
encouraged identification with national interests and social peace, helped to build a 
stakeholder society of homeowners, and raised fiscal resources for public 
infrastructure projects. But Hong Kong was a more transient society, a temporary stop 
for political refugees thought to be at risk of being forcefully retaken by communist 
                                                 
9
 This approach of delineating historical phases in East Asian social policy development follows earlier 
work by authors such as Chow (1994), Tang (1998), Lee (1999) and Lin (2004). 
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China in the 1950s. Social policy consisted mainly of short-term assistance schemes 
which were only formalised in the 1970s with rising needs and social unrest. The need 
for national and political consolidation therefore explains the different pension systems 
in the two places. 
 The second political explanation is that where democratisation has taken place, 
there were greater public demands for pension provision and other social policies in 
the adjustment phase. Chow (1995) argues that democratisation in Hong Kong in the 
1990s led to social welfare groups and political parties pressing for improvements to 
social security, creating pressure on the government to expand the existing pension 
system. The introduction of electoral competition in particular spurred public debates 
about social spending and compelled policymakers to balance more vocal and diverse 
interests (Fu, 2003). But Hong Kong‘s brand of democracy was susceptible to business 
lobbying, which eventually persuaded the government to adopt a system of mandatory 
savings based on private investment instead of contributory universal pensions (C. K. 
Chan, 2003). On the other hand, sustained electoral domination meant that Singapore‘s 
government was not required to increase state involvement in social protection in 
exchange for political support. It was only when political support waned in the 1980s 
that the government introduced a range of ad hoc transfers and subsidies (Ramesh, 
2000).  
 A third approach, an ideational one, emphasises the role of social norms and 
governing philosophy. In earlier literature, Jones (1993) suggests that the East Asian 
welfare states are influenced by a shared Confucian lineage or what she calls 
underlying ―tiger qualities‖, such as a distinctive familial tradition, a social discipline 
that values the collective above the self, and an avoidance of open dissent. Social 
policy therefore reflects a kind of cultural destiny. In her words, ―welfare states are 
born, not made‖ (p. 215). However MacPherson (1993) has argued that historically 
Hong Kong‘s failure to introduce a comprehensive system of social security for elderly 
persons was due to colonial policy that reflected ―a convenient conjunction of cultural 
sensitivity and cost-saving‖ (p. 52). High levels of family support among the Chinese 
population provided a useful pretext for social policy decisions. Cultural explanations 
have since been criticised for mistaking political rhetoric for social reality and for 
failing to account for policy change and diversity in countries with apparently similar 
cultural backgrounds (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005; C. K. Chan, 1998; K. S. Chang, 
1997; Palley, 1992; G. White & Goodman, 1998). Other scholars focus on governing 
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ideologies that are hostile towards Western-style welfare and encourage self-reliance 
(Chow, 1985a; Ramesh, 2000; Wilding, 1997). In Ramesh‘s (1992) analysis of 
Singapore‘s CPF and other social security provisions, he argues that ―the basic 
motivation underlying the efforts to limit statutory social security is ideological 
opposition to the welfare state‖ (p. 1103). In an early study that directly compares the 
factors behind pension development in Hong Kong and Singapore, Chow (1985b) 
argues that the government‘s economic objectives and scepticism towards welfare 
states help to explain the underdevelopment of income security policies in both cases. 
Chan (2003) similarly refers to bureaucratic principles of minimal welfare in Hong 
Kong. In the adjustment phase, democratisation has been linked with a new and more 
collectivist popular welfare ideology which expected the government to adopt a more 
direct role in social welfare (Chow, 1995). This area however remains understudied. 
 
Summary and next steps 
Table 8.1 shows the major explanatory approaches for pension policy development. To 
summarise, explanations of public pension policy are not the same in the European and 
East Asian contexts. Among the advanced welfare states of Europe, the adoption of 
welfare policies has been explained by functional theories such as industrialisation and 
globalisation that imply an expansion of the state‘s welfare functions, whereas political 
perspectives emphasise policy diversity depending on the influence of the state and left 
political power. In the adaptation phase, welfare retrenchment has been linked with 
universal factors such as post-industrialism but also national factors such as the 
configuration of political institutions and existing pension system design. In East Asia, 
strong state autonomy and restrictions on social mobilisation initially allowed 
governments to rein in social spending, although the imperative of political 
consolidation in emerging nations encouraged the introduction of public pension 
systems in some places. Ideational arguments on the other hand highlight cultural 
norms of familial provision and governing philosophies that were suspicious towards 
European-style welfare states. These explanations have however been criticised for 
being overly deterministic. In the adaptation phase, democratisation in some places 
resulted in electoral competition over social policy issues and evolving public 
expectations about the role of the welfare state, which contributed to the growth of 
formal pension provision. 
 
 259 
Table 8.1 Explaining public pension policy 
  Adoption Adaptation 
European 
welfare 
states 
Functional Industrialisation 
Globalisation 
Post-industrialism 
Globalisation 
Political 
 
Power resources           
State capacity 
Institutionalism               
Path dependency 
East Asian 
welfare 
states 
Political State autonomy            
Political consolidation 
Democratisation 
Ideational Culture                  
Governing philosophy               
Popular welfare ideology 
Source: Own summary 
 
 The current literature leaves a number of questions unanswered regarding the 
development of public pensions in Hong Kong and Singapore. First, the choice of 
pension model is not adequately explained. Singapore‘s choice of the CPF model has 
been explained in terms of its compatibility with the tasks of nation-building. But it 
can be argued that more solidaristic forms of provision such as social insurance would 
have been more effective for promoting a sense of social unity or that tax-funded 
universal pensions would have generated greater popular goodwill towards the 
government.
10
 Second, if the governments‘ ideologies towards social policy were the 
deciding factor in the choice of pension models, what were the bases of these 
ideologies and, more generally, what was the role of ideas in pension development in 
both the adoption and adaptation phases? Third, if democratisation was a critical factor 
in the latter phase, why has there been greater policy activity in recent years in Hong 
Kong where the government is only partially elected, compared to Singapore which 
has held democratic elections since 1965?  
 The explanatory task in the rest of this chapter is to account for (i) the origins 
and stability of the CPF system in Singapore compared to the initial reliance on public 
assistance and flat-rate allowances in Hong Kong; and (ii) recent decades of policy 
inactivity in Singapore despite growing concerns about population ageing and 
retirement income, compared to the policy contestation resulting in the implementation 
of Hong Kong‘s MPF in 2000. A summary of the historical milestones in the two 
pension systems can be found in the appendix at the end of the chapter. To do this, the 
                                                 
10
 For example, in Taiwan several social insurance schemes were initiated to win the political loyalty of 
the bureaucrats and military personnel who had fled mainland China together with the nationalist 
government when they lost the civil war to the communists in 1949 (C.-W. Lin, 2004). Since then both 
Taiwan and Korea have introduced national social insurance schemes. 
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discussion combines three theoretical perspectives: developmentalism, 
democratisation, and the role of ideas. While there is a large literature on the East 
Asian welfare model and the economic thinking behind it, the deeper implications of 
the developmental state model and its bureaucratic structures for pension policy 
change in the region have not been explored. The analysis here also adds to previous 
studies of the role of democratisation and governing philosophies in pension policy 
development by tracing the impact of particular forms of democracy and distinct 
ideational processes. The next section sets out the theoretical definitions and 
framework. 
 
8.2  Theoretical framework: Ideas, developmentalism and democratisation 
The role of ideas in policy change 
Ideational theories explain policy outputs in terms of cognitive and normative 
structures. There is a wide range of definitions for ―ideas‖ in the public policy 
literature, such as causal beliefs (Béland & Cox, 2011); social or cultural constructions 
(Fraser & Gordon, 1994; Schneider & Ingram, 1993); norms and collective identities 
(Eckstein, 1988; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; March & Olsen, 
1984), and policy blueprints and paradigms (Berman, 1998; Blyth, 2001; Hall, 1993). 
The range of these definitions reflects differences in interpreting the level of generality 
(broad beliefs or policy strategies), visibility (implicit or expressed), location (elites or 
the public), and function (specify identities or regulate behaviour) of ideas. Campbell 
(1998)  alludes to several of these dimensions when he differentiates between four 
types of ideas based on whether they reside in the foreground or background, and if 
they are cognitive or normative: foreground cognition specifies policy programmes; 
paradigms or policymakers‘ assumptions form background cognition; frames or policy 
communication to the public are foreground norms; and public sentiment or culture are 
background norms.
11
  
 It is generally understood that ideas do not act alone on policy processes. 
Rather, they shape political interests and mediate conflict within institutional 
constraints (Katzenstein, 1996). Political interests are not stable or exogenous to the 
                                                 
11
 Ideational approaches have been criticised for being too fluid and arbitrary, and difficult to separate 
from other factors like the political actors who propagate and enact them (Blyth, 1997; Hall, 1997; Yee, 
1996). To some extent, differentiating the types and functions of ideas can help to clarify their role in 
policymaking. 
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political system but reflect socialisation and underlying norms (March & Olsen, 1984). 
Ideational change is also a political process that requires the mobilisation of political 
actors (Payne, 2001; L. A. White, 2009). 
 Blyth (2001) argues that the results of institutional change cannot be inferred 
from structural explanations alone, but require both ―material‖ and ―ideal‖ 
explanations. By providing a bounded space for policy competition and political 
conflict, ideas both constrain developments and allow innovation (Surel, 2000; Weir, 
1992; L. A. White, 2009). Of these various processes, two are most relevant to 
understanding the context of public pensions in Hong Kong and Singapore. These will 
be set against the background of two broad phases in pension policy change—
developmentalism and democratisation. 
 In the first ideational process, policy paradigms set modes of thinking and 
constrain the range of policy solutions. Hall (1993) suggests that ideas can work at 
three levels. At the first two levels, they relate to the settings and choice of policy 
instruments. At the third level, as paradigms, they provide ―a framework of ideas and 
standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that 
can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to 
be addressing‖ (1993, p. 279). Sabatier (1998) observes a similar ―deep core‖ of 
axiomatic and philosophical beliefs among decision-makers that affects their ―policy 
core‖ of general positions and strategies. Blyth (2001) echoes these perspectives when 
he argues that ideas may serve as blueprints during periods of uncertainty, giving 
content to interests and suggesting new institutional equilibriums. They may also 
provide ―weapons‖ in distributional struggles in the form of cognitive and normative 
critiques of existing and alternative institutions. Since paradigms provide powerful 
worldviews or logics about the policymaking environment, it follows that they are not 
easily changed. Blyth (2001) refers to ideas becoming ―cognitive locks‖, reinforcing 
existing institutions and creating a sort of intellectual path dependency. Often these 
paradigms are only challenged and overhauled at critical junctures of crisis and policy 
failure that open up windows of opportunity for radical change (Collier & Collier, 
1991; Hall, 1993; Kingdon, 1984). The likelihood of change is also related to the 
political setting. Where decision-making is more hierarchical and power more 
concentrated, policymakers are more prone to cognitive locking and paradigms 
become harder to shake (Blyth, 2001). Policy paradigms connected to more technical 
policy domains manned by influential technocrats under political continuity may also 
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be more resistant to change (Hall, 1993), with public pensions especially in Singapore 
being a case in point. 
 The second ideational process is ideas as discourse, where the flow of ideas 
between political actors results in the creation of new policy strategies and in some 
cases a revision of the basic terms of the policy debate (Hall, 1993). Discourse may 
involve the exchange of ideas at different levels. Schmidt‘s (2000, 2008, 2010) model 
of policy change through discursive institutionalism, for example, distinguishes 
between coordinative discourse among policy elites to construct policy, and 
communicative discourse to promote policy decisions to the public. Hay (2001), 
building on Hall‘s model of policy paradigms, suggests that policy failure alone is not 
sufficient to precipitate a paradigm shift. Other conditions are necessary, such as 
widespread public experience of policy consequences, interpretation of policy failure 
through a crisis narrative often through the media and other channels of public 
discourse, and circulation of policy alternatives that are widely perceived as feasible 
and legitimate. Other theoretical perspectives variously emphasise the transfer of ideas 
among and by epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), norm entrepreneurs (DiMaggio, 
1988), advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), and 
policy forums (Rein & Schon, 1991). The common thread is the importance of 
discourse to policy change. Weir (1992) demonstrates this in the context of the United 
States, arguing that the permeability of bureaucratic decision-making and the 
fragmented federal governance structure enabled access to interest groups and 
favoured diverse ideas and policy innovation. Discourse among research organisations, 
leading academics, business leaders, and a lead policy council promoted a growing 
consensus and resulted in advances in employment policy. 
 
Hong Kong and Singapore as developmental states 
The concept of the developmental state was first proposed by Chalmers Johnson 
(1982) in his study of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) and its role in national economic development. The developmental state as 
portrayed by Japan pursued economic development above other national objectives 
using market-conforming strategies, and orchestrated industrial policy through a small 
elite bureaucracy fronted by a lead agency with broad-ranging powers. This model was 
subsequently used to describe the experience of other industrialising societies in East 
Asia that appeared to emulate the Japanese road map for development, including South 
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Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong (Amsden, 1989; Castells, 1992; Deyo, 
1987; Öniş, 1991; Wade, 1990). In the context of these countries, Castells (1992) 
defines the developmental state as one that ―establishes as its principle of legitimacy 
its ability to promote and sustain development‖ (p. 56). Legitimacy was an important 
motivation in the 1960s when these societies were either ruled by young regimes (such 
as Singapore) or were facing uncertain political prospects (such as the British colony 
in Hong Kong). 
 Although theoretical specifications of the developmental state are mostly 
concerned with the planning and implementation of economic policies, it has also been 
argued that the national strategies of developmental states suited a certain mould of 
social policy, known as productivism (Holliday, 2000). This involved the suppression 
of welfare spending and subjugation of social issues to economic priorities. Concerns 
about income distribution and equality were not on the national policy agenda (Öniş, 
1991). There were no comprehensive social security measures such as public pensions 
and unemployment protection. Organised labour was often repressed to create cheap 
and disciplined workforces that would attract foreign investment (Castells, 1992; 
Deyo, 1989, 1992). Instead social stability was maintained by delivering 
improvements to living standards through increased labour participation especially 
among women (Chew, 1974). Other forms of social wage such as public housing and 
subsidised healthcare were also introduced, especially where these were compatible 
with the aims of national and political consolidation (Vasoo & Lee, 2001). In 
combination, the economic programme, political strategies, and social policy (or how 
it was contained) at the time indicated a distinct policy paradigm that specified clear 
goals regarding national development, ways to achieve them, and how problems might 
be overcome.  
 But developmental states were not uniform. While there was a similar push for 
economic transformation, governments chose different strategies suited to national 
conditions. In Singapore, the government took the lead in soliciting a huge inflow of 
foreign investment which generated employment and growth. But Hong Kong, in the 
colonial fashion of governance with a light touch, depended on a huge network of local 
businessmen who coordinated trade with Mainland China and the rest of the world. 
These economic strategies reflected underlying differences in the configuration and 
capacity of government. It has been argued that Hong Kong and Singapore portray 
administrative states that intervened in diverse spheres of economic and social life 
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(Bellows, 1985; H. C. Chan, 1989; Cheung, 2008; L. Y. C. Lim, 1983). They both 
relied on elite in-groups and discouraged political pluralism (Johnson, 1982; Öniş, 
1991). However the extent of bureaucratic intervention was much higher in Singapore, 
where an elite administration worked closely with elected politicians in tight-knit 
policy networks that were well-insulated from public pressure. While the Hong Kong 
government was also highly autonomous, especially as there were no formal 
mechanisms of electoral accountability, it was traditionally less cohesive and more 
permeable to business interests. By the 1980s, the administration came under even 
greater pressure as it adjusted to the loss of the expatriate ranks and impending 
Chinese rule. These conditions are important to understanding the adoption of different 
public pension models. 
 
Democracy and democratisation in Hong Kong and Singapore 
Democratisation has had different effects on social policy in East Asian societies. The 
first is to increase public demands for social welfare. Although the newly 
industrialised East Asian countries started from comparable political traditions, such as 
an authoritarian style of policymaking and an inhospitable climate for political 
opposition and civil society (Onis, 1991), several of these countries began to 
democratise from the 1980s. Haggard and Kaufman (2008) argue that this enabled 
popular demands to translate into electoral pressure and spurred the growth of social 
security systems. This led to a divergence in the level of social protection in the region 
depending on the pace of political liberalisation. This can be seen in the case of 
Taiwan. Following the lifting of martial law and the introduction of democratic 
elections, social policy became a means of electoral competition as politicians vied to 
offer more attractive welfare measures (C.-W. Lin, 2004; J. Wong, 2004). The growth 
in public pension coverage and the implementation of the National Health Insurance 
have been attributed to this opening up of political space. The second countervailing 
effect is that intense party competition and the rapid circulation of policy issues on the 
political agenda may sometimes make it harder for democratic governments to effect 
policy change compared to more autonomous and insulated states (J. Wong, 2010). In 
Taiwan, a proposed National Pension Plan stalled for many years in the legislative 
process due to party competition within a system where powers were separated 
between the president and legislature (C. Lin, 2002). 
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 The third, less recognised, implication is that different forms of democratic 
practice have different levels of tolerance towards plural policy discourse, which in 
turn can have an impact on the potential for policy change.
12
 Hong Kong and 
Singapore are examples of two different models. Although democratisation of the scale 
seen in Taiwan and Korea has not taken place in either society, political liberalisation 
and the promotion of political parties near the end of colonial rule in Hong Kong gave 
institutional form and momentum to debates about social policy issues such as poverty 
and income inequality even though the government was not popularly elected (Chow, 
1995; Ma, 2012). There was also political space for other forms of public discourse: 
charity groups were able to advocate for social policy while academics could engage in 
policy critiques regarding old-age poverty and pension issues (E. Y. M. Chan, 2012; 
Chow, 1994). Such discourse provided programmatic ideas that posed direct 
alternatives to the government‘s policy proposals. They increased the possibility of 
policy change but also implied more indeterminate outcomes. But the practice of 
illiberal democracy in Singapore (Mutalib, 2000; Rodan, 2009a), where the 
government was popularly elected but other forms of political expression and civil 
liberties were controlled, discourse on social policy among opposition parties, interest 
groups, the public, and the research community was far more limited. Sources of 
alternative policy ideas were therefore less likely to emerge and pension policy more 
likely to remain stable. This highlights that in places where the full range of 
democratic rights still cannot be taken for granted, it is important to examine not just 
formal democratic institutions but also underlying political interactions and ideational 
flows in order to understand policy change. 
 
Summary 
This section reviewed the three theoretical strands that will be used to explain the 
development of public pension policies in the rest of the chapter. It focused on two 
ideational processes—ideas as policy paradigms or overarching logics that connect 
policy goals, problems, and solutions; and ideas as discourse through which policy 
                                                 
12
 Although Hall (1993) does not explicitly link shifts in policy paradigm with democratic practices, he 
alludes to this when he specifies the conditions for a fundamental change in Britain‘s economic policy, 
such as: ―the outside marketplace for economic ideas‖ (p. 289), ―the complex of political parties and 
interest intermediaries that stand at the intersection between the state and society in democratic polities‖ 
(p. 288), and ―collective puzzlement and uncertainty...marked by highly sophisticated debate in the 
media, the political parties, and the City, as well as among policymakers‖ (p. 289). This link is also 
studied in the literatures on deliberative democracy and participation. 
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alternatives compete and solutions emerge. Policy paradigms emphasise stability and 
constraint, whereas policy discourse generates momentum for change but often with 
indeterminate outcomes. The other two theoretical strands relate to the two phases in 
the historical development of public pensions in Hong Kong and Singapore: 
developmentalism better describes developments between the 1950s and 1980s, while 
democratisation provides a useful perspective for the period from the 1990s to the 
2000s. Developmentalism refers to a powerful set of ideas and strategies regarding 
economic growth, political control, and social welfare that was influential at the time, 
or in other words, a policy paradigm. However the execution of this paradigm was 
different for Hong Kong and Singapore due to differences in administrative culture and 
capacity. While democratisation took place in Hong Kong in the second phase, levels 
of political control did not weaken in Singapore. As a result, there was a surge in social 
policy discourse in Hong Kong that posed direct alternatives to the government‘s 
thinking. But in Singapore, tight controls meant there was a lack of policy discourse 
and ideas that might have motivated reform.  
 Based on these principles, the rest of this chapter will make the following 
argument. The policy orthodoxy in the 1950s was to avoid social spending and 
extensive social security systems. But one of the main reasons the state-managed 
Central Provident Fund (CPF) was adopted whereas a similar model was swiftly 
rejected in Hong Kong was that the CPF suited Singapore‘s more interventionist style 
of developmentalism and the autonomous, elite administration. The CPF model was 
incompatible with Hong Kong‘s administration, which was less cohesive, less trusted 
by the public, and more porous to lobbying. From the 1980s, concerns about ageing 
and income security arose in both places. Democratisation in Hong Kong enabled 
interest groups to press for change and the emergence of public debates over pension 
models. Intense discourse led to several policy u-turns and eventually the 
implementation of the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF). Strict political controls 
meant that Singapore was not conducive for public discourse and debates about policy 
alternatives. Despite concerns about the CPF, the second phase was characterised by a 
lack of ideas—the same repertoire of policy adjustments was repeated without 
fundamental change. 
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8.3  Developmentalism and pension adoption, 1950s-1980s 
Singapore 
Introduction of the Central Provident Fund and the emergence of an interventionist 
developmental paradigm: Briefly in the 1950s, before Singapore gained independence, 
the government came close to adopting a social insurance pensions model.
13
 In fact 
throughout the 1950s, the CPF had not always been the clear policy choice. In 1951 
formal social protection became available for the first time in Singapore when the 
public assistance scheme was introduced (Committee on Minimum Standards of 
Livelihood, 1957). In the same year, the colonial government appointed the Retirement 
Benefits Commission, also known as the McFadzean Commission, to assess the need 
for a retirement protection scheme. Although the commission felt that a provident fund 
would be simpler to administer, it recommended a pension scheme based on a social 
insurance model in order to address the immediate needs of workers nearing retirement 
and to ensure a steady flow of income in old age (Retirement Benefits Commission, 
1951). This was rejected by the colonial administration, which began planning for the 
CPF instead in 1953. But as the CPF legislation was being finalised by lawmakers, the 
government appointed two additional committees to look into social security.  
 First the Caine Committee on Minimum Standards of Livelihood was asked to 
assess the population‘s living standards and poverty level, and to weigh policy options 
such as minimum wage, unemployment insurance, and pensions. Agreeing with the 
McFadzean Commission, the Caine Committee concluded that ―the Provident Fund 
basis provides no element of spreading of risks, and no acceptance of a common social 
obligation to assist the less fortunate members of the community...we feel strongly that 
only a pension scheme on an insurance basis can achieve the basic purpose of 
providing for the needs in old age of the poorest sections of the community‖ 
(Committee on Minimum Standards of Livelihood, 1957, p. 44). In 1957 the 
Brocklehurst Committee (1957) led by a International Labour Organization (ILO) 
representative came to a similar conclusion that ―few, if any, workers are in a position 
to provide out of their current earnings a sufficient amount to maintain themselves in 
their old age‖ (p. 33). It too proposed a contributory social insurance scheme that 
                                                 
13
 This is often overlooked in the literature, as well as the fact that it was the new rulers of self-
governing Singapore who chose to abandon the plans to replace the CPF with social insurance. 
Therefore the view that the CPF is a colonial policy decision is only partly true. Barr (2000) provides a 
detailed account of this issue. 
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would initially cover sickness and maternity, and then expand to include old age, 
invalidity, and survivors‘ benefits, so as to replace the CPF. The government then 
appeared to have been persuaded by these recommendations. In his address to the 
Legislative Assembly in 1958, the Governor Sir William Goode announced that: 
 
 The recommendations of the Caine and Brocklehurst Reports have been 
examined, and the Government proposes to introduce during 1958 
social insurance schemes based on contributions by both employers and 
workers. Such schemes cannot all operate immediately, but provided 
these policies are steadfastly followed, workers will in a few years be 
protected from sickness, old age, unemployment and similar handicaps. 
(Hansard, 9 April 1958, col 10) 
 
 In 1959 the government convened a Committee of Officials to look into the 
administrative details for a social insurance scheme and a second round of assistance 
was sought from the ILO to draft the necessary legislation (Committee of Officials, 
1959; International Labour Office, 1959). At that point plans were fully underway to 
develop an alternative pension scheme that would supersede the CPF.  
 However in the 1959 general elections, the Labour Front government led by 
Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock lost to Lee Kuan Yew‘s People‘s Action Party (PAP). 
Up to that point Lim had been personally involved in discussions about the draft social 
insurance legislation (International Labour Office, 1959). But under the new 
government, negotiations with trade union leaders for a new unemployment insurance 
scheme that would lay the foundation for a comprehensive social security system 
ended unsuccessfully in 1961 (Hansard, 15 March 1962). The government claimed 
that the unions had planned for unemployment insurance to fail so that they could reap 
political capital from workers‘ disaffection. But statements by Lee in parliament 
suggest that the government might not have been fully committed to social insurance
14
: 
 
Nobody in his right mind is in the least bit concerned with social 
insurance in the immediate present. It is not included in any resolution 
passed by any union. It is not on the platform of any political Party at 
this particular juncture....We are not interested in it. The Barisan 
Sosialis
15
 are not interested in it. There are many other more urgent 
                                                 
14
 Based on interviews with senior party figures, Barr (2000) argues that the PAP had publicly endorsed 
social insurance in the 1950s only to preserve their alliance with the communists. 
15
 The Barisan Socialis was a splinter party that broke away from the PAP. It is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
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problems - merger and Malaysia....Having settled the basic and 
fundamental conditions, we will proceed with social insurance. 
(Hansard, 15 March 1962, col 146-9) 
 
 After 1962 social insurance was not discussed in parliament again and the 
earlier proposals were quietly forgotten (M. D. Barr, 2000; Low & Aw, 2004). In its 
place, the government began to assert their policy thinking about social welfare. In this 
account, the Western welfare state—especially as experienced by several of the PAP 
leaders while they were students in Britain—was deemed to be economically 
unsustainable. Instead the individual work ethic was regarded as the key factor to 
economic success. In an interview, Lee said (M. D. Barr, 2000):  
 
From the late ‘60s, I have visited Hong Kong almost every year, to 
study and to understand why Hong Kong people work with so much 
more drive and vigour than the people in Singapore, and to learn 
something from them…. Through Hong Kong watching, I concluded 
that state welfare and subsidies blunted the individual‘s drive to 
succeed.... I resolved to reverse course on the welfare policies which 
my party had inherited or copied from the British Labour Party. (cited 
in M. D. Barr, 2000, pp. 112-3) 
 
And in another statement about social solidaristic welfare systems: 
 
I was too young, too idealistic to realise that the cost to the government 
would be heavy; worse, that under such an egalitarian system each 
individual would be more interested in what he could get out of the 
common pool than in striving to do better for himself. (cited in M. D. 
Barr, 2000, pp. 114) 
 
 Economic priorities became part of a unifying project for national survival after 
Singapore gained independence in 1965. The state always occupied a central role in 
this policy paradigm, planning and directing the country‘s economic and political 
activities (M. D. Barr, 2000), while participation in this national project became a form 
of civic duty and social discipline (Hill & Lian, 1995; S. R. Quah, 1983). On their part, 
the government was actively involved in promoting this ideology to the public 
(Christie, 1998). 
 From the early 1960s, the political strategy that accompanies developmentalism 
as described by Deyo (1987) was in full force as the government began a much wider 
campaign to contain leftwing political forces. In the 1940s and 50s, the government 
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had used Emergency powers to outlaw the Malayan Communist Party and quell labour 
unrest (Gillis, 2005).
16
 But some leftist elements joined the newly formed PAP in 1953 
to carry on their political activities. This suited the PAP because their English-
educated senior cadre were not able to mobilise the support of the Chinese workers and 
student groups as effectively as the Chinese-speaking leftists (Tilman, 1989). But by 
the late 1950s, there was an internal struggle for party leadership during which the 
moderates would have lost control of the party if not for the arrest of political 
opponents. The leftist faction then broke off to form the Barisan Socialis but was 
unable to regain political influence (H. C. Chan, 1989). The result of this period of 
history was that firstly, the PAP began to distance itself from its socialist roots and 
instead stressed its moderate credentials and neoliberal stance towards social policy; 
secondly, in a polity which deeply distrusts left-wing politics, another party built on 
working class support and social democratic ideals has not emerged since. 
 As leftwing politicians were ousted from mainstream politics, pro-communist 
unionists split from the national trade union movement (H. C. Chan, 1989; Vasil, 
1989). Several police operations mounted under internal security laws later threw the 
leftwing labour movement into disarray and their central organisation was deregistered 
in 1963 (H. C. Chan, 1989; Gillis, 2005). The role of independent organised labour in 
political life began to wane and in its place, the government-led National Trades Union 
Congress (NTUC) was established. The NTUC has been headed by a succession of 
senior party members since its establishment in 1961 and regularly exchanges 
personnel with the PAP (Pang, Tan, & Cheng, 1989; Vasil, 1989).
17
 The cooption of 
the labour movement has been justified as a tripartite model of industrial relations that 
promotes cooperation instead of competition between the government, employers, and 
workers.
18
 From the 1970s, the NTUC‘s traditional focus on wages and work 
conditions was gradually redirected towards the provision of retail, insurance, and 
                                                 
16
 As an alternative to the militant Malayan Communist Party, the British administration supported the 
formation of the Singapore Labour Party (later the Labour Front) and the Singapore Trade Union 
Congress in the 1950s, with a vision to replicate the British model of Labour politics (Gillis, 2005). But 
internal disagreements saw the party‘s influence wane and its successor Workers‘ Party did not emerge 
as a significant political force until recent years. Likewise Conservative politics did not survive into the 
1960s as organisations like the Straits Chinese British Association tended to identify with the British 
and became irrelevant and unpopular as the campaign for nationhood gathered momentum. 
17
 From the 1980s, these have included a Deputy Prime Minister who was later President of Singapore, 
and two cabinet ministers. 
18
 This is most clearly seen in their joint endorsement, under the National Wage Council, of a series of 
wage adjustments to complement the various phases of industrialisation from the 1970s onwards (Pang, 
et al., 1989). 
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transport services through various cooperatives. Constraints on union activities were 
also introduced through various laws related to strike action, wage setting, and 
employee management.
19
 These developments meant that by the 1970s, left power 
resources as a potential source of political pressure for more comprehensive social 
security had been largely dismantled. 
 Liberalisation of the Central Provident Fund, developmental objectives, and 
bureaucratic capacity: In 1968 the CPF rules were changed to allow its use for non-
retirement purposes for the first time (Low & Aw, 2004). Under the Public Housing 
Scheme, up to the entire sum of Ordinary Account savings could be withdrawn to 
purchase a flat from the public housing authority. This marked a major shift in policy 
and the start of a period of liberalisation of the CPF to various forms of pre-retirement 
withdrawal including private housing (in 1981), health (1984, 1990), education (1989), 
financial investment (1978, 1986), and insurance (1982, 1989). By far the most 
important of these schemes were those related to housing. The impact of linking the 
CPF to housing on retirement savings has been discussed in Chapter 3. The policy also 
served a range of political functions. It boosted demand and contributed to the success 
of the public housing programme. Ethnic quotas were used in housing allocations to 
encourage interaction among ethnic communities and prevent the development of 
ethnic enclaves. By dominating the housing market, controlling supply, and 
influencing prices, the government was able to manage the steady appreciation of asset 
values and meet the aspirations of an increasingly affluent population to ―upgrade‖ to 
larger properties (Vasoo & Lee, 2001). All of these contributed to political 
consolidation and social stability in the young nation. Lee Kuan Yew has said that he 
believed home ownership gave citizens a stake in the country and would dissuade them 
from voting against the government (K. Y. Lee, 2000). 
 Singapore‘s public administration at the time was well-suited to the tasks of 
managing large schemes such as the CPF and the related public housing programme. 
The bureaucracy was disciplined, technocratic, autonomous, and pervasive. Managed 
along meritocratic principles, the Singapore civil service had evolved during the 1960s 
and 1970s into an elite technocracy, ―a class of scholar-bureaucrats and scholar-
                                                 
19
 The Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Bill of 1967 makes strikes and lockouts 
illegal in sectors that provide essential services. The Employment Bill of 1968 links wages more directly 
to efficiency and productivity. The Industrial Relations (Amendment) Bill of 1968 states that matters 
such as recruitment, promotion, and dismissal would not be subject to collective bargaining but would 
be the sole decision of employers. 
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officers—imbued with a sense of their superior ability and endowed with the energy, 
resources, and political backing to expand operations into every sector of society in the 
name of the national interest‖ (Chan, 1989, p. 81). Recruitment through an extensive 
scholarship system and the successful control of corruption also contributed to 
credibility and legitimacy such that, as a senior politician observed in 1970, the civil 
service could afford to be ―more interested in being right than in being popular‖ (cited 
in Bellows, 1985, p. 61). At the top levels, civil servants often shared a similar outlook 
and background with senior politicians and some were eventually drafted into politics 
(Bellows, 1985; B. H. Lee, 1989). The close integration of the executive and the 
bureaucracy helped in the implementation of political decisions and protected civil 
servants from public pressure (H. C. Chan, 1989). This was a public bureaucracy that 
was used to exercising a pervasive influence on national economic life. A large 
number of statutory boards led by top civil servants, like the public housing authority, 
carried out policies in specific domains with deep mandates and freedom from the 
usual procedural constraints. In this sense the CPF model, which availed policymakers 
of an enormous amount of funds for public infrastructural projects in the initial years 
and foreign investment subsequently, was suited to Singapore‘s system of governance 
(M. D. Barr, 2000; Hu, 1986).
20
 
 Central to the policy paradigm of the developmental state is the prioritisation of 
economic growth above other social objectives. This was most apparent in the 
decisions to use CPF contribution rates as a wage adjustment tool when a major 
economic recession set in towards the end of the 1980s. In initial discussions among 
senior ministers, there was disagreement over the lowering of contribution rates. But 
by late 1985, the political leadership closed ranks and Lee Kuan Yew publicly 
endorsed a rate cut (Sherwell, 1985, 1986). In accordance with the recommendations 
of a government committee, the employer‘s CPF contribution rate was reduced from 
25% to 10% of monthly wage, rates were graduated by age to make older workers 
cheaper to employ, and contributions to the Special Account reserved for retirement 
were temporarily suspended. These changes accompanied a slew of initiatives to 
restructure the economy including wage reforms, tax reductions, and a divestment of 
state enterprises (Economic Committee, 1986; Public Sector Divestment Committee, 
                                                 
20
 The precise deployment of  CPF funds is a matter of contention as the details are not fully disclosed 
by the government. Goh Keng Swee, Singapore‘s first finance minister, had argued the importance of 
the CPF for capital accumulation to boost economic development in the initial years (M. D. Barr, 2000). 
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1987). Just as contribution rates were gradually being restored, the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997 and the economic recession in 2001 triggered cuts again. The Committee 
on Singapore's Competitiveness appointed in 1997 to review national economic policy 
recommended that the employer contribution rate be halved to 10% to reduce wage 
costs. Similarly the Economic Review Committee formed in the aftermath of the 2001 
recession recommended that the restoration of employer contribution rates be delayed 
until economic conditions improved, even though it noted the adverse impact of using 
CPF as a counter-cyclical cost-cutting instrument on retirement saving (Economic 
Review Committee, 2003). This was followed by a closed-door caucus among the 
party leadership at which it was decided that the contribution rate would be cut from 
16% to 13% (L. Lim, 2003). The long-term target contribution rate was also revised 
downwards from 40% of monthly wage as set in 1987 to 30-36%. 
 The centralised nature of decision-making within the government was a major 
factor in the implementation of these reforms. During the CPF rate cuts, committees 
led by ministers were first appointed to study the issue and make recommendations. 
Policy decisions were then taken following discussions among senior politicians. This 
mode of decision-making is compatible with a high concentration of power at the top 
of the party and the executive (H. C. Chan, 1989). Tilman (1989) argued that within 
the PAP, leadership was personality-driven and power was initially monopolised by a 
core team of fewer than a dozen men, from which even senior cadres and Cabinet 
colleagues were excluded. Each successive generation of leaders was then chosen and 
nurtured by the previous, rather than democratically elected from within party ranks. 
The historical experience of factionalism further meant that tolerance of dissent among 
party members was low (H. C. Chan, 1989). This monocentric organisational structure 
was equally adopted within the government as the same circle of party leaders also 
held key Cabinet positions. The result was that disputes over contentious decisions 
such as CPF contribution rate cuts were resolved internally among senior members of 
government, while bypassing public debate and open contestation of the sort 
associated with the pension politics of European states. That the government was able 
to push through these potentially unpopular decisions is also evidence that the trade 
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unions and opposition parties were at that point no longer effective sources of 
resistance.
21
  
 
Hong Kong 
Limited social security under a free-market developmental paradigm: In stark contrast 
to the mounting of large-scale social programmes like the CPF and public housing in 
Singapore, Hong Kong‘s early social policy history is often associated with a different 
type of developmental policy paradigm. On the supposedly adverse effects of generous 
welfare, policy assumptions in Hong Kong and Singapore were similar. Both 
governments believed it would corrode individual work ethic and hurt economic 
growth (Wilding, 1997). Phillip Haddon-Cave, who was Financial Secretary during the 
1970s, advocated what he referred to as ―positive non-interventionism‖. This ideology 
stressed self-reliance and individual responsibility, where hard work and success 
would be rewarded but only the most needy would be protected by residual welfare 
services. Redistribution was not an aim of social policy. But while Singapore‘s 
developmental policy paradigm was built on an activist state that was heavily involved 
in economic management for national survival, Hong Kong‘s approach to 
developmentalism emphasised a small government and free enterprise. Successive 
British officials spoke of the need to restrict public expenditure, charge for services 
where possible, keep taxes low, and promote private enterprise. As former Financial 
Secretary Hamish Macleod explained: 
 
We have a clear philosophy, consistently applied, which is based on a 
commitment to market forces, free enterprise and free trade. We believe 
in creating an environment with minimum regulation and interference 
plus maximum government support in terms both of infrastructure and 
protection of the needy, leaving business free to flourish. (cited in 
Wilding, 1997, pp. 264-5) 
 
 Developments in social security between the end of the Second World War and 
the 1970s followed this free-market developmental blueprint closely. In the years after 
the war, the colonial administration‘s welfare effort focused mainly on providing 
public relief in the form of rations and cash (Chow, 1978). One of the justifications for 
not formalising a system of social protection was that many service recipients were 
                                                 
21
 The cuts had been criticised by some analysts and, at one point, even the NTUC (see Leow, 1998). 
But these eventually gave way to trade union endorsements that were widely reported in the press. 
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part of an influx of migrants who had left the Mainland due to civil war and political 
unrest, and might leave Hong Kong once the political situation stabilised (Wilding, 
1997). It was felt that the needs of this group could be sufficiently met through public 
assistance and support from voluntary organisations. When the communists took 
power in China in 1949, it became clear that many of these migrants would settle down 
in Hong Kong. Although the young demography of the population meant that old-age 
pensions were not yet a pressing policy concern, the government undertook several 
studies of social security options in the 1960s. The reports that emerged from these 
studies highlighted the limits of public relief as a form of social protection but were 
cautious in recommending more comprehensive schemes, citing cost and the erosion of 
Chinese familial traditions as concerns (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1965). Two 
reports released in 1967 proposed a contributory scheme covering old age and other 
needs, but the recommendations were not accepted by the government on financial 
grounds (Chow, 1978). While these studies drew attention to poverty among some 
segments of the population and placed social security issues on the policy agenda, the 
overall trend at the end of the 1960s was one of non-policy. 
 Several public riots in the late 1960s had already alerted the colonial 
government to the population‘s social needs (Chow, 1978, 1985a). But it continued to 
avoid implementing a comprehensive social security system, opting instead to act 
incrementally. In 1971 public assistance was formalised into a scheme that provided 
cash assistance to individuals and households whose income fell below minimum 
subsistence levels as measured by a standard basket of goods. Able-bodied persons 
aged between 15 and 55 were ineligible. Although this scheme was not primarily 
concerned with old-age income security, older persons quickly became the largest 
group of recipients. From 1971 to 1976 persons aged 55 and above consistently made 
up above half of all beneficiaries, followed by persons with ill health, workers with 
low earnings, and single parents. Then in 1973 the Disability and Infirmity Allowance 
Scheme was introduced to provide flat-rate cash assistance to persons with disabilities 
and all elderly persons aged 75 and above with no means tests. Although this was in 
effect a universal scheme for old age, the age requirement limited coverage to a very 
small proportion of the population considering life expectancies at the time. These two 
schemes, precursors to the current Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) 
scheme and Social Security Assistance Scheme (SSAS), became the main pillars of 
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social security for the elderly population and were gradually expanded over the 
following three decades.  
 Rejection of central provident fund and a waning bureaucracy: While there 
were no further developments to pension policy until the 1990s, the possibility of a 
central provident fund for Hong Kong was vigorously debated in the Legislative 
Council in 1986-87 (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 13 May 1987). The debates 
exposed a sharp division among legislators over the ideal pension model and strongly-
held beliefs among politicians and the government about the importance of free market 
principles to Hong Kong‘s economic prospects. While some council members 
supported the scheme because of inadequacies in the existing social security system 
and the strain of demographic ageing on family support, there was strong opposition 
on the grounds that mandating employer contributions to a central provident fund 
would discourage business investment, hurt small businesses, reduce voluntary savings 
and investment, and contradict Hong Kong‘s respect for individual choice, self-
reliance, and the free market. Many members preferred that enterprises set up private 
provident funds and urged the government to study the issue in greater depth. A 
minority of council members argued that old-age income security was not a pressing 
need as family support was still strong. A 1986 government review of the implications 
of setting up a central provident fund in Hong Kong summed up why they were 
opposed to this approach (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 13 May 1987): 
 
 The CPF would not significantly benefit persons most in need such as those 
with low earnings or irregular employment and would therefore not lower the 
demands on existing non-contributory social security schemes 
 It would be detrimental to economic activity and business confidence because 
of higher labour costs and lower take-home pay 
 It would have a major impact on financial markets and create resources for 
public borrowing which the government did not need 
 
 Instead the government identified an alternative approach: it would gradually 
expand existing social security schemes and employee protection measures, and 
promote private provident funds and other forms of individual saving and investment. 
Just as a social insurance system became a non-option in Singapore by the 1960s, the 
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idea of a central provident fund never found wide support from policymakers and 
politicians again after the 1980s, even though it was occasionally raised in the 
legislative council.
22
 
 It is revealing that one of the reasons the Hong Kong government rejected the 
central provident fund model—that it would amass excessive financial resources for 
the public sector—was in fact a motivation behind Singapore‘s adoption of the CPF. 
The nation-building project in Singapore at the time is an important but incomplete 
explanation. Asher (1985, 1995) has argued that from the late 1960s, Singapore no 
longer needed to raise resources for public infrastructural projects as it was running 
annual surpluses. Neither is a massive public housing programme funded from the 
CPF the only option for promoting social stability, which might equally have been 
achieved by introducing universal or defined benefit old-age pensions that are arguably 
more compatible with ideals of social solidarity than enforced individual savings. A 
critical factor is the differences in governance models. The civil service in Hong Kong 
and Singapore in the 1980s shared a number of similarities. They were both generally 
regarded as efficient, professional, and relatively insulated from popular demands 
(Wilding, 1997; Scott, 1984; Lui, 1989). Organisationally the two had comparable 
features like the Administrative Service as a result of the colonial legacy. But there 
were important differences. 
 First, in the 1980s, the senior levels of Hong Kong‘s bureaucracy was 
dominated by a small expatriate elite while local personnel filled the lower ranks 
despite concerted efforts to ―localise‖ the public sector workforce (Burns & Scott, 
1984; Scott, 1988). This imbalance, as well as ethnic and linguistic differences, 
accentuated a sense of inaccessibility and mistrust between the administration and the 
Chinese population (Scott, 1984). Second, while the interventionist bureaucracy in 
Singapore could tap on a ―reservoir of legitimacy‖ from its track record of economic 
performance and selective social programmes by the 1980s, the free market model in 
Hong Kong meant that the administration could not claim responsibility for economic 
progress in the same way. Third, the integration of the executive and the bureaucracy 
in Singapore was thought to lend political authority to policy implementation. But in 
Hong Kong the civil service lacked basic institutional accountability through elected 
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 Motions to debate the CPF were raised in the Legislative Council in 1991 and 1993 (Hong Kong 
Legislative Council, 2005). 
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politicians (Terry, 1988). The relationship between civil servants and the executive had 
also been marred by public sector wage disputes and work stoppages in the late 1970s 
which were met with heavy-handed responses by the colonial administration (Arn, 
1984). Fourth, bureaucratic priorities in Hong Kong were closely allied with business 
interests, which had been hostile towards proposals for contributory social insurance 
and increases in welfare spending generally (Wilding, 1997). Fifth, as the reversion to 
Chinese rule drew closer, Hong Kong‘s bureaucracy became increasingly beleaguered 
and disjointed as it faced a loss of expertise due to the departure of the expatriate 
leadership, greater public demands set off by democratisation, and the growing 
political sensitivities of a Chinese government-in-waiting (Terry, 1988). One critic 
described Hong Kong as ―facing a near paralysis of the policy-making machinery in 
the face of environmental turbulence‖ (Mushkat, 1984, p. 114). In contrast to 
Singapore‘s public sector, Hong Kong‘s administration just before the 1990s was on 
the whole not as influential, autonomous, or self-assured. There were direct 
implications for pension policy development. Just as the centrally-managed CPF suited 
the interventionist developmental state in Singapore, the administrative demands of the 
CPF model were incompatible with Hong Kong‘s free market developmental state 
with a less cohesive bureaucracy. 
 
Summary 
The 1950s were a period of flux as Singapore vacillated between the CPF and social 
insurance pension models and Hong Kong tried to meet the social needs of a large 
inflow of political refugees through public relief. Both governments were motivated by 
developmental paradigms that prioritised the competitiveness of their labour force and 
rapid economic growth, and were wary of the fiscal burden of a generous welfare state. 
Singapore‘s interventionist developmental state favoured the CPF because of the 
resources it raised for the public sector, and had an administrative capacity and 
orientation which matched the operational demands of a large state-managed provident 
fund scheme and the public housing programme it supported. The CPF scheme became 
a tool of economic policy when recessions hit in the 1980s, as the highly autonomous 
and centralised government swiftly pushed through a series of contribution rate cuts 
that would ensure wage competitiveness at the expense of retirement saving. The free-
market developmental state in Hong Kong, however, stuck to a strategy of 
incrementalism. It gradually extended existing allowance schemes despite several 
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commissioned reports urging a more comprehensive social security system. When the 
central provident fund model was brought up by legislators in the late 1980s, the 
bureaucracy was not geared to manage a scheme of that scale, having traditionally 
been led by an elite expatriate core who were shortly due to leave. It had also been 
affected by the political uncertainty related to the handover to China. At the end of this 
period, while both Hong Kong and Singapore were pursuing the growth model of the 
developmental state, their old-age pension systems reflected important variations in 
policy paradigm and governance structures. 
 
8.4  Democratisation and pension adaptation, 1990s-2000s 
Hong Kong 
Democratisation and introduction of the Mandatory Provident Fund: The 1990s were 
dominated by debates over three public pension models in Hong Kong: (i) a mandatory 
private saving scheme called the Retirement Protection scheme; (ii) a social insurance 
scheme called the Old-age Pension Scheme; and (iii) the Mandatory Provident Fund, a 
privately run individual accounts system that was eventually adopted. These began 
when the Working Group on Retirement Protection led by the Education and 
Manpower Branch, comprising civil servants and actuarial professionals, released a 
consultation paper in 1992 that ruled out three options: (i) the central provident fund 
model because of its possible adverse economic impact; (ii) universal pensions as ―it 
suffers from the disadvantage of paying out to those who do not need the money, or 
may not have contributed to the system‖; and (iii) sole reliance on voluntary private 
retirement schemes that would not cover the majority of the population (Education and 
Manpower Branch, 1992, p. 6). Instead the group argued for the separation of ―social 
security or social services‖ provided by the government to tackle old-age poverty, 
from ―financial provision for old age‖ which should be the primary responsibility of 
individuals and their employers. For the latter they proposed that the government 
establish a decentralised Retirement Protection Scheme (RPS) with mandatory 
contributions from employees and possibly employers towards private retirement 
schemes, with basic regulation and no public funding. This proposal was not adopted 
due to a lack of public support and concerns about the exposure of retirement savings 
to market risks (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2005). 
 A year later the government proposed an alternative PAYG Old-age Pension 
Scheme (OPS) and commenced public consultation in 1994 (Education and Manpower 
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Branch, 1994). The scheme would provide a basic level of income security that would 
be appropriate to an affluent society like Hong Kong. The government argued that the 
OPS, unlike the central provident fund and RPS models, would also serve workers 
nearing retirement, persons outside the workforce, and current retirees, and would be 
less vulnerable to inflation and market risks. The OPS was to be funded by equal 
contributions by employers and employee totalling 3% of monthly income. It would 
pay a flat-rate inflation-linked benefit to all persons aged 65 years old and above that 
was about 30% of the median wage in 1994. The existing SSAS was to be replaced 
and its budget used to help finance the new scheme. The proposal sparked intense 
public debate, with the public consultation drawing almost 7000 returns (Hong Kong 
Legislative Council, 2005). The OPS was eagerly promoted by the government and 
supported by social workers, but economists and the Chinese authorities were worried 
about the potential fiscal burden. Public opinion was generally favourable although 
many preferred a multi-pillar system that combined universal pensions with private 
retirement schemes. The turning point in the debate was when 78 academics, mostly 
economists, published an open letter in the newspapers criticising the OPS proposal (F. 
T. Lui, 1998). They argued that social assistance to poor elderly persons should be 
enhanced and continue to be funded from general taxation. But the government should 
also establish a central provident fund parallel to existing private enterprise-level 
retirement schemes and make it compulsory for workers to participate in either system. 
This was an unusually direct and coordinated attempt to influence public policy by the 
academic community. Their proposal received extensive media coverage and triggered 
a shift in public opinion. Shortly after, in November 1994, legislators moved a motion 
to criticise the OPS and the government soon announced that the scheme would be 
abandoned due to a lack of consensus (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2005). 
 In an unexpected turn of events the government swiftly released plans for yet 
another alternative in 1995, this time a mandatory private savings scheme called the 
Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) similar to the RPS proposed several years before 
(Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2005). After strong lobbying by the government 
among legislators and academics, the MPF proposal was passed by the Legislative 
Council and the legislative framework was drawn up not long before Hong Kong‘s 
handover to China in 1997, concluding a contentious and protracted policy process. 
 This meandering course of pension policymaking throughout the 1990s, 
characterised by unpredictable policy proposals and counter-proposals, reflects how 
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Hong Kong‘s partially democratic politics accommodated contention. A string of 
reforms initiated by the British government in a bid to foster democratic practices 
before 1997 had created party competition and some popularly elected seats in the 
legislature, laying the foundations for the current political system (W.-M. Lam, 
2012a). The territory is led by a Chief Executive with wide-ranging legislative and 
administrative powers, who is selected by a 1200-strong Election Committee and 
appointed by China (Table 8.2). The Chief Executive in turns appoints an Executive 
Council that assists in policymaking. Laws are enacted by the Legislative Council 
which consists of members elected by designated social and economic sectors (i.e. the 
Functional Constituencies) or through popular vote (i.e. the Geographical 
Constituencies). From the 1990s, the main political cleavage within Hong Kong 
politics has been defined by democratisation and electoral reform, with social rights 
and welfare policy development traditionally aligned with pro-democracy parties, and 
business interests supporting the pro-establishment parties. While institutionally, the 
configuration of seats and other rules in the legislature may appear to favour the pro-
establishment faction
23
, this system of partial electoral democracy ironically ensures a 
level of formal political representation by groups that advocate improvements to social 
policy, particularly among the Functional Constituencies. The presence of a relatively 
free media has also created opportunities for legislators and other interest groups to 
influence public opinion, as seen in the scuppering of the OPS proposal.
24
 Pension 
policy debates both within the legislature and in the public domain have therefore 
often been vigorous and competitive. 
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 For example, under Article 74 of the Basic Law that is equivalent to a constitution for Hong Kong, 
private members‘ bills must not pertain to public expenditure and the structure or operation of the 
government. Bills relating to government policies require the consent of the Chief Executive. 
Additionally, private members‘ bills may only be passed when a majority vote is achieved both among 
the seats representing the Functional Constituencies and the Geographical Constituencies, compared to 
government bills which only require a simple majority in the Council as a whole. It has also been argued 
that pro-establishment parties, being guided from the top by Chinese representatives, are better able to 
avoid the coordination problems faced by fragmented pro-democracy parties during elections (Cheng, 
2005). 
24
 Like most institutions in Hong Kong, the mainstream media is traditionally divided between those that 
advocate further democratisation and others that are pro-China (Keller, 1992). The labour movement, 
which has traditionally not played a significant role in social policy debates, is also split between a 
leftist pro-China union that ironically allies with the corporate lobby and a more centrist union that 
supports democracy and promotes workers‘ interests (M. K. Chan, 1992; Levin & Chiu, 1994). 
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Table 8.2  Political system in Hong Kong, 2012 
Institution Mandate Constitution 
Chief Executive Wide-ranging legislative, 
budgetary, veto, and 
administrative powers, 
including appointment of 
officials and dissolution of 
Legislative Council, some 
requiring Council approval 
Nominated and elected by 
Election Committee made up 
of 1200 members nominated 
or elected by designated 
social, corporate, and 
government sectors  
Formally appointed by 
Central People‘s Government, 
China 
Executive 
Council 
(28 members) 
To assist the Chief Executive 
in policy-making by 
recommending decisions on 
policy initiatives from the 
bureaux 
Appointed by the Chief 
Executive, comprising 15 
official members (Principal 
Officials) and 13 non-official 
members who may be 
Legislative Council members 
or public figures 
Legislative 
Council 
(70 members) 
To enact laws (but limited 
powers to introduce 
legislation), approve the 
government‘s budget, and to 
debate government policies 
35 members elected by 
Functional Constituencies 
representing social and 
economic sectors (29) and the 
District Councils (6) 
35 members elected by 
Geographical Constituencies 
through popular vote 
District Councils 
(507 members) 
To manage local community 
amenities 
Popularly elected (412), 
appointed by the Chief 
Executive (68), and the 
Chairpersons of Rural 
Committees (27) 
Principal 
Officials 
(15 persons) 
To head the 15 government 
departments and bureaux 
Nominated by Chief 
Executive and appointed by 
the Central People‘s 
Government 
Source: Li (2012), Lui (2012), Lam (2012) 
 
 Policy discourse and pension reform pressures: Pressure from legislators on 
public pension provision, particularly for universal pensions, did not cease with the 
introduction of the MPF. Concerns about the MPF were raised in the Legislative 
Council in 2005, including the exclusion of persons outside the workforce; the failure 
to protect current retirees; potentially low benefits for older workers; and risks to 
investment returns (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2005). Legislators also urged the 
government to study alternative policy models. In response, the government‘s Central 
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Policy Unit embarked on a series of studies between 2007 and 2010 on financial 
planning among retirees, private saving, the fiscal sustainability of existing pension 
provisions, transfers between elderly parents and adult children, and the norms and 
practices of intergenerational family support (Legislative Council, 2011a, 2011b).
25
 In 
2011 a Subcommittee on Retirement Protection was set up by the Legislative 
Council‘s Panel on Welfare Services, which had been an advocate of a universal 
pension system and was headed by a legislator elected from the social welfare 
Functional Constituency (Legislative Council, 2012). The subcommittee was asked to 
look into retirement income security with an explicit focus on the suitability and 
implementation of an alternative pension scheme that would cover all elderly persons 
in Hong Kong. In their report, they delivered a grim assessment of the existing public 
pension system, which is worth quoting at length (Legislative Council, 2012): 
 
Members note with concern that many needy elders rely on the monthly 
OAA of $1,090 for a living, and they choose not to apply for CSSA 
because of its labelling effect.... Members remain of the view that OAA 
and CSSA are not retirement protection schemes. The former is 
designed on the assumption that older people will be looked after by the 
families and is a supplementary source of income, whereas the CSSA 
Scheme is a safety net for the needy. (pp. 4-5) 
 
Members take a strong view that the MPF system cannot benefit the 
current cohort of older persons, and does not cover people not 
participating in the workforce, such as housewives. Further, casual 
workers who do not meet the continuously employment criteria are not 
required to make MPF contributions [sic]. For low income earners, the 
benefits of MPF are limited even in the longer term having regard to the 
fluctuation of the financial market and the high MPF management fees. 
(p. 5) 
  
Having regard to the decreasing family size of the baby boomers, who 
were born in 1950s and 1960s with no, one or two children, and the 
declining willingness of the younger generation to support elderly 
parents, members share the view of some academics on the unreliability 
of family as a major source of financial support for their elderly parents. 
(p. 7) 
 
 The key recommendation of the subcommittee was for the government to 
immediately establish a task force to study the policy options and implementation 
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 At the time of writing, findings from these studies have not been published in full. 
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details, and to draw up a timetable for public consultation. In the course of their 
deliberations the subcommittee canvassed widely for policy proposals and heard 
around 60 deputations from political parties, trade unions, think tanks, and other civil 
society organisations, as well as individual academics. Five of these presented detailed 
proposals for a new retirement protection scheme: 
 
 The Professional Commons proposed a universal old age pension scheme 
that would pay HK$3000 a month to every elderly person 65 years old and 
above with no means test. The scheme would be funded by a contribution 
of 2.5% of monthly salary each by employers and employees (additional to 
MPF contributions) and periodic capital injections by the government. 
Public funding can be reclaimed from the budget for the existing social 
assistance schemes. 
 
 The Alliance for Universal Pensions proposed a universal old age pension 
scheme similar to the Professional Commons‘ except that half of current 
employer and employee contributions to the MPF would be diverted to the 
pension scheme and that company profit tax should be increased to raise 
revenue for the scheme. 
 
 The Civic Party (a political party) proposed a universal old age pension 
similar to that of the Alliance for Universal Pensions with a slightly 
different distribution of contributions between the MPF and the universal 
pension scheme, and with periodic injections of public funding without 
increasing taxes. 
 
 The Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong 
(DAB, a pro-China political party) proposed a three-tier non-contributory 
pension scheme consisting of a universal first tier (the current SSAS) and 
two additional means-tested flat-rate tiers, with the third tier offering a 
higher benefit based on a stricter asset limit. The scheme would require an 
increase in public funding compared to the current social assistance setup.  
 
 285 
 The Hong Kong Social Security Society proposed a universal old age 
pension that would pay a flat-rate benefit pegged at 20% of average 
monthly wage without means tests. The scheme would be funded by 
contributions from employees (2% of salary), employers (6%) and the 
government (4%), and would replace existing social assistance schemes. In 
addition they proposed that the MPF should guarantee a minimum level of 
return and become a voluntary scheme. 
 
 By the end of the 2000s, the Hong Kong government had however largely 
resisted calls for change and the three-pillar system based on the CSSA, SSAS, and 
MPF remained intact. A significant achievement from those years was the 
advancement of public debate on the range of available policy options and the trade-
offs implied by different pension models, which also kept old-age income security 
prominently on the government‘s agenda. Such debate was possible because a 
fragmented polity and the assurance of basic freedoms meant that the government‘s 
policy paradigm was more vulnerable to challenge, there was greater room for policy 
discourse, and sources of policy ideas were more distributed. Compared to Singapore, 
the relationship between Hong Kong‘s political leadership and bureaucracy was more 
fractious or, in Scott‘s (2000) words, highly disarticulated. The introduction of 
political appointees who were directly answerable to the Chief Executive into senior 
departmental positions in 2002 and 2008 were seen to be attempts at increasing control 
and eroding the neutrality of the civil service (Li, 2012). In recent years the Health and 
Welfare Bureau has openly criticised the current pension system and the MPF (Hong 
Kong Legislative Council, 2005; Legislative Council Secretariat, 2012). The lack of 
cohesiveness is partly related to the structure of government. Unlike Singapore, where 
continuous rule by a single party has given it the opportunity to deepen ties with the 
bureaucracy and assert a coherent policy paradigm across successive generations of 
leaders, Hong Kong‘s system of government concentrates power in Chief Executives 
who have limited tenure, do not represent distinctive party platforms, suffer from low 
political legitimacy and accountability, and have increasingly become the target of 
public censure (Ho & Lee, 2013; Kwong & Yew, 2012; Li, 2012). Moreover, the 
continued protection of basic freedoms in Hong Kong in the first decade of Chinese 
rule allowed the media, civil society, and academia to participate in policy debates, 
promoting a diverse and sophisticated policy discourse in the public domain that 
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further increases the pressure on policymakers.
26
 So while the threat of electoral 
punishment, a key factor in European pension politics, did not apply in Hong Kong, 
―consensus‖ in the sense of broad public endorsement was frequently cited throughout 
the period as a justification for policy positions on both sides.
27
 
 
Singapore 
Rising concerns about ageing but parametric reforms to the Central Provident Fund: 
From the 1990s, concerns about the adequacy of CPF savings in old age began to 
emerge in Singapore, following decades of liberalisation that had opened up retirement 
savings to a range of other purposes. Criticisms about coverage of nonworking 
persons, income replacement levels, and the dilution of the CPF‘s retirement 
objectives appeared in local press commentaries and studies by international bodies 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Asher, 1999; Cardarelli, 
Gobat, et al., 2000; Henson & Chung, 1994; Long, 1999; E. Yap, 1996). Additional 
pressure came from wage stagnation among older and low-skilled workers in the 2000s 
which prevented the raising of contribution rates for persons nearing retirement. The 
government‘s own interest in the issue was signalled by a succession of national 
committees appointed to look into CPF and ageing issues from the late 1990s.
28
 An 
international advisory panel of pension and actuarial consultants was convened in 2006 
to develop proposals for improving the returns to CPF savings (S. Chia, 2006). Several 
of these committees concluded that CPF savings would not be sufficient for retirement 
for the majority of the elderly population and recommended changes such as higher 
interest rates, a larger proportion of monthly contributions for the Special Account 
                                                 
26
 In 2006, more than three quarters of journalists in Hong Kong regarded the role of mass media as 
―monitoring the government‖ and to ―reflect public opinion‖ (J. M. Chan & Lee, 2012). See Sing & 
Tang (2012) and Lam (2012b) on political activism; and Chan (2012) on civil society. However the 
political climate in Hong Kong is rapidly changing and has appeared more ambivalent in recent years. 
See discussion in next chapter. 
27
 The Subcommittee on Retirement Protection (2012) argued for reforms on the grounds of ―general 
consensus of the community for the introduction of a universal retirement protection scheme in the light 
of the inefficacy of the existing three-pillar retirement model‖ (pp. 17-18). The government‘s response 
has been that achieving consensus on a new universal pension scheme would be difficult (D. Tsang, 
2011, October). 
28
 1996: Cost Review Committee. 1999: Inter-Ministerial Committee on Health Care for the Elderly; 
Inter-Ministerial Committee on the Ageing Population. 2002: Economic Review Committee, Sub-
committee on Policies Related to Taxation, the CPF System, Wages and Land. 2006: Committee on 
Ageing Issues. 2007: Tripartite Committee on Employability of Older Workers. 2008: National 
Longevity Insurance Committee. 
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reserved for retirement, higher Minimum Sums to be set aside for retirement at 55 
years old, and a later age to start payouts.  
 Relative to the challenges, actual reforms were very limited. There was a 
gradual shift in policy thinking to place greater weight on preserving retirement 
income. For instance, in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the government 
rejected the option of cutting contribution rates and chose instead to provide direct 
cash grants to employers to subsidise wage bills (Hansard, 22 January 2009). The 
strategy of using CPF contribution rate cuts to suppress wage costs during economic 
recessions, favoured throughout the 1980s and 1990s, had been criticised by a 
government-appointed committee several years before (Economic Review Committee, 
2003). But for the most part, the CPF changes in the 2000s were minor parametric 
adjustments rather than systemic changes: a higher Minimum Sum and later payout 
were announced in 2003; interest rates were raised and the mode of payout was 
switched from phased payments over 20 years to compulsory life annuity in 2007; and 
public housing policy was gradually relaxed to facilitate the liquidation of housing 
assets among retirees (see discussion on housing in Chapter 3). Some of these reforms 
do not make clear functional sense, often suggestive of ideational ―locks‖ or fixed 
modes of thinking (Blyth, 2001). Raising the Minimum Sum, for example, prevents 
excessive withdrawal of savings at 55 years old. But this only applies to accounts that 
exceed the Minimum Sum, not the majority of persons whose savings fall below this 
level and are more at risk of old-age poverty. It also does not address withdrawal for 
housing that accounts for more than half of all pre-retirement withdrawals and occurs 
at much younger ages. Annuitisation of CPF savings prolongs the income stream but 
does not boost the overall value of retirement savings. Recent estimates suggest that an 
annuity based on the Minimum Sum would translate into very low monthly benefits 
(see Chapter 3). Policymakers in the 2000s showed growing concern about the CPF 
but also a lack of ideas about what could be done.  
 Restriction of policy discourse and the lack of ideas: Compared to Hong Kong, 
one of the most striking aspects of recent pension policy activity in Singapore is that 
apart from a brief mention of voluntary pension plans in 2003 (Tay, 2004), none of the 
committee reports touched on alternative pension models such as universal pensions or 
contributory social insurance, nor did they assess the implications of major structural 
reform of the pension system. This points to more fundamental issues with the range 
and quality of policy discourse, which can be an important source of policy change. 
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For decades, parliamentary debates about old-age income security have revolved 
around the same repertoire of adjustments to CPF features with no reference to pension 
systems that operate in other economically advanced countries regionally and 
internationally. The scope of policy commentaries in the press is equally narrow.
29
 The 
underdevelopment of ideas for pension reform reveals the impact of Singapore‘s 
model of illiberal democracy
30
, particularly the constraints on those institutions that in 
Hong Kong‘s case were a rich source of policy proposals in recent years—opposition 
parties, civil society, and academia. 
 As described earlier, historical tussles between the PAP and the communists 
had already resulted in the defeat of leftwing politics and heightened vigilance within 
the government towards all forms of political opposition. Opposition parties continued 
to face a number of hurdles in Singapore‘s political system even in the 2000s. 
Historically the application of defamation laws and restrictions on public speaking 
resulting in bankruptcy, imprisonment, and disqualification from standing for elections 
among opposition politicians is well-documented in the literature (H. C. Chan, 1989; 
Gomez, 2006). Rodan (1997b) has argued that the Group Representative Constituency 
(GRC) system, which requires voters to choose slates of candidates for clusters of 
constituencies instead of voting within individual electoral wards, has been used to 
absorb constituencies where PAP support was weaker and to raise the bar of entry for 
opposition parties. Many opposition parties lacked the resources and candidates to 
contest these multi-seat constituencies. When they did enter parliament, Rodan 
observed that opposition politicians found themselves ―subjected to a level of scrutiny 
never applied to those actually wielding power in Singapore‖ (p. 177), referring to a 
case where an MP was found in contempt of parliament and heavily fined for an error 
in a document criticising high health care costs. The cost of political participation 
meant that opposition representation in parliament has been very low. The PAP has 
won every election since 1965 and had not lost more than four seats in a parliament of 
about 80 members up to the end of the 2000s (Singapore Elections Department, 2013), 
an extremely low proportion even by comparison to the presence of pro-democracy 
                                                 
29
 An interesting indication of the disengagement with international policy debate about old-age 
pensions is that the term ―pensions‖ has all but fallen out of use in Singapore‘s public and policy 
discourse, and is used nowadays almost exclusively to refer to private and former civil service 
retirement schemes. Instead locals simply refer to retirement income policy as ―CPF‖. 
30
 The political system in Singapore has been variously described as illiberal, authoritarian, 
undemocratic, and hybrid (Diamond, 2002; Mutalib, 2000; Rodan, 2009a). 
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parties in Hong Kong‘s partially elected legislature. This had several consequences for 
social policy discourse. Parliamentary debates were often dominated by ruling party 
members. But more than just numerical balance, the state of politics meant that the 
opposition had been preoccupied with fundamental issues such as civil liberties and 
political freedoms, and their electoral platforms lacked a strong policy orientation 
(Rodan, 1997b). 
 Civil society including interest groups, professional associations, and religious 
organisations, faced overt restrictions on political engagement and freedom of 
expression (J. S. T. Quah & Quah, 1989; Rodan, 1997b). The Societies Act prohibits 
non-governmental organisations‘ involvement in politics unless they are registered as 
political organisations, while the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act of 1990 
dictates a separation between religion and politics that prevents religious bodies from 
participating in policy discourse. The extent to which the government was prepared to 
enforce restrictive laws was seen in 1987, when a group of Catholic social activists 
were arrested and several detained without trial for years under the Internal Security 
Act, based on allegations that they were part of a Marxist conspiracy to overthrow the 
government (M. D. Barr, 2010). Barr argues that it was the ability of these activists to 
mobilise public support through quasi-religious networks and their adversarial stance 
on social justice issues that attracted what amounted to political persecution.
31
 As the 
activists were championing social causes such as the rights of foreign workers and 
were directly involved in operating social services, the episode had a strong deterrent 
effect on other socially-concerned civil society groups. The arrests also marked the 
beginning of a separation between politics and religion in Singapore, which can be 
seen in the political abstinence of the Catholic church and other religious groups in 
later years. In their place, a range of official channels for managed political 
participation were introduced, such as grassroots organisations that allow citizens to 
                                                 
31
 Several of the detainees later alleged that they had given confessions under coercion. A few senior 
Cabinet members also revealed that they had not been fully satisfied of the veracity of the allegations 
(M. D. Barr, 2010).  
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participate in social activities and solve municipal problems
32
 and a Feedback Unit 
which collects public suggestions and responses to policy developments.
33
 
 Two other factors helped to push pension policy discourse in Hong Kong in the 
2000s—participation from academics with policy expertise and a relatively free media. 
Both of these were limited in Singapore. Although there was some critical academic 
research on the CPF and other social policies
34
, the growth of social science research 
in the policy fields was hampered by limited disclosure of official data, while some 
local academics have been criticised for failing to interrogate official rhetoric with 
greater objectivity and rigour (Asher, 1991, 2002b; H. C. Chan, 1976; Christie, 1998; 
J. S. T. Quah & Quah, 1989; Williams, 1996). In an extreme case, a visiting researcher 
at the National University of Singapore became the subject of police investigation in 
1994 after he published an article in the foreign press questioning the independence of 
Asian judiciaries and was subsequently found guilty of contempt of court (Lingle, 
1996). In place of independent think tanks, the government established an Institute of 
Policy Studies in 1988 to undertake research on local policy issues (Rodan, 1992). 
Press and media freedom were also strictly controlled, on the grounds that the 
sensationalisation of issues such as ethnicity might lead to social unrest (J. S. T. Quah, 
1987). Strict licensing rules place the national press under government control
35
, 
limiting independent coverage of critical policy dialogue that might in turn have 
focused public opinion and interest (T. L. Tan, 1990). Whereas interest groups and 
academics were sources of policy innovation in Hong Kong‘s pension debates, in 
                                                 
32
 Initially set up to mobilise the rural population to fight communism, these grassroots organisations 
were retained and substantially expanded by the PAP government to promote policy initiatives and 
assess ground sentiment (H. C. Chan, 1989). Each grassroots organisation represents a small 
geographical unit and is supervised by the local MP. The system as a whole is managed by a statutory 
board, the People‘s Association, which is chaired by the Prime Minister. 
33
 Rodan (1997a) argues that in the late 1990s, Hong Kong and Singapore represented two models of 
civil society development in the region: growing space for independent political activity associated with 
democratisation in Hong Kong, and increasing use of co-option tactics in Singapore to manage diverse 
social forces. 
34
 Mukul Asher has been a particularly outspoken advocate of CPF reforms (see Chapter 3). His 
proposals include improving the transparency of the government‘s investment of CPF savings in line 
with international best practices; improving the rate of return to members; allocating a higher proportion 
of contributions to retirement; establishing an independent regulatory authority and separate asset 
management company; considering the introduction of social insurance; and raising the benefit level of 
public assistance (Asher, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2004; Asher & Nandy, 2011; Asher & Rajan, 
2002). Others have also written critiques of public housing and social security policies (Chua, 1997; 
Ramesh, 2000). 
35
 The Newspaper and Printing Presses Act stipulates that printing presses can only be operated under 
license by the government. The only press corporation in Singapore is also usually chaired by a senior 
party figure. 
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Singapore legal constraints prevented the emergence of a civil society fertile to diverse 
social policy ideas while the diversion of discourse through state-managed political 
arenas curbed policy debates that could have contributed to policy change.
36
 Unlike in 
open, plural democracies, political groups in Singapore could not mobilise to promote 
policy reform or provide focal points for popular concerns, such as on behalf of 
socially disadvantaged groups (Rodan, 1997a). 
 
Summary 
Between the 1990s and 2000s, pension policy developments in Hong Kong and 
Singapore were almost a reverse image of what happened in previous decades. Hong 
Kong experienced a period of almost frenzied policy debate as various pension models 
were proposed and dropped, before the MPF was eventually adopted. This took place 
against a backdrop of democratisation introduced by the colonial administration in the 
run-up to 1997. A more permeable government, party competition, and the rise of 
interest groups within a legal environment that allowed relatively free media spurred 
intense policy discourse that continued even after the MPF was introduced. While 
policy outcomes often seemed indeterminate, these conditions held out a possibility of 
change. On the other hand, in Singapore, most of these prerequisites for discourse and 
policy innovation were absent due to political developments in earlier times. Notably, 
opposition parties, interest groups, and academics all faced various legal constraints 
from engagement in policy discourse and advocacy, or competition from equivalent 
entities set up by the government. In a country with formal electoral competition, there 
was a surprising lack of policy competition. Despite concerns within the government 
about old-age income security, the only reforms to the CPF were minor parametric 
adjustments. 
 
                                                 
36
 This counter-factual argument finds support in glimpses of social policy change when there had been 
small political openings. A scheme started in 1990 provides for up to nine Nominated Members of 
Parliament (NMPs) within each term of parliament who are selected from major sectors such as 
business, labour, professions, academia, and social and community services (Rodan, 2009b). Even 
though NMPs are selected by a committee appointed by the rest of parliament, they have raised a wide 
range of social issues over the years and the only law they have proposed to have been passed in 
parliament is the Maintenance of Parents Act which gives elderly persons the legal right to seek 
financial support from their children. In the 1990s a particularly policy-oriented opposition party, the 
Singapore Democratic Party, published a paper criticising the rising costs of housing, education, and 
public transport. As the report resonated with public concerns about the costs of living and income 
inequalities, the government convened a Cost Review Committee to study the matter and later issued a 
report to dispute the claims (Rodan, 1997b). 
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8.5  Summary 
This chapter began with a review of the major theoretical explanations for social 
policy change in the advanced democracies and in East Asia. The discussion showed 
how different factors matter for different regions. For the mature welfare states, 
functional and political factors such as globalisation, post-industrialism, left power 
resources, and path dependency have been used to explain social policy development 
and subsequent reform and retrenchment. But for East Asian societies, political factors 
such as state autonomy and ideational factors like governing philosophy have emerged 
as explanations for the adoption of modest pension policy schemes initially, while 
democratisation is a key factor for the rapid expansion of pension systems in the 
adjustment phase. Three theoretical strands stand out in the literature and are 
particularly helpful for understanding pension policy development in Hong Kong and 
Singapore: ideas as policy paradigm and discourse; developmentalism in its 
interventionist and free-market variations; and democratisation and its effects on 
policy discourse. 
 The historical analysis divided policy developments into two periods, 1950s-
1980s and 1990s-2000s. The main arguments are summarised in Table 8.3. Following 
a period of flux in the 1950s, the policy orthodoxy in both places during the first phase 
was to avoid social spending and extensive social security systems. After ousting the 
political left and rejecting social insurance, the Singapore government built up a 
pension system based on the CPF that was suited to its interventionist style of 
developmentalism and a cohesive and autonomous bureaucracy. The developmental 
motivation became even clearer during economic recessions in the 1980s as the 
government pushed through a series of employer contribution rate cuts to suppress 
labour costs. Meanwhile in Hong Kong, the government tried to meet social needs 
through a system of public relief instead of developing a formal social security system. 
Later years saw incremental expansion of these policies as the government kept to its 
paradigm of free-market developmentalism, and the rejection of the central provident 
fund model which was incompatible with its smaller and more permeable bureaucracy. 
At the end of this period, while both Hong Kong and Singapore were pursuing the 
growth model of the developmental state, their old-age pension systems reflected 
important variations in policy paradigm and governance structures. 
  
 293 
Table 8.3  The context of public pension policies in Singapore and Hong Kong, 1950s-
2000s 
 Singapore Hong Kong 
1950s-1980s: Developmentalism 
Policy 
context 
Interventionist developmental 
state: centralised cohesive 
government, autonomous 
bureaucracy 
Policy paradigm: national 
survival through economic 
growth 
Free-market developmental state: 
small permeable government, 
beleaguered bureaucracy 
Policy paradigm: self-reliance 
and ―positive non-
interventionism‖ 
Policy 
developments 
Rejection of social insurance, 
introduction of CPF, 
liberalisation of pre-retirement 
withdrawals, contribution rate 
cuts to suppress wage costs 
Post-war public relief and 
voluntary welfare, expansion of 
public assistance, introduction of 
CSSA and SSAS, rejection of 
central provident fund 
1990s-2000s: Democratisation 
Policy 
context 
Illiberal electoral democracy: 
one-party rule, absence of 
political left 
Policy discourse: cognitive 
locks on policy thinking, 
restrictions on civil society 
Partial democratisation with civil 
liberties: fragmented system of 
government, contentious politics 
Policy discourse: diverse policy 
ideas, active civil society 
Policy 
developments 
Growing concerns with ageing 
and retirement income, limited 
parametric adjustments to the 
CPF 
Debates on different pension 
models, adoption of MPF, 
sustained pressure for pension 
reforms 
CPF: Central Provident Fund. CSSA: Comprehensive Social Security Assistance Scheme. 
SSAS: Social Security Allowance Scheme. MPF: Mandatory Provident Fund. 
Source: Own analysis 
 
 In the second period, concerns about ageing and income security arose in both 
places. Democratisation in Hong Kong enabled interest groups to press for change and 
there was an emergence of competitive policy discourse over pension models. This 
resulted in several policy u-turns before the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) was 
finally introduced. But in Singapore, strict political controls were not conducive for 
policy discourse. Despite concerns about the CPF, the 1990s-2000s was notable for a 
lack of ideas, with the government applying a narrow range of minor policy 
adjustments without tackling fundamental challenges brought on by demographic 
pressures. Hong Kong‘s model of partial democracy with civil liberties turned out to 
be more facilitative of policy discourse than Singapore‘s model of illiberal electoral 
democracy. Such policy discourse was often indeterminate of policy outcomes, but 
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implied the availability of policy alternatives that could challenge the status quo and 
therefore a potential for change. 
 The premise of this chapter is that there are two dimensions to the prospects for 
old-age income security: the functional—whether policy and informal arrangements 
can meet the needs of the elderly populations; and the political—whether policies can 
evolve in areas where they fall short. Part 2 of the study has shown that there is a likely 
and considerable risk of financial hardship among future elderly populations in both 
places, largely due to the inadequacy of the public pension systems. The analysis in 
this chapter helps to explain the foundations and development of these pension 
systems, and how they have accommodated or resisted change in the face of functional 
policy challenges. The main theoretical levers in the discussion—developmental policy 
principles and democratic pressures for policy change—provide a systematic way for 
thinking about whether public pensions can grow further to make up for declining 
family support, which is discussed in Chapter 9. 
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Appendix 8.1 History of public pensions in Hong Kong and Singapore 
 
Table 8A.1 Public pension development in Hong Kong 
Year Major policy developments 
1965 White Paper on Aims and Policy for Social Welfare in Hong Kong 
Report on the Feasibility of a Survey into Social Welfare Provision and 
Allied Topics in Hong Kong 
1967 Inter-departmental Working Party Report on Social Security  
1970 Report on the Administration of the Extended Public Assistance Scheme 
in Hong Kong 
1971 Public Assistance Scheme expanded to guarantee a minimum 
subsistence level for persons who are not able-bodied (later the 
Comprehensive Social Security Assistance Scheme, CSSA) 
1973 Disability and Infirmity Allowance Scheme for the elderly infirm and 
disabled (later the Old-Age Allowance and Social Security Allowance 
Scheme, OAA and SSAS) 
White Paper on Social Welfare Development in Hong Kong 
1977 Able-bodied persons allowed on the Public Assistance Scheme if 
unemployed for more than a month 
Green Paper: A Programme of Social Security Development 
1987 Legislative Council debate on the central provident fund model 
1992 Consultation exercise titled "A Community-wide Retirement Protection 
System‖, on a mandatory and privately managed scheme 
1994 Consultation exercise ―Taking the worry out of growing old‖, on  a 
proposed Old-age Pension Scheme (OPS) that would offer universal 
pensions 
1995 OPS dropped, decision on a new Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) 
announced 
1998 MPF legislation passed 
2000 Start of the MPF scheme 
2012 Report from the Panel on Welfare Services, Subcommittee on Retirement 
Protection 
2013 New Old Age Living Allowance (OALA) to replace the OAA, offering 
higher benefits from 65 to 69, and either the existing rate of universal 
allowance or a higher rate of means-tested allowance from 70 onwards 
Source: Chow (1978, 1985a), Hong Kong Legislative Council (2005), Legislative Council 
(2012), Social Welfare Department (2013) 
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Table 8A.2 Public pension development in Singapore 
Year Major developments 
1952 Report from the McFadzean Committee 
1955 Central Provident Fund (CPF) established by legislation 
1957 Reports from the Caine Committee and Brocklehurst Committee 
1968 Public Housing Scheme introduced 
1977 Special Account for withdrawals at 55 years old 
1978 First investment scheme, for public transport companies 
1981 Residential properties Scheme for private housing 
1982 Home protection insurance to help members and their families with 
outstanding mortgage payments in cases of disability and death  
1984 Medisave introduced for hospitalisation expenses and approved 
outpatient charges 
1986 Investment rules liberalised to allow investment in non-residential 
properties, shares, stocks, unit trusts, and gold.  
First round of employer contribution rate cut, 25% to 10% 
1987 Minimum Sum Scheme and Retirement Account introduced to reserve a 
portion of savings for retirement and to allow top-ups by spouses and 
children 
Long-term contribution rate of 40% (borne equally by employer and 
employee) announced, and lower rates for workers 55 years old and above 
1989 Education Scheme allowing repayable loans for children‘s local tertiary 
education 
Dependents’ Protection Scheme to cover surviving family members 
when breadwinner dies or is permanently disabled 
1990 Medishield introduced, medical insurance for major illnesses 
1993 Employer contribution rate cut for 55-60 age group 
1994 Medishield Plus introduced 
1999 Employer contribution rate cut, 20% to 10% 
2001 Eldershield introduced to help with medical expenses incurred due to 
severe disabilities 
2003 Phase-out of CPF 50% withdrawal rule announced 
Employer contribution rate cut, 16% to 13% 
2005 Medishield made compulsory, Medishield Plus privatised 
Contribution rate cuts for 50-55 age group 
2006 Contribution rate cuts for 50-55 age group 
2007 Phased payout over 20 years to be replaced by CPF Life, a compulsory 
annuity  
Minimum Sum Draw-down Age to be delayed from 2012 
Nominal interest rate increased by one percentage point for first $60,000 
of savings  
 Source: Low & Aw (2004), CPF Board (2013a)  
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9. Reforming public pensions: Potential and constraints 
 
The public pension systems in Hong Kong and Singapore are both in need of change. 
As discussed in Chapter 8, public pension policies in Hong Kong and Singapore are 
framed by a policy paradigm associated with the developmental states of East Asia that 
is geared towards achieving economic growth through low social spending and cheap 
wages. This paradigm sets the intellectual perimeters for the growth of public pension 
systems. But it is balanced, in the case of Hong Kong, by diverse and competitive 
policy discourse that first emerged during a period of rapid democratisation and has 
served as impetus for pension policy innovation. Political stability under a strict 
regime in Singapore has prevented such discourse, so a limitation to the expansion of 
public pensions has been the lack of proposed alternatives to the current system. 
However these conditions do not remain static. In recent years, political developments 
have signalled different sources of potential and constraint for the reform of public 
pension systems. This chapter surveys three streams of recent evidence: (i) problem, in 
terms of public opinion and demand for change; (ii) policies, or the prioritisation of 
reforms by policymakers, and (iii) politics, focusing on social mobilisation and public 
participation. The analysis also makes use of the two factors flagged in the previous 
chapter—the developmental policy paradigm and democratic policy discourse. The 
discussion concludes by summarising the evidence and assessing the general policy 
directions. 
 
9.1  The three sources of reform potential and constraints 
One useful way of thinking about the potential for pension reforms is in terms of the 
main dimensions through which policies come to fruition. Borrowing from  Kingdon‘s 
(1984) work on the setting of policy agendas, this perspective is concerned with three 
independent streams or processes that influence the direction of policy
37
: 
 
                                                 
37
 Kingdon was concerned specifically with the setting of policy agendas and alternatives, not the 
delivery of policy change as a whole. There are other differences between his framework and the one 
here: Kingdon‘s ―policies‖ dimension is based on the availability and transfer of ideas, while his 
―politics‖ stream takes into account broader aspects such as changes in national mood and bureaucratic 
personnel. The framework here is an adaptation for the task of this study. The chapter does not aim to 
engage with the theoretical debate on policymaking processes or ―test‖ the framework proposed here 
against others in the literature. 
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 The ―problem‖ stream is about the development of the policy problem. A 
worsening of the problem or an increase in its visibility may predict policy 
action. The analysis here focuses on public opinion and demand for change as 
an indicator of the potential for pension reform. 
 
 The ―policies‖ stream looks at whether policymakers respond by placing the 
problem on the policy agenda. Policy prioritisation may be indicated by the 
issue‘s prominence in official communications or, even more directly, small 
steps towards change. 
 
 The ―politics‖ stream asks how much force the policy problem gathers through 
the mobilisation of interest groups and other forms of political participation 
that can exert pressure on policymakers to take action. 
 
 In contrast to linear models of the policymaking process based on a series of 
stages, this perspective regards the three streams as independent but interconnected. 
Not all visible and urgent policy problems find agency in lobby groups and the general 
public, while policy prioritisation may happen even in the absence of direct political 
pressure. But these streams can also merge—pressing policy problems that carry 
political weight and command policymakers‘ attention have the clearest potential to 
translate into policy change. Approaching the question of pension reform potential 
through the three streams also takes account of the three main types of political 
participants in policy developments—the public, policymakers, and interest groups.  
 
9.2  “Problem”: Public opinion and demand for pension reforms 
Hong Kong 
Public opinion regarding retirement and the Mandatory Provident Fund: A 2010 
telephone survey of adults aged 18 and above jointly conducted by a university and a 
lobby group for universal pensions found that despite the introduction of the 
Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) in 2000, a large segment of the population in Hong 
Kong still felt unsettled regarding income prospects in old age and would like to see 
the introduction of a more comprehensive pension scheme (Alliance for Universal 
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Pensions & Hong Kong Polytechnic University, 2010). There is also an income 
gradient in the likelihood of supporting the MPF. 
 
 Close to half said that they were worried about retirement finances, and 85% 
felt that old age income security was a pressing policy issue that the 
government should address immediately. Older persons and those with lower 
incomes were more likely to be worried. 
 Even among persons with MPF contributions, two thirds said that the MPF did 
not reduce their anxiety about retirement. As many as 40% agreed that the 
scheme should be abolished while 53% disagreed. Support for the MPF was 
weaker among persons with lower incomes. 
 Almost 80% supported the introduction of a universal old-age pension scheme 
that would extend coverage to non-MPF members, but 14% were opposed to 
the idea. Of the supporters, 90% felt that the government should contribute 
towards scheme, while 83% felt that the government should provide a starting 
grant. Among persons who opposed universal pensions, 40% said they did not 
understand the scheme (with more among respondents who were older and had 
less education); a third were concerned about higher contributions or taxes 
(especially those with more education); and a fifth felt that individuals should 
be responsible for their own retirement. 
 
 Another survey series was recently commissioned by HSBC Bank and 
conducted by a local university to look into public perceptions of the MPF (Public 
Opinion Programme, 2008, 2010).
38
 Several important findings indicate low public 
confidence in the adequacy of the MPF. In 2008, the respondents estimated their MPF 
savings to cover their basic expenses for around 8 years from the point of retirement. 
In 2010, the average estimate was 7 years. Compared to a period life expectancy of 20 
years at age 65, these figures suggest that MPF participants do not on the whole expect 
their savings to be sufficient to sustain them throughout old age. Three quarters of the 
respondents felt that the current contribution rate of 10% was too low, preferring on 
                                                 
38
 This survey is part of the Hong Kong Public Opinion Programme, an independent research 
programme based at Hong Kong University which conducts opinion polls on a wide range of political 
and social topics. The survey on public perceptions of the MPF is carried out once every two years. The 
2008 survey covered a random sample of 505 MPF participants aged 18 to 65.  In 2010, the survey 
sample was around 1000. 
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average a contribution rate of 22%—not  far from the Central Provident Fund (CPF) 
contribution rate after discounting withdrawals for housing. 
 An optimistic reading of these data is that the surveys included older 
respondents (up to 65 years old) who would have had a very short period of 
participation in the MPF. For most of them, the MPF will not realistically be a 
significant source of income after retirement. But the surveys also revealed a problem 
of uneven coverage that may not necessarily resolve itself over time. The telephone 
survey found that MPF participation rates were lower for women, casual workers, and 
persons with lower education. Both the telephone survey and HSBC polls also found 
that around 40% of the respondents had no retirement savings or investments other 
than the MPF, and that persons with better education and higher income were also 
more likely to have alternative forms of saving. These underlying inequalities suggest 
that even when the current pension system built around the MPF achieves maturity, 
public anxiety towards retirement and the wish for change may not go away.  
 Public opinion regarding social policy: Individual concerns about retirement 
and the MPF must however be read against the background of general attitudes 
towards social needs and social welfare. Between the 1990s and 2000s, findings from a 
repeated survey of social attitudes in Hong Kong suggest that public concern increased 
regarding ageing and income inequality (S. K. Lau, Lee, Wan, & Wong, 1995, 1997, 
1999, 2003, 2005; S. W. Leung, Wan, & Wong, 2008). The proportion of persons who 
thought that ageing was a serious social problem grew from 50% in 1993 to 60% in 
2006, while the proportion who were concerned about income inequality increased 
from 54% to 77% before falling slightly to 71% (Table 9.1). These gains were mainly 
at the expense of persons who were undecided on these issues, as there remained a 
core of around 10-14% and 4-8% who felt the two issues were not serious problems 
throughout the period. But views regarding the role of social policy in addressing 
income inequality were surprisingly stable: around three quarters agreed that ―it is the 
government‘s responsibility to reduce the rich-poor gap‖ in 1993 and 2006 despite a 
slight dip to 63% in 1999. In fact the proportion who disagreed increased quite 
noticeably from 11% to 28% over the period. At the same time, the proportion of 
people who were satisfied with the state of social welfare increased from 29% to 39% 
between 1995 and 1999, and then remained at that level up to 2004. This was 
accompanied by a corresponding fall of almost 10 percentage points in the proportion 
who were dissatisfied. 
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Table 9.1  Attitudes towards social policy in Hong Kong, 1990s to 2000s, percentage 
  Serious Not serious 
Whether ageing is a serious social problem 1993 
1997 
1999 
2001 
2004 
2006 
50 
52 
53 
50 
54 
60 
11 
13 
14 
12 
12 
10 
Whether income inequality is a serious 
social problem 
1995 
1997 
1999 
2001 
2004 
2006 
54 
66 
64 
77 
71 
71 
8 
7 
8 
4 
6 
5 
  Agree Disagree 
It is the government‘s responsibility to 
reduce the rich-poor gap 
1993 
1999 
2001 
2006 
75 
63 
67 
72 
11 
- 
20 
28 
  Satisfied Dissatisfied 
Satisfaction with the state of social welfare 1995 
1999 
2001 
2004 
29 
39 
37 
39 
32 
22 
24 
23 
Note: Not all the results were reported for every year of the survey. 
Source: Indicators of social development survey (S. K. Lau, et al., 1995, 1997, 1999; S. K. 
Lau, Lee, Wan, & Wong, 2001; S. K. Lau, et al., 2003, 2005; S. W. Leung, et al., 2008) 
 
 So while there was greater awareness about retirement income issues and 
demand for additional pension provision over time, especially when questions posed 
are framed at the individual level, society-wide attitudes towards social policy as a 
whole still appear to reflect an underlying ethos of individual responsibility and free-
market competition that has been promoted by successive colonial governments and 
the local administration from 1997 (see Chapter 8). In 1993, for example, 80% of 
respondents agreed with the statement that social welfare should be limited to those 
who cannot be self-reliant, and 62% agreed that universal welfare will reduce the 
incentive to work and care for the family. The proportion of people unwilling to pay 
more taxes to finance welfare expenditure also increased from 35% in 1993 to 40% in 
2001. 
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Singapore 
Public opinion regarding retirement and the CPF: There has been consistent evidence 
that Singaporeans feel uncertain about how far the CPF can protect their financial 
security in old age. In a 2010 survey of 500 randomly selected adults, 7 in 10 
respondents said that they believed their CPF savings would provide only ―some‖ or ―a 
little‖ of the retirement income they need (Citibank Singapore, 2011). About half 
expected to continue working after retirement age and to require additional retirement 
income from private investments and insurance. An earlier round of this survey in 
2008 found that just 38% of Singaporeans felt confident in their retirement savings, 
compared to 59% in Hong Kong and 65% in Korea (Citibank, 2008). In the multi-
country ―Future of Retirement‖ survey carried out by HSBC Bank in 2012 with adults 
aged 25 and above, Singaporeans estimated their retirement to last for 17 years but 
their savings to run out in 9 years, compared to 17 and 11 years respectively in Hong 
Kong (HSBC, 2013a, 2013b). In Singapore, 62% of the respondents were worried 
about financial hardship and 60% about affording quality health care during 
retirement—higher than the equivalent statistics for Hong Kong which are 50% and 
45% respectively.  
 Public attitudes towards the CPF can also be gathered from the National Survey 
of Senior Citizens (Ministry of Community Development, 1995, 2005) and the Sample 
Household Survey of the public housing population (Housing and Development Board, 
2010). In 1995, 28% of elderly respondents aged 65 years and above reported that they 
had CPF savings. Of these individuals, 70% felt that their savings were inadequate for 
retirement. Ten years later, still only 31% of those aged 65-74 and 21% of those 75 
years old and above reported having CPF savings. Among them, only 4% of those 
aged 65-74 and 2% of the 75+ age group felt that the CPF was their most important 
source of financial support. The most recent Sample Household Survey asked elderly 
residents aged 65 years and above to list potential financial sources to meet their old-
age needs. Only 30% cited CPF savings, whereas 68% mentioned their children. On 
the whole, these findings indicate that in the last decade or so, the CPF has remained a 
minor source of income for elderly persons and most retirees do not regard the system 
as an adequate form of income protection.  
 The demand for change depends at least partly on perceptions of alternatives. 
But unlike for Hong Kong, very little information is available on what Singaporeans 
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thought about other public pension models.
39
 In the only known survey regarding this 
topic in 1995, researchers asked a small purposive sample of respondents whether they 
would prefer the social security system in the United States over the CPF (R. Chen, 
Wong, & Chiang, 1997). Half of the participants said that they would not, compared to 
35% who said they would. This of itself may not be a remarkable statistic. But while 
the authors did not enclose within their report the description of the American Social 
Security system given to the respondents, other text in the report referred to it as ―an 
unfair insurance programme because beneficiaries cannot be assured on getting full 
value for their tax dollars‖ (p. 4). If a similar bias had been introduced into the 
programme description offered to respondents, than the support rate of 35% would 
indicate a surprisingly high level of openness towards a system different from the CPF. 
 Public opinion regarding social policy: The multi-country AsiaBarometer 
Survey has provided useful data for comparing East Asian countries on a consistent 
basis in recent years (AsiaBarometer, 2013). Both Singapore and Hong Kong were 
included in the 2006 wave of the survey. The results on the whole suggest a complex 
picture. When prompted with a strong statement that ―equality and a stagnant economy 
are preferable to inequality with economic development‖, almost two thirds of 
Singaporeans and 41% of Hong Kongers agreed, compared to 14% in Taiwan and 22% 
in China (Table 9.2). This would appear to suggest that social equality is a deeply held 
social value in both societies, particularly Singapore. Yet Singaporeans were less 
enthusiastic about promoting equality in society through policy intervention compared 
to other societies, with just 58% agreeing with this policy objective compared to 70% 
or more in Hong Kong, China, and Taiwan. However, on the whole, the majority of 
persons in these East Asian societies agreed that income equality should be eagerly 
promoted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39
 Alternative pension models based on universal or social insurance principles are not generally 
discussed in policy debates and the press in Singapore. See Chapter 8 regarding policy discourse. 
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Table 9.2  Attitudes towards inequality in East Asian societies, 2006 
Percentage who agreed that Singapore Hong 
Kong 
China Taiwan Korea 
Equality and a stagnant 
economy are preferable to 
inequality with economic 
development  
64 41 22 14 39 
Income equality should be 
eagerly promoted 
58 70 79 77 55 
Source: Own analysis of data from the 2006 wave of the AsiaBarometer Survey, obtained from 
AsiaBarometer (2013) 
 
 When it came to the assessment of current social policy, the results for 
Singapore are particularly striking (Table 9.3). Two thirds or more of the respondents 
expressed satisfaction with diverse aspects of social policy, ranging from the general 
standard of living to specific policy domains such as health, housing, and education. 
The best ratings were received for housing (87%) and health (84%), and the lowest for 
the ―social welfare system‖ on the whole. The results for equivalent items for Hong 
Kong were poorer, with satisfaction levels generally in the 30s except for health (60% 
satisfied) and housing (55%). When compared to the rest of East Asia, the results for 
Hong Kong are quite similar, especially the prominent peaks for health and housing 
which some have argued are cornerstones of productivist welfare regimes that 
emphasise social capital and social wage ahead of social security and high wages 
(Holliday, 2000). Singapore is therefore the anomaly within the region. The results 
must be interpreted against a context of generally high levels of satisfaction in 
Singapore across diverse life domains such as family and community life (Tambyah, 
Tan, & Kau, 2010).  
 
Table 9.3  Satisfaction with current social policy in East Asian societies, 2006 
Percentage satisfied with Singapore Hong 
Kong 
China Taiwan Korea 
Standard of living 76 38 32 44 33 
Household income 65 33 25 38 28 
Social welfare system 62 31 14 20 18 
Health 84 60 57 59 57 
Housing 87 55 49 58 52 
Education 73 36 33 42 36 
Source: Own analysis of data from the 2006 wave of the AsiaBarometer Survey, obtained from 
AsiaBarometer (2013) 
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 But within the Singaporean context, it is important to note that satisfaction with 
household income and the social welfare system as a whole were lower than for other 
policy domains. In fact these two items drew the lowest satisfaction ratings in a list of 
16 life domains (Tambyah, et al., 2010). It would therefore be wrong to conclude that 
there is no public interest in social welfare issues or demand for change. In fact, when 
asked about their views of government spending, almost three quarters of 
Singaporeans said they would prefer higher spending on old-age pensions and 
unemployment benefits, similar to levels in China and much higher than in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and Korea (Table 9.4). The demand for higher pension spending is 
remarkably consistent across the sexes, age groups, educational levels, and income 
groups. It is also much higher than for other policy areas such as defence, policing, 
public transport, environment, and culture. When read in combination, the widespread 
concerns with retirement income at the individual level, the preference for higher 
public pension spending, and the positive satisfaction ratings for the social welfare 
system as a whole may reflect limited awareness of policy alternatives and low 
expectations of state intervention, themselves an indirect consequence of the lack of 
policy discourse in the public domain, as discussed in Chapter 8. This ambivalence is 
aptly captured by the HSBC ―Future of Retirement‖ survey (Leeson & Harper, 2008). 
It found that more respondents in Hong Kong and Singapore were worried about 
financial hardship in old age compared to places such as Korea, Taiwan, and the 
industrialised European countries. But only 10-20% of respondents in the two 
populations felt that retirement needs should be financed through public spending, 
compared to around 30-40% in China, France, and the United Kingdom, and more than 
50% in Denmark and Sweden. 
 
Table 9.4  Demands for specific social policies in East Asian Societies, 2006 
Percentage who would 
prefer higher government 
spending on 
Singapore Hong 
Kong 
China Taiwan Korea 
Old-age pensions 74 50 77 50 69 
Unemployment benefits 70 39 74 47 54 
Source: Own analysis of data from the 2006 wave of the AsiaBarometer Survey, obtained from 
AsiaBarometer (2013) 
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Summary 
 Public opinion about pension policy and expectations of social policy can be a 
source of either reform potential or constraint. In recent years, there has been 
disquiet about the adequacy of the MPF for retirement needs. The majority of 
adults in a public survey regarded old-age income security as a pressing issue 
and, on average, they did not expect their MPF savings to last beyond seven 
years. Also, 40% felt that the scheme should be dropped entirely and 80% 
supported the introduction of a new universal old-age pension scheme. These 
point to public demands being an important source of reform potential for the 
pension system.  
 
 But despite growing concern about population ageing and income inequality, 
there has been no sea change in perceptions about the role of government in 
promoting social welfare. Around three quarters of persons in Hong Kong 
believed the government was responsible for addressing inequality, but the 
proportion who disagreed in fact increased from 11% to 28% between 1993 
and 2006. The proportion who were satisfied with the state of social welfare 
also increased from 29% to 39% between 1995 and 2004. 
 
 In Singapore, survey data consistently indicate that most people do not expect 
the CPF to provide enough for retirement. In separate studies in 1995 and 2010, 
around 70% said that they believed their CPF savings would not be sufficient. 
In 2012, 62% of adults aged 25 and above were worried about financial 
hardship during retirement compared to 50% in Hong Kong. The extent of 
public pressure for pension reforms also depends on support for alternatives. 
Here, very limited evidence suggests that at least a segment of the population is 
open to pension models other than the CPF.  
 
 Comparing the two populations in 2006, Singaporeans were more likely to 
identify with equality as a social objective, but less likely to support it as a 
policy objective. Singaporeans were also on the whole more satisfied with the 
state of social policy domains such as the standard of living, housing, and 
health, when compared to other East Asian societies. But even in Singapore, 
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there was strong public support for higher social spending particularly for old-
age pensions. Almost three quarters of survey respondents preferred higher or 
much higher pension spending. 
 
9.3  “Policies”: Prioritisation of reforms by policymakers 
Hong Kong 
Prioritisation by policymakers is a particularly important indicator of the potential for 
pension reforms considering that traditionally, governments in Hong Kong and 
Singapore have had more autonomy to implement their preferences than they do in 
more open polities (Fu, 2003). In Hong Kong‘s political system, policy statements by 
the Chief Executive are an especially important bellwether of future policy directions 
due to the concentration of political power in this office (see Chapter 8). The current 
Chief Executive, Leung Chun-ying, has acknowledged public concerns about 
retirement protection and pledged to make long-term plans for an ageing population in 
his election manifesto. But his most recent Policy Address, which sets out major policy 
plans at the start of every year, has dampened optimism about the introduction of 
universal pensions in the near future (C. Y. Leung, 2013, January): 
 
The Government will reinforce and enhance the existing three pillars, 
namely, private savings and family support, the social security system, 
and the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) System... We are also aware 
of views in favour of the introduction of universal retirement protection. 
But there are concerns that universal retirement protection would 
impose a very heavy burden on the public coffers over time, and would 
be impractical without tax hikes. The other option based on tripartite 
contribution from employers, employees and the Government is equally 
controversial, involving issues such as affordability and sustainability. 
(p. 35) 
 
The Finance Secretary‘s recent budget address strikes a similar tone (J. C. Tsang, 
2013, February): 
 
In the past few months, there have been considerable discussions on 
retirement protection... I hope that the community will explore the issue 
in a rational, pragmatic and prudent manner and with due regard to the 
sustainability of public finances and the possible financial pressure on 
our future generations. (p. 46)  
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 On the one hand, these statements reveal how little the developmental 
paradigm which de-prioritised social spending has changed since the colonial period. 
The present administration has been accused of attempting to buy time and stall reform 
by creating bureaucratic activity, and using rhetoric to reinforce its model of social 
policy. For instance, the Central Policy Unit (CPU) which reports directly to the Chief 
Executive has delayed releasing findings from a series of studies completed in 2010 
that were supposed to inform decisions on universal pensions (Panel on Welfare 
Services, 2012). Chan, Lee and Ho (1999) have also argued that Hong Kong‘s 
legislature falls under the government‘s ―hegemony of rationality‖ in welfare 
policymaking, which uses a combination of obfuscation (e.g. is family support really 
under threat? Can any pension system really solve all the problems?) and economic 
assumptions (e.g. extensive social security will slow down economic growth and 
weaken Hong Kong‘s spirit of enterprise) to avoid genuine policy debate. 
 But there are also recent signs that while the government‘s position on 
universal pensions has not shifted, reforming retirement protection has been a serious 
priority. For instance, the Commission on Poverty
40
 was reconvened in November 
2012 with a Social Security and Retirement Protection Task Force to study the pension 
problem and policy options, while an academic was commissioned to conduct a year-
long study into retirement protection in March 2013 (Legislative Council Secretariat, 
2013; RTHK, 2013). There are also ongoing reforms to give employees greater choice 
in the management of their MPF savings. In January 2013, the government announced 
that it would proceed with plans to introduce a new means-tested Old Age Living 
Allowance (Social Welfare Department, 2013). For persons aged 60 to 64 who would 
have qualified for the means-tested allowance under the previous Social Security 
Allowance Scheme (SSAS), this new allowance will provide a higher rate of benefit. 
Persons aged 65 and above who pass the means test will receive a higher benefit under 
the new allowance while those who fail the test will continue to receive the universal 
benefit from the SSAS. This scheme had been shelved in 2008 due to strong public 
reactions against the use of means testing at all for old age allowances. Even though 
the government‘s decision to push through the scheme has provoked public criticism 
                                                 
40
 During the previous term of this commission in 2005-2007 it did not make concrete recommendations 
regarding universal pensions, citing as a reason an ongoing study of existing policies. Instead it 
proposed relaxing means test criteria for elderly applicants to the CSSA Scheme (Commission on 
Poverty, 2006). 
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(Tam & Ho, 2012), the scheme is nevertheless an expansion of the existing allowance 
system. Overall, while senior politicians and the Chinese administration do not appear 
to favour the introduction of a universal pension scheme, recent concessions signal 
policy prioritisation and reflect the impact of sustained political  pressure on the 
pension system. 
 
Singapore 
In Singapore, ageing and income security have been prominent policy concerns from 
the 1990s, but the government has not seriously considered alternatives to the CPF. 
Pensions have been a priority, but pension reform has not. Policy statements in recent 
years continue to reiterate the principles of developmentalism and show how 
policymakers approach social welfare within this policy paradigm. When the Prime 
Minister announced his annual policy agenda at the National Day Rally Speech in 
2011, he said (H. L. Lee, 2011, August): 
 
We will progressively improve our social safety nets, update our basic 
schemes whether it is the CPF, whether it is the Medisave schemes and 
so on... But while we do all these things, we have to be very careful that 
we do not become a welfare state. Take the example of Greece, you 
know it is in trouble but why is it in trouble? It is a small country, 
population is about twice ours, the GDP is about twice ours and its 
former prime minister Papandreou—a generation ago he built a 
generous welfare system, protecting the Greeks from competition, 
giving them jobs in the government, welfare benefits, pension benefits, 
but it was not affordable. And so the country has gone broke and has 
been set back for many decades... Our competition is not getting less 
worldwide; it is getting more competitive than ever. We cannot afford 
to think that we do not have to try hard because the state is there and if 
something happens, we can always fall back on the government. 
 
 In the budget statement of the same year, the Finance Minister repeated this 
cautionary message about the dangers of welfare spending (Shanmugaratnam, 2011, 
February): 
 
[We] must avoid the mistakes of the developed countries which have 
built up unsustainable systems of entitlements—in healthcare, 
unemployment insurance and pensions. These have not only meant high 
taxes today, but huge debts and unfunded government liabilities which 
can no longer be postponed. Worse, the over-generous social 
entitlements have progressively reduced the work ethic over time. Some 
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of these developed countries are now undertaking painful reforms to 
gradually recover their economic dynamism. 
 
 In this policy paradigm, social needs must primarily be met through individual 
industry and family resources, an approach that is believed to be more compatible with 
national competitiveness. As explained in the National Day Rally Speech of 2012 (H. 
L. Lee, 2012, August): 
 
First, inclusiveness does not just mean more good things from the state 
or falling from heaven. All benefits have to be paid for... In many 
countries the politicians champion social spending but they pretend it 
does not cost the taxpayers anything.... As our social spending increases 
significantly, sooner or later our taxes must go up.... The second 
message is that social safety nets have to be coupled with self reliance 
and resilience.... The state will help you where it can but it cannot 
replace what you and your family can do for yourself and each other. 
To survive we have to be resilient, tough as individuals, close as 
families, cohesive as a society, strong as a nation. We have to be 
prepared to compete and to hold our own. 
 
 The priority in recent years has instead been on boosting employment and 
wages for older workers and low earners, and improving returns from the CPF. In 
2007, the Workfare Income Supplement was introduced to provide a bi-annual grant to 
workers aged 35 and above with monthly work income of below S$1500, roughly 70% 
of the median work income of all workers (CPF Board, 2013b). The grant is split 
between cash and contributions to the workers‘ CPF accounts.41 Re-employment 
legislation also started in 2012, which requires employers to offer their workers annual 
contract extensions between the ages of 62 and 65 (Ministry of Manpower, 2013). 
Recent changes to improve returns from the CPF, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 8, 
include higher interest rates, later eligibility age, the compulsory annuitisation of 
savings upon retirement instead of a lump-sum payout, and other housing policies to 
facilitate the monetisation of housing assets. All these indicate that fundamental 
changes to the existing pension system built around the CPF are not yet on the policy 
agenda. 
 
                                                 
41
 The Workfare Income Supplement is interesting in that by paying grants into CPF accounts, the 
scheme operates like a social insurance scheme that offers credits for low earners which translate into 
pension benefits upon retirement. It illustrates how, even in Singapore, professed policy principles are 
not always consistently upheld in practice. 
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Summary 
 Judging from recent policy statements, the governments in Hong Kong and 
Singapore have not changed their basic positions on public pensions. Both have 
continued to reiterate a preference for reinforcing the existing pension systems 
and their convictions towards a developmental model of social policy with 
these features: avoidance of new fiscal demands that may imply higher taxes; 
ensuring economic agility and competitiveness; protecting the individual work 
ethic and economic dynamism; and reliance on the self rather than the state. 
 
 Within this overarching policy paradigm, the Hong Kong government has not 
been completely able to dismiss proposals for a new universal pension scheme. 
It has commissioned committees and studies to look into alternative pension 
models and has also increased the generosity of the existing old-age allowance 
scheme, although the new scheme involves means testing. The potential for 
change therefore arises from the government having to prioritise the 
consideration of reform, if not reform per se. 
 
 But in Singapore the official position on old-age pensions remains staunchly 
―anti-welfare‖, blending a developmental line of economic reasoning with 
rhetoric that is highly critical of European welfare states. A major constraint on 
pension reform is that the government has so far not been prepared to seriously 
consider alternative approaches to retirement income. Instead it prioritises the 
protection of CPF returns under the current system. 
 
9.4  “Politics”: Social mobilisation and public participation 
Hong Kong 
Whether public demands translate into policy action may depend on how effectively 
these demands are asserted through channels of social mobilisation and public 
participation. This ―politics‖ stream is an important source of pension reform potential 
in Hong Kong due to an active civil society, policy engagement by academia, and a 
relatively free media (see Chapter 8). One additional aspect that has not been discussed 
so far is popular mobilisation over social issues. Annual demonstrations on 4 June and 
1 July provide focal points for expressing public dissent over a wide range of issues, 
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including democracy, civil liberties, and social concerns (Shae & Wong, 2007).
42
 
There have also been other protests focused on specific policy issues such as universal 
old-age pensions (C. K. Chan, 2003). Social mobilisation on such scale requires 
leadership from influential policy-oriented pressure groups. The Alliance for Universal 
Pensions, for example, has regularly organised marches in support of pension reforms 
(Tam & Ho, 2012). In a system that does not have an elected government, broad-based 
political participation has been an important tactic for influencing social policy. In 
2012, a series of student-initiated demonstrations and sit-ins outside the government‘s 
headquarters attracted large numbers of participants and forced policymakers to back 
down on a proposed national education curriculum that would allegedly promote 
identification with China‘s political system (S. Lau & Nip, 2012). Recent protests have 
become more brazen in censuring the Chief Executive‘s leadership and calling for his 
removal from office. As a sign of the government‘s growing concern, the Chief 
Executive has repeatedly called for ―social stability‖ in recent policy addresses (C. Y. 
Leung, 2013, January; D. Tsang, 2011, October). 
 However there are important and less visible constraints on the policy leverage 
of popular dissent. First, the business community continues to be a major influence on 
policymaking, as it had been during the colonial era (Goodstadt, 2009; Lo, 1996). 
They are represented in the Functional Constituencies and are guaranteed the support 
of pro-China political parties in legislative debates. They also share a common policy 
outlook with senior economic bureaucrats and have direct access to the Chinese 
leadership (C. K. Chan, 2003). In matters of pension reform, they are strong opponents 
of tax-funded and social insurance systems. Second, heightened civil activism in recent 
years may not imply better prospects for an expansion of the pension system. 
Goodstadt (2012) has argued that there may be a trade-off on the popular political 
agenda between democracy and equality. Public attention in recent times has been 
increasingly occupied by political issues such as the implementation of universal 
suffrage
43, Chinese interference in Hong Kong‘s administration, and the impact of 
                                                 
42
 The 4 June protests mark the 1989 Tiananmen incident in Beijing, while the 1 July protests were first 
organised by pro-democracy groups to mark the handover to China in 1997 (Shae & Wong, 2007). 
Participation in the 1 July protests gained real momentum in 2003 when large numbers took to the 
streets to oppose proposed anti-subversion legislation arising from Article 23 of Hong Kong‘s Basic 
Law. The proposal was subsequently shelved by the government. 
43
 Hong Kong‘s Basic Law commits the government to implementing universal suffrage but does not 
specify a schedule or other details. 
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population growth on public services and costs of living, at the expense of narrower 
social policy issues like pension reform and poverty. 
 If social mobilisation is a source of potential for pension reform, then the most 
worrying development is a possible reversal of democratic rights in Hong Kong‘s 
wider political environment. It has been argued that increasing civil activism may be a 
response to stricter controls by the government, perceived threats to civil liberty, and 
disillusionment with party politics, rather than a sign of growing political freedom 
(Fong, 2012, November; Shae & Wong, 2007). Fong identifies three areas where 
government intervention has been increasingly heavy-handed: police tactics against 
demonstrators as seen in higher arrest numbers; alleged manipulation of electoral 
procedures; and control of media freedom. The issue of journalistic freedom has been 
particularly contentious. In 2012, Hong Kong‘s ranking on the Reporters without 
Borders‘ (2010, 2012) annual survey of press freedom around the world fell from 34th 
to 54th (while Singapore ranked 136th and 135th in those years). Other international 
observers have also noted rising self-censorship among Hong Kong news organisations 
due to the co-option of media owners into various Chinese organs of state, police 
tactics against journalists, reporting restrictions at public events, and instances of 
interference with editorial content (Freedom House, 2012). In a recent survey of 
journalists in Hong Kong, 87% felt that press freedom had deteriorated since the start 
of the present term of government, compared to 58% in the last round of the survey in 
2007 (Hong Kong Journalists Association, 2012). The main reasons cited were 
government restrictions on access to information, obstruction of new coverage, and 
interference from the Chinese government. More than a third of the respondents said 
that they had practised self-censorship in the past year, such as by softening news that 
might cast an unfavourable light on the Chinese or Hong Kong governments. Fong 
(2012, November) has argued that if current trends continue, Hong Kong may 
transform into a society with universal suffrage but limited civil liberties or, in other 
words, an illiberal democracy in the image of Singapore. 
 
Singapore 
Restrictions on civil activism in Singapore are a constraint on the prospects for pension 
reform. Some of these restrictions and their effects on policy discourse in the past have 
been discussed in Chapter 8. Furthermore, social mobilisation as in Hong Kong is not 
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possible as strict laws prohibit public protests
44
 and there are no pressure groups 
campaigning for pension reforms. While legislators advocating pension reforms in 
Hong Kong can draw on the ideas and energy of interest groups and individual 
academics, the political opposition in Singapore find themselves isolated from these 
potential social bases due to restrictions on the political activities of interest groups.
45
 
As Rodan (1997a) argues, ―growing concerns over the last decade about widening 
material inequalities may have translated into greater electoral support for the PAP‘s 
formal political opponents, but these parties cannot draw on, or connect with, 
independent social organisations with complementary reform agendas‖ (p. 172). 
Controls on social mobilisation therefore also weaken opportunities for reform through 
parliamentary channels (Rodan, 1997b). 
 However recently, there have been signs of gradual political liberalisation and 
accommodation of an emerging social policy discourse.
46
 Some of the most influential 
critiques have been from former senior civil servants and have been carried in the 
national press. In 2012 the Institute of Policy Studies, a government-sponsored think-
tank, organised a public conference on social inequality. One of the papers to emerge 
from the conference was highly critical of existing social policy principles and 
strategies, arguing that:
47
 
  
Addressing the interconnected challenges of poverty, stagnant wages, 
rising inequality, lower social mobility, and reduced well-being in this 
new environment will require not just policy tweaks, but a broader, 
more holistic rethinking of Singapore‘s economic and social policies.... 
In some areas, long-standing policies reflect certain policy beliefs that 
may not be robustly or sufficiently questioned.... policy biases could 
hamper efforts to deal with rising income inequality, while the 
government‘s reluctance to contemplate a more redistributive system of 
taxes and transfers could undermine public support for growth-oriented 
                                                 
44
 The Public Order Act disallows public protest and demonstrations while the Penal Code criminalises 
specific aspects of protest activities. 
45
 The Societies Act prohibits non-governmental organisations from involvement in political activities. 
46
 It must be qualified that predicting political liberalisation in a country where the government has 
enjoyed such longevity is always a risky endeavour. In the past, other analysts have predicted political 
pluralisation in vain (see for example J. S. T. Quah & Quah, 1989; Williams, 1996). After a poor 
performance in the 1984 elections, some had expected to see the government initiate political reform. 
But in 1986 a leading opposition MP was imprisoned for a charge that was later reversed by the Privy 
Council of the UK, and in 1987 a group of social activists were detained for an alleged Marxist 
conspiracy (M. D. Barr, 2010; H. C. Chan, 1989). By 1989, a researcher observed that ―the electorate 
will eventually appreciate that the configuration of the political system has not substantially changed, 
and will not change‖ (H. C. Chan, 1989, p. 86). 
47
 Several of the authors were formerly senior civil servants. 
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policies such as being open to immigration, globalisation and economic 
restructuring. (Bhaskaran et al., 2013, p. 127, 144) 
 
 Observing that Singapore has sufficient fiscal resources, including regular 
budget surpluses and huge reserves, the authors also called for the government to 
consider raising social spending and to ―find a better balance between individual 
savings, social insurance, and direct subsidies‖ (Bhaskaran, et al., 2013, p. 160), 
through ways such as: providing protection from unemployment and income instability 
through social insurance to reduce disruption to saving for retirement; examining the 
allocation of CPF savings to housing and retirement and increasing options for 
monetising housing value; and introducing a basic means-tested retirement grant for 
persons aged 70 and above, to be phased out as retirement saving improves for future 
cohorts. 
 Recent social policy debate may reflect two underlying trends. The first is that 
the declining popularity of the ruling People‘s Action Party (PAP) may have prompted 
political leaders to relax social controls. From a historical perspective, the PAP‘s vote 
share at general elections has been falling steadily for some time. In the first five 
elections between 1968 and 1984, their average share of the votes was 70% (own 
calculation, based on Singapore Elections Department, 2013). This fell to 64% for the 
next five elections from 1988 to 2006. In the most recent elections, they received 59% 
of votes, the lowest since independence, and several senior candidates lost their seats. 
Although this translated into just six out of 87 parliamentary seats for the opposition, it 
was their highest numerical representation in the history of Singapore‘s parliament. 
The second is that the volume of public criticism has increased, especially around 
issues related to social inequality.
48
 Fundamental to Singapore‘s developmental 
economic strategy is shared growth, or widespread improvements to living standards 
resulting from better job opportunities and real wage growth. Between 1965 and the 
late 1970s, income inequality fell with economic development (P. S. J. Chen, 1974; 
Pang, 1975; Rao & Ramakrishnan, 1980). But from the 1980 onwards, income 
inequality began to rise slowly and the Gini coefficient peaked at 0.48 in 2007 (Rao, 
1990). In the 2000s low-skilled workers became increasingly at risk of receiving low 
wages or retrenchment, a problem made worse by a surge in the size of the low-skilled 
workforce due to immigration policy (Rodan, 2006). Over the past decade, work 
                                                 
48
 See for example press commentaries by D. Chan (2013), R. Chan (2013), and Chang (2013). 
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income at the lower end of the distribution has been stagnant (Ministry of Manpower 
& Department of Statistics, 2011). These have reinforced perceptions of economic 
mismanagement and contributed to public dissatisfaction.
49
 
 Drawing again from the 2006 wave of the AsiaBarometer Survey, a 
comparison with other East Asian societies reveals that satisfaction with the extent of 
civil liberties in Singapore is low (Table 9.5). Only a third were satisfied with the 
extent of ―rights to criticise the government‖, while 56% were satisfied with the extent 
of free speech—lower than in China. Satisfaction with these civil liberties was the 
highest in Hong Kong at more than 70%, just ahead of Taiwan and Korea. But while 
these figures may suggest impetus to demand greater freedoms, it is easy to overstate 
the prospect of political change in Singapore. The level of trust in public institutions in 
Singapore is in fact the highest in the region, with only China coming close (Table 
9.6). Between 84% and 90% of respondents said they trusted the parliament and the 
government to act in the best interests of society, compared to just 46% to 59% in 
Hong Kong, and 8% to 21% in Korea. In this country, explicit political controls 
operate parallel to and often mask strong popular support for the government and 
implicit public consent to much of its policy paradigm for the economy and society. 
The current political leadership draws its legitimacy and mandate from a number of 
sources: a smooth political transition to independence and nationhood, a strong 
economic track record, essentially free elections, and a bureaucracy that operates on 
meritocratic principles and with low corruption (Castells, 1992; Chua, 1993; Öniş, 
1991; J. S. T. Quah, 2010). In combination, these factors strongly favour regime 
stability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49
 In 2013 the largest public demonstration in decades was held at the only designated ―free speech area‖ 
in the country, Hong Lim Park, after the release of a Population White Paper that outlined the 
government‘s plans to further increase immigration (BBC, 2013). 
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Table 9.5  Satisfaction with civil liberties in East Asian societies, 2006 
Percentage who are 
satisfied with the extent of  
Singapore Hong 
Kong 
China Taiwan Korea 
Rights to gather and 
demonstrate 
47 76 42 60 62 
Freedom of speech 56 77 67 74 65 
Rights to criticise the 
government 
32 70 36 66 64 
Source: Own analysis of data from the 2006 wave of the AsiaBarometer Survey, obtained from 
AsiaBarometer (2013) 
 
Table 9.6  Trust in public institutions in East Asian societies, 2006  
Percentage who trust these 
institutions to operate in the 
best interests of society 
Singapore Hong 
Kong 
China Taiwan Korea 
Parliament 84 46 71 22 8 
Central government 90 59 86 35 21 
Trade unions 67 39 52 51 27 
The media 67 21 41 31 35 
Source: Own analysis of data from the 2006 wave of the AsiaBarometer Survey, obtained from 
AsiaBarometer (2013) 
 
Summary 
 Social mobilisation and public participation can contribute to the potential of 
pension reform by channelling public demands for change into the political 
arena. The restriction of social mobilisation conversely reduces such potential 
for change. In Hong Kong, public demonstrations provide focal points for 
expressing public dissent. Pension lobby groups have also taken part in or led 
their own protests to call for the introduction of universal pensions. Large-scale 
social mobilisation has been known to reverse government decisions about 
social policy, most recently on the introduction of a new national education 
curriculum in 2012. 
 
 But several other factors mediate the impact of political participation on 
pension reform. First, business interests are a forceful lobby against social 
insurance or tax-funded pension schemes. Their influential position within 
Hong Kong‘s political system is a strong counterbalance to popular demands. 
Second, narrower policy issues such as old-age pensions have to compete for 
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public interest and support with more prominent political issues such as 
universal suffrage which have dominated the attention of civil activists in 
recent times. Third, social mobilisation may itself be under threat due to stricter 
government controls, such as on media freedom. There is some evidence that 
journalists are facing more restrictions on reporting and have become more 
likely to practice self-censorship. 
 
 On the other hand, in Singapore, public demonstrations are prohibited by law 
and there are no pension lobby groups calling for changes to the CPF system. 
Opposition politicians in parliament therefore also lack social bases from which 
to draw ideas and support when arguing for reforms. There are some signs that 
controls on political participation are being relaxed, particularly in the 
emergence of critiques of social policy principles and strategies, including 
criticism of the CPF. This trend may be a reflection of waning support for the 
ruling party which turned in its worst electoral performance at the 2011 general 
elections, and public disaffection over a widening income gap. 
 
 It is possible to argue that in terms of the ―politics‖ stream of pension reform, 
as controls on social mobilisation are tightened in Hong Kong and gradually 
relaxed in Singapore, the outlook for reform in the two systems may converge 
towards the middle over time. But in reality, the prospects for pension reform 
in Hong Kong depend on wider developments especially in the democracy 
movement, as social policy has traditionally travelled on the democratic ticket. 
In this regard, recent trends towards contentious and polarised politics make the 
path ahead increasingly ambivalent. Equally, in Singapore, it may be easy to 
overestimate the momentum of change. Strict controls of civil liberties conceal 
a deep trust in public institutions and the current government. 
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9.5  Summary 
The table below summarises the discussion in this chapter:  
 
Table 9.7  Potential for pension reforms in Hong Kong and Singapore 
 Hong Kong Singapore 
Public opinion and 
demand 
 High 
Low confidence in MPF, clear 
support for additional 
universal pension scheme 
 Moderate 
Low confidence in the 
adequacy of CPF, some 
support for higher pension 
spending 
Prioritisation by 
policymakers 
 Moderate 
No shift in policy paradigm, 
but ongoing studies and recent 
reforms to allowance scheme 
 Low 
No shift in policy paradigm, 
no discussion of alternatives, 
only adjustments to the CPF 
Mobilisation and 
participation 
 High, but decreasing 
Regular public protests and 
pension lobby groups, but 
stricter controls on political 
freedom recently 
 Low, but increasing 
Public protests disallowed, no 
pension lobby groups, but 
growing public disaffection 
and more space for policy 
critiques 
Source: Own analysis 
 
 To review the three streams of problem, policies, and politics for Hong Kong, 
the clearest indication of potential for pension reform lies in public opinion and 
demand. Public opinion data from recent years show that the majority of people 
are worried about their retirement income and do not believe the MPF will be 
sufficient for their needs. There is also clear support for the introduction of a 
new universal old-age pension scheme that will cover all elderly persons, not 
just workers. These views are set against a background of broader beliefs that 
the government is responsible for addressing income inequality. 
 
 Prioritisation of pension reform by policymakers, however, does not always 
match up to public expectations. A clear constraint is the government‘s 
convictions towards a developmental policy paradigm that prefers to promote 
individual responsibility rather than incur new fiscal demands. But the 
government has taken steps to demonstrate that it is concerned about old-age 
income security and is considering possible alternatives. There are ongoing 
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studies into alternative pension models and have been recent reforms to the old-
age allowance scheme. 
 
 The politics stream is the most volatile and ambivalent. Strong traditions of 
social mobilisation and lobbying by pension groups, including large-scale 
demonstrations that have been known to reverse government decisions about 
social policy, indicate potential for change. But these calls for pension reforms 
are opposed by influential business interests with links to the government, and 
have to compete with other more pressing political issues to do with democracy 
and Hong Kong‘s political future. Moreover the political trend in recent times 
has been towards stricter controls, most clearly of press freedom.  
 
 In Singapore, the overall prospects for major changes to the pension system are 
poorer. In the problem stream, there is evidence that most people do not believe 
the CPF will be sufficient for retirement. The majority also support higher 
social spending for old-age pensions. But the magnitude of these demands must 
be interpreted against a context of very high levels of satisfaction with most 
aspects of social policy by regional standards. It is also unclear how far 
Singaporeans will support a different pension model, or even understand the 
available alternatives. 
 
 Systemic reforms to public pensions do not appear to be a priority to 
policymakers so far. The government continues to promulgate a developmental 
model of social policy based on economic dynamism and self-reliance, and 
recent policy statements have been rich with rhetoric on the risks of European 
welfare models. Reform efforts have focused on shoring up the existing 
approach towards retirement income—promoting work, supplementing low 
wages, and improving returns to CPF savings. 
 
 Finally a weak tradition of social mobilisation and public participation is a 
major constraint on pension reform, as public demands lack a conduit to the 
political arena. Public demonstrations are illegal and there are no pressure 
groups lobbying for pension reforms. While the space for social policy debates 
 321 
has opened up recently, reflecting an underlying shift in political mood among 
the population, it is easy to overestimate the momentum for change in 
Singapore and this trend should be interpreted cautiously 
 
 On the whole, in Hong Kong, there are reasonable opportunities for the pension 
system to undergo substantial change, but policymakers‘ fundamental principles about 
social policy and the uncertain outlook for the democracy movement represent 
constraints on pension reform prospects. The tension between ideational potential on 
the ground and institutional constraints imposed from within the formal political 
system makes policy outcomes difficult to predict. But in Singapore, the overall 
potential for significant change to Singapore‘s pension system appears low. The 
system is powerfully constrained by a lack of serious debate about the alternatives, 
policymakers‘ unwillingness to consider them, and the inability to translate any such 
discourse into political pressure. The major constraints are intellectual ones but with 
deep institutional roots. 
 This chapter concludes Part 3‘s discussion of the possibility of pension policy 
reform in Hong Kong and Singapore, and brings to a close the study‘s major empirical 
analyses of the prospects for old-age income security in the two places. The next 
chapter, the Conclusion, draws together the main findings of the study and presents the 
key policy messages.  
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10. Conclusion 
 
10.1  Aims and approach 
This study set out to answer the question, what are the prospects for old-age income 
security in Hong Kong and Singapore? It is concerned with the role of family support 
in providing for the needs of elderly persons 65 years old and above, the impact of 
demographic pressure on these arrangements, and the potential for public pension 
systems to fill the gap. The emphasis on prospects means that the study aimed to 
examine the dynamics of this interaction between demography, policy, and family, 
both in the recent past and into the future. The study has been organised around these 
three pairs of research questions: 
 
 What is the current state of old-age income security in Hong Kong and 
Singapore? How important are public pensions and family support to income 
security? 
 
 How is the level of family support expected to change for future cohorts of 
elderly persons? What are the possible public pension outcomes? 
 
 What factors affect pension policy development in the two societies? What are 
the pressures for and constraints on reforms to improve the generosity of public 
pensions? 
 
 The study was divided into three parts according to these research questions. 
Part 1 analysed elderly persons‘ income levels and sources; existing public pension 
systems; and children‘s support through co-residence and transfers. The analysis is 
based mainly on new analysis of four nationally representative datasets—the Hong 
Kong Population By-census 1996 and 2006 and the Singapore National Survey of 
Senior Citizens 1995 and 2005—as well as additional survey microdata on specific 
topics such as the value of children‘s transfers and asset ownership in Hong Kong. 
Prior to this study, these data had not been jointly used to study the income situations 
of elderly persons in depth, across a period of 10 years, or from a comparative 
perspective. Part 2 turned towards possible developments in old-age income security in 
 323 
the future. It constructed an original macrosimulation model to estimate future trends 
in the living arrangements of elderly persons, and their level of access to market 
income and children‘s contributions. Possible pension outcomes were then projected 
using illustrative cases with historically accurate rules and a range of assumptions that 
were varied for sensitivity analysis. Part 3 of the study adopted a comparative case 
study design to examine the possible factors influencing pension policy development 
in the context of Hong Kong and Singapore, and discussed how they might promote or 
restrict pension reforms in future. 
 The main contributions of the study are empirical. In fact nearly all of the 
empirical material presented here on Hong Kong and Singapore is based on original 
analysis or modelling. There have been particularly striking findings regarding: the 
size of the income gap between elderly persons and the working-age population; the 
prevalence of low incomes even among elderly persons in the workforce; the persistent 
lack of access to income sources other than adult children especially among elderly 
women; the size of children‘s transfers relative to average elderly incomes; the 
inequality of asset ownership among elderly persons; the extent to which decreasing 
fertility outstrips any mortality gains among adult children in determining the number 
of surviving children; the connection between intergenerational co-residence and 
elderly parents‘ financial dependence; and the potentially dramatic effects of income 
sharing within intergenerational households especially for elderly women and others 
with low incomes. The original projections further suggest a possible and remarkable 
increase in elderly persons living apart from children and a growing likelihood of 
having access to neither market income nor children‘s contributions for future elderly 
cohorts. They also show that pensions may remain relatively low despite recent 
reforms, implying in some cases seemingly implausible demands on children unless 
other income sources become available.  
 At the same time, there have been methodological adaptations and theoretical 
discoveries: 
  
 First, the use of equivalised household incomes to analyse the income effects of 
co-residence had not previously been adopted in the literature on these two 
populations. Instead, in official reports, household incomes are still generally 
presented on a per capita basis that does not take into account the scale 
economies of shared living.  
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 Second, while macrosimulation is commonly used to project household 
composition and living arrangements, this study demonstrates its usefulness for 
projecting access to different income sources and examining the sensitivity of 
these trends to different assumptions about the pace of change.  
 
 Third, the analysis of illustrative cases is built around a comparison of 
successive cohorts of entrants to the pension systems using historically accurate 
rules in every year, as opposed to assuming static pension rules as is more 
commonly done, such as in the OECD‘s multi-country studies. It also extends 
the analysis of pension outcomes to consider implicit demands for children‘s 
support. 
 
 Fourth, the study connects questions of why policy needs to change with why it 
has not and whether it may, and applies the approach to the specific case of 
pensions in two societies where policy has been slow to expand in the face of 
growing risks to old-age income security. This involves combining two 
disciplinary perspectives—social policy‘s concerns with substantive social 
needs and policy effects, and public policy‘s interest in policy causes and 
processes. 
 
 In the process, the study also contributes to theoretical understanding of how 
different types of developmentalism and constraints on democracy can affect 
social policy development; as well as how ideas as policy paradigm promote 
policy continuity, while ideas as policy discourse can drive social policy 
reforms. 
 
 The rest of this chapter reviews the findings of the study in relation to the 
research questions above and discusses the policy implications. 
 
10.2  What is the current state of old-age income security? 
The issue of income security in old age is made more salient by the current 
demographic structure of the two populations and projections that expect further 
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population ageing. Period life expectancy at 65 in Hong Kong and Singapore are 
already among the highest in the world and may reach around 22 years by 2030, 
compared to 20 in the United Kingdom (UK). As fertility rates fall, the old-age 
dependency ratio is also projected to exceed the European average of 30% by 2025. 
This exerts a dual pressure on old-age income security—it implies an increase in the 
length of retirement unless individuals are prepared to postpone retirement, at the same 
time as support for older persons declines. 
 Yet up to now, the available information, mainly from official reports, has 
provided only a partial picture of older people‘s income situations in these societies: in 
general, they have lower earnings than younger workers, lower gross incomes relative 
to population work incomes, and lower household incomes compared to households 
with no elderly persons. The original analysis of national survey datasets in this study 
led to several important findings regarding the prevalence of low incomes among 
elderly persons, their income sources, and the impact of work participation on income 
security. 
 Firstly, there has been no dramatic or automatic increase in work among 
elderly persons despite longer life expectancies and government efforts to delay 
retirement. For the birth cohorts between 1930 and 1970, men‘s labour force 
participation has remained almost unchanged in Hong Kong and Singapore. While 
women‘s work participation has risen, the increase has mostly been at younger ages. 
The increase has also slowed down between recent cohorts in Singapore and tapers off 
by about 50 years old in Hong Kong.  By 60 years old, work participation among men 
is around three times as high as women‘s, about 50-60% compared to 10-20%. On a 
cross-sectional basis, overall elderly work participation has changed by no more than 
two percentage points between the 1990s and 2000s. In 2005/2006, it was 8% in Hong 
Kong and 14% in Singapore, compared to 12% in the OECD countries.  
 Even though the ratio of median earnings between elderly workers and the 
entire working population improved from 0.54 to 0.65 during 1996-2006 in Hong 
Kong, elderly persons‘ individual incomes on the whole remain extremely low relative 
to population work incomes in both places. As many as 78% of elderly persons in 
Hong Kong and 88% in Singapore had individual incomes below 0.6 times of the 
median population work income in 2005/2006. More strikingly, even among elderly 
persons who were in work, 9% in Hong Kong and 27% in Singapore had individual 
incomes below 0.4 times the median work income. This proportion had doubled in 
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Singapore compared to a decade before. Any increase in work participation and 
earnings therefore cannot be assumed to result in better income security for the elderly 
population. 
 Work income does not usually form a major component of elderly persons‘ 
income package. Instead, children and public income sources were more common. 
Here there are differences between Hong Kong and Singapore. The most common 
source of income in Singapore was children‘s contributions, available to 75% of 
elderly persons in 2005. But in Hong Kong, 69% of elderly persons reported income 
from the Social Security Allowance Scheme (SSAS) in 2008, compared to 41% who 
received income from children living apart and 33% from co-resident children. Other 
observations about Singapore are of concern. Between 1995 and 2005, income receipts 
from children fell by nine percentage points. Yet elderly women continued to depend 
almost singularly on these contributions—less than 7% had access to work income, 
private or public pensions, or public assistance schemes. 
 
10.3  How important are public pensions and family support to old-age income 
security? 
Public pensions and housing 
While the features of the public pension systems in Hong Kong and Singapore
50
 have 
been widely reviewed, information on their workings and impact has hitherto been 
very scarce. From the national survey datasets, the main finding is that between 1995 
and 2005, the proportion of elderly persons citing the Central Provident Fund (CPF) as 
an income source in Singapore increased from 3% to 12%. Public pension rights have 
become more common but is not yet a predominant source of retirement income. 
Moreover data from official reports suggest that pension payouts from the Central 
Provident Fund (CPF) for coming cohorts of retirees will be very low. During 1996-
2011, the average balance in individuals‘ CPF accounts at age 51-55 was around three 
years of the population median work income for men and two years for women—
                                                 
50
 Hong Kong‘s public pension system has three pillars: (i) the Comprehensive Social Security 
Assistance (CSSA) Scheme, a means-tested social assistance scheme based on prescribed standards of 
living for different types of household; (ii) the SSAS which provides flat-rate means-tested assistance 
between 65 and 69 and a universal old-age allowance from 70 (or at a higher rate with means testing 
under a new supplementary Old-Age Living Allowance [OALA] Scheme); and (iii) the Mandatory 
Provident Fund (MPF), a defined contribution, privately managed, provident fund scheme. In Singapore 
the Central Provident Fund (CPF), a defined contribution, publicly operated scheme, is the main pillar of 
old-age income security. See Chapter 3 for details. 
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compared to period life expectancy at 55 of 27-31 years. According to official 
estimates, the stipulated minimum amount of retirement savings under the CPF will 
translate into benefits of just 33-44% of the population median work income for 
persons who reached 55 in 2009. But average savings among persons aged 51-55 were 
only 70% of the stipulated amount that year, suggesting that actual pensions for many 
elderly persons may be even lower. In the only major study to make comparable 
theoretical projections of pension outcomes in Hong Kong and Singapore, the OECD 
estimates that the combined benefits from the MPF and SSAS in Hong Kong are 
equivalent to about 30% of lifetime average earnings, whereas CPF benefits reach just 
13%. But these are based on a very conservative assumption of maximum pre-
retirement withdrawals for housing under the CPF. Most other studies arrive at 
benefits of around a third of final earnings. Pre-retirement withdrawals are a major 
factor behind the low benefit levels. Between 2001 and 2010, 53% of all annual CPF 
withdrawals were for housing while just 20% were for retirement, although the latter 
share has been rising.  
 Given the amount of retirement saving usually diverted to housing under 
Singapore‘s CPF, asset ownership and the liquidation of housing value become 
important to old-age income security. An analysis of asset data in this study found that 
housing ownership was much higher in Singapore. About 75% of elderly persons 
owned housing in 2005 compared to just 23% in Hong Kong in 2000. But asset 
ownership in both places was highly unequal. The distribution of assets is largely 
overlooked in the social policy literature on housing in East Asia, which usually 
regards Singapore as an example of the successful integration of social security with 
national economic development. Among elderly persons with no income in Singapore, 
31% owned housing. But among individuals with incomes more than 2.5 times the 
median population work income, there was 100% housing ownership. Likewise in 
Hong Kong, elderly persons with higher individual incomes were more likely to own 
assets of greater total value. This suggests that assets are unlikely to reverse 
unfavourable income positions. 
 Moreover policy measures to encourage the liquidation of housing assets have 
had mixed results in Singapore. A survey of public housing residents in 2008 found 
that just 12% of elderly persons were subletting their properties for income, while 8% 
had traded down and 2% had participated in a reverse mortgage scheme operated by 
the government. It may be that in Singapore, as documented for other countries, 
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elderly persons may prefer to keep their homes as precautionary saving or for bequest. 
Therefore it cannot be assumed that individual CPF savings channelled into housing 
will eventually be converted back into retirement income as a matter of course. 
 
Family support 
In contrast to the low levels of access and benefits from public pensions, this study 
found clear evidence from analysis of the national survey datasets that children‘s 
support through co-residence and transfers are critical sources of old-age income 
security. In terms of intergenerational co-residence, more than half of the elderly 
persons in Hong Kong and two thirds in Singapore lived with their children in 
2005/2006. But there had been a downward trend in co-residence between the 1990s 
and 2000s of about ten percentage points. In Singapore, the proportion of elderly men 
aged 70-79 not living with their children doubled from 19% to 37% over 10 years. 
Change of this pace and scale casts a different light on arguments about intrinsic 
cultural preferences for intergenerational co-residence in East Asian societies. In fact, 
during this period, even what are believed to be gender roles prescribing a greater 
responsibility for sons to support their parents underwent change. In 2005/2006, 
among elderly persons who were co-resident with children in both places, about 60% 
lived with their sons only, or with sons and their spouses. But during 1996-2006 in 
Hong Kong, the proportion living with single daughters only rose from 15% to 24%, 
overtaking the 23% living with sons and their spouses. 
 Co-residence is especially important to poorer elderly persons, helping to boost 
their living standards relative to the rest of the elderly population as well as working-
age persons. In Hong Kong, elderly persons living with their children had lower 
individual incomes than those who were not co-resident, while in Singapore, elderly 
persons living with their children only (without the spouse) had the lowest incomes. 
For low-income persons, living with the children may help them to secure in-kind 
support such as rent-free housing, food, care, and other necessities. The possible 
income effects of shared living can also be approximated by measuring incomes on an 
equivalised household rather than individual basis. Taking this approach, the 
downward age gradient for incomes becomes less steep and the income gap between 
elderly men and women disappears. In 1996, younger persons in Hong Kong had 
individual incomes that were 12.5 times that of elderly persons but equivalised 
household incomes that were less than 1.5 times as high. In 2006, elderly persons 
 329 
living with neither the spouse nor the children had a median individual income of 
HK$3100 and a median equivalised household income of HK$3500. Elderly persons 
who co-resided with their children only, on the other hand, had a median individual 
income of just HK$700 but a median household income of HK$10300. 
 Regardless of living arrangement, transfers from children was also an 
important source of income. Again, the analysis suggests that transfers may provide 
income protection to those who are least financially independent. In both Hong Kong 
and Singapore, elderly persons who lived with their children were also more likely to 
report children‘s contributions, and less likely to have access to other types of income, 
such as from work and private pensions. On average, these transfers were a sizeable 
proportion of elderly incomes. In 1995 children‘s transfers were equivalent to more 
than 75% of individual income for three quarters of elderly persons in Singapore, with 
women and low-income persons receiving larger contributions. Previously 
unpublished data also show that transfers from children were equivalent to almost two 
thirds of the average individual income of elderly persons living in public housing in 
2008. In Hong Kong the equivalent of about 33% of elderly persons‘ average income 
in 2008 came from non-co-resident children, while a further 25% came from co-
resident children, with women and persons outside the workforce receiving more. 
 Given children‘s central role in elderly income security, any decline in the 
availability of children may have serious implications. Research in the UK has 
highlighted that mortality gains can offset decreasing fertility. For instance, current 
cohorts of mothers now approaching retirement age are more likely to have at least one 
surviving child when they reach 80 due to improving mortality among their children. 
But an analysis of aggregate demographic indicators in this study suggests this is not 
the case in Hong Kong, and possibly Singapore which faces similar demographic 
pressures. For women born between 1944 and 1974 in Hong Kong, falling fertility is 
the key determinant of the number of surviving children they have whereas the effect 
of children‘s improving mortality is relatively marginal. This is due to the continuous 
and steep fall in fertility, which is quite unlike the trend in the UK. On average 
mothers born in 1944 may have 3.40 children by age 65 and 3.20 by 85, compared to 
1.18 and 1.16 children by these ages for mothers born in 1974. The number of 
surviving children is therefore likely to follow a downward trend for elderly persons 
retiring in the next two to three decades, implying a decline in a key source of income 
security. 
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10.4  How might family support and public pension outcomes change for future 
cohorts? 
Future family support 
The key observation of the decade between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s is that 
family support had been critical to old-age income security whereas public pensions 
had a relatively minor role. But things were also changing: co-residence fell in both 
places; transfers became less common in Singapore; the availability of children in 
Hong Kong is expected to fall further; there were signs of improved access to the CPF 
in Singapore; and Hong Kong had introduced the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) in 
2000. The next questions to ask are therefore about the future: how living 
arrangements and income sources may change; what pension entitlements people can 
expect; and the demands for children‘s financial support that these imply.  
 The analysis of future living arrangements and income sources in the two 
populations has not been attempted before in the literature. To answer these questions, 
the study first constructed a macrosimulation model, adopting as a base population 
projections by the United Nations up to 2030 and projections of labour force 
participation by the International Labour Organization (ILO). On top of these 
population profiles, the model incorporated an extrapolation of living arrangement 
patterns from the national survey datasets and a logistic regression model to estimate 
levels of  access to different combinations of income sources. The analysis considered 
two scenarios: first, that living arrangements continue to change at the rate that it did 
between 1995/1996 and 2005/2006; and second, that living arrangements change at 
half that rate. Under both assumptions, projections from the model indicate a fall in co-
residence in the two populations, and an increase in the likelihood that elderly persons 
will have no co-resident children as well as no access to either children‘s transfers or 
market income. The trends for Singapore are more worrying. 
 In Hong Kong, co-residence with children is projected to fall from 59% to 48-
53% between 2006 and 2030, depending on the assumed underlying rate of change in 
living arrangements. Whereas in 2006 the most common living arrangement was with 
both the spouse and children, in 2030 living with the spouse only will become the most 
common. At the same time, the number of elderly persons living alone is expected to 
at least double from 154,000 to 306,000-348,000 as the total elderly population grows. 
The trends for Singapore are sharper and more worrying, but also contain more 
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uncertainty. Although Singapore starts with a higher level of co-residence at 72%, this 
is expected to fall more rapidly to 47-58% by 2030, around the same levels as in Hong 
Kong. Over this period, the most common living arrangement switches from living 
with the child only to living with the spouse only or with both, depending on the 
assumed underlying rate of change in living arrangements. The most striking trend is a 
surge in the number of elderly persons living alone, from 45,000 to 246,000-296,000, 
or an increase of up to 6.6 times. 
 Projections based on the assumption of a constant relationship between income 
sources and other personal characteristics suggest that the patterns of access to market 
income and children‘s contributions may remain largely stable in Hong Kong.  While 
the proportion of elderly persons receiving financial support from children may fall 
from 62% to 61%, access to market income improves from 9% to 12%. At the same 
time, the likelihood of having access to neither type of income decreases slightly from 
31% to 30%. For Singapore, again, larger changes are expected. There may be a 
similar compensatory dynamic as in Hong Kong, as the proportion of elderly persons 
with children‘s contributions decreases from 75% to around 70% while access to 
market income including the CPF increases from 26% to 30%. But the proportion of 
persons with access to neither type of income may also increase slightly from 14% to 
15-16%. In absolute numbers, the size of this vulnerable group may increase from 
49,000 in 2005 to 208,000-222,000 in 2030. 
 To further isolate groups at risk of income insecurity, the projections of living 
arrangements and income sources were combined. This revealed a possible upward 
trend in the proportion of elderly persons with no access to market income and 
children‘s financial contributions, and who are also not co-resident with their children. 
Between 2010 and 2030 the likelihood of this outcome grows from 17% to 18-20% in 
Hong Kong depending on the rate of change in living arrangements, and from 6% to 9-
11% in Singapore. 
 
Future pension outcomes 
If, as the projections suggest, there is a decrease in children‘s co-residence and 
transfers, and better access to market income sources including contributory public 
pensions, then potential pension outcomes in the two systems may become 
increasingly important for determining the income security of future elderly persons. A 
number of studies have modelled possible pension outcomes. But the only major study 
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to compare Hong Kong and Singapore (by the OECD) adopts a very conservative 
assumption that the maximum permitted pre-retirement withdrawal is made from the 
CPF. Other single country studies have different model assumptions that make direct 
comparison difficult, while most studies use static pension rules that do not reflect the 
impact of entry timing. This study began with a set of six illustrative cases—three men 
and three women with wages pegged to those of workers with primary, secondary, and 
post-secondary education in 2010. The analysis then incorporated historically accurate 
pension rules with different starting points and examined two policy scenarios per 
system while keeping other assumptions consistent between Hong Kong and 
Singapore.  
 Focusing on the middle cases, men and women with secondary education, 
Hong Kong offers more generous pensions than Singapore but women are 
disadvantaged in both systems. Depending on eligibility for the new and more 
generous Old Age Living Allowance (OALA), pensions in Hong Kong may reach 49-
55% relative to the median wage for men but just 20-26% for women. Due to lower 
wages, replacement rates—pensions relative to final wage—are higher for women, at 
34-45% compared to 26-30% for men. In Singapore, expected pension outcomes are 
highly sensitive to assumptions about pre-retirement withdrawals for housing. This 
study considered two scenarios: maximum withdrawal leaving only the Special 
Account that is legally protected for retirement; and average withdrawal based on 
historical trends in housing withdrawals relative to total saving. Between these two 
scenarios, pension replacement rates range from 14-22% for men to 17-28% for 
women, while pension levels relative to the median wage are 20-31% for men and just 
9-15% for women. These estimates are comparable to those from previous studies but 
reflect the latest pension rules and are calculated on a similar and transparent basis for 
Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 The incorporation of historically accurate rules with different starting points 
allows the tracking of possible pension outcomes for successive cohorts of workers. In 
general, younger cohorts fare better in both systems, due to the expansion of Hong 
Kong‘s pension system through the introduction of the MPF and OALA, and 
contribution rate adjustments to the CPF in recent years. Compared to the cohort 
starting their career in 1990, the 2010 cohort gained about 4-6 percentage points in 
terms of pension replacement in Hong Kong, and 1-2 percentage points in Singapore. 
But more detailed analysis of pension outcomes for every starting year between 1990 
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and 2010 shows that parametric adjustments to the CPF have not had a consistently 
positive effect on pension replacement rates. Any gains from later career timing are 
very small compared to the differences between the withdrawal scenarios. In other 
words, the major challenge remains the depletion of CPF savings for non-retirement 
purposes such as housing. In Hong Kong, although the pension system also favours 
later entrants, deeper structural reforms have significantly boosted pension 
replacement rates for all cohorts. For instance, for women with secondary education 
starting their career in 1990, the introduction of the MPF pushed their replacement rate 
up from 7% to 28%, while the latest OALA further increases the replacement rate to 
39%. 
 Other parameters such as life expectancy, career length, and interest rate for 
calculating annuities also affect pension outcomes but are less critical than pension 
system design. An increase in life expectancy lowers pension payouts because the 
annuity stream generated from the final balance in individual CPF and MPF accounts 
must last longer. A one year increase in life expectancy decreases the pension 
replacement rate by up to 2 percentage points for both men and women in Hong Kong, 
and by 1 percentage point in Singapore. Earlier retirement was modelled for women as 
they generally have shorter careers than men in the two populations. Five fewer 
working years correspond with a 2 percentage point reduction in pensions relative to 
median wage but does not change the pension replacement rate in Hong Kong. In 
Singapore, this reduces pensions by 1 percentage point relative to median wage, but 
improves replacement rates by up to 2 percentage points. The assumed interest rate for 
calculating annuities can make a difference. Using a 4% interest rate instead of the 2% 
in the OECD study improves the replacement rate by 2 to 7 percentage points in both 
systems. 
 The projected pension outcomes were then compared against different income 
benchmarks—40-60% of the median wage to assess poverty avoidance and of 
individual final wage to measure consumption smoothing—to estimate the demands 
for children‘s support based on the implied income gaps. Two forms of support were 
considered: the amount of transfers from non-co-resident children in order for elderly 
persons to reach the various income standards, and the amount of individual income 
co-resident children must achieve in order for equivalised household income including 
parents‘ pensions to reach the designated benchmarks. The analysis covered one child 
and two children scenarios (either both co-resident or both living apart). 
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 Elderly women require much higher levels of support than men and couples for 
poverty avoidance in Hong Kong. To reach the income standard of 50% median wage, 
single women with secondary education and one child require transfers of 24-30% 
median wage compared to just 1-2% for men and couples. A co-resident child has to 
achieve an individual income of 45-51% of the median wage, compared to just 6-18% 
if these women lived with their spouse. But in Singapore, the risks of financial 
hardship are more widespread due to lower pension rights. For poverty avoidance, 
even men with secondary education require transfers of 19-30% of the median wage, 
while women and couples require transfers of more than 40% median wage. With two 
children and if transfers are of more realistic levels of no more than a fifth of the 
median wage, then elderly persons must accept lower living standards at 0.5 times the 
median wage in Hong Kong and 0.4 times in Singapore. Having one fewer child 
doubles the demands for transfers per child, raising these requirements to seemingly 
impractical levels for some cases. For example, to reach a living standard of 60% 
median wage with one child, W1 in Hong Kong will require transfers equivalent to 
almost half of median wage, while CP1 in Singapore will need transfers of up to 70% 
median wage. 
 On the other hand, from a consumption smoothing perspective, higher earning 
cases will require significant support from children just to reach a replacement rate of 
40%. Men with tertiary education need transfers per child equivalent to 84-88% of the 
median wage in Hong Kong and 69-79% in Singapore. Because of lower final wages, 
women with secondary education in both systems require relatively lower levels of 
support. To reach 50% income replacement, they need transfers of around 3-9% of the 
median wage in Hong Kong and 11-17% in Singapore. 
 Assuming there are no other incomes sources apart from pensions and children, 
the two pension systems appear likely to fall short of the objectives of both poverty 
avoidance for lower educated cases and consumption smoothing for higher educated 
persons. Notwithstanding the simplifying assumptions about family configuration and 
children‘s support, these projections serve to illustrate the implications of the current 
pension systems in terms of the possible financial strain either on elderly persons who 
are not able to access children‘s support or on the children themselves. 
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10.5  Can the public pension systems change? 
The findings of the empirical and modelling work carry one consistent message: while 
family support has been important to the financial security of elderly persons in Hong 
Kong and Singapore, such support has been weakening under demographic pressure 
and may continue to do so in the coming decades, especially in Singapore where the 
pace of change is likely to be faster and the needs greater. At the same time, the 
existing public pension systems may not be sufficiently comprehensive or generous to 
compensate for the decline in children‘s support, again particularly in Singapore where 
a system centred on the CPF may offer very low benefits. An alternative source of 
income is assets, but these are unequally distributed and correlated with incomes. 
While housing ownership is relatively high in Singapore, the liquidation of housing 
assets is not straightforward and policy measures to encourage this process have been 
unpopular. The prospects for old-age income security may therefore depend 
increasingly on the chances for an expansion of public pensions.  
 The current pension systems are evidence that reforms do not always happen 
because they need to. Unlike the mature European welfare states where pension 
adoption has been linked to left political power and state capacity, while the path of 
pension retrenchment has been explained with post-industrialism and institutional 
forces, modest pension development in Hong Kong and Singapore has historically 
been framed by a unique political context. Taking a different approach from the 
literature that regards East Asian states as portraying a common model of social policy, 
the analysis in this study emphasised the effects of different types of state 
developmentalism—defined as the pursuit of economic development as national 
priority while curbing social spending and demands; different forms of political 
liberalisation and democracy; and the different roles of ideas as stable policy 
paradigms or competitive policy discourse leading to change. The interaction of these 
factors over two phases, the 1950s to the 1980s, and the 1990s to 2000s, resulted in 
distinct pension systems in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 Following a period of flux in the 1950s, a strong policy orthodoxy emerged 
within both governments to avoid social spending and extensive social security 
systems. After ousting the political left and rejecting social insurance, the Singapore 
government built up a system based on the CPF that was suited to its interventionist 
style of developmentalism led by a cohesive and autonomous bureaucracy. The 
developmental motivation was most apparent during the economic downturns of the 
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1980s when the government enacted a series of cuts to employers‘ CPF contributions 
to suppress labour cost. In Hong Kong, the government initially tried to meet social 
needs through a system of public relief rather than formal social security. Later years 
saw a gradual expansion of these policies as the government kept to its paradigm of 
free-market developmentalism, and the rejection of a central provident fund which 
would have been incompatible with its smaller bureaucratic capacity. At the end of the 
1980s, while both Hong Kong and Singapore were pursuing the growth model of the 
developmental state, their old-age pension systems reflected important variations in 
policy paradigm and governance structures. 
 During the 1990s, concerns about retirement income security grew in both 
places. Democratisation set off by the departing colonial administration in Hong Kong 
enabled interest groups to press for change and allowed the emergence of competitive 
policy discourse over pension models. This resulted in several policy u-turns before 
the MPF was eventually adopted. But in Singapore, strict political controls were less 
conducive for policy discourse. So despite concerns about the CPF, the 1990s-2000s 
was notable for a lack of ideas, with the government applying a narrow repertoire of 
minor policy adjustments without tackling fundamental challenges brought on by 
demographic changes. Hong Kong‘s model of partial democracy with civil liberties 
turned out to be more facilitative of policy discourse than Singapore‘s model of 
illiberal electoral democracy. Such policy discourse was often indeterminate of policy 
outcomes, but implied the availability of policy alternatives that could challenge the 
status quo. 
 These historical factors provide a basis for assessing the possibility of further 
pension reforms. Three ―streams‖ are important to consider: public demands (or 
―problem‖), policy prioritisation (or ―policies‖), and political participation (or 
―politics‖). For Hong Kong, the clearest indication of reform potential lies in explicit 
public support for a new universal old-age pension scheme that will cover all elderly 
persons, not just workers. Public opinion data from recent years show that the majority 
of people are worried about their retirement income and do not believe the MPF will 
be sufficient for their needs. In the face of these demands, the government has taken 
steps to demonstrate that it is concerned about old-age income security and has 
commissioned studies into alternative pension models, despite its convictions towards 
a developmental policy paradigm. The politics stream is the most volatile and 
ambivalent. Strong traditions of social mobilisation and lobbying by pension groups 
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come up against influential business interests with links to the government, other more 
pressing issues to do with Hong Kong‘s political future that may dominate public 
attention, and signs of stricter political control by the government.  
 In Singapore, the overall prospects for major changes to the pension system are 
poorer. In the problem stream, there is evidence that most people support higher social 
spending for old-age pensions and do not believe that the CPF will be sufficient for 
retirement. But it is not clear how much Singaporeans understand or will support 
alternative pension models. So far systemic reforms do not appear to be a policy 
priority. The government continues to promulgate a developmental model of social 
policy based on economic dynamism and self-reliance, and recent reform efforts have 
focused on promoting work, supplementing low wages, and improving returns to CPF 
savings. Finally a weak tradition of social mobilisation and public participation is a 
major constraint on pension reform, as public demands lack a conduit to the political 
arena. While the space for social policy debates has opened up recently and may reflect 
an underlying shift in political mood among the population, there are no pressure 
groups lobbying for pension reforms and public trust in the government remains 
strong. 
 On the whole, in Hong Kong, there appear to be reasonable opportunities for 
the pension system to undergo further change, but policymakers‘ fundamental 
principles about social policy and the uncertain outlook for the democracy movement 
represent constraints on pension reform prospects. But in Singapore, where the need 
for an expansion of public pensions is greater, overall reform potential seems lower. 
The system is powerfully constrained by a lack of serious debate about the alternatives, 
policymakers‘ unwillingness to consider them, and the difficulties with translating any 
such discourse into political pressure. 
 
10.6  Limitations and future research 
This study has several limitations. First, the macrosimulation projections of living 
arrangements and income sources have huge underlying uncertainties. Moreover 
current data limitations mean that it has not been possible to model future income sizes 
but only income sources. The study has attempted to improve the dynamism of the 
projections by combining different rates of historical extrapolation with regression 
modelling. But the range of cell variables and predictors was constrained by the small 
total sample sizes in the national survey datasets. As George et al. (2003) argue, 
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although all projections are subject to error, their utility lies not just in anticipating 
future developments but also in guiding policy thinking about the impact of different 
factors on population trends. It is hoped that the projections in this study have shown 
the possible impact of demographic change on elderly persons‘ living arrangements, 
access to income sources, and overall financial security in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Chapter 4 also drew from additional data sources to estimate the relative sizes of 
different types of income within the average elderly income package, although it was 
not possible to integrate these data into the macrosimulation model. With better data 
on elderly persons‘ income amounts especially on a longitudinal basis, future research 
can extend the modelling to income composition and consider how income security 
changes during retirement. 
 Second, the modelling of pension outcomes in this study was based on a 
limited set of hypothetical individuals and as such says very little about the distribution 
of pension outcomes within the elderly populations as compared to what a 
microsimulation model would have achieved. To maximise the relevance of the 
analysis, Chapter 7 focused on six base cases in each population selected to represent 
different parts of the earnings distribution, increased the analysis to 18 cases based on 
three different entry points into the pension systems spaced 10 years apart, 
incorporated two policy scenarios per system, and finally examined a range of 
sensitivities including life expectancy, career length, and interest rate for calculating 
annuities. There remains some uncertainty especially surrounding the different pre-
retirement withdrawal scenarios for the CPF. But the advantage is that as illustrative 
cases are relatively simple to implement, it has been possible to explicitly analyse the 
impact of these scenarios and other model assumptions on projection outcomes, which 
is often not possible with microsimulation. 
 The understanding of pension policy performance can be significantly enriched 
in future research by including the other two East Asian countries, Korea and Taiwan, 
where family support has also been important traditionally but there are defined benefit 
instead of defined contribution public pensions. In this way, the cluster of East Asian 
welfare states can provide a useful context for understanding how variations in the 
intersection of informal arrangements with formal provision can impact on social 
outcomes in crucial and unexpected ways. They can also help to identify the conditions 
under which public pensions can grow, just as this study has attempted based on Hong 
Kong and Singapore. 
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 Beyond the remits of financial security, the findings from this study have 
possible implications for other aspects of retirement, such as social care and health 
care. Co-resident adult children not only contribute to income security but may also 
provide informal care for frail elderly persons. The projected decline in co-residence 
should therefore raise concerns about access to care within the family for future elderly 
cohorts. The alternatives are to depend on public social care services or to purchase 
these on the market. This implicates the level of retirement income. Unless subsidised 
public care services develop sufficient capacity, elderly persons with lower retirement 
incomes may be disadvantaged when it comes to purchasing care. Similar arguments 
may also be applied to health care. Unlike in Hong Kong where the cost of hospital 
care is mainly covered by universal public subsidies, hospitalisation expenses in 
Singapore are paid for through a mix of public subsidy, means-tested assistance, public 
medical insurance for some conditions, CPF savings, and cash. Since the amount of 
health care savings within individual CPF accounts are proportionate to earnings 
during working life, elderly persons with poorer pension outcomes may also face 
greater difficulties with medical expenses. These wider aspects of well-being during 
retirement and their connections with pension outcomes are important topics for future 
research. 
 
10.7  Policy implications for Hong Kong and Singapore 
The findings from this study challenge two assumptions that regularly surface in policy 
debates about public pensions in Hong Kong and Singapore. The first assumption, 
concerning the interaction of demography and policy, says that the problems set off by 
population ageing—lower family support and longer retirement—will somehow be 
resolved by social progress, the accompanying changes in population profile, and 
pension system maturity. In particular, improvements to education and higher work 
participation among women may be thought of as factors that contribute to better 
financial independence in old age under wage-driven pension systems like the CPF and 
MPF. Individual account systems also benefit persons who have a longer record of 
participation, so younger cohorts of workers will retire with more savings in their MPF 
accounts then current workers who are nearing retirement. This study‘s findings 
indicate that such reasoning may be too optimistic. First, despite noticeable gains in 
labour force participation over recent decades, women‘s retirement income situations 
continue to lag far behind men‘s. Although more women are joining the workforce at 
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young ages, they continue to drop out of the workforce at much earlier ages, which 
may be linked to motherhood and other care responsibilities. Women also receive 
lower wages than men with equivalent qualifications. The result is more stark in 
Singapore which lacks a basic pension scheme like the SSAS. Even in 2005, most 
women were almost exclusively dependent on children for income upon retirement. 
Second, even taking into account further increases in labour force participation under 
ILO projections and the effects of any population profile changes between the 1990s 
and 2000s as captured in the national survey data, the projected access to market 
income and children‘s contributions is worrying. The projections showed that, under 
certain assumptions, it is possible for the proportion of elderly persons with market 
income and those with neither market income nor children‘s contributions to increase 
at the same time. This is the case for both Hong Kong and Singapore. In other words, 
increased access to income sources such as the CPF can take place parallel to—instead 
of compensating—an increase in income vulnerability due to declining support from 
children. 
 The second assumption relates to the interaction of family and policy. Much 
has been made of the resilience of ―the Asian family‖ in supporting elderly members. 
The debate is sometimes obfuscated by a mix of cultural reasoning and political 
rhetoric, such as the Asian values discourse in the 1990s, that confuse what is desirable 
with what is. The central message from the empirical analysis in this study is clear. 
Family support has been a critical component of income protection in old age in both 
Hong Kong and Singapore. But reliance on this mode of support is also proving to be a 
source of vulnerability, especially if pension systems remain stuck to old assumptions 
as family structures change with demographic shifts. Already, intergenerational co-
residence is falling quickly and transfers have declined in Singapore. The projections 
in this study suggest a sharp rise in the sheer numbers of elderly persons living alone 
and a slight fall in the likelihood of receiving children‘s contributions by 2030. They 
also show that the implicit demands for children‘s support under current pension 
systems may not be feasible. These trends should suggest strongly that persisting in 
promoting a family model of old-age income security as a main policy strategy is not a 
sound option. This is taken to the extreme in Singapore, where a law was enacted in 
1995 to allow parents to bring their children to court in order to claim financial 
support. A more useful approach may be to think about how pension policy may keep 
pace and remain compatible with social changes, instead of resisting these trends. 
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 The comparison between Hong Kong and Singapore throughout the study has 
shed new light on the policy prospects for each society and indicated possible ways 
forward. It also contributes a new perspective on pension policies within East Asia.  
 One lesson is that conceptions of an East Asian welfare regime can benefit 
from closer empirical analysis of policy effects. These notions have long been 
criticised for not sufficiently accounting for variations across country cases. What this 
study has shown is that there is diversity not just in terms of modes of social policy but 
also their outcomes. At the outset, there is an assumed affinity between Hong Kong 
and Singapore within the East Asian regime cluster and, in the specific domain of 
pensions, apparent similarities in terms of demographic pressures, dependence on 
family support, and ungenerous pension systems. It is therefore surprising how the 
findings for Singapore turned out to be less favourable in almost every respect: low 
incomes were more prevalent both in the 1990s and 2000s; income sources were less 
diverse especially for women; co-residence with children is expected to fall more 
quickly from now until 2030; the number of elderly persons living alone may grow 
more quickly; the possible pension outcomes are much lower; and the chances for 
pension reform appear to be less optimistic. It is all the more striking that the CPF 
system achieves poorer outcomes despite very high contribution rates that, while 
supportive of housing ownership in a way that Hong Kong‘s pension system is not, 
constrain the scope for raising taxes to improve pensions or other aspects of retirement. 
 The uniqueness of the CPF model and sustained economic competitiveness in 
Singapore may continue to motivate studies that commend the distinctiveness of its 
social policies and their compatibility with national economic goals, but the empirical 
analysis in this study shows that policy effects are not self-evident or generalisable 
across domains. In the case of old-age income security, the policy outcomes depend 
crucially on specific configurations of family support and pension provision. In Hong 
Kong family support through co-residence starts off at a lower level but public 
pensions have grown more quickly, while in Singapore family support begins at a 
higher level but is falling more quickly and public pensions have been slower to adapt. 
The result is a greater risk of financial hardship in old age and economic strain on the 
children in Singapore, even by comparison to Hong Kong‘s lean pension regime that 
still relies on family support. This alone should alert policymakers to the need for 
action. 
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 At the same time, the comparison of policy responses highlights considerable 
dynamism over time within East Asian pension systems. Hong Kong and Singapore 
portray two different strategies for responding to policy pressures, with different 
outcomes and prospects. One way is to work within the parameters of the current 
system. This has been Singapore‘s approach. The government has in recent years 
introduced initiatives to encourage workers to retire later, started an income 
supplement scheme for older low-wage workers, adjusted CPF contribution and 
interest rates to give stronger emphasis to retirement saving, tightened some forms of 
pre-retirement withdrawal, replaced phased payments over a limited period with 
annuity payout, and promoted the liquidation of housing assets. The projections in this 
study have shown that these parametric adjustments may gradually raise the pension 
entitlements of younger cohorts, but the impact is limited as these gains can be easily 
cancelled out by housing withdrawal. The major structural issues still need to be 
addressed: within the CPF, large withdrawals for housing; and for the retirement 
income system as a whole, a lack of protection for persons with poor labour 
participation histories.  
 Hong Kong follows an alternative strategy. Substantial new schemes were 
introduced in 2000 and 2013, with the first targeting adults in the labour force and the 
second catering for all elderly persons. Projections of pension outcomes suggest that 
these schemes may boost pension replacement rates by 5 to 13 times for women and 
men with secondary education, respectively. The case of Hong Kong illustrates that 
even within a policy environment that favours familial welfare and is wary of any 
growth in social spending, it is possible to extend public pension provision in ways 
that strengthen income security in old age. This was achieved only with considerable 
policy contestation, sustained and broad-based policy discourse, and concerted public 
pressure. Policy choices can make an important difference to the prospects for old-age 
income security. Equally the cost of avoiding an open and thorough assessment of the 
full range of policy alternatives may be to increase the risks of hardship for future 
elderly generations. 
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Appendix A: Data variables 
 
This appendix lists the key variables in the survey data analyses from Chapter 2 to 4, 
the source datasets, what the variables refer to, and how they were coded for analysis. 
Where formal variable definitions are not available, the original wording of the 
questionnaire items are shown instead within quotation marks. 
 
 
1. Labour force participation (Section 2.4) 
 
Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006 
 Variable WHETLF: Whether in labour force, based on the seven days before the 
census reference date  
Cases are coded as In labour force if response is Yes. 
 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995 
 Question V.1. ―Activity/occupational status‖ 
Cases with any of the following responses are coded as In labour force: ―Working, 
self-employed‖; ―Working, employee/odd job‖; ―Working, unpaid family worker‖; 
―Not working but looking for work‖. 
 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 2005 
 Question D.41. ―What is your current working status?‖ 
 Question D.51. ―If currently not working... are you currently looking for a job?‖ 
Cases are coded as In labour force if response to D.41. is ―Working‖ or response to 
D.51. is Yes. 
 
 
2. Gross monthly income (Section 2.5) 
 
Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006 
 Variable MEARN: Earnings from main employment; amount earned excluding 
business expenses for self-employed; salary, bonuses, commission, overtime pay, 
and other allowances earned for employees; February 1996/June 2006 
 Variable OTH_EARN: Earnings from other employment 
 Variable OCASH: Other case income; all recurrent cash incomes which are not 
remuneration for work; February 1996/June 2006 
Monthly income is calculated as the sum of the above. 
 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995 
 Question VI.A.6a. ―Total monthly income and allowances from all sources‖ 
 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 2005 
 Question E.58. ―Income/allowances from all sources‖ 
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3. Income sources (Section 2.6) 
 
Hong Kong General Household Survey Supplementary Enquiry 2000 
 Variable Source of monthly personal income 
Cases are coded as in receipt of income from these sources if response is Yes to: 
―Salary‖; ―Pension‖; ―Financial support from children‖; ―Financial support from other 
relatives‖; ―Comprehensive Social Security Assistance‖; ―Old Age Allowance‖. 
 
Hong Kong Thematic Household Survey 2008 
 Question CD.1. ―Do you have the following sources of income?‖ 
Cases are coded as in receipt of income from these sources if response is Yes to: 
―Salary (including income from full-time and part-time job, bonus and allowances)‖; 
―Pension‖; ―Financial support from children living together‖; ―Financial support from 
children living apart‖; ―Financial support from other relatives (including 
grandson/granddaughter)‖; ―Comprehensive Social Security Assistance‖; ―Old Age 
Allowance‖. 
 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995 
 Question VI.A.1. ―Sources of monetary income in the last 6 months... Respondent‘s 
own sources‖ 
Cases are coded as in receipt of income from these sources if response is Yes to: 
―Salaries or business income‖; ―Pension‖; ―Monthly withdrawal from CPF account‖. 
 Question VI.A.2. ―Number of children providing cash allowance... on a regular 
basis‖  
Cases are coded as in receipt of children‘s transfers if response is one or more. 
 Question VI.A.3. ―Cash contribution from related persons‖ 
Cases are coded as in receipt of income from Other kin if response is Yes to any of: 
―Allowance from spouse‖; ―Allowance from grandchildren‖; ―Allowance from 
brothers/sisters‖; ―Allowance from other relatives‖. 
 Question VI.A.4. ―Cash contribution from non-relatives... Public assistance‖ 
Cases are coded as in receipt of public assistance if response is Yes. 
 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 2005 
 Question E.58. ―Total monthly cash resources... From what source(s)?‖ 
Cases are coded as in receipt of income from these sources if response is Yes to: 
―Income‖; ―Pension‖; ―CPF savings‖; ―Children‖; ―Public assistance‖. 
Cases are coded as in receipt of income from Other kin if response is Yes to either 
―Spouse‖ or ―Other family members‖. 
 
 
4. Assets owned (Section 3.3) 
 
Hong Kong General Household Survey Supplementary Enquiry 2000 
 Variable Type of assets owned 
Cases are coded as owning these assets if response is Yes to: ―Self-occupied 
properties‖; ―Non-self-occupied properties (e.g. shops and rented housing units)‖; 
―Cash/savings or fixed deposits‖; ―Stocks/bonds/investment funds‖. 
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Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995 
 Question VI.D.1. ―Respondent‘s own assets‖ 
Cases are coded as owning these assets if response is Yes to: ―Own house‖; 
―Savings/fixed deposits‖; ―Life/endowment insurance‖; ―Stocks, shares and bonds‖; 
―Partnership in private/family business‖. 
 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 2005 
 Question E.59. ―Do you own (or co-own), or have the following?‖ 
Cases are coded as owning these assets if response is Yes to: ―The house you are living 
in‖; ―Savings/fixed deposits‖; ―Life/endowment insurance‖; ―Stocks, shares and 
bonds‖; ―Partnership/interest in private/ family business‖. 
 
 
5. Asset value 
 
Hong Kong Thematic Household Survey 2008 
 Question CD.16. ―Apart from owner-occupied properties, what is the estimated 
value of your total assets? If the asset is shared with others, please calculate only 
your own share.‖ 
 
 
6. Living arrangements and household composition (Section 4.3) 
 
Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006 
 Variable HHN: Household serial number 
 Variable PPN: Person serial number 
 Variable DJHEAD: Personal serial number of head of household, defined as the 
person acknowledged by members of the household to be responsible for making 
major decisions affecting the household 
 Variable RELAT: Relationship to head 
 Variable SEX: Sex 
 Variable SSN: Spouse‘s serial number 
Cases are coded as Living with spouse only; Living with children only; Living with 
neither; or Living with both, and cases living with children are coded as living with 
single or married sons or daughters, based on responses to above items within each 
household. 
 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995 
 Question II.1. ―Whether spouse living in same household‖ 
 Question III.1. ―Number of living children (including adopted children)... living in 
same household‖ 
Cases are coded as Living with spouse only; Living with children only; Living with 
neither; or Living with both, based on responses to above items. 
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Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 2005 
 Question A.6. ―Household member... state relationship to elderly‖ 
Cases are coded as Living with spouse only; Living with children only; Living with 
neither; or Living with both, and cases living with children are coded as living with 
single or married sons or daughters, based on responses to sub-items ―Spouse‖; ―Child 
1, Child 2...‖; and ―Child 1‘s spouse, Child 2‘s spouse...‖. 
 
 
7. Proportion of elderly income from children’s transfers (Section 4.4) 
 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995 
 Question VI.A.6b. ―What percentage of this amount comes from your children?‖ 
 
 
8. Proportion of elderly income from different sources and amount of children’s 
transfers (Section 4.4) 
 
Hong Kong Thematic Household Survey 2008 
 Question CD.4. ―How much do you receive on each source of income every 
month?‖ 
Income sources based on Question CD.1. (see point 3 above) 
 
 
9. Household size (Section 4.5) 
 
Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006 
 Variable UHSIZE: Household size 
 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995 
 Question IV.1. ―Number of persons in household‖ 
 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 2005 
 Question A.4. ―Number of household members‖ 
 
 
10. Number of working household members (Section 4.5) 
 
Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006 
 Variable WORKPP: Number of working household members, defined as persons 
who performed work for salary or profit during the seven days before the census 
reference date 
 
Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 1995 
 Question IV.5. ―Number of working persons in household‖ 
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Singapore National Survey of Senior Citizens 2005 
 Question A.6. ―Household member... state relationship to elderly‖ 
Total number of working persons calculated based on number of ―Working full-time‖ 
and ―Working part-time‖ responses to sub-items ―Spouse... Work status‖; ―Child 1... 
Work status, Child 2... Work status...‖; and ―Child 1‘s spouse... Work status, Child 2‘s 
spouse... Work status...‖. 
 
 
11. Household income (Section 4.5) 
 
Hong Kong Population By-census 1996, 2006 
 Variable DJHHINC: Household income; total income including earnings and other 
cash income of all members of the household in February 1996/June 2006 
 
